deceived, when it delivers the doctrine of Christ and his apostles, and speaks consonantly to Scriptures and if a single doctor does so, he is to be believed.' What then? where is the difference? this only is it, that it is more likely a council shall find out the truth, and report the tradition;and if we be to choose our faith by guess and probability, a council is better than a single doctor, by so much as there are many more than one doctor in it. But this will only serve the turn, till men are willing, or at leisure to inquire: this only excepted; because few men can judge, and most men are ruled by others, all such persons can have nothing better to rule and determine them than a general council: but then it is an argument of reason, and not of authority; it is not because they are bound, but because it is most reasonable in their circumstances.

4. I should here have considered of what authority the writings of the fathers are to the interpretation of Scripture, and the conduct of conscience. But because I find only the same use of them as of other learned men, in all ages of the church, save only in those things, where they are witnesses of the apostolical doctrines, to which they best can give testimony who are the most ancient, and because themselves disclaim any authority in matters of faith, and call to be tried by the word of God;—I had rather this thing should be read in others than in myself: because it is matter of envy and reproach to tell why they cannot be relied upon: and to add more reputation to that authority which they have acquired by many intervening causes, by reason, and by unreasonableness, would be matter of danger, and sometimes the causes of error, and very often of a deceitful confidence. But who please, may see this uncertainly disputed, and never concluded to any certainty by Cajetan on one side, and Melchior Canus on the other. He may also consider the saying of the bishop of Bitonto t, that he preferred the sentence of one pope before a thousand Jeromes, and a thousand Austins and Gregories; and that every side declines their arbitration, when they speak against them;

r S. August. epist. 48. et. 111. Vide Gratian. dist. 9. Cyril. Hier. Catech. 4. S. Jerome. ep. 19. et. 76.

s Præfat. in comment. de locis com. lib. 7. cap. 3. concl. 3, 4.

* Concion. in epist. ad Rom. cap. 14. p. 606.

by which it appears, that no side supposes themselves to be bound in conscience to follow them.

5. But the best use of them is that which the church of England hath described in one of her ancient canons, that her bishops and priests should teach nothing "nisi quod ex doctrina Veteris et Novi Testamenti veteres patres et ecclesiæ episcopi collegerint:" "but what the fathers and ancient bishops of the church have gathered out of the doctrine of the Old and New Testament;" which canon gives a very good answer to this inquiry, if we should enter into it. For it declares that the fathers are so far to be followed as they follow Scripture, and that their writings are of great use for the reproof of new doctrines: and certainly if preachers were confined to this measure, possibly we might miss some truths, which now, it may be, we find; but it is certain we should escape very many errors. For the rest, I refer my reader to the archbishop of Spalato ", to Rivet, to Daniel Tossanus y, to Gregory de Valentia, to bishop Morton a, and to Dr. Whitaker ь. In this whole affair the conscience is at liberty, and therefore I am here to inquire no further.

RULE XXIII.

Subscription to Articles and Forms of Confession in any particular Church, is wholly of political Consideration.

1. WHEN forms of confession are made, and public articles established, it is of great concernment not only to the reputation of the government, but to the unity and peace of that Christian community, that they be not publicly opposed. To this purpose we find so many subscriptions to the decrees of councils, by princes and prelates, and priests and deacons, by prefects of cities, and governors of countries; it was an instrument of unity and peace, a declaration of their consent, and at no hand to be approved, unless it be in a false article, or with tyranny to consciences, or to maintain a faction.

"De Rep. Eccles. lib. 7. cap. 6.

y

Synopsis de Legendis Patribus.

a Catholic Apology.

x Prolegomena to his Criticus Sacer.

2 Analysis Fidei.

b De Script. Auctoritate.

But that which the government looks after, is, that no new religions be introduced to the public disturbance; of which the Romans were so impatient, that they put to death c a noble lady, "Pomponia Græcina, utpote novæ cujusdam religionis ream," saith Tacitus, "as being guilty of a new religion." Now to prevent this, subscription is invented, that is, an attestation of our consent; which if it be required by the supreme authority, it may be exacted in order to peace and unity; and Tacitus a tells that Assidius Merula was degraded from the dignity of a senator, because he refused to subscribe to the laws of Augustus. This is the same case; for subscription serves no other end, but that which is necessary in government. We find in Polydore Virgile, that the ancient kings of England, at their inauguration, "silicem tenebant juraturi per Jovem, se religionem et ritus patrios retenturos, hæc verba loquentes, si sciens fallo, tunc me diespiter, salva urbe arceque, bonis omnibus ejiciat ;"" "they swore by Jupiter that they would keep the religion and their country rites; and cursed themselves, if they did not." This was more than ecclesiastical subscription: for that bound them to it for ever: this only gives witness of our present consent, but according to its design and purpose: for the future, it binds us only to the conservation of peace and amity,

2. For though it may be very fitting to subscribe a confession of articles, yet it may be very unfit, that we swear always to be of the same mind; for that is either a profession of infallibility in the authority, or in the article,—or else a direct shutting our heart against all further clarity and manifestations of the truths of God. And therefore subscription ought to be so intended, that he who hath subscribed, may not perceive himself taken in a snare. But yet he that subscribes, must do it to those purposes and in that sense and signification of things, which the supreme power

e Tacitus does not say, that Pomponia was put to death: but that her husband and relations sat in judgment on her conduct; and pronounced her innocent. She lived to a great age.-" Pomponia Græcina insignis femina, Plautio nupta, ac superstitionis externæ rea, mariti judicio permissa. Isque, prisco instituto, propinquis coram, de capite famaque conjugis cognovit, et insontem nuntiavit. Longa huic Pomponiæ ætas fuit."—Annal. xiii. 32. Ruperti, pag. 343.—(J. R. P.)

d “Assidium Merulam, quod in acta D. Augusti non juraverat, albo senatorio erasit." Annal. iv. 42. Ruperai, pag. 205.

intends in his commanding it; that is, at least, that he who subscribes, does actually approve the articles overwritten ; that he does, at that time, believe them to be such, as it is said they are; true, if they only say they are true: useful, if they pretend to usefulness; necessary, if it be affirmed that they are necessary. For if the subscriber believes not this, he, by hypocrisy, serves the ends of public peace and his own preferment.

3. But this whole affair is to be conducted with some wariness, lest there come more evil by it than there can come good. And therefore, although when articles are framed, the sons of the church ought to subscribe them for public peace, in case they do heartily approve them: yet such articles ought not to be made and imposed, unless they of themselves be necessary, and plain by a divine commandment. And this was the advice of Melancthonf: "Ut sit igitur discordiarum finis, recte facit potestas obligans homines ut obtemperent, quando alioqui parere est necesse ;"-" The supreme power may then command men to subscribe to such articles, which it is necessary that they should believe." But if God have not commanded us to believe them, no human power can command us to profess them.

4. Beyond what is necessary or very useful, unless peace be concerned in the publication of the article and its establishment, it is but weakly and impertinently concerned in the subscription. For if the peace of the church be safe without the article, how can it be concerned in the consent to it and profession of it, excepting only by an accidental and a necessity superinduced by themselves and their own imprudent forwardness, or itch of empire over consciences? If an article be contested publicly, and is grown into parties and factions, and these factions cannot be appeased without decision of the question,-then the conformity is as useful to peace as the sentence and determination were; and then there is nothing else to be considered, but that the article be true, or believed to be so. But to them that are so persuaded, it is necessary they obey, if they be required to subscribe; and the supreme power hath authority to require it, because it is one of their greatest duties, to govern and to rule in peace. But these things can seldom happen thus without our own

In epist. et consiliis theologicis.

fault: but when they do, there is inconvenience on all sides; but that which is least, must be chosen.

5. When articles are established without necessity, subscription must be required without tyranny and imperiousness. That is, it must be left to the liberty of the subject, to profess or not to profess that doctrine. The reason is plain. In things, not certain in themselves, no man can give a law to the conscience, because all such laws must clearly be divine commandments: but if the conscience cannot be bound to the article, and the profession serves no necessary end of the commonwealth, then God does not bind, and man cannot and therefore, to bring evil upon men that do not believe the article, and dare not profess to believe what they do not, is injustice and oppression, it is a law of iniquity; and therefore it is not obligatory to conscience, and no human authority is sufficient for the sanction and imposition. Socrates was wont to say, "Sacramentum oblatum duabus de causis fide firmandum: vel ut teipsum à turpi suspicione liberes, vel ut amicos ex magnis periculis eripias:" "When you are required to give faith and security by a sacrament, oath, or subscription, there are two cases in which you must not refuse when thou thyself art suspected, and canst no otherwise purge thyself; and when any of thy relations are in danger, that is, when it is for good to thyself or thy friends." But when there is no necessity of faith, and no public need to be served, the causes that, besides these, enjoin subscription, are fond persuasions, and indiscreet zeal, and usurped empire over consciences: in which cases the ecclesiastic state hath no power to give commandments; and if the civil state does, they oblige to suffering calamity, but not to any other conformity, and then it is a direct state of persecution.

6. Upon the account of this rule it hath been of late inquired, whether it can be lawful for any man to subscribe what he does not believe to be true, giving his hand to public peace, and keeping his conscience for God.

7. But to this the answer is easy, if subscription does signify approbation; for in that case it is hypocrisy, and a denying to confess with the mouth what we believe with the heart. But if subscription were no more than the office of Apud Stobæum.