Commitments, Consensus, and U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session, January 31, February 4, 5, 6, 7, 20, 25, 26, October 31, November 7 and 12, 1985, Volume 4

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986 - 628 páginas

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Página 551 - Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based.
Página 552 - President decided that he agreed "in principle, but not in practice" with this "reinterpretation" . Based on a Presidential directive. Secretary Shultz announced on October 14 in a speech before the thirty-first annual meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly that "a broader interpretation of our authority is fully justified", but SDI "will be conducted in accordance with a restrictive interpretation of the treaty's obligations.
Página 44 - Chairman. [Whereupon, at 12:48 pm, the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 pm the same day.] AFTERNOON SESSION The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 pm, in room SD419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon.
Página 564 - In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles...
Página 420 - ... number, and consistency over time, of incidents of concurrent operation of ABM and SAM components plus Soviet failure to accommodate fully US concerns, indicate the USSR probably has violated the Treaty's prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. Additionally the SA-X-12/ GIANT system may have the potential to intercept some types of strategic ballistic missiles.
Página 574 - In our view, it [SDI] is the first stage of the project to develop a new ABM system prohibited under the Treaty of 1972. See TIME (Sept. 9, 1985). p. 24. [Emphasis added.] (See also Soviet documents printed in Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies (OTA, 1985) pp. 312-15.) Specific Soviet responses to the US "reinterpretation...
Página 365 - ... whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arm.
Página 451 - ... BUSBEY. In other words, by the same token every State, including New York, Delaware, and Massachusetts, which you referred to a minute ago, would fall more than 20 percent short of meeting those standards ? Dr. DUVAL. Yes, sir; that is how far the State hospitals are behind. Dr. OVERHOLSER. If I may say, that is what I had in mind when I spoke of the Federal Government trying to set an example for the States rather than try to come down to the level of the States in this particular regard. Some...
Página 564 - Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems using devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars to perform the functions of these components". Doubletalk, pp. 265, 343-44. The Soviets balked at any Treaty language and, subsequently, the initial US proposals for an agreed interpretation. Eventually the Soviets proposed a counter draft. This was modified several times at US insistence (including the insertion of the opening phrase "In order to insure fulfillment of the...
Página 51 - US forces to combat should be a last resort. I believe that these tests can be helpful in deciding whether or not we should commit our troops to combat in the months and years ahead. The point we must all keep uppermost in our minds is that if we ever decide to commit forces to combat, we must support those forces to the fullest extent of our national will for as long as it takes to win.

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