1. That the defendant was not in the execution thereof a free and voluntary agent. 2. That the contract was illegal. In support of the first of these reasons, he says, among other things, that the power of properly considering whether he ought or ought not thus to bind himself; whether it is prudent so to do or not, is altogether taken away from a father who is brought into the situation of either refusing and leaving his son in a perilous situation, or of taking upon himself the amount of the obligation.

How aptly these authorities bear on the case in hand I need not say, for any one who reads the evidence, will at once see that Mrs. Elliott was so thoroughly overcome by fear, produced by the conduct of the plaintiff, that in the execution of the note in suit, she was anything but a free and voluntary agent. Her sole object was to free herself, on any terms, from the presence of her impudent persecutor, and to rescue her son from prosecution. Had this man insidiously gained the confidence of this old lady, and by his lies induced the signing of this obligation, as in Hunt v. Moore, 2 Barr, 105, it would, without doubt or hesitation, have been regarded as fraudulent and void, but how much less fraudulent is that conduct, which produces the same result through fear? It may, indeed, be the fear of a weak mind, but I cannot see how that helps the matter; to the generous mind it is rather an aggravation. It is the weak that is the most easily imposed upon; hence, the weak, in an especial manner, need our protection.

you and not for us." We would have to regard that jury as extremely stupid that did not understand that the judge was here talking about the weight of evidence, and what would or would not be sufficient to overcome the prima facies of the paper itself, and the whole answer, when taken together, makes this sufficiently plain. Previously, in answer to the plaintiff's first point, the court had carefully instructed the jury as to the legal force of this paper; that the burden of proof was thrown upon the defendant, and that, in the outstart, every presumption was against her. To this answer much force is given by that to the plaintiff's second point, where the court says: "This point we affirm. Where a written instrument is sought to be set aside for fraud or imposition, the proof which will justify a jury in setting it aside, must be clear and satisfactory, and it must be precise and indubitable." With instructions so careful as these, the jury could not have been misled by the language complained of, which, at best, is only ambiguous.

We discover nothing in the remaining excep tions which has not been covered by what has been already said.

The judgment is affirmed.

FREDERICK et al. v. CORCORAN et al.

Where the holder of an equitable title to land under articles of agreement borrows a sum of money from a third party, a portion of which is applied on account of the purchase money, and thereupon the holder of the legal title to the land executes to the lender of the money a deed therefor, which deed is not recorded, it being understood with the borrower that the property is thus conveyed simply as security for the loan, the transaction will be held to constitue a parol mortgage from the borrower to the lender, which will be ineffectual as against the title acquired by a vendee of the land at a sheriff's sale under a subsequent judgment recovered against the borrower.

Where in such case the amount of the loan has been left by the borrower with the lender, and subsequently, at his request, the purchase money for the land is paid directly from said amount to the vendor, the vendee at sheriff's sale aforesaid will not, on account of that circumstance, be compelled to tender the amount so paid out to the lender before he is entitled to recover possession. Said amount so paid was the money of the lender, not of the borrower.

In this, the main branch of this case, we discover no error in the rulings of the court below. The 3d exception complains of the allowance of the question to, and the answer of, the defendant as to what she had heard of the plaintiff's reputation for violence. This was altogether proper, not indeed, as proof of character, for that was not in question; but as a circumstance affecting the defendant; as showing her conviction that she was dealing with a dangerous man, whose will it would not be safe to resist. Again, in the 4th specification, complaint is made that the court submitted the note to the jury for construction, or rather, perhaps, as to the effect which it would have as evidence. But it did nothing of the kind. The language of the learned judge, which in this assignment is especially empha- Ejectment by James Corcoran and B. L. Richsized, is this: "It is for you to say what is suf-ards against Joseph R. Frederick and the Lewisficient to set aside a paper of this kind. We do burg Building Association, for a tract of land not determine this question for you. It is not in Wayne township, Clinton county. for us to say what would be sufficient to set it aside. There might be circumstances which would justify the setting it aside, and the question of the evidence and the effect of it are for

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton county.

On the trial, before MAYER, P. J., the following facts appeared: On July 14, 1869, Thomas Karstetter, being seized of the tract in controversy, sold the same by articles of agreement to

This was an action of ejectment brought by Corcoran and Richards, the plaintiffs below, The court charged, inter alia, as follows: against Joseph R. Frederick and the Lewisburg "Plaintiffs contend that their title, acquired Building Association, for the recovery of the under and by virtue of the sheriff's sale, must possession of a certain property, in the writ deprevail against that of the building association, scribed, situated in the township of Wayne, for the reason that in law the deed made to said county of Clinton. The common grantor, unassociation by Karstetter was but a mortgage, der whom both parties claim title, was Joel and not having been recorded, and they not Karstetter, who, it seems, by articles of agreehaving had either actual or constructive notice ment, dated July 14, 1869, bound himself to of the character of the title held by said associa- convey to Frederick the land in controversy on tion, it must be postponed to the title acquired payment by him of eight hundred dollars. The under the judgment of Corcoran & Richards. plaintiffs' claim is founded upon a sheriff's deed Where a person receives a deed, absolute upon executed to them, in pursuance of a sale of this its face, but which was agreed and intended be-property, regularly made on the 7th of May, tween the parties as a security for a debt, and 1880, upon a judgment of Corcoran, Bubb & Co. the deed when recorded is not accompanied with against Frederick, entered to No. 314 February the defeasance, it is to be considered an unre-Term, 1874. The building association claimed

tion under the laws of this Commonwealth." Act of June 10, 1881, is in conflict with Section And if the plaintiff's hypothesis that this law is in operation were correct, there would be good ground for its complaint that its real estate has been illegally assessed with local taxes; for it was held in County of Lackawanna v. First National Bank of Scranton, 94 Pa. St., 221, that the banking-house of a bank is part of the capital represented by its shares of stock and a tax upon the par value of the shares is a tax upon it. But after that decision was made, the Legislature on June 10, 1881, passed an act entitled "A supplement to an act entitled 'An Act to provide revenue by taxation,' approved the seventh day of June, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-nine," the third section of which is in these words: "In case any bank or savings institution, incorporated by this State or the United States, shall elect to collect annually from the shareholders thereof a tax of six-tenths of one per centum upon the par value of all the shares of said bank or savings institu- | tion, and pay the same into the State treasury on or before the first day of March in each year, the shares, and so much of the capital and profits of such bank as shall not be invested in real estate, shall be exempt from all other taxation under the laws of this Commonwealth." The purpose of this section is not doubtful. Obviously the intention is to restrict the exemption from taxation conferred by the Act of June 7, 1879, and to subject the real estate of banks to distinct taxation. Moreover, section six of the Act of June 10, 1881, expressly repeals the 17th section of the Act of June 7, 1879.

It is, however, contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the third section of the Act of June 10, 1881, is inoperative and void, and for this several reasons are assigned.

6 of Article III of the Constitution of Pennsylvania: "No law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended or conferred shall be re-enacted and published at length." It cannot, of course, be pretended that there is here any violation of the first part of this section, for there was no attempt to revive or amend the original act, or to extend or confer its provisions, by reference to the title only. The objection as stated in the bill of complaint, is this, "that said third section materially amends the provisions of section 17 of the Act of June 7, 1879, (to which it is a supplement) and fails to re-enact and publish at length so much of said Act of June 7, 1879, as is thereby amended." But does the constitutional provision in question require that a supplemental and amendatory act must republish the original act or so much thereof as is amended? This I understand is what is insisted on. It seems to me, however, that such is not the natural or true construction of the clause. It is to be read as a whole, and thus considered, its purpose is plain. It was intended to prevent covert legislation and the passage of laws whose meaning and object are not fully disclosed. If there is no attempt to legislate by reference to the title of the old law, it is, I think, sufficient if the proposed law in its amended form is "re-enacted and published at length." Treating of a similar constitutional provision, Mr. Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations, page 185, well says, that the requirement "is fully complied with in letter and spirit, if the act or section revised or amended is set forth and published as revised or amended, and that anything more only tends to render the statute unnecessarily cumbrous."

1. The title to the act, it is said, is in conflict with Section 3 of Article III of the Constitution of Pennsylvania: "No bill, except general ap- 3. Again, it is contended that the third section propriation bills, shall be passed containing of the Act of June 10, 1881, in so far as it would more than one subject, which shall be clearly subject the real estate of national banks to taxaexpressed in its title." But it is the settled tion for local purposes is inoperative and void construction of this section that where an Act for repugnancy. The argument runs thus: unof Assembly is entitled a supplement to a former der the Act of Congress (R. S., Sec. 5219) only act, and the subject thereof is germane to the the shares and real estate of national banks subject of the original act, its subject is suffi- are taxable under State laws, and the shares ciently expressed to meet the constitutional re- are not taxable at any higher rate than other quirement: State Line & Juniata Railroad moneyed capital of individuals; in PennsylCo.'s Appeal, 77 Pa. St., 429; Craig v. First vania the moneyed capital of individuals is Presbyterian Church, 88 Id., 42. In the pres- exempt from all local taxation and was so exent case the supplement, from first to last, re-empt prior to the passage of the Acts of June lates to revenue by taxation, and there is no 7, 1879, and June 10, 1881; at the time of the provision in it incongruous with the original passage of the latter act the only property of national banks taxable for local purposes was

act.

2. It is insisted that the third section of the their real estate; and, therefore, the restricting

words in the third section of the Act of June 10, 1881, excepted from the operation of the act the only property of national banks to which the exemption could extend, and they thus constitute a saving clause repugnant to the purview of the act and void. But the argument is not satisfactory, and, even if the premises were conceded, the conclusion sought to be deduced | could not be accepted. For it was held in Hepburn v. The School Directors, 23 Wal., 480, that shares in national banks in Pennsylvania may be valued for taxation at an amount above their par value. The Act of June 10, 1881, therefore, does unquestionably leave something for its exemption clause to act on, and the argument based upon a supposed repugnancy plainly fails. It will be perceived that neither the act of June 7, 1879, nor that of June 10, 1881, peremptorily imposes a tax of six-tenths of one per centum upon the par value of the shares of stock. Under each of these acts the payment of that tax is optional with the banks. The former act gave the banks the election to pay the specified tax in commutation for all other taxes under the laws of the Commonwealth; the latter act gives the banks the like option in commutation for all taxes except that on real estate; the only difference is in the extent of the exemption. It is not pretended that the method of taxation contemplated by this legislation is open to constitutional objections or contravenes the provisions of the national bank act. Indeed the plaintiff is satisfied with, and seeks the benefit of the Act of 1879. But why could not the Legislature modify that act by the amendments incorporated in the Act of June 10, 1881? Clearly it was competent for the Legislature to do so.

I am of opinion that none of the objections which the plaintiff has raised against the validity of the local taxation of its real estate for the year 1882, are tenable.

316, and Osborn v. The U. S. Bank, 9 Id., 738, adjudged to be unconstitutional.

But it does not follow that because the tax is illegal, the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction to restrain the collection thereof: Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wal., 108; Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 15 Id., 547; State Railraad Tax Case, 92 U. S., 575; and I am of opinion that the bill does not bring the plaintiff's case within any of the recognized foundations of equitable jurisdiction: Ibid. The ordinance imposing the tax does not undertake to make it a lien, and it is not enforceable by any summary process. The ordinance gives an action of debt for its collection, and it is not otherwise collectible. To such action the bank can set up its defense and therefore needs not equitable relief.

What has been said covers all the questions thus far raised, and it is only necessary to add that the motion for a preliminary injunction must be denied. And it is so ordered.

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Sitting in the Western District.

The following judgments were entered October 4, 1882:
BY MERCUR, J.:

Appeal from the C. C. P of Lancaster Co.-Schwelke's. The appeal from the order directing the issue devisavit vel non is quashed, and the decree revoking the letters testamentary issued to the appellant is reversed.

Error to C. C. P. of Lancaster Co.-McIlvaine v. Lantz. Judgment affirmed. Lancaster Co. v. Mishler. Judgment reversed and a v. f. d. n. awarded.

Error to 0. T. of York Co.-Coyle v. Commonwealth.

Judgment reversed and a v. f. d. n. awarded.
affirmed. SHARSWOOD, C. J. and TRUNKEY, J, dissent,

Error to C. C. P. of Blair Co.-Ake v. Mason. Judgment

Error to C. C. P. of Cumberland Co.-Eberly v. Lehman. Judgment reversed and procedendo awarded.

Appeal from the C. C. P. of Frauklin Co.-Lininger's.

Decree reversed at costs of appellees.

Appeal from the C. C. P. of Huntingdon Co.-Shaeffer's. Decree reversed. Distribution to be made according to this opinion, appellees to pay costs of this appeal.

Error to C. C. P. of Dauphin Co.-Penna. Canal Co. v.
Harris. Judgment reversed and a v. ƒ. d. n, awarded.
GORDON, TRUNKEY and STERRETT, JJ., dissent.
BY STERRETT, J.:

Error to C. C, P. of Dauphin Co.-Nat. Mutual Aid Society v. Lupold. Judgment reversed.

Error to C. C. P. of Adams Co.-Myers v. Leas. Judgment affirmed.

Appeal from the C. C. P. of Huntingdon Co.-Collom's. Decree reversed at costs of appellee, Aaron Dunsworth, etc.

At the hearing of this case the validity of the ordinance of the city of Titusville in so far as it attempts to impose a tax license upon national banks doing business in that city, was not much discussed; and at present I shall simply indicate what my impressions are on that subject. It seems to me the ordinance undertakes to tax the operations of national banks and is a direct obstruction to the exercise of their corporate powers. I do not see that this license tax is distinguishable from the business tax involved in the case of the City of Pittsburgh v. The First National Bank of Pittsburgh, 55 Pa. St., 45, which the Supreme Court of Pennsyl- denin. Judgment reversed, and judgment now entered vania, following the authoritative cases of McCulloch v. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheat.,

Error to C. C. P. of Lancaster Co.-Morgan and Wife v. Yard. Judgment reversed and procedendo awarded. Columbia National Bank v. Bletz. Judgment modified (as to reduction of verdict by agreement to $644.28) and affirmed.

Error to C. C. P. of Cumberland Co.-Sheaffer v. Clen

on verdict in favor of plaintiff for $127.56 with interest. Error to C. C. P. of York Co.-Sponger v. Penna. Mutual Aid Society. Decree reversed and procedendo awarded.