ment under seal, May 4, 1880, contracted with the plaintiff for the leasing, and conditional purchase, of a sewing machine, in which agreement it was stipulated, that "in the want of any legal proceedings being instituted for the recovery of the monthly payments or hire, or any portion thereof, the said bailee (the defendant) doth hereby waive the benefit of any exemption law exempting any property whatever from levy and sale under execution." "Cu Amusing Provisions in Old Wills. A foreign review of a new book entitled " riosities of the Search Room; a Collection of Sermons and Whimsical Wills," writes as follows: "The chapters on Eccentric Wills, on Vindictive Wills and on Directions for Burial contain some curious illustrations of human frailty and folly. A certain Dr. Ellerby bequeaths his heart to one friend, his lungs to another and his brains to a third, declaring that if they do not execute his wishes with re This is an action to recover some of the monthly payments, and the question now pre-gard to them he will come and torment them 'if sented is, Is the waiver just recited binding upon the defendant? The Act of 29th February, 1872, provides that "All contracts made by married women, in the purchase of sewing machines for their own use, shall be valid and binding, without the necessity of the husband joining in the same." This act removes the common law disability of coverture of a married woman in the purchase of a sewing machine. By enabling her to contract without the consent of her husband, it enables her to contract as if she had no husband. If she had no husband she could undoubtedly waive the benefit of the exemption law. The act was manifestly intended for some special purpose, not simply to enable a married woman to buy a sewing machine. That right she already possessed, if she had means of her own, under the Act of 1848. If she had no means of her own, and the intention was to enable her to pay for it by her earnings and keep it as her own, the wording of the act would have been very different. The plain, direct and sole purpose of the act, as apparent on its face, was to enable a married woman to make a contract, for the purchase of a sewing machine, without her husband becoming a party to it. The language is peculiar and very comprehensive. “All contracts made by married women," etc., "shall be valid and binding." The enactment was specifically to make valid and binding the contract. it should be by any means possible.' Another testator, an American, requires that his skin may be converted into two drum-heads, upon which are to be inscribed Pope's Universal Prayer and the Declaration of Independence; another American, a New Yorker, leaves seventy-one pairs of trousers, to be sold to the highest bidder without examination, no purchaser being allowed to buy more than one pair. In each pair was found a bundle of bank notes representing a thousand dollars. A Frenchman institutes an annual race with pigs, to be ridden by boys or men, with a prize of £80 to the winner. A Baptist minister who died last year declares in his will that he thirsts to see the Church of England brought down, and desires all posterity to know that he believes 'infant sprinkling to be from his Satanic Majesty.' Another dissenter, recently deceased, bequeaths £20,000 upon trust for two nieces upon condition that neither of them 'marry a minister of the Established Church, or a person holding any office or commission in her Majesty's army. Grotesque instructions with regard to the testator's body are frequent in wills. One man bequeathed his body to the Imperial Gas Company to be consumed to ashes in one of their retorts; and a New York spinster desires to employ all her money in building a church, 'but stipulated that her remains should be mixed up in the mortar used for fixing the first stone.' Some of the bequests in what the compiler calls Vindictive Wills,' have in them a touch of humor. Thus the Fifth Earl of Pembroke writes: 'I bequeath to Thomas May, whose nose I did break at a masquerade, five shillings. My intention had been to give him more, but all who have seen his 'History of the Parliament' will consider that even this sum is too large;' and a certain Dr. Dunlop bequeaths to his brother-in-law Christopher his best pipe, out of gratitude that he married my sister Maggie, whom no man of taste would have taken,' and to his eldest sister, Joan, his fiveThe exception to the award of the arbitrators acre field, to console her for being married to a is dismissed. man she is obliged to hen-peck." The language is broad enough to cover any kind of a contract. She could make a contract to give a judgment, or to pledge other property as security. Being authorized to make the contract she is subject to all legal remedies for enforcing it. With the wisdom or folly of such legislation we have nothing to do. The defendant claimed the benefit of the act, made the contract in pursuance of it, and should be content to abide the consequences. a On distribution of the proceeds of an execution, a preferred claimant, under the Act of April 9, 1872, claimed for wages earned during the six months preceding the sale. It appeared that during that time he had been paid nearly sufficient to liquidate the amount earned in the six months; but these payments were appropriated by the auditor and court below to a pre-existing indebtedness, leaving his claim for the six months almost without reduction, and his claim was accordingly allowed him to the extent of the maximum $200. Held, affirming this distribution, that there is nothing in the Act of 1872 to inter. fere with the application of the principles of the appropriation of payment. Appeal from the decree of the Court of Common Pleas, No, 4, of Philadelphia county. The fund in the court below arose from the sale of personal property, being the contents of a brick yard, of the defendant in the execution, one Anthony Huver, a labor claimant for wages, claimed $200, the maximum allowed under the Act of 9th of April, 1872. He was the foreman of the brick yard, and had worked there for twenty-five weeks immediately preceding the sale at $21 per week, or $525 in all. During this period he had received $426 from his employer. His employer owed him, however, $355 for preceding years' services. The auditor and court below appropriated the above payment of $426 first to this old indebtedness, which left more than the said maximum of $200 still due Huver, which was accordingly awarded him. This is assigned for error. The counsel for appellant contended, that the Act of 1872, not being a re-enactment of the Act of 1849, and limiting the time during which the debt shall accrue, is not affected by the doctrine of appropriation of payments. That all transactions, during any period other than the exact six months immediately preceding the sale, are wholly unmentioned and unprovided for by the statute, and must not therefore be considered. For appellant, Charles P. Sherman, Esq. Contra, Charles L. Smyth, Esq. Opinion by MERCUR, C. J. Filed April 23, 1883. This distribution arises under the Act of 9th of April, 1872, Purd. Dig., 1464. It is conceded that the wages of the appellee for the six months immediately preceding the sheriff's sale exceeded $200. It is admitted that the appellee sustained such a relation to the defendant in the execution and to the fund as to entitle him to claim the $200 if so much of the sum earned within said six months remained unpaid. It appears that the appellee had been in the employ of the defendant in the execution for some time prior to the preceding six months. His wages during that time, added to those earned within the six months, amounted to $887.64. Different sums, amounting in the aggregate to $426.94, had been paid to the appellee within six months prior to the sale. The contention is whether this sum must be applied on the wages earned within the six months preceding the sale, or whether the appellee may apply, on the previous indebtedness, so much as is necessary to satisfy the same. The general rule of law as to the application of payments is well settled. It is this: When one indebted to another on several accounts makes a payment, he may direct on which it shall be applied. If he omits so to do, the creditor may apply the payment as he sees proper. Where no specific application has been made by either debtor or creditor, the law will apply in discharge of the earliest liabilities of a runit in the way most beneficial to the creditor, or ning account: Pierce et al. v. Sweet, 9 Casey, 151; Smith v. Brooke, 13 Wright, 147; Hollister v. Davis, 4 P. F. Smith, 508. The creditor may reserve his election until he is called on to re port his action: Wharton on Contracts, ¿ 932. When the debtor paid the several sums aggreof any of them. His indebtedness prior to the gating $426.94, he made no specific application six months was not only the earliest, but it was least secured. It was therefore most beneficial The elder debt lacked the security of lien given to the appellee to apply the payments thereon. by the act cited. The appellee therefore had a right to apply the payments thereon. If he had not so elected prior to the levy on the property, he might then make the election. He did make it, and gave due notice of his claim prior to the sale. On what principle then shall the sum due him for wages within the six months, not exceeding $200, be disallowed? His claim is meritorious. Under the well recognized rules controlling the application of payments, all the money paid was correctly applied on the earliest indebtedness. The court committed no error in adjudging it to be so applied, nor in the disposition made of the costs. Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at costs of the appellant, KEPLER v. ERIE DIME SAVINGS & LOAN debts, and that there can be no such surplus, COMPANY. Real estate held in the name of a firm and bought with its funds is not thereby converted into personalty; in order to effect such conversion as against strangers and creditors of the individual partners, it is necessary that the deed should expressly state that it is held as partnership property, or there must be actual notice to the party. One who holds a judgment against an individual who is a member of a firm is entitled to a revival thereof, as against a terre-tenant, who is the assignee for the benefit of creditors of the firm in question. An assignee for the benefit of creditors is a mere volunteer, and has no greater rights than has his assignor. Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Erie county. Scire facias to revive a judgment issued by the Erie Dime Savings and Loan Company against S. P. Kepler, with notice to Frank Gunnison, assignee for the benefit of creditors of the firm of Hayes & Kepler. The facts of the case were as follows: In October, 1876, the Erie Dime Savings and Loan Company entered a judgment against S. P. Kepler on a judgment note. Kepler was then, and had been for some time, a member of the firm of Hayes & Kepler, who were engaged in buying and selling real estate. The firm subsequently got involved and made an assignment for the benefit of creditors to Frank Gunnison, under the terms of which the partnership property consisting of real estate passed to the assignee. This scire facias to revive having been issued with notice to the assignee, the latter filed an affidavit of defense, setting out the above facts and drawing certain conclusions therefrom, for which, see the opinion of the court, infra. The court, MCDERMOTT, P. J., made absolute a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, whereupon the assignee took this writ, assigning for error the said action of the court. For plaintiff in error, Frank Gunnison, Esq. Souther. 1882. because the assigned property is not sufficient to pay the debts. He then expresses his belief that the plaintiff's judgment was not a lien upon the property assigned to him, and closes the affidavit. We are clearly of opinion that the affidavit does not disclose sufficient facts to prevent a judgment of revival. In the case of Lefevre's Appeal, 19 P. F. Smith, 122, the present chief justice showed, in a careful review of the authorities, that even where real estate was purchased with the money of a firm and title taken in the name of the firm, it was not enough to convert it into personalty as partnership property. In order to accomplish that result as to strangers, purchasers, mortgagees and creditors, the fact that the property is held as partnership property must be expressed on the face of the deed itself, or else some agreement in writing to that effect must have been executed by the members of the firm, and duly recorded. If this has not been done, notice of the character of the real estate as partnership property must have been brought home to a purchaser or creditor, before he can be affected by it. It will be perceived that the facts which will give the quality of personal estate to partnership land are exceptional and special. They cannot be presumed, but must be alleged and proved, if one who is either a purchaser or creditor is sought to be affected. It is essential that the affidavit of defense, in a case like the present, must set forth the facts which are necessary to defeat the revival of the plaintiff's judgment. All the actual facts alleged in this affidavit may be strictly true, and yet it would not necessarily follow that the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment. It is the exhibition of this peculiar kind of title to the public that gives immunity to real estate so held from the claims of lien creditors of the individuals composing the firm. If it does not appear on the face of the deed, or by some recorded agreement in writing, that the land in question is held as partnership land, it does not have that quality. This fact then being vital, must be specially alleged, and in case Opinion by GREEN, J. Filed December 30, of contest must be proved in order to defeat the plaintiff's claim. Especially is this the case where, as here, the proceeding is simply a scire facias to revive the judgment against the origi It is true that the affidavit of defense alleges that the real estate assigned to the affiant was the property of the partnership of Hayes & Kep-nal defendant, and one who is his assignee for ler, but that is the only averment it makes on the benefit of creditors. Such an assignee is not that subject. The other allegations are merely a purchaser. He is a mere volunteer, standing conclusions of the affiant, which may or may in the place of the assignor, and, as a general not be correct. Thus he says that, conse- rule, has no rights against the lien creditors of quently" the property was not subject to the the assignor, which the latter did not himself debts of the defendant, except as to any surplus have. In Luckenbach v. Brickenstein, 5 W. & remaining after payment of the partnership | S., 145, it was held that assignees, under a vol untary assignment for the benefit of creditors, have no rights against a mortgage creditor, which could not be claimed by the assignor himself. In Ludwig v. Highley, 5 Barr, on p. 137, we said: "The assignees, being mere volunteers, are regarded but as the agents of the assignor, standing in his place, and consequently, as a general rule, take only such rights and interests as he himself had and could claim at the time of the assignment made." It is only necessary to add, that the defendant in this case makes no defense against the revival of this judgment, and further, that this is not a proceeding for the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the land of the defendant. Hence, we decide nothing more than the mere question of revival. If it shall turn out hereafter that there are partnership creditors claiming that any real estate which the defendant held, either as a partner, or otherwise, at the time the writ in this case was issued, was really partnership property, and not subject to the lien of this judgment, their rights will not be in the least degree prejudiced by the decision of this case. Judgment affirmed. MOSGROVE and POLLOCK, Administrators, v. GOLDEN. The statute of limitations bars the claim of an attorney as it does the claims of other persons when the services may be measured in a similar way as the services of others. It does not begin to run against the claim for conducting a suit until the end of his services in that case; nor would it against his claim for other special services until it was finished. One member of a partnership, to whom the others have transferred their interest in the partnership property and claims, cannot sue and recover, a debt which was owing to the firm, in his own name. either as to the amount of his claim, the time when his services had been rendered, or the amount and character of the work done. The administrators of course for these reasons could make no settlement. It was, however, agreed, at the suggestion of Mr. Golden, that the claim be made the subject of an amicable action to be entered in the Common Pleas of Armstrong county. This action was accordingly entered and the following agreement signed by the parties: "It is hereby agreed that the prothonotary of said court shall enter the above suit upon his docket, and that from the time of such entry the said action or suit shall be deemed to be pending in like manner as if the said defendants had appeared to a summons issued against them by said plaintiff. And whereas, the said plaintiff seeks in this suit to recover for professional services and counsel rendered by him to James E. Brown about his business generally and disbursements therein for a number of years prior to his death; and whereas, the said defendants are uninformed as to the correctness and legality of such claims and deny the same. And now, it is further agreed between the parties to the above named action that a reference be made a rule of court for the referring of the matters herein before set forth under the compulsory arbitration law of this Commonwealth and to be awarded accordingly, and a rule of reference is hereby entered and choice made of J. G. D. Findley, William J. Wright and Ross Reynolds, as arbitrators, who are to meet at the office of Gilpin & McCain, in Kittanning borough, Penn'a, on Monday, the 27th day of June, 1881, at two o'clock P. M." In this amicable action no bill of particulars, declaration or statement of claim was ever filed, and hence, up to the time of the trial, the deError to the Court of Common Pleas of Arm- fendants had no more specific information of strong county. This suit was brought by E. S. Golden, Esq., against the administrators of James E. Brown's estate, to recover for alleged professional services. James E. Brown died on or about the 27th of November, 1880. A short time thereafter Mr. Golden suggested to Brown's administrators that there was due him from the estate an unpaid account for counsel and services rendered to Mr. Brown in his lifetime. Mr. Golden was at the time, and, in other matters, still is, one of the attorneys for the administrators in the settlement of the said estate. The plaintiff presented to them no agreement with Mr. Brown, no book account, no probated statement, nor indeed anything from which they could form any definite estimate of claim. The plaintiff gave them no specific information, the plaintiff's claim than is contained in the foregoing agreement. From the witnesses called by the plaintiff on the trial it appeared that claim was made for services for a period extending from 1855 down to 1880, the year Mr. Brown died. In that time the plaintiff's practice as an attorney had been in part by himself without a partner, but during most of the time he was associated as partner with other members of the Bar in Kittanning. From the evidence it appears that he practiced as a member of the firm of Lee & Golden from 1852 until 1855. From 1855 until 1862 as a member of the firm of Golden & Fulton. From 1862 until 1871 as a member of the firm of Golden & Neale, and from 1877 until 1879 as Golden & Patton. So that a large part of the services sued for in this case was rendered by the plaintiff while he was a member of the law firm above named. The evidence shows that while James E. Brown had large individual interests in Armstrong county and elsewhere during the period above stated, his business was also largely connected with corporations and business partnerships. He was in 1855 a member of the firm of Brown, Floyd & Co., owners of the Kittanning Iron Works. Soon after this he became a member of the firm of Brown & Mosgrave, which operated for several years what was known as the Pine Creek Furnace. Within the time the plaintiff's services are alleged to have been rendered, Mr. Brown was also connected with various corporations and partnerships, such as the Kittanning Bridge Company, the Kittanning Bank, the First National Bank of Kittanning, the Kittanning Insurance Company, the Clarion and Allegheny River Oil Company, the Parker Bridge Company, the Grant Pipe Company, the Karns Pipe Company, and others. While the plaintiff's testimony indicated a claim for services running back through a period of about twenty-five years, he made no effort to prove any renewal by Mr. Brown which would prevent the bar of the statute of limitations. Mr. Golden prepared and tried during the period for which he claims, a large number of suits in court, and in every instance, as soon as a case was finally disposed of, Mr. Brown either brought or sent Mr. Golden a receipt for the services in the case, with the amount left blank which Mr. Golden would fill with the value of his services in the case, for which Mr. Brown would give him a check, and the receipt was signed, and the business then closed up. There was no evidence as to what the alleged consultations for which the plaintiff claimed were about, or that they were concerning anything else than the cases he had in charge, and for which he was fully paid and had receipted. The main substance of the plaintiff's demand on which he recovered was for alleged counsel and advice, with no evidence to show any specific item, or that the advice was of a legal char In the Karns Pipe Company Mr. Golden was interested with Mr. Brown as stockholder, and was also his partner in the ownership of a num-acter, or to what it related. ber of oil wells and other property in the oil country. In some of the above named corporations and partnerships, Mr. Brown served continually as president, and he was prominent in the management of all of them, either as director or otherwise. The plaintiff sues in his own name for all services referred to by the witnesses, notwithstanding the various law firms of which he was a member, while most of the work was done. The court was requested by the defendants' points to charge the jury that the statute of limitations would prevent the plaintiff from recovering for more than six years. This the court refused, for the reason that the statute had not been formally pleaded. The answer of the court to this request and other parts of the charge to the jury are assigned as error, and will be fully considered in the argument. The court was respectfully requested to charge the jury on behalf of the defendant as follows: 1. That there is no evidence of an express contract of hiring by the year to be submitted to the jury. 2. That there is no right to recover on a quantum meruit or an implied contract of hiring by the year, and there must be an express contract or a failure to recover. 3. The right to recover on a quantum meruit or an implied contract is applicable only for specific service rendered by an attorney in the shape of consultations, advice and trial of causes. The principal witnesses for the plaintiff, in 'estimating the value of his services, took into consideration the work done for the corporations and partnerships, as well as other business, and did not attempt to estimate by itself the work done for Mr. Brown individually. It is contended that Mr. Brown cannot be charged individually for counsel and advice given him as an officer or manager of a corporation. The plaintiff did not attempt to prove an express contract of hiring by the year, but, as the testimony will show, relied upon evidence which, it was claimed, proved an implied contract for such work. There being no declaration, bill of particulars, or statement of claim filed of any kind, there also was no formal plea entered by the defendants. By common consent, the case was 5. The general relation of attorney and client tried without formal pleadings. In the agree- in other business will not prevent the running ment the defendants denied both the correct-of the statute for any specific services performed ness and legality of the plaintiff's claim. But they filed no formal plea, because not specifically informed, by declaration or otherwise, of what the plaintiff's claimed. 4. The moment the services are rendered and ended the right of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run. by an attorney. 6. But even if the court should be of the opinion that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover on quantum meruit, or on an implied contract of |