A disposition for temporary convenience will not have that effect. But when the disposition is such that a servitude attaches, plainly visible or notorious, and from the character of which it may fairly be presumed the owner intended it for the permanent convenient enjoyment of the property, it passes with a conveyance to the property: Phillips v. Phillips, 12 Wright, 178. "Although there was no plot of the alley on record, and no reference to it in her deed, yet Mrs. Alexander had notice from the condition of the properties at the time she purchased, enough to put her on inquiry, when she could have learned the facts in the case. In Overder v. Updegraff, 19 P. F. Smith, 110, a case much like the present, it was said by WILLIAMS, J., 'the alley was plainly to be seen on the ground, and its use by the occupants of the adjoining lot was indicated by the gate in the partition fence, which opened into the alley. This was sufficient to put him upon inquiry as to their right to the alley.' In that case there was a reservation of the right of way at the time of sale, but its validity was disputed, and the purchaser of the servient property had no notice of it. But it was held that was immaterial. 'If there had been no express reservation,' continues the opinion, 'of the right to use the alley, *** the latter would have taken it subject to the servitude imposed upon it by the decedent for the use and benefit of the occupants of the adjoining lot. It was a continuous and apparent easement, and the law is well settled that, in such a case, the purchaser, whether at private or judicial sale, takes the property subject to the easement.'

"The exceptions to the master's report are sustained, and decree ordered in favor of plaintiff to be drawn up by counsel.”

five feet wide. At the death of William Black, his said lot, except the part conveyed to Logan, vested in Robert E. and John Brown. They made partition by deeds, and the land embracing the lots now owned by the parties to this action, became vested in John Brown. He conveyed to Helen Alexander on June 3, 1871, and to John Montgomery, under whom Harris claims, on the 5th of the same month; the south end of Mrs. Alexander's lot abuts on the Harris lot. When Mrs. Alexander bought, the line was ten feet south of her coal-shed and fence; and John Brown had as good right to sell the part south of the shed and fence as north. Had Montgomery inquired when he bought, he would have learned that Mrs. Alexander's title was not subject to a right of way over either five feet or ten feet of her land. No survey or plan recognizing a private alley was ever made; nor was an alley or right of way granted or reserved in any deed.

There has been no controversy respecting the legal principles involved. These are well stated in the master's report, and also in the opinion of the court. In both the testimony has been reviewed at length, and it need not again be remarked in detail. Upon the controlling question of fact, we are of opinion that the master's conclusion was right, namely, that the evidence does not warrant a finding that there was an implied reservation of a right of way in John Black, his heirs and assigns, over the land he conveyed to Helen Alexander.

Decree reversed and bill dismissed, costs to be paid by the appellee.

WATSON, MALONE & SON v. THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA.

Contra, John F. Edmundson, Esq.

Opinion by TRUNKEY, J. Filed November 20, 1882.

William Black, owning a large lot, built thereon four dwelling houses, two fronting on Franklin street and two on Evans alley. For a number of years the occupants of these houses used in common a piece of land ten feet wide in the rear of the houses fronting on Franklin street. In 1866 said Black conveyed to John Logan the northwest corner of his lot, sixteen feet front on Franklin street and fifty-five feet on Evans alley. Logan placed his fence on the south line of his lot, and from that time the ground used in common by the tenants of the other houses, in the rear of his lot, was but

wharves, who may be damaged by the filling up the space in front or at the sides of the same by matter discharged from culverts, emptying into the River Delaware beyond low water mark, as such lessees have no title beyond the low water line.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 2, of Philadelphia county. Opinion by TRUNKEY, J. Filed October 2, 1882.

The Act of February 25, 1861, P. L., 43, authorizes the councils of the city of Philadelphia to continue the culvert intended to drain Cohocksink creek, from Front street into the River Delaware. In 1869 the city entered into a contract for the building of the culvert. It was finished in 1872, the mouth being at the low water line of the river, at the foot of Laurel street. The plaintiffs' wharf, held by lease, is materially injured by the filling of the dock, on its south

side and in front of the street, with matter discharged from the culvert. Upon these facts the court entered nonsuit which judgment is the specification of error.

The plaintiffs' title to the land does not extend beyond the low water line. Outside that line his right is subject to the control of the Commonwealth under her laws. Neither allegation nor proof shows want of care or skill in the construction of the culvert; nor that it drains a larger district than was contemplated by the statute; nor that it casts any substance on the plaintiffs' land. The alleged nuisance is in the river, where the title is in the Commonwealth, and where the statute authorized the city to place the mouth of the culvert.

The principle is well settled that a municipal corporation is not liable to an action for consequential damages to private property, unless it be given by statute, where the act complained of was done under a valid Act of the Legislature, and there has been no want of reasonable care, or of reasonable skill in the execution of the power, although the same act done without legislative sanction, would be actionable: Dill. on Mun. Corp., & 781; O'Connor v. Pittsburgh | R., 6 Harris, 187; Allentown v. Kramer, 23 P. F. Smith, 406. Nothing appears in the evidence to take this case out of the operation of that principle. Judgment affirmed. For plaintiffs in error, Messrs. John R. Read and Silas W. Pettit.

Contra, C. E. Morgan, Jr., Assistent City Solicitor, and Wm. Nelson West, City Solicitor.

THE COUNTY OF LANCASTER v. MISHLER.

A coroner acts in a judicial capacity in holding an inquest, and his findings cannot be questioned as to regularity in a collateral proceeding.

A coroner is not warranted in holding an inquest, unless he has ground for suspecting that the death was caused by violence or other undue means.

Liability of counties for the fees of coroners.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster county.

Opinion by MERCUR, J. Filed October 4, 1882. This is a suit by the coroner against the county for his fees and costs in holding an inquest on the body of one John Philip Hahn.

In holding an inquest the coroner acts in a judicial capacity. If he has jurisdiction in the particular case, and makes a sufficient record of the inquest, the regularity of the finding cannot be impeached in a collateral proceeding. We see no such defect in this record, nor in the manner in which it was kept, as to prevent its being admitted in evidence.

It is the duty of a coroner to hold an inquest super visum corporis, where he has cause to suspect the deceased was feloniously destroyed: County of Northampton v. Innes, 2 Casey, 156; or when his death was caused by violence: Commonwealth v. Harman, 4 Barr, 269. Whenever he holds one the presumption is that he acted in good faith and on sufficient cause. The question now presented is, whether, in a suit by him for his services, that presumption is conclusive against the county, or may it be overthrown by evidence?

Here the offers were to prove by several witnesses, in substance, that, in holding this inquest, the coroner did not act in good faith, but knowingly acted without any sufficient cause or reason; that Hahn was nearly fourscore years old; that he had been ill for some days, and attended by Dr. Atlee, à regular practicing physician of the city of Lancaster; that he died a natural death in his own house, surrounded by his family; that his death was a natural one; that there was nothing suspicious, sudden or extraordinary connected with it, and that all these facts were communicated to the coroner before he summoned the inquest.

son.

The learned judge thought, inasmuch as the office of coroner is a judicial office, and the holding of an inquest a judicial inquiry, therefore this evidence was inadmissible. The duty of a coroner to hold an inquest rests on sound reaOn that reason which is the life of the law. It is not a power to be exercised capriThe ciously and arbitrarily, against all reason. object of an inquest is to seek information, and obtain and secure evidence, in case of death by violence or other undue means. If there be reasonable ground to suspect it was so caused, it becomes the duty of the coroner to act. If he has no ground for suspecting that the death was not a natural one, it is a perversion of the whole spirit of the law to compel the county to pay him for such services. In this case the inquest found the decedent came to his death "from a paralytic stroke." Nay, more, if under the facts offered in evidence, a coroner may hold an inquest, he may, in his discretion, at the expense of the county, order a post mortem examination, whereby those bound to the deceased by the nearest and most tender ties may have their feelings lacerated in every case of natural death. The idea is preposterous and abhorrent to all the finer emotions of human nature. It was error to reject the evidence. If he had sufficient cause to justify his action he may still show it. If he had not, there is no good reason why the county should pay for unnecessary and meddlesome services. The county was no

party to the inquest, and this is the first opportunity it has had of being heard.

The other specifications are not sustained. Judgment reversed and venire facias de novo awarded.

ness then before the court or demanding its immediate attention. And this is applicable to attorneys of the court, having no immediate business with the court, as to other persons. These remarks are induced by a circumstance

Contra, J. W. Johnson, Esq.

Court of Common Pleas, No. 1,

Philadelphia County.

ALL COURTS SHALL BE OPEN.

Rights of attorneys and others to enter court. Opinion by PEIRCE, J. Filed March 17, 1883. The Constitution of Pennsylvania, Article I, Section 11, declares: All courts shall be open, and every man, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. The meaning of the words "all courts shall be open," used in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, is that all courts shall be open for the administration of law, right and justice, in controversies between suitors, as matter of right, and not as of grace or favor. It involves, of course, the right of ingress and egress to and from the place where the court is held, to suitors, jurors, witnesses and every person having business with the court. Also to all officers of the court, especially those who have immediate business with the court, as attorneys, etc. The general public also have the right of admission to the court, as they are largely interested in the public administration of law and justice. But all these rights are subservient to the orderly and peaceful administration of law, without which its administration would be impossible and the courts would be brought into contempt. Therefore they are armed with the power to preserve order, and to summarily punish as contempts all breaches of the peace committed in their presence. And to aid the court in preserving order and for other purposes, officers are appointed whose duty is to see that there are no obstructions to free transit, the orderly conduct of persons in the court-room, and to aid in the general business of the court. But it is a mistake to suppose that when a courtroom is so croweded that other persons cannot be admitted without producing disorder and inconvenience to those already in the courtroom, that they have a right to enter without regard to the rights of others and the peaceful administration of the law, unless they enter for purposes immediately connected with the busi

Keyser v. Forepaugh, before me. The courtroom was very crowded, and a member of the Bar went to the door for admission of members of the Bar, and, finding it fastened, went to the door for the admission of suitors, witnesses and the general public. He was informed there that the court was full, and that there was no room for his admission. He avers that there was room for him, and that he had business with one of the counsel then engaged in trying the case. He told the officer in charge of the door that he was a member of the Bar, and insisted on going in. The officer told him he could not go in; that there was no room there, and to go to the door for the admission of members of the Bar. This he did not do, and attempted to go in against the will of the officer. This the officer resisted, and used sufficient force to put him out. He afterward went in at the door for the admission of the members of the Bar.

There are differences of statement as to what occurred between the member of the Bar and the officer; but the above is a substantial statement of the occurrence.

This court requires not only a faithful, but a courteous discharge of the duties of its officers to all persons having business with the court, members of the Bar, suitors, witnesses, jurors and the public; and any complaint made against them will always receive the prompt attention of the court. But the members of the Bar, so far as relates to their own conduct, are equally bound to preserve the peace of the court as the officers appointed for that purpose. And when, in this instance, the member of the Bar was refused admittance by the officer, his course was to bring the matter to the attention of the judge at the first opportunity, and not to attempt to force his way into the court-room against the will of the officer. To do this was to endanger the peace of the court, and to bring the court and its authority entrusted to its officers into contempt.

For any improper or ungentlemanly language used by the officer, and for refusing to admit the complainant to the court-room, if there was room for him, both of which the officer denies, he would be justly censurable and punishable; but redress in the first instance should have been sought from the court, and not by act of the party.