ever, that this rule is subject to the exception that one who is a liquidating partner may, after dissolution, bind his former partner by either an acknowledgment or an express promise to pay, so as to take the debt out of the statute: Fulton v. Central Bank of Pittsburgh, 11 Norris, 112; Reppert v. Colvin, supra. Nor is it necessary that there should be an express and specific appointment of one as liquidating partner. His authority may be inferred from acts done in liquidation with the knowledge and consent of his former partners: Ibid. In the present case there was no evidence that M. J. Jack was a liquidating partner by any express authority to that effect. There was no evidence that he ever settled any other claim than this one against the old firm, or that he ever undertook or agreed to do so. In fact, the firm of Jack & Co. also became insolvent a few months later, in June following. When Jack settled this claim he did not give the paper of the old firm but of Jack & Co. Hence no inference can be drawn that he intended thereby to keep alive the debt of the former firm. Indeed Jack testified that the note of Jack & Co. was given and accepted as absolute payment of the debt, and that he took a receipt for the debt. Wilson denied having agreed to discharge Waugh, but did not deny giving the receipt. But, however, that may be, it is clear that no inference can be drawn from such a settlement as this, that Waugh was assenting to any promise, engagement or acknowledgment of the debt as a continuing partnership obligation. Moreover, he no longer had any ownership of the partnership goods, and was not at liberty to dissent from the control and disposition of them by Jack & Co., consequently no inference of assent to their possession and appropriation of them can be derived from the absence of any dissent on his part. He, of course, was liable for the debt due the plaintiffs during six years from its maturity, but that was the extent of his involuntary responsiblity. If M. J. Jack had, at the settlement, given to the plaintiff's a note for the $1,500, in the name of the old firm of Waugh, Jack & Co., there would have been an inference that, so far as he was concerned, he intended to continue the obligation of the old firm, and therefore of Waugh as a member of it. In that event the question would fairly have arisen as to his power to make Waugh liable by such an instrument. But he did not do that, and hence, so far as the giving of that note is concerned, the inference would be, not that he intended to preserve Waugh's liability or that of the old firm, but to substitute for it a new and different liability, to wit, that of the new firm of Jack & Co., been expressed so many times that a repetition of the authorities is unnecessary. Generally there is but little difficulty in its application to the facts of a given case. In the present case, however, the facts are somewhat peculiar. The original debt was for a bill of merchandise sold by the plaintiffs to a firm composed of R. M. Waugh, M. J. Jack and E. H. Jack, and called Waugh, Jack & Co. The goods were sold during the year 1873, and the debt became due on November 3, 1873. On December 11, 1873, the interest of R. M. Waugh in the firm was sold by the sheriff under an execution against him to one Marriett, who immediately assigned it to M. J. Jack and E. H. Jack, and these persons thereafter conducted business at the same place under the firm name of Jack & Co. On Febru- | ary 17, 1874, a settlement took place between the plaintiffs and M. J. Jack, of the claim against the old firm of Waugh, Jack & Co. The plaintiff, H. M. Wilson, testified that at that time he received a payment of $25.21 on the account, and it was proved, and not denied, that he took also a note of the new firm of Jack & Co. for $1,500 for the remainder of the claim. Wilson said he took it expecting it to be paid. As to the payment of $25.21, Wilson said he received it but did not know who was present at the settlement. Waugh said that no money was paid in his presence that he saw, and Jack said that he did not remember of any money being paid. No one testified that any money was paid in Waugh's presence. The court below charged that the partnership was dissolved by the sheriff's sale of Waugh's interest in the firm in December, 1873, that after the dissolution the remaining partners could not bind him by an acknowledgment of, or promise to pay, the debt, that there was no evidence of any promise by Waugh to pay it after it became due, and if the jury so found, they should render a verdict for the defendant Waugh. Was there any error in this? It is certainly true that the firm was dissolved by the sale of Waugh's interest: Story on Partnership, 311, 312, 313; Parsons on Partnership, p. 400; Horton's Appeal, 1 Harris, 67. In Estate of Davis & Desauque, 5 Wharton, on page 539, ROGERS, J., said: "There are various ways of dissolving a partnership; affluxion of time; the death of one partner; the bankruptcy of one which operates like death; or a dry, naked agreement that the partnership shall be dissolved." In Levy v. Cadet, 17 S. & R., 126, and in many cases since, it was held that after the dissolution of a partnership, one partner cannot, by his acknowledgment, revive a partnership debt so as to deprive the other partner of the benefit of the act of limitations. It is also true, how of which Waugh was not a member. The plaintiffs were under no obligation to accept such a note, and if they had refused it and insisted upon a note of the old firm, it would have been apparent that they intended that the old firm should remain liable. But nothing of that kind took place. If, again, it had been proved that the alleged payment of $25.21 on account was made in Waugh's presence and with his knowledge and consent, there would have been some, though not a conclusive, basis, for an inference that he assented to such a continuation of the liability of the old firm as would flow from a payment on account. But there was no such proof, and hence there is no authority for such an inference. As we have seen by the decided cases, the power of one partner to bind another, after dissolution, by either an express or implied promise, is exceptional. The facts which give rise to it must appear in any case where it is claimed to exist. If they do not appear it does not exist, and the general rule of non-liability applies and controls. In the present case there was no express authority to Jack to act as liquidating partner, there was no implied authority from his actually undertaking the settlement of the affairs of the firm, because there was no proof of such an undertaking, there was no implied assent to any continuation of the debt by the giving of the note of Jack & Co. for it, and there was no assent, express or implied, to any payment on account of the debt, since there is no evidence that such payment was made in Waugh's presence or with his knowledge or consent. In these circumstances there is absolutely nothing, upon which to found any legal obligation on the part of Waugh to pay the debt in suit within six years before suit brought, and hence the plea of the statute of limitations was a good plea, and there was no error in the instructions given by the court. Judgment affirmed. For plaintiffs in error, Messrs. Hancock & Glenn. Contra, H. D. Hancock, Esq. MORGAN et ux. v. YARD. Bonsall and Charles Yard for ten years, at a rental of $500, which was afterwards reduced to $250 per annum. The quarries were worked by the lessees under the firm name of Bonsall & Yard for nearly two years, when an assignment was made for the benefit of creditors. Afterwards the leasehold, inter alia, became vested in Robert K. McCurdy, by whom the same was conveyed to John L. Yard, who purchased as trustee for his father, Charles Yard. The testimony tends to show that in November, 1878, the same leasehold, inter alia, was exposed to public sale by the agent of Charles Yard, and purchased, as a whole, by the defendant, H. H. Yard, for $650, which was paid by him. Afterwards a deed for the property thus purchased and paid for, was, at his request, made to J. P. Felton, who afterwards conveyed to defendant all the property except the lease from plaintiff. The testimony also tended to show that Felton was merely the agent of the defendant, and as such took possession of the leased premises. The plaintiffs, claiming that defendant was in fact the assignee and owner of the term, brought this suit to recover rent which accrued since November, 1878, the date of the public sale. In view of the testimony tending to prove the foregoing facts, the court erred in nonsuiting the plaintiffs. If the case had been submitted to the jury under the testimony before them, they would have been justified in finding, not only that the defendant was in fact the owner of the term, but also that by his agent, Felton, he took and retained possession of the demised premises. If so, he was liable for the rent which accrued in the meantime. The liability of the assignee of a term springs not from any contract relation between his assignor and the lessor, but is founded on privity of the estate, which is the actual or beneficial enjoyment of the premises, or the right to their possession and enjoyment, and lasts only so long as that privity continues: Negley v. Morgan, 10 Wright, 281; Borland's Appeal, 16 P. F. Smith, 470. The testimony tended to prove that defendant had not only the right of possession and enjoyment, but actually exercised it; that he bought and paid for the premises him The liability of an assignee of a term is founded upon self, and put his agent in possession. Opinion by STERRETT, J. Filed October 4, 1882. There is no merit in the position that the lease was not assigned to the defendant. If it was included in his purchase, and at his request the deed was made to Felton, not for the purpose of investing the title absolutely to him, but to be held in trust for defendant, the bene-. ficial ownership was in the latter. This was a question of fact for the jury. Judgment reversed and procedendo awarded. good than to go to law. In 1848, when I was appointed President of the District Court, after three years' experience as an associate, I found the trial list of that court to consist of more than 1,600 cases. I determined, with the concurrence of my associates on the bench, to make the attempt at least to break it down. It was pretty hard work for three men, but with the hearty co-operation of the Bar it was accomplished. In six or seven years the list was reduced to about 600, and there it remained though the business of the court had largely increased-the suits on the appearance docket alone having run up from 2,000 a year to 6,000 and 8,000. I have sometimes been haunted with the fear that, in riding this hobby so hard-driving trials so fast-injustice must have been done to suitors in many cases. It was, however, a choice between two evils-for it is with the administration of justice as with everything else, there is nothing perfect under the sun. It is, indeed, a most difficult problem with any court to reconcile that speed which is necessary to prevent such delay as practically amounts to a denial of justice with the care, study and deliberation required to arrive at the proper determination of important questions. Festina lente is the simple rule; but, in its application—hic labor, hoc opus est. When I took my seat on the Supreme Bench, in 1868, The Chairman, Hon. Henry M. Phillips, pro- the whole number of cases on the argument list for the posed the following toast: Our Guest-Closing a judicial life, brilliant with legal learning, and adorned with the integrity of judicial virtue, we tender our Chief Justice this tribute to characteristics which have ennobled the jurisprudence of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Chief Justice SHARSWOOD, in response, said: MR. PRESIDENT: I need hardly assure you that I have a profound and grateful sense of the honor you have done me. I accept this testimonial as crowning the many others I have received in the course of my professional and judicial life of the kind and generous feelings toward me of the members of this Bar, all of whom I am proud and happy at this moment to call my friends. With an able, faithful and honorable Bar such as this, it is by no means wonderful, as Lord CAMPBELL seems to have thought it was, with how little knowledge of law a man may make a great judge. Indeed it may be questioned whether great learning is a desirable quality in a judge. He is apt to wish to display it on all occasions by elaborating long and tiresome opinions and delivering charges unintelligible to juries. *** It is now more than half a century since I was enrolled in your number. It has been a great period in the history of this country and of the world-of great improvements in every department of life-of marvels-I had almost said of miracles. There have been great changes in the law-in the Bar-in the courts-in the administration of justice. Soon after my admission I was retained to appear before the Board of Property at Harrisburg. It took ine seventeen long hours of hard staging by the way of Reading to get there, and when I came back in thirteen hours through Lancaster in a swift mail coach, with seats for only four passengers, it was thought wonderful. Such was the rapid-transit of that day. Law suits and everything else were conducted with stage-coach slowness. * * * You can easily perceive what injustice was done to suitors "clamoring for justice," as the old books have it, by such interminable delays, and how often hope deferred made the heart sick. I saw many sad instances of it in my brief practice, and carried a deep sense of it with me when I went on the bench. It was a common saying that it was better for a man to abandon a cause however | four districts, Eastern, Western, Northern and Middle, was 660; the cases argued or submitted that year were 375. The list was fearfully growing, rolling up like a great revolving snow ball, not only by remanets from one year to another, and the increased business of the people, particularly the coal and oil operations of the western counties, but from constant additions to the jurisdiction by the Legislature, who never seemed to think that the court had business enough. By laws then existing, it was incumbent on the court to write and file not only an opinion in every case, but upon every point made in every case. These laws, however, were never very strictly observed. When the court thought that the judgment below was right, and ought to be affirmed, they managed, as Judge KENNEDY once told me, "to hop. skip and jump" over the errors assigned. When this legislation was repealed in 1871, and the duty of writing and filing opinions confined to reversals, the practice was adopted, that whenever a judgment or decree involving no new principle was affirmed unanimously, to dispose of the case by a per curiam, stating briefly the grounds of the decision. They might be disposed of by a simple affirmation. These “pur curs.,” as they are termed, are not so easy as perhaps they seem, and I should like to see the gentlemen that I occasionally hear laugh at them, try their hands in writing them. We are told by Chief Justice GIBSON that this was the practice of the court under Chief Justice TILGHMAN before these laws were passed. Let me mention in defense of it, that Lord BACON, in his proposition for the amendment of the law, recommended, and Chancellor KENT said wisely recommended, that “homonymiæ,” as Justinian termed them, that is, cases of mere iteration and repetition, "should be purged away from the books," because they do more harm than good. The law now prohibits any case to be published in the regular State Reports, which is not ordered to be so by the court. Such, however, is the eagerness of the profession for the latest decisions, that these cases are still reported somewhere, and will continue to be so. In 1876 the hour list was adopted. The operation of it was undoubtedly beneficial in disposing of cases and diminishing remanets. Yet, from other causes to which I have adverted, the lists continued to increase. In 1879, when I succeeded to the Chief Justiceship, the number had reached 1,339, the largest which had ever been. It was a year of very hard work, as you may judge, when I tell you that the arguments were 860. Since then, however, it has been gradually but slowly decreasing. I will not weary you with figures. In the present year the whole number was 1,029; arguments 716. Of course, many cases, 62 in all, were continued for cause or by agreement, and 26 were not reached. I think you will agree with me that this court is overburdened with work. I have deemed this an appropriate time and occasion to bring this subject to the attention of the profession, and on behalf of my colleagues to invoke their counsel and aid in securing some remedy by legislation. My brethren feel, and have long felt, that if these lists are to be kept down, they have not time to do justice to themselves in the study of questions and the prepartion of opinions. I believe it to be the general sense of the profession throughout the State, that an experiment should be made of intermediate Courts of Appeal. It can be done without creating new judges, and with trifling additional cost to the State or the suitors. There are at present in commission 77 law judges. Every five or six contiguous districts could be formed into a circuit, with an intermediate court of the same number of judges, one from each district. In cases removed from this court to the Supreme Court, no new paper-book would be required. I will not go into further details, nor dilate upon the advantages of such a system, as well to the inferior courts as the Supreme Court. I will merely express the opinion concurred in by all my colleagues, that it would diminish the lists in the Supreme Court one-quarter if not one-third. now rests from its cares and anxieties. He possessed all the estimable traits that form a strong character and make it useful in life. Patient in his industry, strict in the discharge of his duties, and dignified in his deportment, his example is worthy of remembrance and constant imitation. His researches in legal studies were constant and thorough and his arguments always exhibited the most ample proof that he had made himself perfectly conversant with the cases that ruled the question under discussion. He stopped not, however, to find, delight in the domain of legal study, but surrounded himself with a library of books that gratified his taste for polite literature, and enabled him to become familiar with the best English and American authors. He ardently loved poetry and indulged himself at times in writing humorous verses, frequently read to a few friends who could enjoy the satire and wit they contained. "In the loss of one so pure in personal character, so much an ornament to his profession, we cannot but feel the Bar has not only lost its oldest, but one of its most honored members. He leaves behind him, after a life of labor, nothing but a record of good deeds, no erasure to be made in it, not an interlineation to mar the fair face of the prayer that is to preserve the memory of his career on earth. With that record to sustain him he stands for judgment to-day at the Bar of that Judge whose decisions are always just, and whose mercy is past all com. prehension." Remarks were made by Jacob Whitesell, ex Gentlemen of the Bar, let me again thank you for this Judge Mellon, W. D. Moore and Thomas M. expression of your kindness. It shall remain engraved on the tablets of my memory as long as memory lasts. Appropriate speeches were made by Mr. Justice PAXSON, Hon. M. RUSSELL THAYER, William Henry Rawle, Esq., Mr. Sergeant Ballantine, Hon. Richard Vaux and David W. Sellers, Esq. In Memoriam. Action of the Allegheny County Bar on the Death of Thomas MacConnell, Esq. A meeting of the Bar was held on Saturday morning last to take suitable action on the death of THOMAS MacCONNEL, Esq., who died on Friday. Judge EWING presided and the vice-presidents were the Judges of the County Courts, of whom there were present Messrs. Stowe, White, Kirkpatrick and Over. The secretaries were Hon. Thomas Mellon, A. M. Watson, John Barton and John Large, Esqrs. On motion, the chair appointed Messrs. W. D. Moore, exJudge Mellon, Thos. M. Marshall, J. H. Hampton and George Shiras, Jr., a committee to prepare a suitable minute and they presented the following, which was unanimously adopted and ordered to be spread on the minutes of the several courts: "We assemble on no ordinary occasion. A member of the Bar long conspicuous for his learning, integrity and devotion to his profession, at the ripe age of seventyeight years, has finished the weary journey of life and Marshall. Supreme Court, Penn’a. UNION SAVINGS BANK v. FIFE. A case stated is a substitute for and in the nature of a special verdict and must find facts and not the evidence. This rule is not affected by Art. V, Sec. 27, of the Constitution, nor the Act of 22d April, 1874, P. L., 109, passed in pursuance thereto. If the finding in this respect be defective, a venire facias de novo will be awarded. Kinsley v. Coyle, 8 P. F. S., 461, approved and followed. Error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 1, of Allegheny county. Opinion by SHARSWOOD, C. J. Filed November 20, 1882. After the evidence in this case had been concluded on the trial before a jury in the court below, the following agreement was entered into between the counsel for the plaintiffs and defendants: "It is agreed by counsel for plaintiffs and defendants, in open court, that the evidence, oral and record, and the entire records shall be treated as a case stated and judgment be entered thereon by the court according to its view of the law and facts; each party reserving the right to sue out a writ of error." Upon this the court subsequently entered judgment on the case stated in favor of the plaintiff. A case stated is a substitute for and in the nature of a special verdict and is subject to the same rules. It must find facts and not the notice was given the insurance company and For plaintiff in error, Messrs. Geo. N. Monro, Duff & Alcorn, John S. Ferguson and Hampton & Dalzell. Albert Pitcairn, the defendant, was the insurance company's agent who procured the issue of the policy. He solicited Kroeger to allow him to effect the insurance; went upon the premises, examined them, furnished the description of them, and had the policy underwritten, bringing it to Kroeger, from whom he collected the premium. The plaintiff then brought this action in case Contra, Messrs. Sutton & Plumer and J. M. against Pitcairn. There was very little controStoner. W. C. KROEGER v. ALBERT PITCAIRN. Where a jury are instructed to return a verdict for the amount of plaintiff's claim, if they believe that the facts presented in one of his points are true, and do find in his favor, the verdict necessarily implies a verification of the several matters stated in the point, and will be so regarded by this court. An agent is liable personally to a party with whom he deals, (1) where he makes a false representation of his authority with intent to deceive; (2) where with knowledge of his want of authority, but without intending any fraud, he assumes to act as though he were fully authorized, and (3) where he undertakes to act bona fide, believing he has authority, but in fact has none. Error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 2, of Allegheny county. versy on the trial as to the facts. The plaintiff submitted the following point: "If the jury believes from the evidence that the defendant made the representations to plaintiff, as testified to by the latter, to wit: ** Answer.-' He procured the policy and brought it to me. I took the policy and read it over, and in reading it over I happened to come across this fine print and noticed about these articles that should be mentioned in the policy-such as petroleum and product of petroleum, and gasoline and other things. I don't know what they call them-all strange names to me-and I told him about petroleum. Says I: 'Albert you know there is a little petroleum kept there for the supplies to the mines.' I had to have that there all the time, as well as company supplies. He said: should be mentioned in the policy.' And he says: "That is never taken notice of only where it is kept in large quantity-say several hundred On April 4, 1874, the Birmingham Fire In-Yes, I know that.' Says I: 'It says here it surance Company issued a policy of insurance to William C. Kroeger, the plaintiff in error and below, "on his stock of merchandise and fixtures contained in the two-story frame store-barrels; in that case, where it is wholesale, it room and cellar and in frame addition attached, situated at Enon Coal Company's works, about two miles west of Enon, etc." One of the printed conditions of the policy was in these words: "Or if the assured shall keep or have in any place or premises where this policy may apply, petroleum, naptha, benzine, benzole, gasoline, benzine-varnish or any product in whole or in part of either; or gunpowder, fireworks, nitro glycerine, phosphorus, saltpetre, nitrate of soda, or keep, have or use camphene, spirit gas or any burning fluid or chemical oils without written permission in this policy, then and in every such case this policy shall be void." In December, 1874, the premises so insured were totally destroyed by an accidental fire. Due should be mentioned, but as long as it is not kept more than one barrel in the store at a time, it is considered as general merchandise, and it is never taken notice of in any other way.' ** Cross-examination. ** Answer.-'The outcome was as I say. I objected to the policy on account of the way it was in the fine print. It seemed to me it was not proper, and I spoke to Mr. Pitcairn about that, and he said that the policy was proper; that the policies were all made out in that way; that carbon oil, as long as it was not kept more than one barrel in the store, was considered as general merchandise and not mentioned in the policy, but where it was kept in large quantity - -a hundred barrels or so-then it must be so mentioned, and exception made of it. And that the latter took said |