Scripture so much is not expressed; yet now I must be more restrained, and deny those superadditions to this doctrine, which the ignorance, or the fancy, or the interest, or the laziness, of men have sewed to this doctrine. SECTION II. Adam's Sin is in us no more than an imputed Sin, and how it is so. 10. ORIGINAL sin is not our sin properly, not inherent in us, but is only imputed to us, so as to bring evil effects upon us : for that which is inherent in us, is a consequent only of Adam's sin, but of itself no sin; for there being but two things affirmed to be the constituent parts of original sin, the want of original righteousness, and concupiscence, neither of these can be a sin in us, but a punishment and a consequent of Adam's sin they may be for the case is thus: : One half of Christians that dispute in this article, particularly the Roman schools, say, that concupiscence is not a sin, but a consequent of Adam's sin: the other half of Christians (I mean in Europe), that is, the protestants, generally say, that the want of original righteousness is a consequent of Adam's sin, but formally no sin. The effect of these is this, that it is not certain amongst the churches, that either one or the other is formally our sin, or inherent in us; and we cannot affirm either, without crossing a great part of Christendom in their affirmative. There have indeed been attempts made to reconcile this difference; and therefore in the conference at Worms, and in the book offered at Ratisbon to the emperor, and in the 'Interim' itself they jumbled them both together, "saying, "Originale peccatum est carentia justitiæ originalis, cum concupiscentiâ." But the church of England defines neither, but rather inclines to believe that it consists in concupiscence, as appears in the explication of the article which I have annexed. But because she hath not determined, that either of them is formally a sin, or inherent in us, I may with the greater freedom, discourse concerning the several parts. The want of original righteousness is not a thing, but the privation of a thing, and therefore cannot be inherent in us; and therefore if it be a sin at all to us, it can only be such by imputation. But neither can this be imputed to us as a sin formally, because, if it be at all, it is only a consequent or punishment of Adam's sin, and unavoidable by us: for though Scotus is pleased to affirm, that there was an obligation upon human nature, to preserve it; I doubt not but as he intended it, he said false. Adam indeed was tied to it, for if he lost it for himself and us, then he only was bound to keep it for himself and us; for we could not be obliged to keep it, unless we had received it; but he was, and because he lost it, we also missed it; that is, are punished, and feel the evil effects of it. But besides all this, the matter of original righteousness is a thing framed in the schoolforges, but not at all spoken of in Scripture, save only that "God made man upright,' that is, he was brought innocent into the world, he brought no sin along with him, he was created in the time and stature of reason and choice; he entered upon action when his reason was great enough to master his passion, all which we do not: it is that which, as Prosper describes it, made a man 'expertem peccati, et capacem Dei ;' for by this is meant that he had grace and helps enough, if he needed any, besides his natural powers; which we have not by nature, but by another dispensation. 11. Add to all this, that they who make the want of original righteousness to be a sin formally in us, when they come to explicate their meaning by material or intelligible events, tell us it is an aversion from God; that is, in effect a turning to the creature, and differs no otherwise from concupiscence, than going from the west directly does from going directly to the east; that is, just nothing. It follows then, that if concupiscence be the effect of Adam's sin, then so must the want of original righteousness, because they are the same thing in real event: and if that be no sin in us, because it was only the punishment of his sin, then neither is the other a sin, for the same reason. But then for concupiscence, that this is no sin, before we consent to it, appears by many testimonies of antiquity, and of St. Austin himself: "Quantum ad nos attinet, sine peccato semper essemus, donec sanaretur hoc malum, si nunquam consentiremus ad malum." And it is infinitely against reason it should; for in infants the very actions and desire of concupiscence are no sins, therefore much less is the principle; if the little emanations of it in them be innocent, although there are some images of consent, much more is that principle innocent, before any thing of consent at all is applied to it. By the way, I cannot but wonder at this, that the Roman schools, affirming the first motions of concupiscence to be no sin, because they are involuntary, and not consented to by us, but come upon us whether we list or no, yet that they should think original sin to be a sin in us really and truly, which, it is certain, is altogether as involuntary and unchosen as concupiscence. But I add this also, that concupiscence is not wholly an effect of Adam's sin; if it were, then it would follow, that if Adam had not sinned we should have no concupiscence, that is, no contrary appetites; which is infinitely confuted by the experience of Adam's fall; for by the rebellion and prevailing of his concupiscence it was that he fell, and that which was the cause, could not be the effect of the same thing: as no child can beget his own father, nor any thing, which it leads and draws in after itself. Indeed, it is true that by Adam's sin this became much worse, and by the evils of the body, and its infirmities, and the nakedness of the soul as well as the body, and new necessities and new emergencies, Πάντη ἡ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς φανεροῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς κρυπτοῖς, ἀπὸ τῆς παραβάσεως τοῦ πρώτου ἀνθρώπου, εἰς ýμāc katývτnσev, as Macarius said; "An entire contrariety, both manifest and secret, came in upon us from the transgressions of Adam f;" this, I say, became much worse, and more inordinate and tempted and vexed, and we were more under the devil's power, because we had the loss of our own. 12. The result is this, that neither the one nor the other is our sin formally, but by imputation only, that is, we are not sinners, but we are afflicted for his sin, and he is punished in us, and that it cannot be our sin properly, but metonymically, that is, our misery only; appears to me demonstratively certain upon this account: for how can that in another be our sin, when it is in us involuntary, when our own acts, if involuntary, are not sins? If it be asked, how can we have the punishment unless we also have the fault? I return this answer, that St. Austin and some others, who make this objection, have already given answers themselves, and Delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi",' is an answer enough; as Saul sinned and his seven sons were hanged: and all that evil which is upon us, being not by any positive infliction, but by privative, or the taking away gifts and blessings and graces from us, which God, not. having promised to give, was neither naturally nor by covenant obliged to give, it is certain, he could not be obliged to continue that to the sons of a sinning father, which to an innocent father he was not obliged to give. But these things, which are only evils and miseries to us upon Adam's account, become direct punishments upon our own account, that is, if we sin. But then as to the argument itself: certainly it were more probable to say, we had not the fault, we did not do the sin which another did: therefore, the evil that we feel is our misery, but not our punishment; rather than to say, we are punished, therefore we are guilty. For let what will happen to us, it is not true that we are guilty of what we never did: and whatever comes upon us by the way of empire and dominion, nothing can descend upon us by the way of justice, as relating to our own fault. But thus it was, that in him we are all sinners;' that is, his sin is reckoned to us so as to bring evil upon us; because we were born of him, and consequently put into the same natural state where he was left after his sin; no otherwise than as children, born of a bankrupt father, are also miserable; not that they are guilty of their fathers' sin, or that it is imputed so as to involve them in the guilt, but it is derived upon them and reckoned to evil events; the very nature of birth and derivation from him infers it. 13. And this it is that St. Austin once said; "Nascimur non propriè, sed originaliter peccatores1;" that is, Adam's sin is imputed to us, but we have none of our own born with us: and this expression of 'having Adam's sin imputed to us,' is followed by divers of the modern doctors: by St. Bernard, serm. 11. 'de Dominicâ prima post 8. Epiph.:' by Lyra h Hor. ep. 1. 2. 14. * Lib. 4. contra duas epist. Pelag. c. 4. i De Civ. Dei, lib. 18. in 5. cap. Rom.: by Cajetan ibidem:' by Bellarmine, tom. 3. de Amiss. Gratiæ,' lib. 5. cap. 17.: by Dr. Whitaker, lib. 1. de Peccato Originali,' cap. 7. et 9.: by Paræus in his Animadversions upon Bellarmine, lib. 5. ' de Amiss. Gratiæ,' cap. 16.: by Dr. George Charleton, lib. de Consensu Ecclesiæ Catholicæ contra Tridentinos,' controvers. 4.: which is the fifth chapter of Grace in these words: "Either we must, with Pelagius, wholly deny original sin, or it must be by the imputation of the injustice that was in Adam, that we are made sinners, because original sin is an imputed sin.”—The effect of this is, that therefore it is not formally ours, and it is no sin inherent in us; and then the imputation means nothing but that it brought evils upon us; our dying, our sorrow, and the affections of mortality and concupiscence, are the consequents of Adam's sin, and the occasion of ours, and 'so we are in him and by him made sinners:' and in this there can be no injustice, for this imputation brings nothing upon us as in relation to Adam's sin, but what by his power and justice he might have done without such relation; and what is just, if done absolutely, must needs be just if done relatively; and because there is no other way to reconcile this with God's justice, it follows, that there is no other sense of imputation than what is now explicated. SECTION III. The Doctrine of the ancient Fathers was, that Free-will 14. ADAM's sin did not destroy the liberty of our election, but left it naturally as great as before the fall. And here I observe, that the fathers before St. Austin, generally maintained the doctrine of man's liberty remaining after the fall; the consequents of which are incompossible and inconsistent with the present doctrines of original sin. That the doctrine of man's liberty remaining was general and catholic, appears by these few testimonies instead. of very many. Justin Martyr, in his second apology for the Christians, hath these words; Καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν νοερὸν καὶ δυνά |