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Thus it has left the door of negotiation unclosed, and it remains to be seen, if the enemy will accept the invitation tendered to him. The honorable gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Pearson) supposes, that if Congress would pass a law, prohibiting the employment of British seamen in our service, upon condition of a like prohibition on their part, and repeal the act of non-importation, peace would immediately follow. Sir, I have no doubt, if such a law were to pass, with all the requisite solemnities, and the repeal to take place, Lord Castlereagh would laugh at our simplicity. No, sir, the administration has erred in the steps which it has taken to restore peace, but its error has been not in doing too little, but in betraying too great a solicitude for that event. An honorable peace is attainable only by an efficient war. My plan would be, to call out the ample resources of the country, give them a judicious direction, prosecute the war with the utmost vigor, strike wherever we can reach the enemy, or on land, and negotiate the terms of a peace at Quebec or at Halifax. We are told that England is a proud and lofty nation, which, disdaining to wait for danger, meets it half way. Haughty as she is, we once triumphed over her, and, if we do not listen to the counsels of timidity and despair, we shall again prevail. In such a cause, with the aid of Providence, we must come out crowned with success; but if we fail, let us fail like men, lash ourselves to our gallant tars, and expire together in one common struggle, fighting for FREE TRADE AND SEAMEN'S

at sea

RIGHTS.

ON MR. CLAY'S RETURN FROM GHENT.

DELIVERED AT A PUBLIC DINNER AT LEXINGTON, GIVEN IN HONOR OF MR. CLAY, OCTOBER 7, 1815.

[MR. CLAY, who had been the chief prompter of the war with Great Britain, was appointed one of the Commissioners to negotiate a peace, and, as has ever been conceded, was greatly influential in determining the conditions. Christopher Hughes, the Secretary of that Commission, in a private letter to Mr. Clay, dated November, 27, 1844, at London, says: "You did more at that Congress than any of its members, by your tact, your discretion, your moderation, your self-command, and your incomparable manner-more, I say, than any other, to bestow this most blessed boon (of peace) among men." Mr. Clay's friends at Lexington, including the people of all parties, were justly proud, not only of the part he had enacted in the war, but especially of his instrumentality in making peace; and on his return, they gave him a public dinner. One of the toasts was as follows: "Our negotiators at Ghent their talents at diplomacy have kept pace with the valor of our arms, in demonstrating to the enemy that these States will be free." Another toast was: "Our guest, Henry Clay we welcome his return to that country whose rights and interests he has so ably maintained at home and abroad." To the first of these toasts Mr. Clay made the following reply:]

I FEEL myself called on, by the sentiment just expressed, to return my thanks, in behalf of my colleagues and myself. I do not, and am quite sure they do not, feel, that, in the service alluded to, they are at all entitled to the compliment which has been paid them. We could not do otherwise than reject the demand made by the other party; and if our labors finally terminated in an honorable peace, it was owing to causes on this side of the Atlantic, and not to any exertion of ours. Whatever diversity of opinion may have existed as to the declaration of the war, there are some points on which all may look back with proud satisfaction. The first re

lates to the time of the conclusion of the peace. Had it been made inmediately after the treaty of Paris, we should have retired humiliated from the contest, believing that we had escaped the severe chastisement with which we were threatened, and that we owed to the generosity and magnanimity of the enemy, what we were incapable of commanding by our arms. That magnanimity would have been the theme of every tongue, and of every press, abroad and at home. We should have retired, unconscious of our own strength, and unconscious of the utter inability of the enemy, with his whole undivided force, to make any serious impression upon us. Our military character, then in the lowest state of degradation, would have been unretrieved. Fortunately for us, Great Britain chose to try the issue of the last campaign. And the issue of the last campaign has demonstrated, in the repulse before Baltimore, the retreat from Plattsburg, the hard-fought action on the Niagara frontier, and in that most glorious day, the eighth of January, that we have always possessed the finest elements of military composition, and that a proper use of them, only, was necessary, to insure for the army and militia a fame as imperishable as that which the navy had previously acquired.

Another point which appears to me to afford the highest consolation is, that we fought the most powerful nation, perhaps, in existence, singlehanded and alone, without any sort of alliance. More than thirty years has Great Britain been maturing her physical means, which she had rendered as efficacious as possible, by skill, by discipline, and by actual service. Proudly boasting of the conquest of Europe, she vainly flattered herself with the easy conquest of America also. Her veterans were put to flight or defeated, while all Europe-I mean the governments of Europe -was gazing with cold indifference, or sentiments of positive hatred of us, upon the arduous contest. Hereafter no monarch can assert claims of gratitude upon us, for assistance rendered in the hour of danger.

There is another view of which the subject of the war is fairly susceptible. From the moment that Great Britain came forward at Ghent with her extravagant demands, the war totally changed its character. It became, as it were, a new war. It was no longer an American war, prosecuted for redress of British aggressions upon American rights, but became a British war, prosecuted for objects of British ambition, to be accompanied by American sacrifices. And what were those demands? Here, in the immediate neighborhood of a sister State and territories, which were to be made in part the victims, they must have been felt, and their enormity justly appreciated. They consisted of the erection of a barrier between Canada and the United States, to be formed by cutting off from Ohio and some of the territories a country more extensive than Great Britain, containing thousands of freemen, who were to be abandoned to their fate, and creating a new power, totally unknown upon the continent of America; of the dismantling of our fortresses, and naval power on the lakes, with the surrender of the military occupation of those waters to the enemy, and

of an arrondissement for two British provinces. These demands, boldly asserted, and one of them declared to be a sine qua non, were finally relinquished. Taking this view of the subject, if there be loss of reputation by either party, in the terms of peace, who has sustained it?

The effects of the war are highly satisfactory. Abroad, our character, which at the time of its declaration was in the lowest state of degradation, is raised to the highest point of elevation. It is impossible for any American to visit Europe, without being sensible of this agreeable change, in the personal attentions which he receives, in the praises which are bestowed on our past exertions, and the predictions which are made as to our future prospects. At home, a government, which, at its formation, was apprehended by its best friends, and pronounced by its enemies to be incapable of standing the shock, is found to answer all the purposes of its institution. In spite of the errors which have been committed (and errors have undoubtedly been committed), aided by the spirit and patriotism of the people, it is demonstrated to be as competent to the objects of effective war, as it has been before proved to be to the concerns of a season of peace. Government has thus acquired strength and confidence. Our prospects for the future, are of the brightest kind. With every reason to count on the permanence of peace, it remains only for the Government to determine upon military and naval establishments adapted to the growth and extension of our country and its rising importance, keeping in view a gradual but not burdensome increase of the navy; to provide for the payment of the interest, and the redemption of the public debt, and for the current expenses of Government. For all these objects, the existing sources of the revenue promise not only to be abundantly sufficient, but will probably leave ample scope to the exercise of the judgment of Congress, in selecting for repeal, modification, or abolition, those which may be found most oppressive, inconvenient, or unproductive.

[In reply to the second toast, as given above, Mr. Clay said :]

My friends, I must again thank you for your kind and affectionate attention. My reception has been more like that of a brother than a common friend or acquaintance, and I am utterly incapable of finding words to express my gratitude. My situation is like that of a Swedish gentleman, at a dinner given in England by the Society of Friends of Foreigners in Distress. A toast having been given complimentary to his country, it was expected, as is usual on such occasions, that he would rise and address the company. The gentleman, not understanding the English language, rose under great embarassment, and said, "Sir, I wish you to consider me a foreigner in distress." I wish you, gentlemen, to consider me a friend in distress.

ON THE BANK QUESTION.

MR. CLAY'S ADDRESS TO HIS CONSTITUENTS, LEXINGTON, JUNE 3, 1816.

[MR. CLAY'S speech in the House of Representatives, 1816, in favor of the re-incorporation of the Bank of the United States, was not published; and as he had spoken and voted against the bill for the re-charter of the Bank in 1811, it seemed quite proper, and necessary to his polititical consistency, that he should avail himself of some opportunity to give his reasons for this apparent change of opinion. In our introduction to his speech on this subject, in 1811, we have endeavored to show, that there was really no change of opinion, but simply an adaptation of policy to a change of circumstances in the financial and commercial condition of the nation. In 1811, the State banks were in a good condition, and competent, if required, to transact the financial affairs of the general government; whereas, the national bank, as then administered, did not work satisfactorily. It could be dispensed with, if the State banks had continued. sound. But the war of 1812 gave such a severe trial to the State bank system, as nearly to break it down, and at the close of the war, the country was left without a sound currency. Commerce, trade, and the government, were equally embarrassed for proper and safe financial agents. The currency had utterly failed to furnish an agency for these indispensable purposes, and the universal cry was for a national bank. What could a wise and practical statesman do in such a case? If he could see that it was merely a present popular demand, soon to pass over, he might risk opposition to the measure; but if the demand was well founded, and likely to become louder and stronger from the necessities of the country, opposition would have been an act of folly. The success of the bank for twenty years from 1816, proved the wisdom of the measure. It executed all the financial business of the government without charge, receiving for its compensation the use of the public deposits; it operated as a salutary regulator of the currency by its check on unsound State

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