ON OUR RELATIONS WITH FRANCE.

IN SENATE, JANUARY 14, 1835.

[THE government of France, by a treaty with the United States, made in 1831, had agreed to pay an indemnity to us for spoliations on our commerce, the first installment of which, about one million of dollars, was taken by the Bank of the United States, but when presented for payment, it was protested, and thrown back on the Treasury of the United States. General Jackson, as his nature was, resented it as he would a private wrong; and in his annual message of December, 1834, recommended to Congress a measure of reprisals on French commerce to obtain the consideration due. This happened in the reign of Louis Philippe, when the French Chambers refused to make the appropriation to meet the engagement. Nobody doubted that it would ultimately be paid, the present difficulty being supposed to be between the French king and the Chamber of Deputies; and it was a mere question of national policy how this dishonor of our draft should be treated. General Jackson's feeling was, Pay or fight-as no one doubted that reprisals would bring on war.

Mr. Clay was for more moderate counsels. He would have our rights, but not rush into war without giving the French government a chance to settle their own dissensions. Being at the head of the committee on foreign relations in the Senate, he made an elaborate but conciliatory report on the subject, submitting the following resolution :

Resolved that it is inexpedient, at this time, to pass any law vesting in the president authority for making reprisals upon French property, in the contingency of provision not being made for paying to the United States, the indemnity stipulated by the treaty of 1831, during the present session of the French Chambers.

General Jackson's message had gone before, and had no doubt much disturbed the temper of the French nation. The French

minister was immediately recalled from Washington, and the American minister at Paris had received his passports. The relations between the two governments were evidently extremely critical. Mr. Clay thought, if he could obtain a unanimous vote of the Senate in support of the above resolution, its effect would counteract that of the president's message, and preserve peace; and it was accordingly unanimously affirmed. The indemnity was paid, and the cloud of war blew over. The effects of General Jackson's precipitancy were neutralized by Mr. Clay's wisdom. Otherwise there would, in all probability, have been war between the United States and France.]

Ir is not my purpose, at the present stage of consideration of this resolution, and I hope it will not be necessary at any stage, to say much with the view of enforcing the arguments in its favor, which are contained in the report of the committee. In the present posture of our relations with France, the course which has appeared to me and to the committee most expedient being to await the issue of those deliberations in the French Chambers which may even at this moment be going on, it would not be proper to enter at large, at the present time, into all the particulars touched upon in the report. On all questions connected with the foreign affairs of the country, differences of opinion will arise, which will finally terminate in whatever way the opinion of the people of this country may so tend as to influence their representatives. But, whenever the course of things shall be such that a rupture shall unfortunately take place between this country and any foreign country (whether France or any other), I take this opportunity of saying, that, from that moment, whatever of energy or ability, whatever of influence I may possess in my country, shall be devoted to the carrying on of that war with the utmost vigor which the arms and resources of the United States can give to it. I will not anticipate, however, such a state of things; nay, I feel very confident that such a rupture will not occur between the United States and France.

With respect to the justice of our claim upon France for payment of the indemnity stipulated by the treaty, the report of the committee is in entire concurrence with the executive. The opinion of the committee is, that the claims stipulated to be paid are founded in justice; that we must pursue them; that we must finally obtain satisfaction for them, and to do so must, if necessary, employ such means as the law of nations justifies, and the Constitution has placed within our power. On these points there is no diversity of sentiment between the committee and the president; there could be no diversity between either the committee or the president and any American citizen.

In all that the president has said of the obligation of the French government to make the stipulated provisions for the claims, the committee entirely concur. If the president, in his message, after making his statement

of the case, had stopped there, and abstained from the recommendation of any specific measure, there could not have been possibly any diversity of opinion on the subject between him and any portion of the country. But, when he declares the confidence which he entertains in the French government; when he expresses his conviction that the executive branch of that government is honest and sincere in its professions, and recites the promise by it of a renewed effort to obtain the passage of a bill of appropriation by the French Chambers, it did appear to the committee inconsistent with these professions of confidence, that they should be accompanied by the recommendation of a measure which could only be authorized by the conviction that no confidence, or at least, not entire confidence, could be placed in the declarations and professions of the French government. Confidence and distrust are unnatural allies. If we profess confidence anywhere, especially if that confidence be but for a limited period, it should be unaccompanied with any indication whatever of distrust; a confidence full, free, frank. But to say, as the president, through our minister, has said, that he will await the issue of the deliberations of the Chambers, confiding in the sincerity of the king, and this, too, after hearing of the rejection of the first bill of appropriation by the Chambers, and now, at the very moment when the Chambers are about deliberating on the subject, to throw out in a message to Congress what the president himself considered might possibly be viewed as a menace, appeared to the committee, with all due deference to the executive, and to the high and patriotic purposes which may be supposed to have induced the recommendation, to be inconsistent to such a degree as not to be seconded by the action of Congress. It also appeared to the committee, after the distinct recommendation by the president on this subject, that there should be some expression of the sense of Congress in regard to it. Such an expression is proposed by the resolution now under consideration.

In speculating upon probabilities in regard to the course of the French government, in reference to the treaty, four contingences might be supposed to arise-first, that the French government may have made the appropriation to carry the treaty into effect before the reception of the president's message; second, the Chambers may make the appropriation after the reception of the president's message, and notwithstanding the recommendation on this subject contained in it; third, the Chambers may, in consequence of that recommendation, hearing of it before they shall have acted finally on the subject, refuse to make any appropriation until what they may consider a menace shall have been explained or withdrawn; or fourth, they may, either on that ground, or on the ground of dissatisfaction with the provisions of the treaty, refuse to pass the bill of appropriation. Now, in any of these contingences, after what has passed, an expression of the sense of Congress on the subject appears to me indispensable, either to the passage of the bill, or the subsequent payment of the money, if passed.

Suppose the bill to have passed before the reception of the message, and the money to be in the French treasury, it would throw upon the king a high responsibility to pay the money, unless the recommendation of the message should be explained or done away, or at any rate unless a new motive to the execution of the treaty should be furnished in the fact that the two Houses of Congress, having considered the subject, had deemed it inexpedient to act until the French Chambers should have had an opportunity to be heard from. In the second contingency, that of the passage of a bill of appropriation after receiving the message, a vote of Congress, as proposed, would be soothing to the pride of France, and calculated to continue that good understanding which it must be the sincere desire of every cit izen of the United States to cultivate with that country. If the Chambers shall have passed the bill they will see that though the President of the United States, in the prosecution of a just claim, and in the spirit of sustaining the rights of the United States, had been induced to recommend the measure of reprisals, yet that a confidence was entertained in both branches of Congress that there would be a compliance, on the part of the French government, with the pledges it had given, and so forth. In that contingency, the expression of such a sentiment by Congress could not but have a happy effect. In the other contingency supposed, also, it is indispensable that some such measure should be adopted. Suppose the bill of appropriation to be rejected, or its passage to be suspended, until the Chambers ascertain whether the recommendation by the president is to be carried out by the passage of a law by Congress, a resolution like this will furnish the evidence desired of the disposition of Congress.

If, indeed, upon the reception of the president's message the Chambers shall have refused to make the appropriation, they will have put themselves in the wrong by not attending to the distribution of the powers of this government, and informing themselves whether those branches which alone can give effect to the president's recommendation, would respond to it. But, if they take the other course suggested, that of suspending action on the bill until they ascertain whether the legislative department of the government coincides with the executive in the contingent measure recommended, they will then find that the president's recommendation-the expression of the opinion of one high in authority, indeed, having a strong hold on the affections and confidence of the people, wielding the executive power of the nation, but still an inchoate act, having no effect whatever without the legislative action-had not been responded to by Congress, and so forth. Thus under all contingences happening on the other side of the water, and adapted to any one of those contingences, the passage of this resolution can do no mischief in any event, but is eminently calculated to prevent mischief, and to secure the very object which the president doubtless proposed to accomplish by his recommendation.

I will not now consume any more time of the House by further remarks, but will resume my seat with the intimation of my willingness to modify

the resolution in any manner, not changing its result, which may be calc lated to secure, what on such an occasion would be so highly desirable, the unanimous vote of the Senate in its favor. I believe it, however, all-essential that there should be a declaration that Congress do not think it expedient, in the present state of the relations between the United States and France, to pass any law whatever concerning them.

[After brief remarks by several other members, the resolution was slightly modified and passed by a unanimous vote.]