over the judges; and on that point the president is independent of both.” Now, Mr. President, I conceive, with great deference, that the president has mistaken the purport of the oath to support the Constitution of the United States. No one swears to support it as he understands it, but to support it simply as it is in truth. All men are bound to obey the laws, of which the Constitution is the supreme; but must they obey them as they are, or as they understand them? If the obligation of obedience is limited and controlled by the measure of information; in other words, if the party is bound to obey the Constitution only as he understands it ; what would be the consequence? The judge of an inferior court would disobey the mandate of a superior tribunal, because it was not in conformity to the Constitution, as he understands it; a custom-house officer would disobey a circular from the treasury department, because contrary to the Constitution, as he understands it; an American minister would disregard an instruction from the president, communicated from the Department of State, because not agreeable to the Constitution, as he understands it; and a subordinate officer in the army or navy, would violate the orders of his superior, because they were not in accordance with the Constitution, as he understands it. We should have nothing settled, nothing stable, nothing fixed. There would be general disorder and confusion throughout every branch of administration, from the highest to the lowest officers-universal nullification. For what is the doctrine of the president but that of South Carolina applied throughout the Union? The president independent both of Congress and the Supreme Court! only bound to execute the laws of the one and the decisions of the other, as far as they conform to the Constitution of the United States, as far as he understands it! Then it should be the duty of every president, on his installation into office, to carefully examine all the acts in the statute book, approved by his predecessors, and mark out those which he was resolved not to execute, and to which he meant to apply this new species of veto, because they were repugnant to the Constitution as he understands it. And, after the expiration of every term of the Supreme Court, he should send for the record of its decisions, and discriminate between those which he would, and those which he would not, execute, because they were or were not agreeable to the Constitution, as he understands it.

There is another constitutional doctrine contained in the message, which is entirely new to me. It asserts that "the government of the United States have no constitutional power to purchase lands within the States," except "for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings ;" and even for these objects, only "by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be." Now sir, I had supposed that the right of Congress to purchase lands in any State was incontestable; and, in point of fact, it probably at this moment owns land in every State of the Union, purchased for taxes, or as a judgment or mort gage creditor. And there are various acts of Congress which regulate the

purchase and transfer of such lands. The advisers of the president have confounded the faculty of purchasing lands with the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction, which is restricted by the Constitution to the forts and other buildings described.

The message presents some striking instances of discrepancy. First, it contests the right to establish one bank, and objects to the bill that it limits and restrains the power of Congress to establish several. Second, it urges that the bill does not recognize the power of State taxation generally; and complains that facilities are afforded to the exercise of that power in respect to the stock held by individuals. Third, it objects that any bonus is taken, and insists that not enough is demanded. And fourth, it complains that foreigners have too much influence, and that stock transferred loses the privilege of representation in the elections of the bank, which, if it were retained, would give them more.

Mr. President, we are about to close one of the longest and most arduous sessions of Congress under the present Constitution; and when we return among our constituents, what account of the operations of their government shall we be bound to communicate? We shall be compelled to say, that the Supreme Court is paralyzed, and the missionaries retained in prison in contempt of its authority, and in defiance of numerous treaties and laws of the United States; that the executive, through the Secretary of the Treasury, sent to Congress a tariff bill which would have destroyed numerous branches of our domestic industry, and to the final destruction of all; that the veto has been applied to the bank of the United States, our only reliance for a sound and uniform currency; that the Senate has been violently attacked for the exercise of a clear constitutional power; that the House of Representatives have been unnecessarily assailed; and that the president has promulgated a rule of action for those who have taken the oath to support the Constitution of the United States, that must, if there be practical conformity to it, introduce general nullification, and end in the absolute subversion of the government.

THE COMPROMISE TARIFF.

IN SENATE, FEBRUARY 12, 1833.

[WE find Mr. Clay, in this speech, occupying one of his eminently historical positions-an epoch of his growing fame. When he came to Washington, at the opening of the second session of the Twenty-second Congress, South Carolina had passed her laws of nullification, and President Jackson had issued his proclamation, that the federal laws involved in the controversy would be executed. Here was a civil war declared, and it was not easy to see how a collision would be avoided. But, in this state of things, a new demonstration turned up, by the action of South Carolina, to wit, that she had not yet resolved on any thing further than a trial in the courts of the questions in dispute. Mr. Clay, who had considered a collision inevitable, from the previous aspects of the case, on this new phase, instantly conceived a mode of conciliation. President Jackson, finding his precipitate movement disapproved throughout the entire South, sought a method of retreat by prompting his friends in Congress to bring forward a new tariff bill, which soon appeared in the House of Representatives under the name of Mr. Verplanck's bill. This bill was constructed so as to break down the system of protection, and if it had passed, would doubtless have satisfied South Carolina. General Jackson, who was always, when left to his passions, running into extremes, and who was never a statesman, did not, perhaps, see the immense calamity which such a measure as Mr. Verplanck's bill, consummated, would bring upon the country, and willing to do Mr. Clay and his friends a disservice, threw all the weight of his influence on the side of the new measure. The greatest promptitude was demanded of Mr. Clay to anticipate and ward off this movement by a measure of his own, and with little aid but his own intuitive perceptions, he brought forward in the Senate his famous Compromise Tariff of 1833. It took both Houses of Congress and the whole country by surprise, and the first impression

was decidedly favorable. It was doubtless one of the boldest measures which a statesman ever conceived. To have been sustained in it at the time, by large majorities in both Houses of Congress, and afterward to realize from it the approbation and gratitude of all parties of the American people, North and South, was a signal triumph of genius. Nothing but a genius of an extraordinary character could have devised such a complicated measure so suddenly, and adapted it to the exigences of the The following is the speech by which he introduced it to the Senate.]

case.

I YESTERDAY, sir, gave notice that I should ask leave to introduce a bill to modify the various acts imposing duties on imports. I at the same time added, that I should, with the permission of the Senate, offer an explanation of the principle on which that bill is founded. I owe, sir, an apology to the Senate for this course of action, because, although strictly parliamentary, it is, nevertheless, out of the usual practice of this body; but it is a course which I trust that the Senate will deem to be justified by the interesting nature of the subject. I rise, sir, on this occasion, actuated by no motives of a private nature, by no personal feelings, and for no personal objects; but exclusively in obedience to a sense of the duty which I owe to my country. I trust, therefore, that no one will anticipate on my part any ambitious display of such humble powers as I may possess. It is sincerely my purpose to present a plain, unadorned, and naked statement of facts connected with the measure which I shall have the honor to propose, and with the condition of the country. When I survey, sir, the whole face of our country, I behold all around me evidences of the most gratifying prosperity, a prospect which would seem to be without a cloud upon it, were it not that through all parts of the country there exist great dissensions and unhappy distinctions, which, if they can possibly be relieved and reconciled by any broad scheme of legislation adapted to all interests, and regarding the feelings of all sections, ought to be quieted; and leading to which object any measure ought to be well received.

In presenting the modification of the tariff laws, which I am now about to submit, I have two great objects in view. My first object looks to the tariff. I am compelled to express the opinion, formed after the most deliberate reflection, and on full survey of the whole country, that, whether rightfully or wrongfully, the tariff stands in imminent danger. If it should be preserved during this session, it must fall at the next session. By what circumstances, and through what causes has arisen the necessity for this change in the policy of our country, I will not pretend now to elucidate. Others there are, who may differ from the impressions which my mind has received upon this point. Owing, however, to a variety of concurrent

causes, the tariff, as it now exists, is in imminent dange, and if the system can be preserved beyond the next session, it must be by some meals not now within the reach of human sagacity. The fall of that policy, sir, would be productive of consequences calamitous indeed. When I look to the variety of interests which are involved, to the number of individuals interested, the amount of capital invested, the value of the buildings erected, and the whole arrangement of the business for the prosecution of the various branches of the manufacturing art, which have sprung up under the fostering care of this government, I can not contemplate any evil equal to the sudden overthrow of all those interests. History can produce no parallel to the extent of the mischief which would be produced by such a disaster. The repeal of the edict of Nantes itself was nothing in comparison with it. That condemned to exile, and brought to ruin, a great number of persons. The most respectable portion of the population of France was condemned to exile and ruin by that measure. But in my opinion, sir, the sudden repeal of the tariff policy would bring ruin and destruction on the whole people of this country. There is no evil, in my opinion, equal to the consequences which would result from such a catastrophe.

What, sir, are the complaints which unhappily divide the peeple of this great country? On the one hand it is said, by those who are opposed to the tariff, that it unjustly taxes a portion of the people, and paralyzes their industry; that it is to be a perpetual operation; that there is to be no end to the system; which, right or wrong, is to be urged to their inevitable ruin. And what is the just complaint, on the other hand, of those who support the tariff? It is, that the policy of the government is vacillating and uncertain, and that there is no stability in our legislation. Before one set of books is fairly opened, it becomes necessary to close them, and to open a new set. Before a law can be tested by experiment, another is passed. Before the present law has gone into operation; before it is yet nine months old; passed, as it was, under circumstances of extraordinary deliberation, the fruit of nine months' labor; before we know any thing of its experimental effects, and even before it commences its operations; we are required to repeal it. On one side we are urged to repeal a system which is fraught with ruin; on the other side, the check now imposed on enterprise, and the state of alarm in which the public mind has been thrown, render all prudent men desirous, looking ahead a little way, to adopt a state of things, on the stability of which they may have reason to count. Such is the state of feeling on the one side and on the other. I am anxious to find out some principle of mutual accommodation, to satisfy, as far as practicable, both parties-to increase the stability of our legislation; and at some distant day—but not too distant, when we take into view the magnitude of the interests which are involved-to bring down the rate of duties to that revenue standard, for which our opponents have so long contended. The basis on which I wish to found this modification is one