Supreme Court, which held that the omission to repair the fence was a breach of duty, and that it should have been left to the jury to determine whether that omission was reasonably connected with the accident as a cause thereof. In neither court did the company rely upon any contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, who seems to have been regarded as too young to be held responsible for his incautious conduct.

MATTHEWS, J.: It is further argued that the direction of the court below was right, because the want of a fence could not reasonably be alleged as the cause of the injury. In the sense of an efficient cause, causa causans, this is no doubt strictly true; but that is not the sense in which the law uses the term in this connection. The question is, was it causa sine qua non, a cause which if it had not existed, the injury would not have taken place, an occasional cause? and that is a question of fact, unless the causal connection is evidently not proximate; Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad Company vs. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469. The rule laid down by WILLES, J., in Daniel vs. Metropolitan Railway Company, L. R. 3 C. P. 216, 222, and approved by the Exchequer Chamber, L. R. 3 C. P. 591, and by the House of Lords, L. R. 5 H. L. 45, was this: "It is necessary for the plaintiff to establish by evidence circumstances from which it may fairly be inferred that there is reasonable probability that the accident resulted from the want of some precaution which the defendant might and ought to have resorted to." And in the case of Williams vs. Great Western Railway Company, L. R. 9 Exchequer, 157, where that rule was applied to a case similar to the present, it was said (p. 162): "There are many supposable circumstances under which the accident may have happened, and which would connect the accident with the neglect. If the child was merely wandering about and he had met with a stile, he would probably have been turned back; and one, at least, of the objects for which a stile or gate is required, is to warn people of what is before them, and to make them pause before reaching a dangerous place like a railroad."

The evidence of the circumstances showing negligence on the part of the defendant, which may have been the legal cause of the injury, according to the rule established in Railroad Company vs. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, and Randall vs. B. & O. Railroad Company, 109 U. S. 478, should have been submitted to the jury.

Williams vs. Railway Co., L. R. 9 Exch. 157 (1874).

In this case there were on the line of the defendant company two crossings, near each other, the railway intersecting a carriage road at one point and a footpath, which branched off from the road, at another point. The company was required by law to have a watchman at the road crossing and a gate or a stile at the footpath; but it had none of these. The plaintiff, a boy four and a half years old, was found lying

on the rails near the footpath, with one foot severed from his body. There was no evidence to show how he had gotten to that place, except that he had, a few minutes before, been sent on an errand from his home, which was about three hundred yards distant from the railway; but whether he had gone by way of the road and from it strayed down the line, or had gone along the path until he reached the track, could only be conjectured. It was held that the jury should be permitted to say whether the accident was caused by the company's omission to establish a gate or a stile at the crossing of the footpath.

Baltimore City Passenger Railway Company vs. Kemp, 61 Md. 74 (1884).

Mrs. Kemp, being a passenger upon a car of the railway company, in alighting therefrom was injured through the negligent management of the car, and sustained a bruise upon one of her breasts. Shortly thereafter a cancer developed from the bruise. In this action brought by her on account of the occurrence stated, it was shown that, before the accident, the plaintiff's health had been good and there had been no evidence of cancer in her person, and medical testimony was adduced to the effect that such an injury as that received by Mrs. Kemp was sufficient to cause a cancer. On behalf of the defendant it was contended that this proof was not legally sufficient to establish the accident as the cause of the cancer; and that, even if the cancer could be traced to the bruise as its immediate cause, the bruise would not have developed as it did unless there had been an existing predisposition to cancer. On these accounts it was argued that the accident could not be regarded as the proximate cause of the cancer, and that no damages could properly be allowed for that disorder.

Held, that the supposed predisposition of the patient to cancer was not a reason for denying her damages on account of a cancer actually superinduced by the defendant's negligence; and that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that the cancer was caused by the bruise.

ALVEY, C. J.: The second prayer offered by the defendants, and which was refused by the court, asked that the jury be instructed that there was no legally sufficient evidence that the cancer, testified to by the witnesses, was caused by the negligence of the defendants, and therefore they should not take the cancer into, consideration in esti

mating any damages that they might award to the female plaintiff. And upon this prayer for instruction, the defendants contend, 1st, that there was no evidence, legally sufficient to be considered by the jury, that the cancer of which Mrs. Kemp suffered was the natural result or consequence of the negligence complained of; and 2ndly, that if there was in fact, any causal connection between the immediate injury received by Mrs. Kemp and the subsequent development of the cancer, the latter, to be treated as a legal effect, was too obscure, and too remote from the alleged cause, to form an element of danger for the original wrongful act.

*

We shall not recite in detail all the evidence upon the subject. Suffice it to state, that the evidence shows clearly and without contradiction, that Mrs. Kemp was, at the time of the accident, and for many years prior thereto, apparently in good health and condition. The accident occurred about the middle of May, 1880, and a very short time thereafter the cancer commenced its development on the injured part of her person. * And the professional witnesses, while they all testify that it is impossible to know and be certain as to the origin of cancer in any given case, yet they all agree in saying that the blow, such as that described by Mrs. Kemp, was sufficient and may have been the cause of the development of the cancer in her case. In the opinion of two of the physicians, the blow on the breast, as described by Mrs. Kemp, was not only sufficient cause for the production of the cancer, but that they would attribute the cancer to that cause. And from the coincidences of the case we must say that their opinion does not appear to be unreasonable.

Now, with this evidence in the case, unless the court could have been required to hold, as matter of law, that the production of cancer was too uncertain and too remote a consequence of the alleged injury to be allowed to be considered in estimating the damages, upon what principle could the court properly withhold the matter from the jury, upon the prayer offered by the defendants? It was for the jury to determine, as matter of fact, whether the cancer did result from the injury received. And in determining this question they were required to consider all the circumstances and coincidences of the case, in connection with the testimony given by the professional witnesses. If therefore the subject was proper to be considered by the jury at all, we are clearly of opinion that there was evidence sufficient to be considered by them.

* * *

It is not simply because the relation of cause and effect may be somewhat involved in obscurity, and therefore difficult to trace, that the principle obtains, that only the natural and proximate results of a wrongful act are to be regarded. It is only where there may be a more direct and immediate sufficient cause of the effect complained of, that the more remote cause will not be charged with the effect. If a given result can be directly traced to a particular cause, as the natural and proximate effect, why should not such effect be regarded by the law, even though such cause may not always, and under all conditions of things, produce like results. It is the common observation of all, that

the effect of personal injuries depend much upon the peculiar conditions and tendencies of the persons injured; and what may produce but slight and comparatively uninjurious consequences in one case, may produce consequences of the most serious and distressing character in another. And this being so, a wrongdoer is not permitted to relieve himself from responsibility for the consequences of his act, by showing that the injury would have been of less severity if it had been inflicted upon anyone else of a large majority of the human family. Hence the general rule is, that, in actions of tort like the present, the wrongdoer is liable for all the direct injury resulting from his wrongful act, and that, too, although the extent or special nature of the resulting injury could not, with certainty, have been foreseen or contemplated as the probable result of the act done. * * * If by the blow received a severe contusion had been produced, resulting in an ordinary tumor or open ulcer, we suppose no question would have been raised as to the right of the plaintiff to show such results of the injury received, as indicating the extent of the injury and the degree of suffering endured. Why should a different rule be applied in this case? That the female plaintiff may have had a tendency or predisposition to cancer, can afford no proper ground of objection. She in common with all other people of the community had a right to travel or be carried in the cars of the defendants, and she had a right to enjoy that privilege without incurring the peril of receiving a wrongful injury that might result in inflaming and developing the dormant germs of a fatal disease. It is not for the defendants to say that, because they did not, or could not in fact, anticipate such a result of their negligent act, they must therefore be exonerated from liability for such consequences as ensued.

Texas and Pacific Railway vs. Howell, 224 U. S. 577, Supreme Court of the United States (1911).

Howell, who was in the employ of the railway company, was set to digging a hole under a coal-chute upon which other men were working. By the negligence of the men above, a piece of timber was allowed to fall upon Howell, whereby he was injured. A few months afterward Howell developed tuberculosis of the spine, or Potts' disease. He sued the company for the injury sustained by him. The defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that the disease of the spine was too remote from the blow to be attributed to it as a result. The court left it to he jury to determine whether the disease was the direct consequence of the blow. The jury found in the affirmative and allowed damages to compensate for the tuberculosis. Held, that the action of the trial court was correct.

HOLMES, J.: There was ample evidence that the blow occasioned the development of his disease, although it was not discovered to be Potts' disease, as it is called, for over a year. But it is argued that, if such a disease is due to the presence of tubercular germs in a man's system before the accident, the defendant ought not to be required to pay more

than it would to a normal man. On this point also we are of opinion that the jury were warranted in finding that the disease was the direct result of the injury.

Green vs. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69 (1909).

The defendants were contractors engaged in work upon the roadbed of a railroad. The work required heavy blasting which shook the surrounding earth for a distance of several hundred yards and hurled large fragments of rock in all directions.

Mrs. Green had rented three rooms in a house situated two hundred yards from the site of the work. She had entire control over these rooms in which she lived. The work continued night and day over a period of about nine months. During this time the house was almost demolished by the vibrations and was struck and penetrated many times by large pieces of stone. In dread for their lives, the inmates often sought shelter in the cellar and, though the plaintiff was never actually struck, she fell into a state of nervous prostration.

It was contended by the defendants that, as there had been no physical impact or bodily injury to the plaintiff, they were not liable to her for injuries resulting from mere fright or nervousness.

Held, that as great fright was the reasonable and natural consequence of the circumstances which the defendant had created, and as the injury to her health was actually and proximately caused by that fright, the defendant was liable.

**

PEARCE, J.: We are of the opinion that under the evidence, the plaintiff was not a mere lodger, the landlady retaining the legal possession of the whole house, but that she was a tenant entitled to the exclusive possession and control of the rooms she occupied. Blasting of rocks by the use of gunpowder or other explosives in the vicinity of another's dwelling house, is a nuisance, and the person doing the act, or causing it to be done, is liable for all injuries that result therefrom. In Webb's Pollock on Torts, the author says: "The conception of private nuisance was formerly limited to injuries done to a man's freehold by a neighbor's acts, of which stopping or narrowing rights of way and flooding land by the diversion of water courses appear to have been the chief species. In the modern authorities it includes all injuries to an owner or occupier in the enjoyment of the property of which he is in possession, without regard to the quality of the tenure." * "The kind of nuisance which is most commonly spoken of by the technical name, is the continuous doing of something which interferes with another's health or comfort, in the occupation of his property, such as carrying on a noisy or offensive trade." * *There is a wide divergence of judicial opinion as to whether a cause of action will lie for actual physical injuries resulting from fright and nervous shock caused by the wrongful acts of another; and it may be considered as settled, that mere fright, without any physical injury resulting therefrom, cannot form the basis of a cause of action. This is so, because mere fright

*