have lived upon expedients till we can live no longer. The history of this war is a history of temporary devices instead of system, and economy which results from it.

"If we mean to continue our struggles (and it is to be hoped we shall not relinquish our claims), we must do it upon an entire new plan. We must have a permanent force; not a force that is constantly fluctuating and sliding from under us, as a pedestal of ice would leave a statue on a summer's day; involving us in expense that baffles all calculation-an expense which no funds are equal to. We must at the same time contrive ways and means to aid our taxes by loans, and put our finances upon a more certain and stable footing than they are at present. Our civil government must likewise undergo a reform; ample powers must be lodged in congress as the head of the federal union, adequate to all the purposes of war. Unless these things are done, our efforts will be in vain."

"To accelerate the federal alliance and lead to the happy establishment of the federal union," congress urged on the states a liberal surrender of their territorial claims in the West; and it provided "that the western lands which might be ceded to the United States should be settled and formed into distinct republican states, that should become members of that federal union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence as the other states." On the fifth of October, in words drafted by Robert R. Livingston, it adhered with hearty good-will to the principles of the armed neutrality, as set forth by Russia. By a vote of a majority of the states it sought to quiet the discontent among the officers in the army by promising them half-pay for life. But, to relieve the embarrassments of the moment, it was helpless.

On the fourth of November congress once more distributed among the several states a tax of six millions of silver dollars, to be paid partly in specific articles. "It is now four days," wrote Glover to Massachusetts on the eleventh of December, "since your line of the army has eaten one mouthful of bread. We have no money; nor will anybody trust us. The best of wheat is at this moment selling in the state of New York for three fourths of a dollar per bushel, and your army is starving for want. On the first of January something will turn up, if

not speedily prevented, which your officers cannot be answerable for."

When congress, in September 1776, had transferred the enlistment of troops to the states, the new recruits were to bind themselves to serve for the war; but in some cases the enlistment was made "for three years or for the war;" and three years had passed since that time. In the night of the first of January 1781, a part of the Pennsylvania line, at Morristown, composed in a large degree of new-comers from Ireland, revolted, and, under the lead of their non-commissioned officers, marched with six field-pieces to Princeton. The want of clothes, of food, and of pay for nearly a year, and the compulsion imposed upon some of them to remain in service beyond the three years for which they believed they had engaged, were extremities which they would no longer endure.

Informed of the mutiny, Sir Henry Clinton passed over to Staten Island with a body of troops for its support; but two emissaries whom he sent to them with tempting offers were given up by the mutineers, and after trial were hanged as spies. Reed, the president of Pennsylvania, repaired to the spot, though it was beyond his jurisdiction; and, without authority and without due examination of each case, he discharged those who professed to have served out their specified term, while measures were taken by the state of Pennsylvania to clothe and pay the rest. They, for the most part, obtained no more than was due them; but it was of evil tendency that they gained it by a revolt.

In a circular letter to the New England states, of which Knox was made the bearer, Washington laid open the aggravated calamities and distresses of the army. "Without relief, the worst," he said, "that can befall us may be expected. I will continue to exert every means I am possessed of to prevent an extension of the mischief; but I can neither foretell nor be answerable for the issue."

Troops of New Jersey, whose ranks next to the Pennsylvania line included the largest proportion of foreign-born, showed signs of being influenced by the bad example; but Washington interposed. The twenty regiments of New England in the continental service had equal reasons for discontent; but they

were almost every one of them native American freeholders, or their sons. A detachment of them, marching through deep snows and over mountainous roads, repressed the incipient revolt. The passions of the army were subdued by their patriotism; and order and discipline returned. "Human patience has its limits," wrote Lafayette to his wife on the occasion; "no European army would suffer the tenth part of what the American troops suffer. It takes citizens to support hunger, nakedness, toil, and the total want of pay, which constitute the condition of our soldiers, the hardiest and most patient that are to be found in the world."

Knox reported from New England zealous efforts to enlist men for the war. Congress could do nothing, and confessed that it could do nothing. "We have required," thus it wrote to the states on the fifteenth of January 1781, "aids of men, provisions, and money;" "the states alone have authority to execute." For the moment, nothing remained for the United States but to appeal to France for rescue, not from a foreign enemy, but from the evils consequent on their own want of government. It was therefore resolved to despatch to Versailles as a special agent some one who had lived in the midst of the ever-increasing distresses of the army, to set them before the government of France in the most striking light. Hamilton, the fittest man for the office, was passed over, and the choice fell on the younger Laurens of South Carolina.

To him Washington confided a statement of the condition of the country; and with dignity and candor avowed that it had reached a crisis out of which it could not rise by its own unassisted strength. "Without an immediate, ample, and efficacious succor in money," such were his words, "we may make a feeble and expiring effort in our next campaign, in all probability the period of our opposition. Next to a loan of money, a constant naval superiority on these coasts is the object most interesting;" and without exaggeration he explained the rapid advancement of his country in population and prosperity, and the certainty of its redeeming in a short term of years the comparatively inconsiderable debts it might have occasion to contract. To Franklin he wrote in the same strain; and Lafayette addressed a like memorial to Vergennes.

The people of the United States, in proportion to numbers, were richer than the people to whose king they were obliged to appeal. Can Louis XVI. organize the resources of France, and is republican America incapable of drawing forth its own? Can monarchy alone give to a nation unity? Is freedom necessarily anarchical? Are authority and the hopes of humanity forever at variance? Are the United States, who so excel the kingdoms of the Old World in liberty, doomed to hopeless inferiority in respect of administration? For the eye of Robert R. Livingston, then the most influential member from New York, Washington traced to their source the evils under which the country was sinking. "There can be no radical cure," wrote he, "till congress is vested by the several states with full and ample powers to enact laws for general purposes, and till the executive business is placed in the hands of able and responsible men. Requisitions then will be supported by law."

In congress itself, on the third of February, Witherspoon of New Jersey, seconded by Burke of North Carolina, proposed to clothe that body with authority to regulate commerce and to lay duties upon imported articles. The proposition was so far accepted that it was resolved to be indispensably necessary for the states to vest a power in congress to levy a duty of five per cent on importations of articles of foreign growth and manufacture. Yet, before that measure could become valid, the separate approval of each one of the thirteen states must be gained.

The assent of Virginia was promptly given. That great commonwealth, having Jefferson for its governor, earnestly sought to promote peace and union. To hasten peace, it even instructed its delegates in congress to surrender the right of navigating the Mississippi river below the thirty-first degree of north latitude, provided Spain in return would guarantee the navigation of the river above that parallel. Madison, obeying the instruction, voted for the measure contrary to his private judgment. Massachusetts, Connecticut, and North Carolina alone opposed, New York being divided. Virginia did more. Avowing her regard for a "federal union," and preferring the good of the country to every object of smaller importance, she resolved to yield her title to the lands north-west

of the Ohio, on condition that they should be formed into distinct republican states, and be admitted members of the federal union; and Jefferson, who from the first had pledged himself to the measure, announced to congress this great act of his administration in a letter full of hope for the completion of the American union, and the establishment of free republics in the vast country to which Virginia quitted her claim.

The first day of March 1781 was a great day in the history of the country. Maryland, last of the states, subscribed the articles; and "the United States of America, each and every of the thirteen, adopted, confirmed, and ratified their confederation and perpetual union."

The states of the United States, in establishing the confederation, established no government. In the draft of Dickinson, the confederation was an alliance of sovereigns: every change in it increased the relative power of the states. The original report permitted each of them to impose duties on imports and exports, provided they did not interfere with stipulations in treaties; this restriction was confined to the treaties already proposed to France and Spain. No power to prohibit the slave-trade was granted. In troops raised for the common defence, the appointment of field and inferior officers was reserved to the several states. Congress was in future to be chosen annually, and on every first Monday of November to organize itself anew. A majority of the states present had thus far decided every question; the confederation, which forthwith took effect, required the presence and assent of seven states, an absolute majority of all, to decide even the most trifling motion, and of nine states-that is, two thirds of all-to carry every important measure of peace or war, of treaties or finance.

Further, each state retained its sovereignty and every attri bute not expressly delegated to the United States; and, by the denial of all incidental powers, the exercise of the granted powers was rendered impracticable. By the articles of confederation, congress alone had the right to treat with foreign nations; but it provided no method for enforcing treaties, so that the engagements on the part of the nation might be violated at the will of any one of its members.