H. OF R.] Removal of the Deposites. [JAN. 7, 1804. applications from foreign public ministers or other for- an executive department, or that, in the performance of eigners, or to such other matters respecting foreign affairs as the President of the United States shall assign to the said department: and, furthermore, that the said principal officer shall conduct the business of the said department in such manner as the President of the United States shall, from time to time, order and direct." any such duties, he is not subject to direction by the Pres ident; but it is meant to say that the Treasury Depar ment is not, in its control of the treasury, an executre department, in the constitutional sense; and that the drection which is to govern the Secretary is left, by the terms of the act, to be settled according to the characte The act of 7th August, 1789, entitled "An act to es- of the function to be exercised. The Secretary is tablish an executive department, to be denominated the the head of an executive department, in the performance Department of War," enacts that the Secretary "shall of acts which concern the custody and security of t perform and execute such duties as shall, from time to public moneys in the treasury. His department is . time, be enjoined on or intrusted to him by the President in this respect, a presidential department. To tar of the United States, agreeably to the constitution, rela- placed the custody of the public treasury within the Extive to military commissions, or to the land or naval forces, ecutive Department, would have been a constitutiona' -ships or warlike stores of the United States, or to such congruity, a solecism, to say nothing of the enormo other matters respecting military or naval affairs, as the mischiefs to result from placing the power of the sw President of the United States shall assign to the said de- and the purse in the same hand. It would have marr partment, or relative to the granting of lands to persons the harmony and simplicity of the whole scheme of th entitled thereto for military services rendered to the constitution, by leaving to Congress the duty of paya United States, or relative to Indian affairs: and, further- the debts and providing for the common defence and ve more, that the said principal officer shall conduct the bu- fare, while the money collected for these objects was siness of the said department in such manner as the Presi- under their control, but in the hands of a different à dent of the United States shall, from time to time, order or instruct." The act of 30th April, 1798, entitled "An act to establish an executive department, to be denominated the Department of the Navy," enacts that it shall be the duty of the Secretary "to execute such orders as he shall receive from the President of the United States relative to the procurement of naval stores and materials, and the construction, armament, equipment, and employment of vessels of war, as well as all other matters connected with the naval establishment of the United States." The provisions of these acts require no commentary. They place the departments wholly under the direction of the President, agreeably to the constitution, in all that regards the exercise of his constitutional powers over foreign affairs, the army, and the navy. partment. It would make, and the adoption of the trine does make, the power of appropriation entirely tile, because the public money is, by force of it, as I under the control of Congress before appropriation as is afterwards; and it gives the control of the public tra ure, so far as the position and distribution of it can g such a control, to a department that can wield the wa force of the revenue against the Legislative Departur and the people. The argument of the honorable gentleman from T nessee here cuts into the subject by means of the pow of removal from office; and, with the aid of the debater Congress, when the act for organizing the Departme of Foreign Affairs was on its passage, he contendst the President may direct the Secretary of the Treas in the discharge of his duties of every description, The act of the 2d September, 1789, for the establish- cause he may remove him. Sir, I do not adopt his t ment of the Treasury Department, pursues a strikingly clusion. It does not flow from his premises, and a beta different course. It drops from the title the denomina- conclusion flows from better premises. tion of "executive" given to the other departments-not The power of removal is a great question, which! by accident, but by design, as the word "executive" was not mean at present to agitate. It has been allowed, ** contained in the title of the bill when reported by com- implication and usage, to the President of the U mittee, (see journal 1st and 2d Cong. vol. 1, p. 57;) and, States, for different reasons; and the argument band what is more material, it enacts that it shall be the duty down to us on this head is, perhaps, not altogether as cer of the Secretary "to digest and prepare plans for the consistent, and intelligible as the great names connec management and improvement of the revenue, and for with it would lead us to expect. It is probably imperfe the support of the public credit; to prepare and report It is, however, plain, from what remains of it, that the ge estimates of the public revenue and the public expendi- tlemen who asserted this power did not all do so for de tures; to superintend the collection of the public revenue; same reasons. It would seem to have been the opinion to decide on the forms of keeping and stating accounts some, that the power of removal was an executive po and making returns; and to grant, under the limitations or a power of the Executive Department. Others, herein established, or to be hereafter provided, all war- did not agree to this, thought it belonged to the appe rants for moneys to be issued from the Treasury, in pur-ing power, which was substantially in the President. A suance of appropriations by law; to execute such services some, who differed from both, deemed the most cot relative to the sale of the lands belonging to the United nient and safest position of the power to be in the Pres States as may be by law required of him; to make report dent, who, by its immediate exercise, might resist the i and give information to either branch of the Legislature, gressions of dishonesty, or prevent the mischiefs of s in person or in writing, as he may be required, respect competency. No one, sir, appears to have thought ing all matters referred to him by the Senate or House of the power belonged to the President, because he lo Representatives, or which shall appertain to his office; right to direct all officers appointed during pleas and, generally, to perform all such services relative to although it is clear, from the argument of Mr. Mad the finances as he shall be directed to perform." The that the force of that principle was very striking in is name of the President is not mentioned in the act, except fluence upon the question then directly before Congres in the 7th section, which charges the assistant with the the right to remove the Secretary for Foreign Af duties of the office in case the Secretary is removed by That eminent person said, "It is evidently the intent the President; and the bond of the Treasurer, prescribed of the constitution that the First Magistrate should re by the 4th section, is not to be approved by the Presi-sponsible for the Executive Department. So far, the dent, but by the Secretary of the Treasury and Comp-fore, as we do not make the officers who are to ad in the duties of the said department responsible to b troller. It is not meant to say, sir, that the Secretary of the he is not responsible to his country." This, sir, is ve Treasury performs, or is bound to perform, no duties of striking, but it goes no further than the duties and 15 AN. 7, 1834.] Removal of the Deposites. [H. of R. or sibilities of an executive department, in its constitu- belong to the Executive Department. This is a confusion al sense. If the honorable gentleman can make it out of language. The departments of our Government are t the keeping and control of the public treasury are legislative, judicial, and executive; and what does not beti es of an executive department in that sense, he will long to the first two, belongs to the third. But there are in a better support for his argument than I have yet executive acts, that is to say, acts to be executed in the eard. Judicial and Legislative Departments, as well as in the ExThe principle which, it seems to me, sir, must govern ecutive Department. An act to be executed in the Judicial is question, and that which I take the liberty of stating Department does not belong to the Executive Department. o the House, as the only satisfactory one that has occur. The question of the right of direction regards not merely ed to me, is this: that the right of direction, where it ex. the act to be done, but the relation in which it is to be ts at all, results from official connexion, subordination, done. nd responsibility, and not from tenure of office. If the It is again said, that the constitutional power of the uty belongs to the Executive Department, the right of President to demand the opinion, in writing, of the officers rection is in the head of that department, who is re- of the executive departments, touching the duties of their ponsible for the performance of all its duties. If it be- respective offices, shows the dependency of these officers ngs to the Judicial Department, the right is in the heads upon the President, and his responsibility for them. This that department-the courts. If it belongs to the Legis- may or may not be so; but it leaves the question, what is tive Department, the right of direction is in Congress. an executive department, in this sense, precisely where he direction in these several cases, by force of this prin- it found it. ple, is in perfect harmony with the system. It proceeds Again: it is said that the President is bound to take om official responsibility in the principal, and official care that the laws are faithfully executed. This proves ty in the subordinate officer to follow what the princi- too much for the argument, as, if it proves any thing, it lirects. The officer is bound to obey the principal, proves that the President may direct the judges as well ecause the principal is responsible for him in the very as other officers during pleasure. The supervisory power atter directed, and his direction is a justification to the cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion in the Secficer who obeys him. Any other principle must pro-retary, when the law gives it to him, because the faithful ice perpetual conflict and confusion. The attempt to execution of the law consists in the exercise of his discreake a test of the removing power fails as soon as you tion; and whoever disturbs that exercise violates the law, ply it. The marshals are, as to matters of judicial cog- instead of executing it. It is a power that does not enzance, directed by the courts, to whom they are re-large the President's authority, but rather declares the onsible, and for the proper direction of whom the courts result of other powers before given to him in the constitue responsible; yet the courts do not appoint, and can- tion. It is corrective, to put aside, where his power is t remove, the marshals. adequate, both dishonesty and incompetency; but it is not Sir, the question cannot well arise as to acts plainly directory nor transcendental, to bring all the officers and escribed. No one can assert an authority in the Pres-operations of the nation under his sway. ent to direct an act to be done, which the laws, or the Finally, it is said that the power of removal is fairly apurts in conformity with the laws, direct not to be done; plied to discharge an officer who does not do his duty; r the contrary. It arises only in regard to discretion- and how can this be, if the President cannot decide what y acts. But the same principle regulates duties of every is his duty, and, consequently, direct its performance? scription, and especially duties which are committed by Sir, the President is responsible for the use and abuse of e law to the discretion of an officer. For abuse of that his power. If he exercises it fairly, to remove an officer cretion, if answerable to any thing but the law, he is who does not do his duty, it is well. But if the discharge swerable to the head of that department to which the is colorably for this, but really to enforce a direction which rticular duty appertains, and by that department he may he had no right to give, he gains the power he ought not directed. The marshal is, in judicial matters, answer- to have by the abuse of the power he has. le to the court; in legislative matters, to Congress; and These are the remarks, sir, which I have supposed executive matters, to the President. The Secretary of would show the inaccuracy of the Secretary, in that part Treasury, as it regards the Treasury, is answerable to of his letter which attributes a power over the deposites ingress. To give the President the right of directing to the Executive, or to the Secretary as an executive controlling his discretion in such matters, is to make officer. In this matter of the deposites, he is emphati: Secretary responsible to the President, who is not cally the minister or agent of Congress. He is to give sponsible for him. This, sir, is the position upon which reasons to Congress; and they are, consequently, to be his e doctrine I maintain may be safely placed. The Pres- own reasons. The reasons of the President are not given, ent is not responsible for the duties which do not apper- and would not be a justification to the Secretary, if they n to his department. His direction is no justification were. The Secretary is to give them to Congress, his the officer to whom the law assigns the duty to be per-principal, and not to the head of the Executive Departmed, or to whom it has given the discretion to perform ment, to whom, in this matter, he does not sustain an e act or not; he is, therefore, not bound to obey him, official relation. It is a charter authority, and to be purr excusable for obeying him. Any other principle will sued as the charter directs. Under this charter the Presve to the President the right of directing and controll- ident has several powers, such as to appoint commissioners the discretion of every officer in the land except the to receive subscriptions, to appoint directors, and to issue lges. a writ of scire facias. The Secretary, also, has powers, The answers given to these suggestions, sir, are not as to require transfers of public money, and to remove isfactory. It is said, the President has the undoubted the deposites, giving his reasons. It is humbly appreht to remove, and may, in this way, obtain the direction. hended that these are different powers in relation as well rtainly the President may thus obtain the direction of as in action, and that the President cannot assume those en who prefer their office to their duty; but if he re- which have not a relation to the department of which he ves, to obtain a power of direction where he has not is the head. e right, he violates his own duty. The power of reval ought not to be so exercised. It is further said, that all powers are legislative, judicial, executive. The Secretary's power is neither legislanor judicial, and therefore it must be executive, and VOL. X.-147 But how would it follow, sir, if this were otherwise, that Congress cannot remove the deposites in any event, as the Secretary avers? It would seem as if the grant to the Executive was set up as a less startling reason for denying the power to Congress, than a grant to the Secre H. OF R.] Removal of the Deposites. [JAN. 7, 1834. tary would be; but the power is inherent to Congress. disappear; she ceases to be an object of the least consd It is one of which they could not divest themselves abso-eration. What are convenience and interests? Where lutely and unconditionally. They hold it now, as they are they defined? What acts promote them? What a always must hold it, subject only to the right of the bank; any degree of them? What law has made the Secretary that is to say, except so far as the charter gives the right of the Treasury a judge of them? This nation and tha of possession to the bank. This right of the bank grows House are variously divided in regard to almost all t out of her covenant to afford safety and to render service. topics of general convenience and interest that are és The continuance of her right depends upon the perform-cussed before them; and here is a challenge of the rig ance of her duty. The covenant of the nation to leave by a single officer of the Government, to direct the me the deposites with the bank, and of the bank to keep mentum of the whole revenue of the United States to t them secure, and to perform other duties in regard to support of what he thinks fit to regard as the general is them, are mutual and dependant covenants. If the bank terests and convenience of the people; and he challenges commits a breach, the covenant of the nation is either dis-it as the power with which his office has been cle charged or suspended, and Congress may take care of since its creation. A more extravagant proposition that which is the property of the nation; and if the acts never, in my humble judgment, been asserted; and imputed to the bank were a sufficient cause of removal, as unsound in reference to the subject to which it in Congress were as competent to decide them to be so, at the present session, as the Secretary was before. The technical doctrine of the Secretary is inconsistent with the spirit of the charter, and with the safety of the nation. It strips Congress of all power, and lodges it where there is no responsibility either to the bank or to Congress. It asserts that Congress could not reclaim the control of the deposites, under any circumstances, from either the bank or its own minister. It leads to this extraordinary consequence, that if the bank could have propitiated the Secretary to connive at the most corrupt employment of the public treasure, there would have been no remedy for it. if "offence's gilded hand" could have shoved by the Secretary, we should have seen "the wicked prize itself buy out the law." The proposition is wholly inadmissible in every possible interpretation of it. plied by the Secretary, as it is dangerous to the liber and welfare of the country. The question of gen convenience and interest, in regard to the public de ites, was settled by Congress when they agreed th bank should have them; and it was settled for the wh term of the charter. The Secretary has nothing to with it. The power of removal was given to him to exercised for the promotion of a particular interest." the remedy of a particular mischief, and for nothing the General convenience and interest are results with wh Congress have never trusted him, or meant to trust... or any body but themselves. The authority given by the charter to the Secrets the Treasury is official, and not personal; and, by res sary implication, it is limited by the sphere of his of His powers and duties are fiscal, and the functions of Another proposition, sir, and the most alarming, from office are the index to the reasons for which, and ir the great practical mischiefs which must flow from it, which alone, he has authority to remove the depo comes from the Secretary in the following terms: "That His reasons must grow out of his relations to the bak the power reserved to the Secretary of the Treasury does the treasure in its custody, and to the collection a not depend for its exercise merely on the safety of the position of that treasure, which the law confides to 12 public money in the hands of the bank, nor upon the if the deposites are not safe, his official connexion fidelity with which it has conducted itself; but he has the the bank will apprize him of it; he has the means of right to remove the deposites, and it is his duty to remove certaining it by the returns made to him; and by ex them, whenever the public interest or convenience will nation of the general accounts of the bank, if he is be promoted by the change." In another part of his satisfied with the returns. If the bank does not per letter, the Secretary of the Treasury says that it is his its duties to the Government, of paying and transf duty to remove the deposites "whenever the change the public funds, the Secretary knows it, because would in any degree promote the public interest." And the officer to direct the service, and to watch over again he says: The safety of the deposites, the ability performance. And, beyond this, what official auth of the bank to meet its engagements, its fidelity in the has the Secretary? What official duties does he per performance of its obligations, are only a part of the con- that can instruct him with reasons for the removal siderations by which his judgment must be guided. The public deposites? Sir, he must leave his office befer general interest and convenience of the people must reg- can obtain them, and enter into departments whe ulate his conduct." not belong to him; he must take charge of interests " 66 The application of this doctrine to the present power have not been confided to his office. I have stated of the Secretary over the deposites in the State banks House why these reasons have not been explicitly de may be seen from another part of the letter. The Sec- in the act, and that it was to continue a control over retary says: "The law incorporating the bank has re-treasury, which Congress thought might be impart served to him, in its fullest extent, the power he before the conditions of its exercise were more explicitly st possessed. It does not confer on him a new power, but In the eye of a court, there is discretion, regulated reserves to him his former authority, without any new appeal to Congress. In the contemplation of Cor limitation." Consequently, it is the Secretary's apprehen- there is limited power, regulated by the duties of sion that he now has the same power over the deposites Treasury Department, in its relations to the bank. in the State banks, which he claims to have had over the is a stain upon the Congress that incorporated this ba deposites in the Bank of the United States; and it is this it is a stain upon the first Congress that organize! which makes the subject worthy of the special attention Treasury Department-to say that they placed of the House. power of unknown men, for an indefinite period, Sir, it is an abuse of language to call the charter direc-period of twenty years, without the right of rec tion as to the deposites a contract, if this be the Secre- whole revenue of the United States, to be used tary's power. It has none of the features or binding force Secretary should think the general convenience of a contract. It is wholly dependant on his mere favor, terest of the public required. Is it so, sir? And w pleasure, opinion; upon any thing short of, and indeed House affirm this proposition of the Secretary Le not short of, the most fantastic caprice. The bank has nation look to it. If it should be the Secretary's no contract with the nation under this construction; and, that it is for the general convenience and interest sir, when I regard the necessary effects of the asserted people that manufactures should decline and die a power upon the nation at large, the interests of the bank brings a dearth upon the land--he draws the publis . 7, 1834.] Removal of the Deposites. [H. OF R. to another quarter--and they perish. If internal im- they were the notes of specie-paying banks, substantially ovements are not to his mind--if Pennsylvania wants a they were not such notes as the bank thought it could n-if New Jersey requires funds, to assist them--if convert into specie. This was not a case of exercise of ere is any proposed rival interest which would be pro- power under the 16th section, but a case of necessity, ted by their decline--his mandate to the State banks, in arising from the lawful refusal of the bank to receive the omotion of general convenience and interest, consum- deposites in the only form in which the Treasury could tes the design. The currency is his, to regulate at his make them. The other acts referred to were of a differeasure, and every thing dependant on it. Sir, if this ent kind, and they consisted of such dispositions of the eory of the Secretary be true, it was the duty of the public money as Mr. Crawford, in his letter of 13th Febnk of the United States, it is the duty of the deposite ruary, 1817, cited by the present Secretary of the Treasnks, to submit to his pleasure. If his power is consti- Jury, says he has authority to make: that is to say, depostionally and legally what he asserts it to be, it is the duty ites made with State banks, to sustain their credit. Upon the banks to become his slaves. If all this power over this point, the committee explicitly say that "this is no e treasury is his lawful power-if he is the arbiter of legal employment of public funds; it is nothing but a neral convenience and interest-if the Executive is the gratuitous loan," which, certainly, the Secretary was not ly head to direct and control him-it is a theory of uni- authorized to make, whatever was the practice. It was rsal subserviency to the Executive, for the profits that precisely of the same character as the transfer drafts, e to spring from the application of the public treasure. which appear to have been placed, by direction of the never occurred to me, sir, that men, treading the soil of present Secretary, in different hands, during the removal republic, would present such a doctrine for the review of the public deposites from the Bank of the United d sanction of Congress. States, and which are liable to precisely the same criticism. The authority of Mr. Secretary Crawford, therefore, does not seem competent for the purpose for which it has been cited. It has been said that both Secretary Crawford and cretary Ingham have asserted a similar doctrine. Sir, thout meaning the least disrespect to those officers, I y be permitted to say, that arguments in favor of power The fourth and last general proposition of the Secretanot entitled to most consideration when they come ry is that which asserts, that, as the propriety of removim those who are to exercise it. A Treasury argument, ing the deposites was evident, it was consequently his favor of Treasury power, is not quite as much to be duty to select the places of present deposite. Sir, on this lied on as an argument for the same power even from point I do not mean to ask any considerable attention of me other department. But, sir, the authority is not the House; for, although I hold the act of the Secretary actly as it is apprehended to be. In regard to Mr. Sec- to be against the law of Congress, and one from which the tary Ingham, there seems to have occurred one or two most critical consequences may result, it is not altogethimated passages between himself and the president of er, as I learn, without the countenance of a previous e bank, in the course of which a menace was let off Treasury practice, and I mean not to press it to any other to the use of the public deposites, for a certain pur-purpose than as a caution to be adverted to in the dispose, or in a certain event; but nothing to the effect sition of the general subject. The authority of the Secreatened occurred. Mr. Secretary Crawford did act, retary of the Treasury, under the 16th section of the t I do not admit that his action sustains the present charter, is not to remove the deposites, as his letter supcretary; or, if it does to a small extent, its effect is poses, but merely to order and direct that they shall not cen off by the opinion of a commitee of this House, of be made in the Bank of the United States. When the ose report a part was read the other day by the honor-deposite in that bank ceases to be lawful by the order of le member from Tennessee. The Secretary of the Treas- the Secretary, the general law takes up the subject, and y was invested, by the joint resolution of 30th April, that law gives to the Treasurer the power which the Sec16, with the largest powers, to cause the taxes and oth-retary has undertaken to exercise. The 4th section of moneys accruing, or becoming payable to the United the act of 2d September, 1789, is entirely explicit, "that ates, to be collected and paid in the legal currency of it shall be the duty of the Treasurer to receive and keep e United States. He was required and directed to adopt the moneys of the United States,"" to submit to the chi measures as he might deem necessary; and there Secretary of the Treasury, and to the Comptroller, or n be no doubt that such an authority gave to that offi- either of them, the inspection of the moneys in his hands,' er a power, which, since the entire and effectual resto- and to give bond, with sufficient sureties, in the sum of tion of specie payments, has ceased to exist. The his- $150,000, payable to the United States, "with condition ry of the disposition of the public moneys by Mr. Scc- for the faithful performance of the duties of his office, tary Crawford, who came into office in the fall of that and for the fidelity of the persons to be by him employar, is given in the report of the committee upon the ed." It is the Treasurer who is to choose the place of emorial or address of Ninian Edwards, made to this deposite; and he is the best officer in theory, as well as ouse in May, 1824. There appear to have been in the the only officer by the law, to perform the act; because ear 1818, and afterwards, two descriptions of acts by the doctrines of general convenience and interest are not r. Crawford affecting the public deposites. One of so likely to reach him. His object will be security, and sem consisted in using certain State banks to the West his bond is the motive for obtaining it. If there is a Treasdepositories of the public money, for the sake of the jury practice that has displaced the Treasurer, the pracvenue itself, and because the Bank of the United States tice should be made to conform to the law, or the law to ould not receive on deposite, as cash, any thing but the the practice. As the case now stands, the money of the gal currency of the country or its own notes, in which United States is not deposited where it is by direction e large receipts of the United States could not at that and under the sanction of the law. It is placed in the me be collected. There consequently were cases in deposite banks by an officer who has not the authority so ich the deposites could not be made in the Bank of to place it; and, in case of controversy, it may possibly e United States, because the bank would not receive be found, not only that the bond of the Treasurer is of em in that form alone in which the Treasury could make no avail, but that remedies for the loss or detention of em. It was not, as I apprehend, a case of omission to the deposites are not to be obtained in the name of the posite the public moneys in the Bank of the United United States, or in the courts of the United States, ates, but an omission to deposite in that bank moneys but in private names and in State courts, with all ich the bank would not receive, and was not bound to the contingencies incident to litigation in this fo ceive as moneys at all, because, although nominally Whatever may be the practice, it is not becoming, H. OF R.] Removal of the Deposites. [JAN. 7, 184. that the treasury of the United States should be in they thought proper, and have made the removal at the any predicament but that precisely in which the law has time a matter of positive enactment, and not of contingengiven its direction to place it. These general propositions of the Secretary are, then, I submit to this House, one and all of them, unsound, and without foundation in law; and some of them are pregnant with most alarming consequences to the public safety and welfare. If his particular reasons are dependant on them, as they doubtless are, they fall with their foundation; and they have, moreover, peculiar defects of their own, as will be seen by the details of more interest to which their consideration will give rise. cy. Now, Congress have not only not done this, but ther Sir, the Secretary admits that the public deposites were safe in the Bank of the United States. He admits that The Secretary has wholly overlooked the provision in the bank has faithfully performed its duty to the Govern- the charter which allows two years to the bank for wind ment in every stipulated form. He admits it, by the clear-up its concerns after the 3d March, 1836. That p est implication, in various parts of his report to Congress, sion runs: "And notwithstanding the expiration of to and places the order of removal upon entirely distinct term for which the said corporation is created, it shall grounds. The only valid causes of removal are, then, in lawful to use the corporate name, style, and capat.. my humble judgment, wanting; and, if all the particular for the purpose of suits, for the final settlement and causes asserted by the Secretary could be sustained in fact dation of the affairs and accounts of the corporation, as and law, they would fall short of a justification. They will, for the sale and disposition of their estate, real, persen. however, be found, one and all, to be without support. and mixed; but not for any other purpose, or in any Sir, the first and principal reason for the order of the er manner whatsoever, nor for a period exceeding Secretary is, that the present charter of the bank will ex-years after the expiration of the said term of incorp pire in March, 1836, and that it is not to be renewed. I do tion."-Sec. 21. not mean to detain the House with a commentary upon "As the act of Congress," says the Secretary, the novel spectacle of a Secretary of the Treasury in- created the corporation, limits its duration to the structing Congress upon the subject of his constitutional March, 1836, it became my duty, as the Secretary of “ opinions in regard to the charter of the bank, or upon Treasury, in executing the trust confided to me t what they will or will not think fit themselves to do in re- the law, to look to that period of time as the terminal gard to the renewal of the charter. For the purposes of of its corporate existence." "It was incumbent on this inquiry, I grant that the charter is not to be renew-in discharging my official duties, to act upon the as ed. The question is, how does that circumstance justify tion that this corporation would not continue in being the present removal? ter the time above specified." Now, sir, the corp The manner in which the Secretary develops his rea- existence is not so limited as the Secretary has felt soning on this head is as striking as it is plain and intelli-cumbent on him to assume. It is to continue two y gible. He begins by an averment, that, if the deposites more, for the very purpose of enabling it to do that wh should be left in the bank until the expiration of the the Secretary says shall be done before. There charter, it may be doubted whether the bank will have one operation which he wishes to compel the bank t the ability to be prompt in paying them to the Govern- to perform, that she cannot most appropriately per ment. He proceeds to suggest that the circulation of the in the additional two years. She may diminish or re bank, moreover, if it continues out till that time, will be- her discounts in any ratio she deems fit, five per cen come a depreciated currency, not merely by the charac- ten per cent. a month, or more or less, as circumsta ter of the paper, but by the cessation of the public guar- may require. She may possibly bring in her circulate antee; that the bank should be made to reduce her circu- in the same proportion; though that depends on lation, by reducing her discounts; that the removal of the pleasure of the holder. She may do every thing she public deposites will compel her to make this reduction; does, but expand herself after having closed or Eque and that the State bank circulation being pushed out, in its place, by means of these deposites made elsewhere, the notes of the Bank of the United States will be withdrawn, and a currency probably more uniform be substituted in its place. A Stat ed a transaction. She cannot make a new loan, but may continue in force the existing contracts, or settle liquidate them, as she may deem expedient. Sir, not has the bank the right to keep out her circulation, keep up her discounts during the whole term of Sir, whatever may be the merits of this plan, there is charter, which right she has purchased and paid for, no doubt that it is perfectly intelligible. It is an opera- it is her duty to do it, unless she is disabled by the a tion we are acquainted with. We know what it means, the Secretary. It was her promise in accepting and what it is to bring to pass. But the question in this charter. Her duty to trade is to assist it; to her stock place is, what right had the Secretary to take the public ers, it is to make an interest upon their capital; and, aber moneys from the Bank of the United States, because its all, her duty to the nation is to keep within the lim charter was to expire in March, 1836? What authority safety, by due control and regulation, the very did Congress mean to give him over the deposites, from bank paper which the Secretary desires to augment. F the simple fact of lapse of time? I confidently assert, these duties, in addition to the greater design of sett none whatever. There was no contingency in the cir- and distributing the public revenue, the bank was cumstance. It was matter of fatal necessity. It must ed, and is bound to their performance as long as se occur; and the Secretary could not be better informed perform them with safety to herself and to the co that it had occurred in 1833, than the Congress which Sir, the project of the Secretary of the Treasur granted the charter in 1816 were then informed that it tonishes me-it has astonished the country. It is would occur. Sir, it was just as well known in 1816 as that we find a pregnant source of the present it now is, that the 1st of October, 1833, was separated it is in the clearly avowed design to bring a by two years and five months from the 1st of March, time upon this land the curse of an unregulated 1836; and if lapse of time had not been deemed an inade- controlled, State bank paper currency. We are quate cause for the removal, Congress would themselves to see the drama which already, in the course of have ordered the deposites to be removed at the time present century, has passed before us, and clos- |