H. OF R.]

Removal of the Deposites.

[DEC. 30, 1833.

contend that it should be the case, if the President thinks the people. Armed with all this omnipotence of power, it necessary. I contend that every President ought to the protector rushes onward with irresistible impetuosity have those men about him in whom he can place the most so sudden and fatal is the stroke, that the expiring genis confidence, provided the Senate approve his choice. of America has hardly time faintly to say, Farewell liberty. But we are not from hence to infer that changes will be Thus despotism rides triumphant, and freedom and hap made in a wanton manner, and from capricious motives." piness are trampled in the dust. Strange, that all s Now, sir, on the other side of the question: what was should arise from the Executive Magistrate's having the said by Mr. Jackson? "But let me ask gentlemen if it is power of removal. But gentlemen tell us that if we possible to place their officers in such a situation as to de- keep the Treasurer out of the power of the President, he prive them of their independency and firmness; for I ap- cannot injure us; that, being thus independent, you prehend it is not intended to stop with the Secretary of strong box will be well guarded, and the President can Foreign Affairs. Let it be remembered that the constitu- not get your money unless he steal it; and, if he steals t tion gives the President the command of the military. and the Treasurer sees him, he will tell; this will lead ! If you give him complete power over the man with the an impeachment, and we shall get rid of the cause of or strong box, he will have the liberties of America under apprehensions. But the constitution says that no money his thumb. It is easy to see the evil which may result. shall be taken out of the treasury but by appropriations If he wants to establish an arbitrary authority, and finds this alone I think a sufficient answer to all that has bee the Secretary of Finance not inclined to second his endeav-said, and will serve to soften down the harsh featur ors, he has nothing more to do than to remove him, and which the terrible picture I have just now mentioned de get one appointed of principles more congenial with his played. I say, sir, our money may be in the treasury own. Then, says he, I have got the army; let me have millions, and, without special appropriation by the Leg but the money, and I will establish my throne upon the lature, the President and Treasurer, either or both ruins of your visionary republic." gether, cannot touch a farthing of it, unless they steal I call the House to some further views on the same side This being the case, I see as little security to the tre of the question, still stronger than these, and strictly ury in the independence of this officer, as danger are analogous to the course of argument of those gentlemen from his dependence, without a single exception; for who deny any power in the President to remove the Sec- the President, with a strong army at his back, comes v retary.

Here, sir, is summed up the whole argument advance at that day against the power which has been exercsta by the President on the present occasion:

lently to lay hold of the money chest, this officer star! Mr. Madison says: "Vest this power in the Senate but a very poor security against such a power. I a jointly with the President, and you abolish at once that the President, supported with the army and navy, making great principle of unity and responsibility in the execu- a descent upon your treasury, would be very apt ' tive department which was intended for the security of carry away the money, and the Treasurer too, if be sto liberty and the public good. If the President should pos- in his way." sess alone the power of removal from office, those who are employed in the execution of the law will be in their proper situation, and the chain of dependence be preserved; the lowest officers, the middle grade, and the "In the constitution (said Mr. Ames) the President's highest, will depend, as they ought, on the President; required to see the laws faithfully executed. He ca and the President on the community. The chain of depend- do this without he has a control over officers appointe ence, therefore, terminates in the supreme body, namely, aid him in the performance of his duty. Take this per in the people; who will possess, besides, in aid of their out of his hands, and you virtually strip him of his aud original power, the decisive engine of impeachment." ity; you virtually destroy his responsibility, the great Mr. Gerry opposed these views: "But what consecurity which this constitution holds out to the people f quence may result from giving the President the absolute America."

control over all officers? Among the rest, I presume, he I take it, sir, the only power the President has ex is to have an unlimited control over the officers of the cised is one not only clearly conferred on him by the c Treasury. I think, if this is the case, you may as well stitution and by the act creating the Treasury Depa give him at once the appropriation of the revenue; for of what use is it to make laws on this head, when the President, by looking at the officer, can make it his interest to break them? We may expect to see institutions arising under the control of the revenue, and not of the law."

Can any thing be more analogous to the arguments we now hear? But, sir, let me trespass so far as to read one more extract, in which the forebodings of danger which had been expressed during the debate are summed up by

Mr. Scott:

ment, but one which has been exercised without objects from the very foundation of the Government to the pro ent hour. The power is exercised under his respos bility to the country. It is not to be exercised cap ciously, though it may be without the assignment of aff reason. If it be abused, the corrective is found in fact that the executive power returns every four years the hands of the people; and, if that be too long to wa the President can be reached by impeachment.

But it is said that the Secretary of the Treasury $ "I have listened to the arguments in support of this bound to make his annual report to Congress; and th motion these three days with great attention, and think, if he shall remove the deposites, he is to assign his when taken together, they consist in this: the raising of a sons, not to the President, but to Congress. And why ↑ great number of frightful pictures, which, at first sight, this, it is asked, unless he be independent of the Pr appear very terrible, but, when they are attentively con- dent? Sir, I will not repeat what I have already said, templated, they appear to be the vagaries of a disordered I will say that, if the act intended by this provision imagination. Let us examine one or two of these frightful control the President's power of removal, it is unco pictures, merely as a sample of the whole set, and see tutional and void. But why, then, must be submit what they amount to. The most frightful of all that have annual report to Congress? I answer, 1st, because (*** been brought into view is, that the Treasurer must be the gress is the guardian of the public purse; it passes" mere creature of the President, and conform to all his di- laws by which the revenue is collected, and by rections, or he arbitrarily removes him from office, and alone it is disbursed; and it is peculiarly proper lays his hand violently upon the money chest; then, hav- head of the Treasury Department should report to ing the sword and the purse, you see the President boldly power which controls the money of the country. It advancing, supported by the army and navy, and the matter of convenience, and facilitates the public busines money chest in the back ground, engaging the liberties of But is this inconsistent with his responsibility to the P

thst

DEC. 30, 1833.]

Removal of the Deposites.

[H. of R.

dent? Not at all. Not in the least degree. But he is was expressly reserved." Again, page 18: "Instructed required to give to Congress his reasons for removing the by the President of the United States, I have instructed deposites. Yes, sir, and why? The first reason I have the Treasurer of the United States to draw upon the already given; and a second is, that, without this enact- banks of New York with which the public money is ment, and prior to it, Congress had the right to call on deposited, and generally through the United States, in him for those reasons. During the existence of the old favor of the Bank of the United States, for the amount Bank of the United States, when the Secretary was not of the public money deposited in those banks." And in required by law to place the public moneys in that bank, the postscript to that letter he says: "The Secretary of but placed them where he thought most conducive to the the Treasury will always be disposed to support the credit public convenience, Congress had a right to require his of the State banks, and will invariably direct transfers from reasons the moment he changed the place of deposite. the deposites of the public money in aid of their legiti But as the proThis enactment is only a standing call on him, instead of mate exertions to maintain their credit. a special inquiry. But why is he to give this account to position of the Bank of the United States excludes the Congress? That we may know whether he has acted idea of pressure on its part, no measure of that nature corruptly or no. That we may know what he has done appears to be necessary at this time." In his letter of the 17th of March, 1817, he states, that, with the public money, and where he has put it. Because, the moment he has removed the deposites from the "by the charter, the public money deposited in places Bank of the United States, we have entire control over where the Bank of the United States or its branches are the location of them. He reports to us for these reasons. established must be deposited in them, except when there are urgent reasons to the contrary. In places But does this make him independent of the Executive? But, sir, the power exercised by the Secretary seems where there is no Bank of the United States, there is no to me to have been greatly misapprehended in all the dis- obligation to deposite the public money in them, or to cussions I have yet heard on this subject. An impression transfer it to them when deposited." Letters of the same seems to prevail that this is a novel procedure, without import, written between the years 1817 and 1824, might I will just call the atiny precedent in the history of our Government. Sir, I be quoted, but it is unnecessary. Jave attempted to trace the history of this power of the tention of the House to the letter of Mr. Crawford of Secretary of the Treasury, and also of the President's December 10, 1817, "communicating to Congress his control over the Secretary in directing the place where reasons for not transferring the public moneys deposited he public money shall be deposited; and what I shall say in certain State and other local banks to the Bank of the It is an interesting United States." (See Ex. Docs. 1st session, 15 Congress, on it shall not rest on mere assertion. part of the documentary history of our country, which Doc. No. 9, in vol. 1.) Mr. C. states that previous to the seems to have lain in a great degree hidden from the view 1st of January, 1817, "a proposition had been submitted of most of those who have entered on this subject. I by this department to the State and other local banks, for shall be able to show you that from the days of Hamilton, the purpose of inducing them to resume specie payments ill now, as well before as since the enactment of the bank on the 20th of February following. As the public mocharter, the power of fixing the place of the public de- ney deposited in them was intimately connected with the posites has been claimed by all the Secretaries of the proposition, it was deemed inexpedient to transfer those Treasury, and never has been considered either by Con- balances to the Bank of the United States, until the result ress, by the bank, or by the people, as any violation of of the proposition was known. On the conight, or transgression of the constitution. rary, it has ever been held necessary for that officer to possess such a power, in order that he may preserve a est equilibrium in the circulating medium of the country. call the attention of the House to what is the power of the President in this matter, and as to what was the understanding of those who chartered the bank as to the power of the Secretary in relation to it, and the power of the President over him. I have the books at hand, but, for my greater convenience, I have drawn off copies of those passages to which I wish to refer, and which I will

now read to the House.

Again: "In order to induce the banks in this District to resume specie payments simultaneously with the banks already enumerated, (those of New York, Philadelphia, and Richmond,) it became necessary for the Treasury Department to give them assurances of support during the first months succeeding such resumption.

"In consequence of this assurance, a considerable portion of the deposites in the banks of Washington and Georgetown were permitted to remain until the 1st day of On the 15th day of March, of the same year, a July last. deposite of $75,000 was made in the Farmers and Mechanics' Bank of Georgetown, which had not previously been one of the depositories of the public money, which sum was transferred to the Bank of the United States at the time that the deposites, which had been previously made in the banks of Washington and Georgetown, were transferred."

The first to which I shall call the attention of the House is an extract of a letter from Mr. Secretary Crawford to the Bank of the United States, January 16, 1817. The Secretary, speaking in relation to the transfer of the deposites from the State to the United States Bank, says: "There can be no objection to the board of directors making propositions to the State banks, which shall be subject to the revision of the President." Again, "which will be submitted to the President for his ultimate deciThus clearly admitting the supervisory power of President over the subject, as understood by Mr. ford.

sion

the

Cra

Mr. Crawford's letter of the 28th of January, 1817, he State banks of Pennsylvania, &c., he asserts "the er of the Treasury Department to control its (the ed States Bank's) proceedings at any moment, by ging the deposites to the State banks."

Again: "Upon the representations of the State bank, (at Boston,) a considerable sum of the public deposite was assigned for the discharge of the treasury notes which had been made payable at that place.

his letter of February 13, 1817, to the Mechanics' k of New York, Mr. Crawford says: "The right to draw the deposites, with a view to equalize the beneresulting from them among the banking community, he situation of the several banks might require, VOL. X.-142

Again: "A considerable sum was left with the Bank of Pennsylvania, upon the ground that a removal of it to the Bank of the United States would be inconvenient to the It was, therefore, determined to continue to holders. employ that bank as the agent of the Treasury, for discharging the outstanding treasury notes demandable at Philadelphia."

By a regulation of the Bank of the United States, the bills of State banks were refused, except those of banks "established in places where they were respectively tendered in payment." In consequence of this, the collectors of the District of Columbia, of Virginia, and Maryland, made their deposites in the Metropolis Bank of this

H. OF R.]

Removal of the Deposites.

[DEC. 30, 1853.

city; and "the sums so paid remain still principally with Mechanics' Bank of Georgetown, to sustain it in its opera the bank." The same thing occurred with the Bank tions, immediately after resuming specie payments. The of Pennsylvania. principle and practice of the Treasury in sustaining the credit of banks disposed to act correctly was, in this com munication, frankly disclosed to Congress, when not the slightest symptom of dissatisfaction was manifested, et the right or propriety of the practice called directly e indirectly in question.”

So that Mr. Crawford informed Congress that he ind in 1817 made his deposites in the local banks, and that the act had not then been called in question.

Again: "In declining to transfer the balances which remained in the banks of this District, at the time that the office in this city commenced business, and in the cases stated to have occurred in Philadelphia and Boston, I was influenced by a consideration of the pressure felt by the State and local banks, during several months subsequent to the resumption of specie payments, and of the services rendered to the Government by those banks during the period that they were used as places of public deposite Many other instances could be enumerated when the by the Treasury. An immediate transfer of the public public deposites were transferred. They had been placed money deposited in them would probably have produced in the Bank of Columbia, in Georgetown, in 1824, and a pressure upon the debtors of those banks, which might the Bank of the Metropolis; and also in the Mechanic' have inflicted upon them evils greatly beyond the benefit Bank in Alexandria. It was stated in this report the which would have resulted from the measure to the Bank they were placed in the Mechanics' Bank in Alexandria of the United States." When a committee of the directors of that bank called t These reasons were communicated to Congress, and Mr. Crawford, and informed him that the institution va the whole Congress acquiesced in their propriety. The in danger of failing, unless it could receive some aid fram bank did not then allege that its rights were interfered the Government, they were requested to call on the re with. The bank had not then set itself up in an antago- | day, as it was necessary that the Secretary should cont nist attitude against the Government. When these reasons the President, and receive his order on the subject. On were assigned, there was no one, in all the country, who opening the subject to the President, the Chief Mag doubted that they were satisfactory and sufficient. What trate concurred in the propriety of granting such as did these reasons establish? ance to the bank as would relieve the institution from the

1st. That it is a sufficient reason for retaining the pub-pressure which placed it in a situation of peril. lic money from the Bank of the United States, and mak ing the deposites in State banks, that it is done to enable the latter to resume specie payments.

2d. That the Treasury may give support (by a deposite of public money) to the State banks, to enable them to pay specie.

3d. That deposites of public money may be made in the banks which have not been before public depositories, to enable them to sustain their credit, as in the case of the deposite in the Bank of Georgetown.

4th. That State banks (as in the cases at Boston and Philadelphia) may be employed as agents of the Treasury, when the public convenience requires it.

5th. That the deposites may be made in State banks to relieve any pressure upon these banks, or in consideration of services previously rendered by them: and

6th. To prevent a pressure by the State banks upon their debtors.

But this assertion of power, and the exercise of the power by Mr. Crawford, was not suffered to pass > served. It was not passed silently over by Congres The House must remember the celebrated memoria Ninian Edwards, making a number of charges against! Secretary of the Treasury; and, amongst others, tha: had permitted money to be deposited in the local barb and to remain there, in States where the United Sta Bank had their offices of discount and deposite. T gentleman who superintended the Treasury was then b fore the country, a candidate for the highest office it gift. When the letter containing these charges was mitted to the House, it was referred to a committee. which a distinguished gentleman from Virginia was chie man. Evidence was in that committee taken, and cashiers from distant banks, as well as from those in th District of Columbia, were examined. All this testin established the fact that, in making these deposites, t Further than this: seven years after the bank was char- Secretary of the Treasury had acted openly and und tered, and had been in full operation, the Secretary of guisedly. All this evidence was collected and emba the Treasury was called on by the Senate of the United into a report; and the committee reported by the ha States to say if he had made any loans to any of the State of their chairman, Mr. Floyd, now Governor of Vec banks, or if he had made any of the public deposites in nia. And what did he say? and what did that commit ** those institutions. In the year 1823, Mr. Crawford an- say? swered this call, and gave the information which was re- The committee do not perceive any thing in quired of him. It would not do for gentlemen to say that principle of these arrangements with the banks, either this was when the bank went first into operation, and violation of law, or contrary to the usage of the Gove that these ought to be regarded rather as reasons for with- ment; since the Treasury has, for many years, had agre holding than for withdrawing the deposites. This call ments with more or less of the banks, by which ther was made seven years after the bank went into operation.lic moneys were deposited in such banks, and drawn He would read an extract from the letter of Mr. Craw-them when wanted; certain terms and conditions as to ford, communicated in reply to that call. mode of drawing being stipulated, such as were the "It is the peculiar province, and it has been the prac- benefical both to the Treasury and the banks. Inde tice of the Department of the Treasury of the United may be proper to observe here, that it seems to have be States, to direct the moneyed operations of the public assumed, by different officers at the head of the Treas to the preservation of credit, by maintaining the equi- Department, that it was their duty to direct its opera librium between the moneyed institutions of the coun- to the support of different moneyed institutions, wher try." Again: er their affairs required support, so as to defeat com "From my personal intercourse with Mr. Gallatin, Itions against them, and preserve an equilibrium of cr know he entertained the sentiments contained in this among them." Again: letter, and, I presume, they have been entertained by all "Among the banks with which these negotiations w of his predecessors and successors in office, and acted made, the attention of the committee was called p upon whenever cases occurred which rendered it neces-larly to the Farmers and Mechanics' Bank of Cuc sary." Again-page 8: the Bank of Chilicothe, and the Branch of the State B "In that report" (Dec. 10, 1817,) "it is stated that of Kentucky, at Louisville, as forming the subject a deposite of $75,000 had been made in the Farmers and charge that does not apply to the others. In the seres

EC. 30, 1833.]

Removal of the Deposites.

[H. OF R.

aces where these banks were situated, the Bank of the In this letter, too, Mr. Secretary Ingham recognises nited States had offices of discount and deposite; and the superintending control and authority of the Chief e law incorporating that institution, as has been before Executive Magistrate. He says: "The Executive is conserved, creates an obligation on the Treasury of the stitutionally bound to see that the laws be faithfully carnited States to use them as places of deposite in prefer-ried into effect-I need not add, in their spirit, or accordace to any other banks, unless the Secretary shall, for ing to their letter. Upon general principles, he cannot sipecial reasons, otherwise direct; and, in that case, such lently permit them to be made a screen for the induleasons shall be laid before Congress, at its then or next gence of bad passions, nor an instrument of any sort of ession. The charge is, that no such communication was oppression, without risking the reproach of a want either aade to Congress. This omission is acknowledged by of vigor or of virtue."

he Secretary, who says it was owing to inadvertence, Yes, sir, (said Mr. P.) an engine of a political party! nd that the inattention to the provision of the law was And before I have done, I shall say something of the politi nimportant, inasmuch as the provision was intended ob-cal character of this purest of all institutions. iously for the benefit of the bank, and the bank had ill notice. The notoriety of the fact is also relied on › show that no improper conduct, or desire to conceal it, roduced the omission.

"The committee see no reason to doubt the statement, r to attribute any improper motive to the Secretary in ais inattention to the directions of the act."

It must be apparent, then, if he had made himself understood, that, in removing the Secretary of the Treasury, the President had exercised only an ordinary and usual power of the Government. He had removed a Secretary. But, according to the argument of the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Duane was, in fact, still the Secretary of the Treasury. If he had been unconstitutionally There is much utility in recurring back to these remi-removed, the removal could be of no effect, and Mr. Duiscences, and seeing what others thought, said Mr. P. ane was still the Secretary, and Mr. Taney was nothing. I was then thought by Governor Floyd, and the commit- But the President had exercised only one of his ordinace of the House, that the deposite of the public money ry and clearest powers. He had removed a Secretary of the local banks by Mr. Crawford was an act which the Treasury, because he would not execute his official as done without disguise or concealment, and for which functions as he was bound to do; and the President had a o censure was applicable to him. Yet now, when a right, and was under an obligation, to remove him. milar act is performed, the President had been de- what said the gentleman from South Carolina? That the ounced as a tyrant and a usurper, and the Secretary of Secretary of the Treasury removed the deposites? No, he Treasury stigmatized as his pliant instrument in an that this tyrant did it. What? Roger B. Taney remove ct of tyranny and despotism. Yet the same power had the deposites! No, no, it was the President that removed een asserted and exercised by Mr. Crawford, and had them; and R. B. Taney had no more to do with it, no hen received the sanction of the House and of the nation, more hand in the removal, than the pen with which he Congress and all. No man was to be found who endeav-signed the order. red to gainsay what the Secretary had reported. The riends of the other gentleman, who was at that time a andidate also for the Chief Magistracy, would not decend to take the course which was now pursued in refernce to the same question.

But

Fortunately for himself, and for the country, the character of the Secretary was such as to require no eulogy there to establish his moral standing, and to show that he was not a man to lend himself to be a mere tool and an instrument to any power. He (Mr. P.) would assert, (and This power, then, had been maintained and exercised he made the assertion on authority,) that the opinion of y Mr. Crawford, and no man was then to be found to Mr. Taney had been given, in writing, while he was Ataise his voice against it. But since that period, the pow-torney General, so long ago as March, advising that the. er had also been claimed by a subsequent Secretary of public deposites should then be removed. When he came he Treasury. Mr. Ingham, in his letter to the president into the Treasury Department, he continued to be of the of the United States Bank, in 1829, claimed a similar same opinion which he had before honestly given. power, and the claim was received by the bank in si- When Mr. Duane, therefore, was dismissed, and Mr. Taence, and remained uncontroverted. This opinion of ney was appointed to be his successor, this was a question Mr. Ingham ratified and confirmed that which had been in which his mind had been previously made up. He previously asserted by Mr. Crawford. could not then be justly designated, as he had been deIn Mr. Ingham's letter of October 5, 1829, it is said: signated, the miserable instrument of tyranny, and crawl"I take the occasion to say, if it should ever appear to ing in his own slime at the footstool of power. [Mr. Mcthe satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury that the DUFFIE here disavowed the application of such epithets bank used its pecuniary power for purposes of injustice and to the Secretary of the Treasury.] He was happy to hear oppression, he would be faithless to his trust if he hesitat- that the gentleman from South Carolina did not apply ed to lessen its capacity for such injury, by withdrawing this language to the Secretary. Some one had used these from its vaults the public deposites. That such a power ex-epithets. The Secretary had deliberately considered ists, is not more certain than that it may be exerted for such the subject, and was not to be regarded as a mere instrua purpose; and the only qualification of it, viz. the rea- ment to carry out the purposes of the Executive, but as sons for its exercise shall be reported to Congress, neces- consummating a measure which he had himself weighed sarily implies the right and the duty to admonish against, and advised. or inquire into, the acts that might lead to such a consequence."

It had been said that the contract entered into by the Government with the United States Bank was violated Again: "Before he can be tempted to exercise the by the removal of the deposites. The general tenor of authority with which Congress have invested him, to with- the argument on the other side was, that the contract draw the public deposites, he will do as he has done had been violated because the President had committed submit directly to your board whatever imputation may the act, and not the Secretary. The fact was, that the be made, and respectfully, resolutely, and confidently Secretary had removed the deposites, acting in perfect ask, nay, demand, the fullest examination; and he trusts unison with the sentiments of the President. How had that he may not be misconceived when he adds that the contract been violated? It was a part of the contract nothing could, in his opinion, more imperatively exact that the Secretary of the Treasury might remove the dethis energetic movement than a well-founded conviction posites whenever he pleased. That was a part of the of the bank's being, as was said of its predecessor, an en-contract. It was expressly stated in the contract that the gine of a political party." Secretary should have the right to remove the deposites.

H. or R.]

Removal of the Deposites.

[DEC. 30, 1833.

There was another part of the contract, to which the ners, and intimate acquaintance with our business men; House might refer. By the 14th section of the act of and, 2dly, the fluctuating policy pursued in relation to charter, it was agreed on the part of the Government that both loans and collections at the bank, together with the the notes of the United States Bank should be received in partiality and harshness that accompany them." In his letter to the president of the United States Bank, payment of the revenue. On the other hand, the Bank of the United States stipulated to transfer public moneys the Secretary of the Treasury had deemed it prudent to from point to point. The Government thus agreed to re-use the following language: "Allow me, therefore, to assure you that those charged ceive the notes of the bank in payment of the public revenue. Suppose that Congress pass a law prohibiting the with the administration of the Government, relying for receipt of these notes. Did any one doubt that Congress support only on the intelligence which shall discern and had a right to do this, without consulting the bank, if, in justly appreciate the character of their acts, disclaim all their opinion, the public interests required the prohibi- desire to derive political aid through the operations of tion? Yet this was as much a contract as any other pro- the bank. And though, under other circumstances than vision in the charter. He would request the attention of those which exist at present, such an avowal would be the House, before he came to an examination of the rea- unnecessary, I find myself called upon explicitly to state sons of the Secretary, while he put out of the way a that they would learn with not less regret than that charge which had been made against the Secretary of the Treasury, in a celebrated paper which had been put in circulation by the United States Bank, and which he would not have noticed, had not something like it been stated by the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. P. here read an extract from the bank report as

follows:

which has prompted this communication that any sup posed political relationship, either favorable or advent towards them, had operated with the bank or any of its branches, either in granting or withholding pecuniary facilities, which, apart from that consideration, wood have been differently dispensed."

Mr. Biddle, in his reply to the Secretary of the Treas

"It was in the midst of this career of inoffensive useful-ury, dated July 18, 1829, says: ness, when, soon after the accession to power of the

"Your own good judgment has indicated the trut present Executive, the purpose was distinctly revealed theory of administering the bank, which is, as you just that other duties than those to the country were required, state, that the bases of credit are to be found in integ and that it was necessary for the bank, in administering rity, industry, economy, skill, and capital; and that uny its affairs, to consult the political views of those who had of action, which may be necessary to give efficiency to, and harmony in, the operations of a bank, is essential now obtained the ascendency in the Executive.”

Now, said Mr. P., I pronounce all this to be false, and secured by regarding these considerations alone as com I challenge the proof. Sir, it cannot be produced. Short-stituting the proper claim to the benefits of its credit ly after the present Executive came in power commenced and that moneyed institutions should not disturb the rethis war of persecution, which is said to have recoiled lations of property, by exerting their power in subser so strongly on the Government. In his first message to vience to the passions or prejudices of local or party Congress, the President had committed the heinous sin of strife;' and you add the very satisfactory assurance, tot informing that body that the constitutionality of the bank those who are charged with the administration of the was questioned by himself, as well as by a large portion Government 'disclaim all desire to derive political of the people. Was this a new view, one which the through the operations of the bank; and would lex President had hastily and suddenly formed, as was insinu- with regret that any supposed political relationship, either ated by the bank manifesto? It was very well known that favorable or adverse to them, had operated with tw the opinion of the President, adverse to the United States bank, or any of its branches, either in granting or w Bank, was not of recent origin. When the judgment of holding any pecuniary facilities, which, apart from th the Supreme Court in the celebrated case of McCulloch consideration, would have been differently dispensed.' vs. the State of Maryland was pronounced, he entertained the same opinion. At the Hermitage, before he prepared his inaugural address, he had communicated his opinion-a fact which was susceptible of proof. But it was thought best not to make public communication of this opinion, until he should send his first message to Congress. On this account it was not introduced into his in augural address. The President, therefore, had acted throughout with perfect consistency; yet it had been charged against him that he had endeavored to negotiate with the bank, and, because he could not buy, determined to break it.

"These clear and sound principles contain the whe elements of the system of the bank, and its true relatin to the Government.”

In the subsequent correspondence, Mr. Ingham indiş nantly repelled the imputations which were thrown saying, in effect, though not in terms, "It is false, a you knew it." What, then, said the president of United States Bank? He apologized, and took back offensive expressions.

The language of the Secretary was as follows: "Further reflection will enable you to perceive a you have gratuitously attributed to me, and, through me, This was the charge which had been distinctly made to the administration, certain acts, without knowing we against him in the public gazettes. It had been alleged ther we sanctioned them or not; and that you have u that the Secretary of the Treasury had enclosed a letter tentionally distorted, by partial quotations, the natur to the president and directors of the branch of the United and obvious meaning of expressions in my former letter And the reply of the president of the bank, dated e States Bank in New Hampshire, the object of which was to make terms with the bank. It was not ordinarily re-tober 9, 1829, was as follows: "I had yesterday the honor of receiving, and have the quired to give proof of a negative, but, from the correspondence itself between the president of this branch and day submitted to the board of directors, your letter of the Government, the contrary could be established. The 9th instant. They have instructed me to say, in rep Secretary of the Treasury had enclosed to the president that, observing, as they do with great pleasure, that of the bank a letter from Mr. Woodbury, parts of which views which they thought disclosed in your previous had been torn from their context, and made the ground respondence are disclaimed, the whole object of of accusation. He read to the House the following extract board, in reviewing it, is accomplished; and you with re from the letter of Mr. Woodbury, to which he had re- the goodness to consider the remarks bearing on the sumed assertion of those views as no longer applicable Yes, (said Mr. P.,) "as no longer applicable." "The objections to the continuance of Mr. Mason in office are two-fold: 1st, the want of conciliatory man-this stale charge was now trumped up by the Bank a

ferred: