of his polity to consist in the fact that it contains, in the monarch, an element of conservatism apparently high above the contending elements of progress and popular liberty.10 What advantages and disadvantages may be wound up in this part, and how far the actual position of Great Britain, the state of her population and her historical development, may make it necessary, it is not our task to investigate, any more than to inquire whether the steady progress of England has not been toward a more and more fully developed institutional selfgovernment and virtual republicanism, or whether the absolutists of the Continent may be right as to this fact when they maintain that England is no bona fide monarchy, and by her unfortunate example is the chief cause of European unrest, by which of course the advocates of despotic power mean the popular longing for liberty.

My expression has been called " very bold." Whether it be so or not is of little importance. I have given my reason why I have called the English polity thus, and I may be permitted to add, that in doing so I meant to use no rhetorical expression, but philosophically to designate an idea, the truth of which has been ever since impressed on my mind more strongly by extended study, and the ample commentaries with which the last lustre has furnished the political philosopher.

10 I do not know that this opinion was ever more strikingly symbolized than lately, when Lord John Russell, the leader of the administration in the Commons, moved an address of congratulation to the Queen on the birth of a prince, and Mr. Disraeli, the leader of the opposition in the same branch, seconded the motion; while a similar motion was made in the Lords by Lord Aberdeen, the premier of the administration, seconded by the Earl of Derby, the premier of the lately ousted administration, and very bitter opponent to the present ministry. What the Queen is, in this respect, in England, is the constitution, or rather the union in the United States. Our feelings of loyalty centre in these, but not in our president, any more than an Englishman's loyalty finds a symbol in his prime minister.

The opposite idea was expressed by a French politician of distinction, when, in writing favourably of Louis Napoleon after the vote which succeeded the second of December, but before he ascended the imperial throne, he said, "Universal suffrage is the republic." " It will be our duty to consider more in detail the question, whether inorganic, bare, universal suffrage, has any necessary and intrinsic connexion with liberty or not, and to inquire into the consequences to which uninstitutional suffrage always leads. In this place I would only observe, that if he means by republic a polity bearing within its bosom civil liberty, the dictum is radically erroneous. If by republic, however, nothing is meant but a kingless state of politics, irrespective of liberty or the good government of freemen, it is not worth our while to stop for any inquiry. Nothing, indeed, is more directly antagonistic to real self-government than inorganic universal suffrage spreading over a wide dominion. I would also allude once more to the fact, that universal suffrage is after all a modus, and not the essence. If, however, it leads to the opposite of self-government, we have no more right to call it "the republic," nor to consider it a form of liberty, than the ancient Germans had a right to be proud of their liberty, after they had gamed themselves into slavery, as Tacitus tells us that many did.

According to the French writer, the Roman republic might be said to have continued under the Cæsars, who were elected by the prætorians, and an elective monarchy would present itself as an acceptable government, while, in reality, it is one of the worst. For, it possesses nearly all the evils inherent in the monarchical governinent,

11 M. Emil Girardin, who has been referred to several times. He is an unreserved writer, who knows how to express his ideas distinctly, and who is a representative of very large numbers of his countrymen.

without its advantages, and all the disadvantages of a republic, vastly increased, without its advantages. History, I think, fully bears us out in this opinion, notwithstanding one authority-the only one of weight I can remember-to the contrary.12

12 Lord Brougham, in his Political Philosophy, speaks in terms of high praise of the elective government of the former Germanic empire. Native and contemporary writers have not done so. It was only after the expulsion of the French, and when the German people instinctively longed for German unity and dignity, that, at one time, a poetic longing for the return of the medieval empire was expressed by some. If there be any German left who still desires a return to the elective empire, he must be of a very retrospective character.

CHAPTER XXX.

INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, THE ONLY GOVERNMENT WHICH PREVENTS THE GROWTH OF TOO MUCH POWER. LIBERTY, WEALTH, AND LONGEVITY OF STATES.

UNIVERSAL suffrage is power-sweeping, real powerso vast, that even its semblance bears down everything before it. Uninstitutional, universal suffrage, may be fittingly said to turn the whole popular power and national sovereignty-the self-sufficient source of all derivative power-into an executive, and thus fearfully to confound sovereignty with absolute power, absolutism with liberty.

Still, the idea of all government implies power, while that of liberty implies check and protection. It is the necessary harmony between these two requisites of all public vitality and civil progress, which constitutes the difficulty of establishing and maintaining liberty—a difficulty far greater than that which a master mind has declared the greatest, namely, the founding of a new government.1

1 Machiavelli-tanto nomini nullum par elogium-says in his Prince: "But in the new government lies the greatest difficulty." This depends upon circumstances. He undoubtedly had in mind the difficulty of uniting Italy, or rather of eliminating so many governments, and establishing one Italic state; for there has been no noble Italian, since the times when Dante called his own Italy, "Di dolor ostello," that does not yearn for the union of his noble land, and look for the realization of his hopes as fervently as he believes in a God. Machiavelli was one of the foremost among these true Italians. But he had not lived through our times. There are times when the people throw themselves into the arms of any one that

Power is necessary, and an executive cannot be dispensed with; and all power has a tendency to increase, to clear away opposition, and to absorb or break down the weaker one. It would not be power if it had not this tendency. How then is liberty to be preserved ? A new power may be created to check the first, like the Roman tribune; but the newly created power is power, and how is this in turn to be checked? Erecting one tier of power over the other affords no remedy. The chief power may thus be made to change its name or place; but the power with all its attributes is there.

Nor will it be supposed that salvation can be found in the mere veto, however multiplied. For the veto, although appearing negative with reference to that which is vetoed, nevertheless is power in itself, and to rest civil liberty upon a system of mere vetoes would indeed be expecting life, action, growth, and that which is positive, from a system of negativism. A government without power and inherent strength is like aught else without power, useless for action. Yet action is the object of all government. The single Polish nobleman who possessed the rakosh or veto, had a very positive but a very injurious power. It was the pervading idea, in the middle ages, to protect by the requisition of unanimity of votes on all important questions. But, on the one hand, this is the principle which belonged to the disjunctive state of the middle ages, not to our broad

possibly may save them from impending or imaginary shipwreck, or promises to do so. Wearied people will take a stone for a pillow, and no people deceive themselves so easily as the panic-stricken. On such occasions it is easy to establish a new government, especially if cumbersome conscience is set aside. The reverse of Machiavelli's dictum then takes place, and the greatest difficulty lies in maintaining a government. This applies even to administrations and ministries. All is pleasant sailing at first. A new power charms like a rising sun; but the heat of noon follows upon the morning.