Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

but even Pitt called it, in 1783, one of the greatest defects in the system of popular representation. Chatham, his father, had expressed himself against it before him, and it would really seem that England will return, at no distant period, to a shorter period of parliaments."

When Count Villêle, in 1824, was desirous of diminishing the liberal spirit of the French charter, he introduced and carried a septennial bill, which was, however, abolished in 1830 by the "July revolution." Parliaments for too short a period would lead to a discontinuous action of government, and unsettle instead of settling; hence they would be as much against liberty as too long ones. In America, two years has become a pretty generally adopted time for the duration of legislatures. It is a remarkable fact that the people in America feel so perfectly safe from attacks of the executive that, in several states, where the constitutions have been revised, a fundamental law has been enacted that the legislature shall not meet more often than every two years. This is to avoid expense and over-legislation. general principle remains true that "parliaments ought to be held frequently," as the British Declaration of Rights and Liberties enacts it. The constitution of the United States makes the meeting and dissolution of Congress entirely independent of the executive, and enacts that Congress shall meet at least once in every year, on the first Monday of December, and that the House of Representatives shall be entirely renewed every second year.

The

As to the irresponsibility of members for their remarks in parliament, the Declaration of Rights enacts," that the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in Volume xiv. page 174, of Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham.

I have given a sufficiently long account of the septennial bill, under this head, in the Encyclopædia Americana.

L

parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament." This was adopted by the framers of our constitution, in the words, that "C for any speech or debate in either house, they (senators and representatives) shall not be questioned in any other place."

32. A farther and peculiar protection is granted to the members of the legislature, both in the United States and in England, by protecting them against arrest during session, except for certain specified crimes. The English House of Commons" for the first time took upon themselves to avenge their own injury, in 1543,"7 when they ordered George Ferrers, a burgess who had been arrested in going to parliament, to be released, and carried their point. "But the first legislative recognition of the privilege was under James the First."

The

constitution of the United States enacts that senators and representatives shall "in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from the same.'

[ocr errors]

33. It is farther necessary that every member possess the initiative, or right to propose any measure or resolution. This is universally acknowledged and established where Anglican liberty exists, not by enactment, but by absence of prohibition, and as arising out of the character of a member of the legislature itself. In most countries, not under the ægis of Anglican liberty, this right of the initiative has been denied the members, and government, that is the executive, has reserved it to itself. So has the so-called legislative corps of the present French empire no initiative. It has indeed not even the privi

7 Hallam, Hist. of English Constitution, 5th edit. vol. i. p. 268.
• Ibidern, vol. i. p. 303.

lege of amendment; it has not even the right of voting on the ministerial estimates, except on the whole estimate of one ministry at once." In some countries, as in France under the charter of the July revolution, the initiative is vested in the houses and in government; that is to say, the government, as government, can propose a measure through a minister, who is not a member of the house. In England, no bill can be proposed by the executive as such; but as every cabinet minister is either a peer, or must contrive to be elected into the Commons, the ministers have of course the right of the initiative as members of their respective houses. The constitution of the United States prohibits any officer of the United States from being a member of either house, and the law does not allow the members of the administration a seat and the right to speak in the houses, as some think that a law to that effect ought to be passed. The representatives of our territories are in this position; they have a seat in the House of Representatives, and may speak, but have no vote. A minister had the right to speak in either house, under the former French charters, in his capacity of cabinet minister, whether he was a member of the house or not. ever the executive of the United States is desirous to have a law passed, the bill must be proposed by some friend of the administration who is a member of one or the other house.

When

It has been mentioned already that the initiative of money bills belongs exclusively to the popular branch of the legislature, both in the United States and in England, by the constitution in the one, and by ancient usage which has become a fundamental principle, in the other.

• Why, indeed, it is called legislative corps does not appear. Legislative corpse would be intelligible.

CHAPTER XVII.

PARLIAMENTARY LAW AND USAGE. THE SPEAKER. TWO HOUSES. THE VETO.

35. Ir is not only necessary that the legislature be the sole judge of the right each member may have to his seat, but that the whole internal management and the rules of proceeding with the business belong to itself. It is indispensable that the legislature possess that power and those privileges which are necessary to protect itself and its own integrity, taking care, however, that this power may not, in turn, become an aggressive

one.

In this respect are peculiarly important the presiding officer of the popular branch or speaker, the parliamentary law, and the rules of the houses.

The speaker of the English Commons was in former times very dependent on the crown. Since the revolution of 1688, his election may be said to have become wholly independent. It is true that the form of obtaining the consent of the monarch is still gone through, but it is a form only, and a change of the administration would unquestionably take place, were the ministers to advise the crown to withhold its consent.

Were the refusal insisted on, disturbances would doubtless follow, which would end in a positive declaration and distinct acknowledgment on all hands, that the choice of the speaker "belongs, and of right ought to

belong," to the House of Commons. There is no danger on that score in England, so long as a parliamentary government exists there at all. The growth of the Commons' independence in this respect is as interesting a study as it is historically to trace, step by step, any other expanding branch of British liberty.

The constitution of the United States says that "the House of Representatives shall choose their speaker and other officers," and so chosen, he is speaker, without any other sanction.

The charter granted by Louis the Eighteenth, of France, prescribed that "the president of the Chamber of Deputies is nominated by the king from a list of five members presented by the Chamber." This was altered by the Revolution of 1830, and the charter then adopted decreed that "the president of the Chamber of Deputies is to be elected by the chamber itself at the opening of each session." It need not be added that, according to the "constitution of the empire," the emperor of the French simply appoints the president of the "legislative corps." In all the States of the Union, the speakers are within the exclusive appointment of the houses. In the British colonial legislatures, the speaker must be confirmed by the governor; but, as was observed of the speaker of the Commons, if consent be refused it would be a case of disagreement between the administration and the legislature, which must be remedied either by a new administration or a new house-that is, new elections.

The presiding officer of the upper house is not made thus dependent upon it. In England, the chief officer of the law, the Lord Chancellor or Keeper of the Seals,'

A keeper of the seals, whom usage does not require to be a peer, is now appointed as the chief officer of the law, only when, for some reason or

« ZurückWeiter »