" We must also differ with you about arranging our cases by subjects instead of by states. If one desires to see what was decided in his state, without regard to subjects, he has them before him, if he is looking up a particular subject. The index in the back arranges them from all the states. In the way you propose, one in order to find out what his state decided, would have to look circumspectly over the entire abstract of 20 or 30 pages." In our notice of the Forum, here referred to (ante, p. 421), we In the recent case of Starr v. Stark, in the Circuit Court of our July number came out, but then we had the case reported long before it the United States for Oregon, Mr. Circuit Judge SAWYER appeared at all in any place. examines this subject with his usual learning and ability, and reaches the conclusion that this general language must be restrained by a consideration of the facts of the cases in which it is used or adopted. The case just mentioned affords an interesting illustration of the tendency of courts in recent times to limit estoppels to cases where the exact point was in issue in the former suit, or failed to be litigated through the negli- | had reference to abstracts of decisions, and not to cases reportgence of the party bringing the subsequent action. The facts ed in full. We said: "We recognize many of these abstracts were these: Starr, being in possession of certain lots in Port- of decisions as being taken from current legal periodicals, land, Oregon, filed a bill in chancery against Stark to deter- where they are published in full. The editor of the Forum mine an adverse claim of title by the latter, in which the com- would greatly enhance the value of such by quoting the periplainant, as one ground of relief, alleged title derived to him- odicals from which they are taken, since, in many instances, self through a United States patent to the City of Portland, and his readers will want to see the case in full. Besides, this that defendant claimed title adversely under a subsequent patent would enable him to give the credit usual among journals in to himself. And, as another ground of relief, that the legal title such cases." The above communication of the editor of the was in defendant under his said subsequent patent; but, that Forum renders it perhaps proper that we should particularize. through certain transactions set out, complainant had the equit- On page 150 of the Forum, for July, is an abstract of the very ble right, and was entitled to a conveyance of said legal title. able decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in People The court, upon motion of defendant, held that the two ex rel. Sutherland v. Badgley. This abstract is the syllabus grounds of action were inconsistent, and could not be litiga- of the case written by Mr. Justice COOLEY and furnished this ted together in the same action, and required complainant to journal and published by us in our issue of June 18 (ante, p. elect upon which he would proceed, and omit the other; 299). It is not unlikely that the Michigan State Reporter whereupon, complainant, after excepting to the ruling and may have sent this case to the Forum, with the same syllabus. order, elected to rely on the first, and withdraw the second. But the next abstract is that of the decision of Mr. District A decree having been rendered in favor of complainant, on Judge WITHEY in Warren v. Ives, published in this journal the cause of action retained, which was affirmed by the Su- for June 25 (ante, p. 312). This abstract is also the syllabus preme Court of Oregon, it was finally reversed by the Supreme of the case, and was drawn by one of the editors of this Court of the United States, on the ground that the patent to journal. We recognize an abstract on the next page of the the city was void, and the bill subsequently dismissed in pur- Forum, case of Viser v. Scruggs, as being the syllabus of the suance of the mandate of that court. Complainant, then filed case as published by us in our issue for June 25 (ante, p. 313). a second bill, alleging the equitable title before set up in the This syllabus was furnished us, together with the case itself, first, and withdrawn in obedience to said order of the court, by Mr. Justice SIMRALL of Mississippi. It is not unlikely and prayed a conveyance of the legal title. On these facts it that he may have furnished it also to the editor of the Forum. was held, and as it seems to us properly, notwithstanding the The next abstract in the Forum is that of Kellogg v. Milwaudissent of the very learned district judge, that the proceed-kee and Saint Paul Railroad Company. This case was reported ings and decree in the former action were not a bar to the especially for this journal, and the abstract in the Forum was second action. written by one of the editors of this journal. The next abCommenting on the case of La Guen v. Gouverneur, supra, stract in the Forum (p. 153) is that of Taylor v. Steamboat SAWYER, J., says: "The principle is, that an end should be Commonwealth. This is the syllabus of the case as published put to litigation; that parties should not litigate their rights in full in the Chicago Legal News for July 11 (p. 334). It by piece-meal; that they are bound to be diligent, and when was written by the editor of that paper. Passing on to page called upon to litigate their claims they ought to present all 158 of the Forum, we find an abstract of Udderzook's case, they have to say, and that it is negligence to omit anything decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. This is the within their knowledge which might be available; and, if an syllabus of the case as published in our issue of July 16 (ante, omission is made, the consequences must fall upon the negli-P. 352). It was written by one of the editors of this journal. gent party. Negligence of the party himself is the main element of the principle upon which the rule is founded." The Forum - Newspaper Credits. We have received the following communication from the learned editor of the Forum: In your notice of the Forum in your valuable journal, for August 20, I think you make a slight mistatement. The greatest object of the review is to publish the most recent cases of importance or interest as soon as delivered, and not take them from the latest published reports. With this view we have either the state reporter or some one resident at the state capital, to report them, and if you publish any of the same cases, especially from your state, it occurred from the fact that your journal being weekly and enterprising, gets the cases as soon as delivered, as we do. We will give you credit whenever we take anything from the "CENTRAL.” For instance, we give the case of Lewis v. Balto. & Ohio R. R. Another law journal publishes it, and it reached us before of People's Ins. Co. v. This is the syllabus of April 30 (ante, p. 214). On the next page we find an abstract -THE common law may be called the severity of one remedial system; fiction is the cowardice of the law, and equity is the justice of the law. Bankrupt Act-Discharge-Proportion of Assets to commenced after the 1st of January, 1869, whether the Debts. Mr. District Judge BLATCHFORD, in re Franke, has recently decided the point that in bankruptcy proceedings, commenced prior to the 31st day of December, 1873, and subsequently to the 1st day of January, 1869, and where all the debts proved against the bankrupt's estate where contracted subsequently to the 31st day of December, 1868, and where application for discharge is not made until after the passage of the act of 1874, the right of the bankrupt to his discharge is subject to the (now repealed) acts of July 27, 1868, and act of July 14, 1870, and that his estate must pay fifty per centum of the debts proved against it, unless a majority of the creditors consent to his discharge. In other words, he holds that section 9 of the act of 1874 is not retroactive, and does not control the bankrupt's right to a discharge in cases which otherwise are subject to the restrictions of the act of 1868 and the act of 1870. On petition be one filed by or against the debtor. Under these requirements the right to discharge in this case is not shown; but the certificate of the register implies that it is supposed that because this is a case of compulsory or involuntary bankruptcy, discharges may and must under the act of June 22, 1874, be granted without a compliance with the requirements of the act of 1868." Judge BLATCHFORD has written a lengthy and elaborate opinion on these points, holding that the provisions of the act of 1868 must be complied with before a discharge in bankruptcy can be obtained, and the decision of the register in bankruptcy is overruled. The Administration of the Law in the South. The Washington Chronicle, a journal whose political bias certainly would not lead it to draw too strong a picture of this question, thus discusses the manner in which justice is administered in the courts of South Carolina : From every indication it seems evident that not only in the administration of the affairs of the state, but in the execution of laws and the trial of causes in court, South Carolina is in an unusually unfortunate condition. Serious charges are openly made against the judges and officers of court, and it is said that it is impossible to obtain a just verdict from a jury, and if one is obtained the court fails to execute it. The juries are largly selected from the colored people. Many of them are honest, and desirous to do their duty con scientiously, but ignorant of the most ordinary rules of business, and without any knowledge of law whatever, or any experience in the business transactions of life. It is no uncommon thing, correspondents report, to find half the jury asleep, and in the courts the testimony and arguments are frequenly interrupted by the judge ordering the sheriff to wake up those jurymen. If the judge has not had his dinner, or if having it, it sits heavily upon his stomach and he feels gengenerally annoyed, he sometimes breaks out, after a short stock of patience is exhausted : Mr. Sheriff, wake up them niggers!" The facts of the case, as stated in Judge BLATCHFORD'S opinion, are as follows: Charles J. Franke, Jr., and Charles F. Franke, were adjudged bankrupt, as co-partners by the court, on the 28th of June, 1872, on a petition filed against them. They appeared and filed a written consent to an adjudication. A warrant was issued, and the first meeting of creditors was held on the 2d of August, 1872. On that day thirty creditors proved their debts. An assignee was elected by the votes of twenty-seven of these. On the 19th of September, 1872, the bankrupts filed their sworn schedule of debts and assets. the 23d of July, 1874, and not before, they filed a petition for discharge. By the 24th of July, 1874, forty-four creditors had proved their debts. The hearing of the petition for discharge was fixed for the 18th of August, 1874. No creditors appeared to oppose a discharge. The assignee has received moneys belonging to the estate to the amount of $9,996.22. It was not shown that the assets of the bankrupts were equal to fifty per cent. of the claims proved against their estate, upon which they were liable as principal debtors, nor was it shown that the assent in writting of a majority in number and value of their creditors, to whom they had become liable as principal debtors, and who had proved their claims, was filed at or before the time of the hearing of the application for the discharge. Ac-proven. Through the ignorance of jurors (and even of cording to the schedule, all of the debts were contracted after the 31st of December, 1868. Notwithstanding these facts the register certified that the bankrupts had conformed to their duty under the act of Congress passed in 1867. According to the act of 1868, no discharge could be granted to debtors whose assets were not equal to fifty per cent. of the claims proved against their estate upon which they were liable as the principal debtors, unless the assent in writing of a majority in number and value of their creditors, to whom they shall have become liable as principal debtors, and who shall have proved their claims, be filed at or before the time of hearing the application. By the first section of the act of July 14, 1870, it is declared that the provisions of the second clause of the thirty-third section of said act of 1867, as amended by the first section of the act of 1868 shall not apply to those debts from which a bankrupt seeks a discharge which were contracted prior to the 1st of of January, 1869. "The requirements of the act of 1868," said the learned judge, “apply to all proceedings in bankruptcy It is evident that where emancipated slaves are permitted to sit as jurors, a stringent jury law is needed, discriminating closely as to intelligence. We remember a case tried before the late Judge HUDSON, of the Criminal Court of Memphis, where a colored man maliciously pushed a white man off a fishing. boat, and drowned him. The body sank to rase no more, and was not afterwards recovered. This was seen by several witnesses; but a colored jury gravely acquitted the prisoner, on the ground that the corpus delicti had not been judges) in some of the Southern states, the administration of justice has become the grossest farce. The constant failure of justice has Lroken down the confidence of intelligent people in the judicial tribunals; mob law is hence invoked and encouraged, and the very ends of government are defeated. There can be no excuse, however, for the failure to enfore the law in those states where the blacks are not predominant, and where the entire administration of the law is in the hands of the whites. We have had instances of mob violence in Missouri, which would be a reproach to savages, and the feeble and cowardly efforts of the authorities to punish them, have been humiliating in the last degree. We will let the Louisville Courier-Journal, which has no interest in misrepresenting its own state, tell how the law is enforced in Kentucky. The law against the carrying of concealed weapons is a dead letter. Every coward and bully goes armed. Every case of manslaughter goes unpunished. Every case of shooting with intent to kill passes by as an amusing episode, provided there is no funeral. Even the most atrocious, cold-blooded, deliberexcept the mark of acquitals purchased by money or intimidation. Redhanded murderers roam at large among respectable people. Red-handed ate, malignant, dastardly assassinations have left no mark on the statute-books for negotiation or circulation, to be used as money, and it so passed into the hands of third persons, the bank would be bound, though the case might be otherwise when it was only certified to give the party presenting it assurance that it was good for his own satisfaction in taking it. 7. But it is clear that a verbal reply that a check is good, given for the information of the party about to receive it, extends only to matters of which the bank had knowledge, or is presumed to have by the law, unless he is told that more extended information is expected or asked for as to the validity of the check. In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio. Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. Stall & Meyer, customers and depositors with the First National Bank of Cincinnati, made their check on that bank for the sum of $26.50, payable to the order of Mrs. E. Hart, and delivered it to a stranger to all the parties to the transaction out of which this controversy arose This man erased the name of the payee and the amount for which it was given and inserted the name of Espy, Heidelbach & Co., bankers and brokers, and also the sum sum of $3,920, and passed it to Espy, Heidelbach & Co., in payment of bonds and gold which he purchased from them. The check was paid by the bank through the clearing-house, and the next day the fraud was discovered and the bank made a demand on Espy, Heidelbach & Co. for the amount, as paid through a mistake. Any attempt to cure this state of things will be futile, unless the causes which have produced and which perpetuate it are first ascertained. These causes are two-fold: one for which the people are responsible, and the other for which the courts are responsible. So far as the responsibility of the people is concerned, it may be summed up in the simple statement that the popular difficulty in the way of preserving the peace and preventing crime consists in the fact that the law breakers are too numerous and too bold, and the law-abiding too few and too cowardly. So far as the responsibility of the courts is concerned, we may point to the fact that as early as 1822, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, decided in Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Littell, 90, that a statute prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons was unconstitutional; and although this rule has, within a comparatively recent period, been changed in Kentucky, under a different constitution (Hopkins v. Com., 3 Bush, 480; Cutsinger v. Com., 7 Bush, 362), yet it existed for more than a generation, during which time the popular habit of carrying weapons had become inveterate. Since the late war the same court has, in a series of decisions, enunciated the extraordinary and startling doctrine that a man whose life has been threatened by another may kill his adversary "on sight," whenever and wherever he may chance to meet him. Phillips v. The Commonwealth, 2 Duvall, 328; Carico v. The Commonwealth, 7 Bush, 124; Bohannon v. The Com-termined by what took place between themselves before the check monwealth, 8 Bush, 481. There may be extraordinary occasions and conditions of society where such a principle ought to be applied, but it is our deliberate judgment that society can have no peace wherever, as a general principal of law, such a rule is suffered to prevail. If this were all the case there would be no doubt of their right to recover. The principle that money so paid under a mistake of the case of raised or altered checks so paid by banks on which they were drawn, there are numerous well considered cases where the right to recover has been established, when neither the party receiving nor the party paying has been in any fault or blame in the matter. Of course if there is fault on the part of the party receiving pay for such a check, it strengthens the right of recovery. But in the case before us the rights of the parties are to be de the facts of the case can be recovered back is well settled; and in was paid. It appears by the bill of exceptions that the man who & Co. the price of the bonds and gold which he proposed to buy perpetrated the fraud, having ascertained from Espy, Heidelbach of them, told them that he had dealings with Stall & Meyer and would get their check for the amount, and after an absence of two or three hours returned the check in question. Not wishing to take it from this stranger without further information, they sent Mr. Right of Recovery where Money is Paid on a Snarenberger, one of their clerks, to the bank, with instructions Raised Check. ESPY v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CINCINNATI. Supreme Court of the United States, No. 195, October Term, 1873. Right of Bank to Recover Money Paid by Mistake on Raised CheckEffect of Bank Officer Pronouncing Such Check "Good."-A check drawn by S. and M. on the bank for $26.50, in favor of H., was raised to $3,920, and the payee's name changed to E. H. & Co., and offered to the latter by a stranger in payment for bonds and gold purchased by him. E. H. & Co. sent the check for information to the bank; whose teller replied "it is good,” or “it is all right.” In a suit brought by the bank against E. H. & Co. a judgment was given for plaintiff. On error to this court it was held : I. That where money is paid on a raised check by mistake, neither party being in fault, the general rule is that it may be recovered back as paid without consideration. 2. But that, if either party has been guilty of negligence or carelessness by which the other has been injured, the negligent party must bear the loss. to ascertain if the cheek was good, and to say that it was presented by a stranger. Snarenberger presented it to Mr. Sanford, the proper officer of the bank, who, after examining the check and the state of Stall & Meyer's account, said "it is good," or "it is all right." "Send it through the clearing-house.” There is a slight disagreement between Snarenberger and Sanford as to the precise words used, but we do not deem the difference of any importance. But there is difference in another point between these two, which with the jury might have had some weight. Snarenberger testifies that he told Sanford that the check was offered to his house by a stranger, which Sanford denies; and Sanford says that he told Snarenberger that if the check was offered by a stranger, he would advise them to have nothing to do with him; that he would be careful and not pay so large at check to a stranger, no matter how good looking he was. On the return of Snarenberger, Epsy, Heidelbach & Co. delivered the bonds and gold to the stranger and received the check in it is drawn, for information, the law presumes that the bank has knowledge of the draw- payment, and in the language of the record, the stranger went his 3. That where a party to whom such a check is offered sends it to the bank on which er's signature and of the state of his account, and it is responsible for what may be replied on these points. 4. That unless there is something in the terms in which information is asked that points the attention of the bank officer beyond these two matters, his response that the check is good will be limited to them, and will not extend to the genuineness of the filling-in of the check as to payee or amount. 5. Quære: Would the endorsement of the word "good," with the officer's initials, under such circumstances, make the bank liable beyond the genuineness of the signature and the possession of funds to meet the check as certified? 6. Where a check is certified for the purpose (known to the bank) of giving it credit way and was heard of no more. Espy, Heidelbach & Co. endorsed the check, and it was paid as stated already, through the clearinghouse. In the suit brought by the bank to recover the money it had a judgment, to reverse which this suit is brought. The defendants excepted to the admission of certain testimony given by the plaintiffs on the trial for the purpose of proving that the words 'all right," "it is good," when used in reference to a 4. That if the parties were mutually ignorant and unsuspicious concerning the check being raised, the law did not impose upon plaintiffs more than the defendants, the duty of calling on the drawers for information on that subject. The plaintiffs in error, defendants below, can have no cause to complain of the first and second proposition laid down by the court below. If the bank officers had their attention turned to the matter of check presented at the bank on which it is drawn, had, by the custom and usages of the bankers of Cincinnati, acquired a limited and well understood meaning, namely, that it had reference exclusively to the genuineness of the drawer's signature and to the state of his account at the bank. The objections made to this evidence were that in its nature it was inadmissible; that the person testifying showed his want of knowledge on the subject, and that the expressions “all right" and "it is good" were not the precise expressions used. But we need not enquire whether the court was right in admitting this testimony, because in the subsequent progress of the trial it became immaterial. The court refused to charge the jury, as requested by the plaintiffs in their fifth and sixth prayers, that if there was such an understanding among bankers as to the use of the terms mentioned, it limited the responsibility of the bank to these two matters; and in the charge of the court of its own motion, it placed the case beyound the influence of such testimony, by instructing the jury that as matter of law such was the effect of the words supposed, when used under the circumstances suggested by the interrogations of plaintiff's counsel in regard to the understanding of them among bankers. We are relieved also, by an attentive consideration of the instructions given by the court, from another very grave question much discussed by counsel in this court, that is, whether a verbal statement, by the proper officer to certify checks, that the one pre-in the fourth proposition of the court. Undoubtedly, where there sented is good, is, or is not, the equivalent of a written certification of the check in the usual manner. For the fourth instruction asked by the defendants and granted by the court is precisely what is claimed by counsel here as to the effect of such verbal statement, as will be seen at once by its inspection. It is as follows: A verbal certification of a check is equally valid with a written certification, and constitutes a contract obligatory on the party giving the certification, the consideration of which is the property parted with by the party receiving the certification on the faith of the certification." The plaintiff in error, against whom the jury rendered their verdict, notwithstanding the instruction thus given, must be held to have had the benefit of the principle thus asserted with the jury, whether the court was right in giving it or not. The plaintiffs on the trial below prayed ten distinct instructions to the jury, all of which were granted except the fifth and sixth, which we have considered. The defendants prayed eight instructions, all of which were refused or modified except the fourth, to which attention has just been called. Upon all these rulings of the court as well as upon the charge of the court of its own motion, errors are assigned. But we are of opinion that the whole case turns upon the latter charge of the court. This consisted of four distinct propositions: 1. That if defendants below sent the check to the bank for the purpose of having the latter pass upon the genuineness of the signature and the state of the account of the drawer, the statement that it was good, or all right, would estop them from denying that the signature was genuine, and there were funds to meet it. 2. If defendants sent the check for the purpose of testing the genuineness of the signature of the drawers, the state of their account, and to test its genuineness in all other respects, and plaintiff knowing the full extent of the object for which it was sent, replied "it is good," or "it is all right," plaintiff is estopped to set up that the check was raised. 3. That if the defendants had no suspicion that the check was raised, and sent it to plaintiffs for examination without specifying the particulars to which they wished the examination directed, the plaintiffs had a right to presume that it was desired in relation to such points as the law presumed them to have knowledge, namely: the genuineness of the drawer's signature and the state of his account, and if they answered in good faith and had no means other than those of defendants of knowing that the check was raised, they were not estopped from setting up that fact. the raising of the check, or even had notice that, in applying to them for information, the parties presenting it did so for the purpose of getting information which would include that subject, they could have limited their general statement that it was good so as to exclude its application to that point, or might have declined answering altogether. If, with this notice, says the court, they gave a general statement that the check was good, or all right, these words must be held to have reference to all the matters on which they knew the other party asked or desired their opinion. Unless we are prepared to hold, to the fullest extent, the principle asserted by the plaintiffs in error, that the general statement that the check is good binds the party making it as to everything connected with its validity; this charge of the court is as favorable to them as it should have been, and is only doubtful as it militates against the bank. We think it is equally clear on principle that there was no error exists a suspicion that the check has been altered in the amount, or in the name of the payee, the proper party to be enquired of is the maker of the check. He and he alone has the means of settling that question conclusively. The bank, as a general rule, can know this no better than the party to whom it is presented for negotiation. It is the latter who first parts with his money or property on the faith of the check, and he is as much bound to diligent enquiry on that question as the bank. The latter is held by law to know the drawer's signature and the state of his account. He is no more bound to know or to answer beyond these two matters than the party who presents it for information. So if there be no suspicion of the fraud in raising the check, the parties are equally innocent, and no question of the relative degree of diligence in making enquiry on that subject arises between them. This is certainly true unless the bank, if it consents to give any information at all about the validity of the check, is bound to answer as to everything which may affect its validity. As this contention is the turning point of the case and is the one which is responded to in the third of the propositions laid down by the court, we turn now to consider that. This assumes that neither party had any suspicion that the check was raised, and that no special reference was made to that point in the enquiry of the defendants below. It is also to be considered that the bank was not asked to certify it in the usual way by endorsing it as good, and that the party who asked information was the one whose name was in the check as payee. We do not propose to decide here what would have been the legal effect in the present case if the bank officer had, under precisely these circumstances, been requested to endorse the check as good and had done so, affixing his name or his initials in the ordinary way. The The strong argument of plaintiff in error is that such an endorsement would bind the bank for the entire validity of the check, and that what was said verbally by Sandford was the legal equivalent of such an endorsement. If this latter point were conceded, no case precisely in point has been produced where this would be held to bind the bank under the circumstances of the present case. authorities relied on are mainly acceptances of drafts or bills of exchange, and it is the same class of cases that are relied on to show that a verbal acceptance, or promise to accept, is equivalent to a written acceptance. The highest courts in this country and in England have regretted the decision which gave original sanction to this latter proposition.--Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Peters, 122; Johnson v. Collins, I East. 103. under no moral or legal obligation to give an opinion on these points. He had no reason to suppose that he was asked for such an opinion, and because he did give an opinion that the check was good in the only points of which he knew anything, it would be illogical to hold the bank liable on the ground that the response meant good absolutely and for all purposes. The court told the jury very clearly that if the bank officer had any reason to believe that the defendants were seeking information in regard to the general validity of the check, or if they had been asked any question which related to the genuineness of the check as to amount or the names of the payees, his statement that it was all right would bind the bank. This was as far as the court ought to have gone in that direction, for they were not bound to answer such a question, nor, as we have already said, does the Bank checks are not bills of exchange, and though the rules applicable to each are in many respects the same, they differ in important particulars. Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wallace, 647. Among these particulars is that a check is drawn against funds on deposit with the banker, and the endorsement that it is good implies that when the endorsement is made there were funds there to pay it. A bill of exchange is not drawn on such deposits necessarily, and its acceptance raises no implication that the drawer has such funds to meet it. It is a new promise by the acceptor to pay, funds or no funds. In both cases the bank is supposed to know the signature of its correspondent, and cannot, after endorsing it as good or accepted, dispute the signature. But as one of the main elements of utility in a bill of exchange is that it shall circulate freely, and it may thus pass through many hands on the faith of the acceptor's signature, it may possibly be that he should be re-law or the nature of the business imply that they had any superior sponsible for the promise contained in it, as it came from his hands, for it was drawn on no special fund, and the possession of such fund by him does not affect his liability. By such acceptance he becomes primarily liable, as if he were the maker of a promissory note. How far these reasons should be applied to a certification that a check was good, seems extremely doubtful, both on principle and authority. Where the object is to use the endorsement to put the check in circulation, or raise money on it, or use it as money, and this object is known to the certifying bank, it may be argued with some force that the bank should, as in the case of an acceptance of a bill of exchange, be held responsible for the validity of the check as it came from the hands of the certifying bank. Such a rule would seem to be just when the checks are certified, as we know they often are, without reference to the presence of funds by the drawer, and when the well-known purpose is to give the drawer a credit by enabling him to use the check as money by putting it in circulation. information on these points to that which the defendants had. The case was certainly very fairly put before the jury, so far as the rights of plaintiffs in error are concerned, if the views here advanced are sound, and the judgment must be AFFIRMED. Remedy by Assignee in Bankruptcy Against Stock- NATHANIEL MYERS, ASSIGNEE OF ST. LOUIS SOAP United States District Court, Eastern District of Missouri. 1. Rights of Creditors against Stockholders.-The remedy in equity of judgment-creditors of insolvent corporations against the stockholders who have not paid in full for their stock, stated and discussed. 2. Bill in Equity by Assignee of Bankrupt Corporation Against Stockholders.-The assignee in bankruptcy of an insolvent corporation cannot maintain a bill in equity in the District Court against the stockholders of such corporation to col lect assessments upon their unpaid stock; because such a bill would necessarily require the appointment of a receiver who could not be the plaintiff in the suit, and But such a verbal statement as was made in the present case cannot come within that principle. There was no design or intent on the part of the bank to assume a responsibility beyond the funds of the drawer in their hands, nor to enable the payee of the check to put it into circulation. Nothing was said or done by the bank officer which could be transferred with the check as part of it to an inno-would hence supersede the regular bankruptcy proceedings. The proper course is for cent taker of it from the payee. Such subsequent taker would have no right to rely on what was said by the bank officers, any further than the payee would. We are of opinion that the court was entirely right in treating the case as one in which information was sought and obtained by Epsy, Heidelbach & Co., for their own use, and to govern their own action. For such information as the bank was willing to give, and did give, it was, no doubt, responsible, because it had reason to believe that the other party would act upon it. But only to this extent and only on this principle is it liable. It is not liable as for accepting or endorsing a draft or check with intent that it might go upon the market for general use and negotiation with the credit of its name attached to the paper just as it was placed on the market. the district judge to order an assessment upon all unpaid stock to be collected by the assignee. Bill in equity by the assignee of a bankrupt corporation against the stockholders to collect the amount alleged to be due on their respective shares of stock. Meyers & Litton, for plaintiff; S. M. Breckenridge, Ira C. Terry, Lee & Adams, for defendants. TREAT J.-The bill is by the assignee of a bankrupt corporation, against certain stockholders, to compel payment by them of the amount alleged to be due on their respective shares of stock. Many of the parties defendant have not been served, and many responsible stockholders are not made defendants. Bills by creditors who have judgments against a corporation have been sustained against the corporation and its stockholders. Said bills being framed in the name of the judgment-creditors and of all others who may choose to come in and be made parties thereto. In such cases the decree has been for an account to be taken of the debts and assets of the corporation, for the appointment of a receiver, to whom the stockholders and officers are ordered to pay and account respectively for so much of the assets and capital stock as are necessary to pay the debts due to the creditors; the assets thus collected and received to be applied by the receiver in dis Under these circumstances we are of opinion that the circuit court was right in holding that in the absence of anything tending to direct his attention to other matters, the bank officer had a right to suppose that the information was desired of him only in regard to the signature of the drawers and the state of their account. These were material facts to be known, which both common sense and commercial law presumed to be within his knowledge. The answer he gave that the check was good, or was all right, must be supposed to be responsive only to these two points. The genuine-charge of the debts. ness of the payee's name, and of the sum filled in the body of the check, were as well-known and as easily ascertainable by the payees themselves as by the bank officer, and unless the enquiry was so framed as to call his attention to these points, he had no reason to suppose, in the nature of the transaction, that he was expected to give information in regard to them. So the response of "good" should not on sound principle be held to extend to them. He was The reason of that rule is, that the unpaid subscriptions are assets applicable to the payment of corporate debts which the corporate authorities may call in for corporate purposes. If there are adequate assets other than said calls, then the creditor has no legal or equitable right to insist upon such calls. Primarily, the amount due on subscriptions is a debt to the corporation which it alone can enforce. and unless the corporation is without other assets to meet |