Confusion of Materials; Cheese Factory; Interest subject to Execu- receipt to the broker, the company gave him no authority to deliver them tion.-Baxter and numerous other farmers delivered milk to a cheese fac-without payment of the premium, and his agreeing to give Marland credit, factory; each was credited with the amount of his milk, and all was man- created no contract with the company. Payment was the consideration ufactured together; the company sold all the cheese; each farmer was which gave life to the contract of insurance. Marland v. The Royal Incharged with the expense, and received his share of the proceeds in pro- surance Co., 71 Penn. State, (21 P. F. Smith) 393. portion to the milk furnished; Baxter's interest in the cheese, etc., was sold under an execution against him. Held, that the sale by the factory converted his interest into a money demand, and this interest was, therefore, not the subject of a levy. The arrangement at the factory did not constitute the farmers partners nor tenants in common in the cheese; nor was there an agency or bailment as to the particular milk delivered. It was a sale of milk to be paid for in a certain time and manner. Butterfield v. Lathrop, 71 Penn. State, (21 P. F. Smith) 225. Levy upon Real Estate; Inquisition; Deputy Sheriff.-The holding of an inquisition upon real estate levied under a fieri facias, is a judicial act, involving an exercise of discretion. The sheriff cannot, therefore, perform it through his deputy. Haberstroh v. Toley, Com. Pleas of Luzerne county, Penn. Reported, Pittsburgh Legal Journal, Dec. 10, 1873. Insurance of Mortgage Interest; Assignment of Policy.-An insurance was made to T., who gave a mortgage to W. T. assigned his policy to W. as security to W., who assigned to E. T. afterwards conveyed the property insured to C., and assigned him the policy; the insurance company refused to approve the assignment. E. afterwards became the owner of W.'s mortgage, and the company insured his interest as mortgagee. By the policy, on payment of a loss the mortgagee was to assign the mortgage to the company. The property was burned, and E. received the amount of his insurance, and assigned the mortgage to the company. Held, that the assignment was properly made; that T. had no claim upon the money paid for the loss, and that the company might recover from T. the amount due on the mortgage. Thornton v. Enterprise Ins. Co., 71 Penn. State, (21 P. F. Smith) 234. 1. Equitable Mortgage; Vendor's Lien.--Where a person purchases land, Trespass for Mesne Profits; Abatement.-Under the Pennsylvania statpays part of the purchase money in cash, and executes a note for the balute of Feb. 24, 1834, 28, trespass for mesne profits does not abate by the ance, together with a paper in the nature of a mortgage, but which is not death of the defendant in ejectment, but survives against his personal rep-sealed and not acknowledged according to law,-held, that such informal resentatives. Arundel v. Springer, 71 Penn. State, (21 P. F. Smith) 398. mortgage amounts simply to an acknowledgement that the vendor retains a ; Joint and several Liabilities.—Where trespass for mesne prof-lien on the land for the payment of the unpaid purchase money. Gill v. its is brought against two, and one pays a certain sum in settlement, and a Blair, Sup. Court Mo., Oct. Term, 1873. nol. pros. is entered as to him, this does not discharge the other defendant. Ibid. State Insolvent Laws; Bankruptcy; Discharge of Sureties.—A debtor | arrested under the Pennsylvania act of July 14, 1842, gave bond pending his application to be discharged as an insolvent. He appeared, and the hearing was continued from time to time, and whilst the proceeding was pending, he was adjudged a bankrupt in the federal court. Held, that the condition of his bond was discharged and the sureties released. The adjudications in bankruptcy suspended the operation of the state insolvent laws. Barber v. Rogers, 71 Penn. State, (21 P. F. Smith) 362. Landlord and Tenant; Liability of Sureties.-A person became bound as surety for a tenant's performance of a contract of lease for one year, the rent payable monthly, and if the tenant held over after the time, the contract to continue for another year. Held, that if the tenant held be yond the expiration of the first year, the surety was bound for the subsequent rent. Coe v. Vodges, 71 Penn. State, (21 P. F. Smith) 383. ; ; ; Notice; Subsequent Purchaser.-A subsequent purchaser from the vendee, who has notice in fact of such lien, takes the Ibid. land subject to the same. Practice of Supreme Court of Missouri; Non-suit.-In equitable actions the plaintiff cannot bring his cause before the supreme court for revision on the merits by taking a non-suit, and then appealing from the order of the circuit court refusing to set it aside; but there must be an adjudication in the circuit court on the facts and law, in order to allow the supreme court to pass upon them on appeal or writ of error. Ibid. Practice of Supreme Court in Equity Cases.-In equity suits, the supreme court will examine the evidence, and decide the case according to the preponderance of testimony, and the law arising thereon. Ibid. Courts of Another.—A legatee residing in Kentucky, the will having been made and probated there, may maintain an action in the courts of Missouri The surety being informed by the landlord that the tenant was in arrears, gave him notice that he would not be further liable, the tenant paying the arrears to that time. This did not discharge the Liability of Sureties who Sign Conditionally.-In Ayers v. Milroy, desurety. He could not, by a mere notice that he would not be liable, dis-termined in the supreme court of Missouri, November 3, 1873, the oft-resolve the contract at his pleasure. Ibid. Sale of Land by Metes and Bounds.-A parol agreement to sell 90 acres of land at $3.50 per acre, to begin on a certain line at a point named, "and go to the creek," makes the creek one of the boundaries; and the vendee must pay for the land within the enclosure, whether there be more than 90 acres or not. Ardery v. Rowles, 71 Penn. State, (21 P. F. Smith) 359. curring question of the liability of a person who signs a bond or note as surety, uponcondition that the signature of a certain other person as surety shall also be obtained, was presented for consideration. In this case, the instrument in question was a non-negotiable promissory note. WAGNER, J., said: “In a case of negotiable or commercial paper, it is very clear that the defence would not be held good. In a suit upon a note of that character, it was expressly held by this court, in the Bank v. Phillips, 17 Mo. 29, that it was no defence for an endorser who was sued upon a note, that he endorsed it on Insurance; "Binding Receipt;" Contract with Broker.-An insurance the express condition that it should also be endorsed by another person, company had a condition in their policies, that "no insurance proposed is where it did not appear that the plaintiff knew of the condition. In to be considered in force until the premium is actually paid." Marland making this line of defence, there is a clear distinction recognized between employed an insurance broker to effect an insurance; he prepared the ap-bonds or other instruments that are not negotiable, and those which are neplication which was accepted by the company, who delivered him a “bind-gotiable. The question here presented has often been before the courts, ing receipt," and afterwards the policy. Marland said to the broker it was and the almost universal holding has been, that where a bond or other innot convenient to pay then, but if he was not safe he would get the mo- strument for the payment of money is executed by a surety, on condition ney; the broker said he would be safe for thirty days; he showed Marland that another person shall also sign it as surety, and if not so signed, then the policy, who asked him to keep it; the property was burned; the policy the principal obligor shall not deliver it, and if the obligor does deliver it not having been delivered to Marland, nor the premium paid by him or the in pursuance of this agreement, then the surety who signed it will not be broker. Held, that the company was not liable. By giving the policy and bound." In support of this rule the learned judge cited and reviewed the follow-procured and sold them, and had afterwards become wholly insolvent, is ing cases: State v. Sandusky, 46 Mo. 377 Cutter v. Whittemore, 10 a demand arising on an implied contract, or one which may be so treated Mass. 442; Linn County v. Farris, 52 Mo. 75; Lovett v. Adams, 3 Wend. by a waiver of the alleged fraud in the conversion of the bonds. It is, there380; Bronson v. Nøyes, 7 Wend. 188; Leaf v. Gibbs, 4 Car. & Pay. 466; fore, the proper subject of set-off by the United States, in a suit by the general Perry v. Patterson, 5 Humph. 133; Bibb v. Reid, 3 Ala. 88; State Bank assignees in insolvency of the parties who had thus converted the bonds v. Evans, 3 Green (N. J.), 155; Carter v. McClintock, 29 Mo. 464; Pep- to their own use, for the recovery of the price of certain property which per v. State, 22 Ind. 399; People v. Bostwick, 43 Barb. 9; S. C. in Court had formerly belonged to the insolvents, and which had, by their said gen of Appeals, 32 N. Y. 445; Powling v. United States, 4 Cranch, 219; eral assignees, been sold to the United States. The amount of the proUnited States v. Leffler, 11 Peters, 86. And, after stating that Millet v. ceeds of the bonds, though not determined by judicial proceedings, was Parker, 2 Met. (Ky.), 608, was the only direct case he had found to the con- sufficiently liquidated, to be at any time the subject of set-off; since it could trary, he concluded: be stated with certainty, and interest could be computed and added. And even if, prior to the passage of the act of March 3d, 1863, amending the act establishing the court of claims, objection to the set-off existed in the fact that the demand of the United States was unliquidated, (assuming it to have been the fact), none could exist subsequently; since the fifth section of the act covers this class of demands. Allen v. United States, U. S. Sup. Court, Oct. Term, 1873. "The plaintiff here occupies the position of taking a security, to which the party giving it had no title. The defendant was merely a surety, and derived no benefit from the contract. If the rule of principal and agent applied, then the defendant would only be liable for such acts as he authorized. The power conferred in this case was conditional; and the condition not being performed upon which its execution depended, and, it being entirely unauthorized, the principal would not be bound. The rule is settled that an agent cannot bind a party contrary to his instructions, and a special authority must be strictly construed. In the case at bar, there was no delivery of the note upon which this action was brought, by the surety, who now defends. It was simply left with Jones on condition that he should not use it for the purposes intended, until after he had obtained the signature of another party. It was, therefore, incomplete, and the transaction was not consummated under such circumstances. Both upon principle and authority, the surety who signed the note is not liable until the condition is fulfilled." The judgment below in favor of the surety was affirmed; all the judges concurring, except SHERWOOD, J., who was absent. | Notices of Books and Exchanges. The American Law Record, Cincinnati: Conducted and published by This is a monthly, in form and character much like the American Law Register. It is made up chiefly of decisions of various American courts, reported in full. It gives its readers, in each issue, 64 pages of reading matter, printed on small type. They thus get, in the course of the year, at a cost of $5,00, about the quantity of matter that would make three ordinary volumes of law reports. It is well printed, and its selections appear to be made with discrimination. The Saint Louis Journal of Law: Weekly: $3 per annum. Edwards & The Journal of Law deserves the thanks of the bar of Missouri for reporting the decisions of the supreme court of this state, very soon after their rendition. This feature alone ought to insure the Journal a good support. It otherwise contains the usual matter found in a weekly publi cation of this character, and under its present management is well conducted. Suits by Corporations; Denial of Corporate Existence; Estoppel.-An important question has just been passed upon by the 5th District Court of New Orleans, CULLOM, J., in the case of the Working Men's Association Accommodation Bank v. Converse et al. We are indebted to John H. New, Esq., of counsel for defendants, for a copy of the opinion of Judge CULLOM, which, owing to its length, we regret that we are not able to publish in full. The bank brought suit on the bond of Converse, its general book-keeper, praying for judgment in solido against him and his sureties for certain mo- In acknowleding in our last issue, the exchanges sent to us, by a lapsus neys alleged to have been received by him in his character of book-keeper, penna, we changed the name of the Pittsburgh Legal Journal to the Pittsand converted to his own use. The defendants filed several exceptionsburgh Legal Gazette. The Legal Gazette is published in Philadelphia. denying the corporate existence of the bank, or that it had any corporate Both are weeklies, and among our most valuable exchanges. existence at the date of the execution of the bond. The banking associa- Reports of Cases determined in the Supreme Court of California, at the tion was organized under the free banking law of Louisiana, Ray's ReJanuary and April terms, 1872, Vol. 43; Charles A. Tuttle, reporter. vised Statutes, 88 275 et seq., which provides, among other things, that The fact that from 1850, when California was little more than a desert, the articles of association, after being executed by a notarial act, etc., to 1872, at which date its population did not, perhaps, exceed 800,000 shall be published for four weeks in the official journal of the state. The souls, the volums of litigation in its courts has been so great as to produce articles of association of the plaintiff were not published in the official jour- an average of nearly two volumes of reports a year, argues the great activnal, but in another newspaper, the New Orleans Times. There was also ity and prosperity of that state. a slight discrepancy (probably a typographical error) between the original instrument, and the instrument as published. Section twenty-one in the authenticated instrument, appeared as section 22 in the Times newspaper. It also appeared that the articles of association, as executed and published, made no mention of the residence of the corporators, as required by the free banking law, above named; nor did they make any mention of a corporate seal. The present volume contains about 730 pages of printed matter; is printed on the largest type used in law reports, and is well leaded and spaced. The same matter, printed in the style of the New Hampshire Reports, could have been included in 400 pages. The reporter's head-notes are very full; perhaps they might be reduced in length without dimin ishing their accuracy. Mr. Tuttle is entitled to credit for stating fully each case where it is not fully stated in the opinion, and for presenting with sufThe question thus presented was, whether, after having in the contract ficient fullness the arguments of counsel-duties which are so generally sued on, recognized the corporate existence of the plaintiff, the defendants slurred over or neglected by reporters, that it is getting to be a standing were estopped from denying it in this suit. This, the learned judge de- observation, that the business of law reporting is one of the lost arts. It cided in the negative, after reviewing and distinguishing the following seems to us quite unnecessary, however, to set out, as he has done, at the cases: United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. 392; Steam Navigation Com-head of each case, the full names of all the parties. It would seem that pany v. Weed, 17 Barbour 378; Meikel v. German Savings Fund Society, the names of the leading plaintiff and defendant, by which the case must 16 Ind., 181; Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480; Silverna- be known, would be sufficient. gle v. Flukle, 21 La. An., 188; Dejona v. Steamboat Osceola, 17 La. An., 277; Lewis v. Homer, 23 La. An., 254; Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Horner, 17 Ohio, 407; Tarbell v. Page, 24 Ill., 46; Rice v. Rock Island Railroad Company, 21 Ill., 93; Eagle Works v. Churchill, 2 Bosworth, 166; Persse & Brooks' Paper-works v. Willett, 1 Robertson, 131. Set off; Liquidated Demand; Demand for Conversion of Indian Trust Bonds. A demand by the United States for the proceeds of Indian trust bonds, unlawfully converted to their own use, by persons who had illegally The opinions are models of brevity. Although an unusual number of the cases are devoted to questions of practice, yet many of them determine questions of general importance; and some of them we hope to find room to notice under the head of " Notes of Recent Decisions" in our next number. The American Law Review, January, 1874. Boston: Little, Brown & Company. Two widely different notions exist in regard to the office of a quarterly publication. By some, it is supposed to occupy about the same posi At the date of this second marriage, he settled permanently at Coop erstown, where he lived for more than 50 years. Those of his family who survive him, are his wife, who was with him at the last, two daughters and two sons, one of whom is the Hon. Renssellaer R. Nelson, United States district judge for Minnesota. tion among the weeklies, that the Devastation would occupy among a fleet | town. of "tin-clads," such as we used in our late war. This conception makes it a receptacle of heavy and exhaustive disquisitions, such as can only be read by scholarly men, who are not overburdened with the cares of business. The other notion makes of it a sort of limbo, into which are tumbled the long and tedious essays, written by men who are unable to con- -A BILL has been introduced into the National House of Representa dense their thoughts into a brief compass, and which the smaller journals tives, by Hon. C. L. Cobb, extending the time for filing claims with the cannot print, nor the busier world read. Perhaps neither of these defini- commissioner of claims, appointed under the act of March 3, 1871, to tions does justice to the Law Review. Whilst the present number contains March 3, 1875. The second section construes the terms “stores and supthe usual amount of "heavy" editorial matter, "grated down and filed plies " to include buildings, and other structures and grounds used or occuaway with thought," it is not destitute of lighter reading, of a more varied pied by the army or navy of the United States, in the states proclaimed as and more enjoyable character. The first article is a fifty-page discussion, in insurrection, for barracks, quarters, hospitals, etc., for periods not less historical and legal, of the ever-to-be-remembered Dartmouth College case. than thirty-five consecutive days; but does not allow any claim for damage The drift of popular sentiment within the past two or three years has given or destruction incident to a state of war. The fourth section requires an to this case peculiar prominence; and now, when the accumulated inter- itemized statement by the claimant. The sixth section authorizes the emests of fifty years rest upon the principle it declared, the people are begin-ployment of five agents, in lieu of the three agents, now provided for by ning to think that it settled the law of vested wrongs rather than that of law. vested rights—that, instead of being the shield of the weak, it has become -IN the United States district court at Jefferson City on the 17th ult., the sword of the strong. The writer in the Review argues that the deci- before Judge KREKEL, a question of some interest was determined in the sion was wrong, and suggests a declaratory amendment of the constitution case of Kappner, assignee of the St. Louis and St. Joseph Railroad comas the least objectionable mode of obviating it. It is evident that the ques-pany v. Ingles. The defendant and twelve others constituted the original tions which gather around that case, are questions of to-day. They pre-corporators and directors of the road. These directors paid a small porsent issues which are knocking at the door, and which, like the slavery tion of their stock in cash, and then by a resolution of the board, declared question, must be met and passed in some way. And the case of Dartthe balance of the subscription paid in services. For the amount due for mouth College v. Woodward, promises to acquire a popular fame equal to stock, which they thus voted themselves exempt from paying, the receiver that of Dred Scott. The next article relates to the San Juan boundary question, recently set- brought suit against each. The instructions were such, as, under the cvidence, required a verdict for the plaintiff. Verdict and judgment that the plaintiff recover $4,370. tled, and is political rather than legal. The article on the Supreme Court of Judicature Act and Law Reform, will be read, we suppose, by every person who desires to acquaint himself with the sweeping changes, which have recently been made in the English judiciary system. The Digest of Recent Decisions we pass over. We have never had much conceit in this feature of the law periodicals; and yet some will say, that if a law periodical were composed of this and nothing else, it would attain its highest degree of usefulness. The difficulty consists in the fact that the volume of adjudicated cases is so great, that such a digest can be at best but partial, and hence its value depends to a great extent upon the rule of selection. But even a partial selection is valuable as far as it goes, and helps the practitioner to form some idea of what the courts are doing. The book notices in this number seem conceived not so much in a spirit fault-finding, as those of former issues. The praise of Mr. Holmes' new edition of Kent's Commentaries is harped by a most friendly hand; but, we doubt not, the work deserves the full measure of approbation accorded to it. -THE supreme court of Iowa decided on the 17th ult., at Des Moines, an important case respecting the law for restraining stock from running at large in the night time. The act provides that stock taken in the act of doing damage between sunset and sunrise, may be detained by the person whose property is injured, whether the fences surrounding such property were lawful or otherwise. The last section of the act provides that the law shall be submitted to a vote of the people of the counties, and shall not be in force in any county unless a majority, of the votes be cast in favor of its adoption. The court decides the last section unconstitutional--that no law can be passed to go into effect at a time to be fixed by somebody else; and also, that (except the last section) the law is in full force as a general law without regard to a vote of the people. -ON November 19, at the sittings in Banco of the court of common pleas, before Justices Keating, Brett and Grove, the new lord chief justice, Sir John Coleridge, took his seat on the bench. For some time before the usual hour for commencing business the court was crowded by gentlemen of the bar and other persons, who had got to know that the new lord chief justice was likely this morning to take his seat upon the bench, and that the preliminary process of investing him with The audience were kept -THE Tichborne case has been postponed on account of the illness of the coif would be gone through in open court. Dr. Kenealy, counsel for the defendant. waiting, for it was not until near close upon 11 o'clock that the judges took their seats upon the bench. Legal News and Notes. -IT is stated that the late Lord Westbury, ex-chancellor of England, made his own will and actually omitted naming executors. It is also stated that he overlooked for a long time the simple fact in English law, that his second marriage invalidated a will previously made. Sir John Coleridge almost at the same time made his appearance at the back of the bar, and advanced along a passage opened in the centre of it, until he got close upon the front row, where he halted, while the ancient form of "counting" in dower was gone through. Mr. Sergeant Parry and ' Mr. Sergeant Ballantine, the two senior sergeants, and Master Bennett, ofh Mr. Justice Keating, as soon as the "counting was completed, said, Brother Coleridge, will you take your seat inside the bar? Brother Coleridge accordingly stepped into the front row of the bar, and bowed right and left to the Queen's counsel, sergeants and other barristers present. —A LARGE number of merchants of St. Paul have sent a telegram to their delegation in congress, begging them to oppose a total repeal of theciated in this proceeding. bankrupt law. They say, "We have no objection to the modification suggested by the president. The clauses relating to dishonest actions on the part of debtors are our only protection, and ought to be retained." -THE board of trade of Cincinnati has passed a resolution protesting against the proposed repeal of the bankrupt law, especially the involuntary clause; but recommending amendments reducing the expenses of enforcing the law, by reducing the fees of officers, and that % 39 be so amended | thing? as to make thirty instead of fourteen days, the time which must elapse, before proceedings can be commenced after a suspension of payment of commercial paper. -THE late Justice NELSON was twice married; first, in 1819, to Pamela Woods, daughter of his former instructor in the law, and three years after her death, which occurred in 1822, to Catherine A. Russell, of Coopers Mr. Justice Keating then said: Brother Coleridge, will you move any Brother Coleridge, having nothing to "move," simply bowed to their lordships, shook hands with his professional brethren near him, and took his farewell of the bar. Mr. Justice Keating observed that the court would adjourn for a few minutes in order to give time for the lord chief justice to take his seat. On the reassembling of the court the lord chief justice appeared upon the bench robed in a judge's robe, and wearing his S. S. gold chain. Master Bennett administered to him the oath of allegiance to "Her Majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, according to law," and also the oath that he would "well and truly serve our sovereign lady, Queen Victoria, in the office of chief justice in the court of common pleas," and that he would "do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of this realm, without fear or favor, affection or good will." His lordship afterward subscribed these oaths upon the roll on which they had been engrossed, and this brought the proceedings to a close, and the ordinary business of the court was gone on with.-[London Daily News. The English statute of 1869 has a provision by which a debtor, who finds himself unable to proceed with his business in its ordinary course, can call a meeting of his creditors, and, with the assent of a majority in number, excluding those under ten pounds, and the assent of a majority of three-fourths in value, effect a compromise upon such terms as he and the majority may agrec to, and thus force the minority to accept the same terms, whether for payin cash or on time. The majority determine the terms for the compromise, ment in full on time, or for compounding at so much per cent. on the dollar, and its resolution can be enforced by the court. The methods of procedure are pointed out by the act; the creditors are summoned by the debtor to attend a meeting in person or by proxy, to consider and vote upon the terms proposed by the debtor; the meeting appoints its own officers, keeps its own Salaries of United States Collectors-Decision by record, accepts or rejects the overtures for compromise, and reports its pro Judge Treat. ceedings to the court, and if all is found in form, the entry of record is made, and the matters are all settled in the manner proposed by the creditors, and Judge TREAT, of the United States district court for the eastern district of the anxiety, annoyance, and waste of a proceeding in bankruptcy is saved. Missouri, has rendered an important decision in the case of the United States Had such a proceeding been recognized by our statute, how many of the v. Donovan, in reference to the salaries of United States collectors. The embarrassed business men could have effected a compromise with their credcase is stated by the Saint Louis Democrat, as follows: Donovan is adminis-itors, so as to carry on their business, a saving both to creditors and debtors. trator of his father, Daniel H. Donovan, who was collector and surveyor of If many prominent banking houses could have effected an arrangement, much the port of St. Louis at the beginning of the war. Following the precedent might have been saved which must now be lost, because one creditor persists of many years, the late Mr. Donovan had charged $6,000 a year for his serin pushing his petition in bankruptcy, and thereby prevents any arrangement vices, and the government contended that he was entitled to only $5,000. for composition, or an indulgence for time of payment, The suit was to settle the disputed question, which had remained undecided for a period of fifteen years. A provision for compromise, similar to that of the English bankrupt act, should be immediately passed by congress, so as to give present relief from the danger threatening every suspended house. Stowell. [From the New York Express.] The collector and surveyor of the port had always withheld $6,000 as his annual compensation, and the treasury department had credited him with $5,000, leaving a balance on the books against the officer. Bingham, San- The Dred Scott Decision-Nelson, Story, Taney, derson, and others, to whom the matter had been referred, had given the opinion that the collectors of St. Louis and other large cities were entitled to the same compensation as those of New York, Boston, etc. Judge TREAT, in his opinion, held that the ninth section of the act of 1822 gave the collectors of seven named ports $4,000 a year as compensation, such officers being classified as collectors of enumerated ports; that the same section gave to all other collectors $3,000; that the fifth section of the act of 1841, as expounded by the court in United States v. Walker, 22 How. 299, and in United States v. McDonald, 5 Wall. 347, gave to collectors of all ports $2,000 a year, when derived from storage on goods in bond, which was additional to the allowance on the ninth and tenth sections of the act of 1822. That the act of 1841 had no other effect than to give to collectors of enumerated and unenumerated ports the same compensation for storage. That the act of 1857, providing that surveyors of certain ports doing duty as collectors, should receive the same compensation for like services, made no discrimination between the different classes of collectors; so that the same construction applied to that act,quently taken back to Antigua. He brought suit for his freedom, and the inas in the case of Walker under the act of 1841, namely: that the act of 1857 and that of 1841 related to two classes of collectors-one receiving $5,000 and the other $6,000, and accordingly as to whether he did duty as collector, represented one or the other of the two classes, so was he to be compensated. That the act of 1822, perhaps, was intended by those who introduced it, to increase the compensation of surveyors and collectors, but its provisions were about the same as the act of 1857, and that the same construction has been given to both, and, in the opinion of the court, Mr. Donovan, as collector of St. Louis, was entitled to only $5,000 compensation, instead of $6,000. Judgment was accordingly rendered in favor of the United States for $1,287.03. The principle involved in this case applies to the cases of Howard, Breckinridge, Fox, and several other collectors who preceded them, and against whom, balances stand on the books of the treasury department for sums varying from $1,000 or $2,000 to $3,000 to $6,000. The same rule will apply to collectors of Cincinnati, Chicago, and all other ports, except the seven enumerated in the act of 1822. Here and there, lingers a strong prejudice against Judge Taney for his decision in the Dred Scott case, and especially in New England, some of whose citizens object to the proposed portrait of the chief justice alongside that of Chase in the supreme court room; but Judge Nelson, upon whose memory so many honors are being bestowed, would have decided the same way. This same Judge Nelson, in the United States Supreme Court, on the Dred Scott case, quoted a very remarkable letter written by Judge Story in 1828, relating to a case analogous to that of Dred Scott. Judge Story was accustomed to write at least once a year to Lord Stowell, sending him a copy of his judicial decisions, which the latter reciprocated. At length a case arose in the English court, (of which Lord Stowell was chief justice), where an Antigua slave was carried by his master to England, for temporary residence, and was subse ferior court decided against his right to freedom. In the appellate court, Lord The Bankrupt Law-A Suggestion as to its Mod- sion is impregnable. ification. [Charles C. Whittelsey, Esq., in the National Bankruptcy Register.] The consolidated English bankrupt act, adopted in 1869, two years after the of our statute, with its improvements upon the old methods, was passage printed in Vol. IV. of the Register, but does not seem to have excited the attention of any one, not even that of the members of the bar, until in this present crisis in the commercial community, the necessity of doing something for commercial men, so as to enable them to come to some other terms than an actual breaking up of their whole business, is fully seen and realized. We, members of the bar, often see what amendments are needed to our laws; but as we are not legislators ourselves, we fail to bring to public attention the reforms which our experience has suggested. * "In my native state (Massachusetts), the state of slavery.is not recognized as legal, and yet, if a slave should come hither and afterward return to his own home, we should certainly think that the local law would reattach upon him, and that his servile character would be reintegrated. I have had occasion to know that your judgment has been extensively read in America (where questions of this nature are not of unfrequent discussion), and I never have heard any other opinion but that of approbation of it, expressed among the profession of the law. I cannot but think that upon questions of this sort, as well as general maritime law, it were well if the common lawyers had studied a little more extensively the principles of public and civil law, and had looked beyond their own municipal jurisprudence. "I remain, with the highest respect, your most obedient servant, JOSEPH STORY." Hon. JOHN F. DILLON, Editor. ST. LOUIS, THURSDAY, JANUARY 15, 1874. SUBSCRIPTION: $3 PER ANNUM, in Advance. {$3 Removal of Suits from State to Federal Court. against him in the state court by a citizen of the state in which The judiciary act, and the subsequent acts of congress, of July 27, 1866, and March 2, 1867, authorize the removal, from the state courts to the federal courts by the non-resident party, of "suits" commenced in the state courts, where the amount exceeds $500, when applied for by the party entitled, and in the mode prescribed. And the acts named also provide that upon the removal, the cause "shall proceed" in the federal court"in the same manner as if it had been brought there by original process." It is obvious that it is important to know what judicial proceedings are embraced in the word suit; for it is "suits" alone which these enactments authorize to be transferred. This question has been several times before the supreme court, and its latest decision is the case of the First National Bank v. Turnbull, 16 Wall. 190. the suit is brought. In Beecher v. Gillett, 1 Dillon C. C. R. 308, it was decided that non-resident attaching creditors, substituted by order of the state court as sole defendants in replevin, in lieu of the sheriff who levied the attachment, may, under the act of March 2, 1867, remove the replevin suit from the state to the federal court. What is an original suit or action, and what is an auxiliary or supplemental proceeding, has been frequently considered in cases which did not arise under the acts relating to the removal of causes from the state tribunals to the federal. Thus, Gwin v. Breedlove, 2 How. 29, decides that a proceeding in the federal court, by motion, under a state law for judgment against the marshal to compel him to pay over moneys collected under execution, is not a new or original suit, but an incident of the suit between the plaintiff and defendant; and hence, the circuit court has jurisdiction, without reference to the citizenship of the execution plaintiff and the marshal. The case just referred to, as well as Dunn v. Clarke, 8 Pet. The court here decides that a proceeding in a state court, under state enactments, to try in a summary and informal manner, the right of an execution plaintiff and a third person, to personal property levied upon by the sheriff, where. no process is issued and no pleadings are; Huff v. Hutchinson, 14 How. 586; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, 460, and Williams v. Byrne, Hempst. 472, turn upon the question as to what are original, and what are supJudge NELSON, in the case last cited, "that a bill filed on the plementary or auxiliary suits; and "the principle is," says filed, cannot be removed from the state to the federal courts, under the act of March 2, 1867. In giving the judgment of the court, Mr. Justice SWAYNE said: "it may well be doubted, whether so informal a proceeding is a 'suit,' within the meaning of the act of congress." The court did not decide the point, but placed its judgment upon the ground that the special proceeding to try the right of property provided by the statute, was "merely auxiliary to the original action, a graft statute, was “merely auxiliary to the original action, a graft upon it, and not an independent and separate litigation." Mr. upon it, and not an independent and separate litigation." Mr. Justice STRONG dissented; but his opinion, if any was written, is not published. We should have been glad to have seen his views; for the point decided, viz., that the proceeding was not an independent litigation, although settled by the judgment of the court, does not seem to us as entirely "too clear to require discussion." What is a "suit" under the 25th section of the judiciary act, was decided in Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, in which it was held that a writ of prohibition to restrain the levy of an illegal tax was a suit within the meaning of that section. Chief Justice MARSHALL, defining the word "suit," says: "The term is certainly a comprehensive one, and is understood to apply, to any proceeding in a court of justice by which an individual pursues that remedy, in a court of justice which the law affords him. The modes of proceeding may be various, but if the right is litigated between parties in a court of justice, the proceeding by which the decision is sought, is a suit." In West v. Aurora City, 6 Wall. 139, it was held, under the 12th section of the judiciary act, that a non-resident plaintiff in the state court, cannot, upon the discontinuance of his original suit, remove to the federal court a cross-action to which he has become liable under the state laws; for the reason that the only removal authorized by the above mentioned section, is by the defendant, who must avail himself of his right at the time of entering his appearance, to a suit regularly commenced equity side of the [federal] court, to restrain or regulate judgments or suits at law in the same court, and thereby prevent injustice, or an inequitable advantage under mesne or final process, is not an original suit, but auxiliary and dependent, supplementary merely to the original suit, out of which it had arisen, and is maintained without reference to the citizenship or residence of the parties." 24 How. 460. See, also, Railroad Companies v. Chamberlain, 6 Wall. 748; and Christmas v. Russell, 14 Wall. 69, where the previous cases are reviewed and commented on. Power of Common Carriers to Limit their Liabilities. An important decision has recently been rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States, involving the question of the power of a railway company to limit its liability as a carrier of goods. The facts were that the plaintiff in this case was a drover, injured while travelling on a stock train of the defendants, proceeding from Buffalo to Albany, and the suit was brought to recover damages for the injury. He had cattle on the train, and had been required, at Buffalo, to sign an agreement to attend to the loading, transporting, and unloading of his cattle, and to take all risk of injury to them and of personal injury to himself, or whoever went with the cattle; and received what is called a drover's pass-certifying that he had shipped sufficient stock to pass free to Albany, but declaring that the acceptance of the pass was to be considered a waiver of all claims for damages or injuries received on the train. The agreement stated its consideration to be the carrying of the plaintiff's cattle at less than tariff rates. shown on the trial that these rates were about three times the ordinary rates charged, and that no drover had cattle carried It was |