it by such improvement. As to such excess I can not distinguish an act exacting its payment from the exercise of the power of eminent domain. In case of taxation the citizen pays his quota of the common burthen; when his land is sequestered for the public use he contributes more than such quota; and this is the distinction between the effect of the exercise of the taxing power and that of eminent domain. When, then, the overplus beyond benefits from these local improvements is laid upon a few land-owners, such citizens, with respect to such overplus, are required to defray more than their share of the public outlay, and the concise act is not within the proper scope of the power to tax. As it does not seem practicable to define the area upon which a tax can be legitimately laid, and beyond which it can not be legitimately extended, and as there is, as has been shown, necessarily a limit to the power of selection may not extend beyond certain presented limits is perfectly indis- prerogatives of the government, and it can be only in cases free putable. from all doubts, that its exercise can be declared by the courts to It is upon this principle that taxes raised in counties, townships be illegal. But such a case, if it can ever arise, is certainly preand cities are vindicable. But while it is thùs clear that the bur- sented when property is specified out of which a public improveden of a particular tax may be placed exclusively upon any partic-ment is to be paid for in excess of the value specially imparted to ular district to whose benefit such tax is to inure, it seems to me it is equally clear that when such burden is sought to be imposed on particular lands, not in themselves constituting a political sub. division of the state, that we at once approach the line which is the boundary between acts of taxation and acts of confiscation. I think it is impossible to assert, with the least show of reason, that the legislative right to select the subject of taxation is not a limited right; for it would seem much more in accordance with correct theory to maintain that the power of selection of the property to be taxed can not be contracted to narrower hands than the political district within which it is to operate, than that such power is entirely illimitable. If such prerogative has no trammel or circumscription, then it follows that the entire burden of one of these public improvements can be placed, by the force of the legislative will, on the property of a few enumerated citizens, or even on that of a single citizen. In a government in which the legislative pow-in such instance, the principle stated in the case cited is perhaps er is not omnipotent, and in which it is a fundamental axiom that private property cannot be taken without just compensation, the existence of an unlimited right in the law-making power to concentrate the burden of a tax upon specified property does not exist. If a statute should direct a certain street in a city to be paved and the expense of such paving to be assessed on the houses standing at the four corners of such street, this would not be an act of taxation, and it is presumed that no one would assert it to be such. If this can not be maintained, then it follows that it is conceded that the legislative power in question is not completely arbitrary. It has its limits, and the only enquiry is where that limit is to be placed. This question was considered, and as it was supposed, was defin itely settled by this court in the case of The Tide-Water Company v. Coster, reported in 3 C. E. Green, 518. The principle men tioned by that decision was that the cost of a public improvement might be imposed on particularized property to the extent to which such property was exceptionally benefited, and that any special burden beyond that measure was illegal. It was upon this principle that the case was rested. the only one that can be devised whereby to graduate the power. Consequently when the improvement, as in the present instance, is primarily for the public welfare, and is only incidentally for the benefit of the land-owner, the rule thus established ought to be originally applied and adhered to. Ful With the doctrine thus expounded the case of The State v. ler, 5 Vroom, 227, is not in harmony. This was an assessment for the improvement of a sidewalk, and in that feature differed from the present one, which is for the improvement of the roadbed. I think the difference is a substantial one. A sidewalk has always, in the laws and usages of this state, been regarded as an appendage to and part of the premises to which it is attached, and is so essential to the beneficial use of such premises, that the improvement may well be regarded as a burthen belonging to the ownership of the land, and the order or requisition for such improvement as a police regulation. On this ground I conceive it to be quite legitimate to direct it to be put in order at the sole expense of the owner of the property to which it is subservient and indispensable. But in the reported case there was another circumstance which The rule thus adopted stands upon the idea that it establishes a illegalized the preceedings. A part of the expense of constructstandard by which, with at least an approach to precision, an acting the sidewalk on one side of the street was thrown on the ownof taxation may be distinguished from an act of confiscation. So far as the particularized property is specially benefited, an exaction to that extent will not be a condemnation of property to the public use, because an equivalent is returned. And this is the ground upon which the abnormal burthen put upon the land owners is justified. Speaking on this subject, Chief Justice GREEN says: "The theory upon which such assessments are sustained as a legitimate exercise of the taxing power is that the party assessed is locally and peculiarly benefited over and above the ordinary benefit which as one of the community he receives in all public improvements, the precise extent of the assessment." State v. City of Newark, 3 Dutcher, 190. It follows, then, that these local assessments are justifiable on the ground above, that the locality is to be especially to be benefited by the outlay of the money to be raised. ers of the other side of the same street. The portion of the burthen thus transferred was one-sixth of the expense, and it was directed to that extent to be imposed irrespective of the amount of any ascertained benefit conferred. This brought the case within the prohibition inherent in the rule laid down in the Tide-Water case, so that the proceedings should have been set aside. The suggestion that in this class of cases it will be presumed that the benefits equal the burthen imposed until the contrary is shown cannot prevail. If well founded, it would have led to a different result in the Tide-Water case. The only safe rule is, that the statute authorizing the assessment shall itself fix, either in terms or by fair implication, the legal standard to which such assessment must be made to conform. In no other way can property be adequately protected. The other objections by the counsel for the plaintiff in error do Unless this is the case no reason can be assigned why the tax is not seem to me well founded. I can perceive no solid foundation not general. An assessment laid on property along a city street, for an improvement made on another street in a distant part of the same city, would be universally condemned both on moral and legal grounds. And yet there is no difference between such an extortion and the requisition upon a land-owner to pay for a public improvement over and above the exception benefit received by him. It is true that the power of taxing is one of the high and indispensable for the position that the law under which the assessment in question has been made raises up a contract between the land owner and the public. This statute declares that it shall be lawful for the common council, on the application of three-fourths of the owners of property in any street, to order, etc., and it then adds that after such grading, etc., is effected, then "the city shall take charge of and keep the same in repair without further assessment." The argument was that after the land owners had petitioned and the to be borne by the adjoining owner and by the municipality at large, work was done, a bargain was constituted, the essential stipulation of which is that the expense of keeping the street in order shall be borne by the public. But how is this language to be converted into that of contract? It is not so in form, for it makes no offer to the land-owner. Nor is the substance with which it deals the subject-matter of agreement. It does not purport to ask from the citizen anything which the state has not the right to demand. The purpose is to define the mode and the extent of the legislative power of the municipality. The power conceded might have been given in an unqualified form, but its exercise was restricted with the condition that it should not be used unless a certain proportion of the owners of property consented, and that the power should not be used a second time. But these limitations on the preroga- People v Mayor, &c, of Brooklyn (leading case), 4 N. Y. 419. But the subtive of local legislation are concessions to the citizens, and can-ject is full of difficulties, and some courts have, as in the principal case, asnot with any show of reason be transformed into considerations serted limitations on the power of the legislature. Hammett v. Philadelphia, moving from the citizen to the state on which a contract can be 65 Pa. St. 146; Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 274; Hoyt v. East Saginaw, built up. The admission of such a doctrine would carry many 19 Mich. 39; Cooley Const. Lim. 508; Dillon Munic. Corp. secs. 596, 597. mischiefs with it. Agreements could be inferred from a large number of the ordinary acts of legislature. Public roads are laid Married Women as Lawyers. on the application of a certain number of freeholders, and the statute directs that after such roads are laid they shall be opened and maintained at the public expense. Why, under such circumstances, can not a contract be claimed as well as in the case now in hand? Numerous other examples of laws from which, by the same course of reasoning, contracts might be deduced will readily occur, if the mind is given to the subject. Neither do the decisions which were cited lend, as it appears to me, the least countenance to the doctrine in question. These are all cases outside of the ordinary field of legislation, and in which the citizen was induced to do some act or yield up some right or property which could not be taken from him except by his voluntary cession. The true principle undoubtedly is, that when it is alleged that any part of the sovereign power has been parted with by force of an agreement, such agreement must be clearly manifested. The cases are largely collected in the excellent work of Justice Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, p. 280. The language of the present statute has not such an aspect, and the intendment that it was the intention to give up. forever any part of the public control with respect of the mode of keeping in order the streets of a great city, is not entertained for an instant. This exception to the proceedings can not be sustained. On the other points raised on the argument, I agree with the views expressed in the supreme court. There are other legal difficulties in the mode of making assessments under the statutory provisions above criticised which were not stated on the argument, which I shall not further notice than to intimate that I am not to be understood as sanctioning them by my silence. On the ground first above stated the judgment should be re versed. JUDGMENT Reversed. NOTE.We have heretofore adverted to this case (CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL, p. 245) and now propose to add but a few words concerning it. One leading proposition decided is that, as respects assessments upon abutters, there is a distinction as to the extent of legislative power between paving streets, and sidewalks as distinguished from streets. It is affimed that the legislature has the power to order the sidewalks to be paved at the sole expense of the adjoining owner, while the same power as respects the grading and paving of streets (proper) is denied. We do not recall any case elsewhere in which the same distinction is judicially asserted, while in many cases it has, impliedly at least, been denied, and the improvement of streets and sidewalks placed upon the same grounds. The power to make local improvements at the expense of the adjoining property is a branch of the taxing power. The power to tax includes, in the absence of special constitutional restriction, the power to apportion the tax. The power of the legislature to direct all or at least some portion of the expense of opening and improving streets to be put as a special burden on the property in the neighborhood is conceded in the opinion to admit of no question. It is denied, however, that the legislature can fix the proportion of the expense In re BELVA A. LOCKWOOD. United States Court of Claims, May 11, 1874. Hon. CHARLES D. DRAKE, Chief Justice. CHARLES C. NOTT, EBENEZER PECK, Judges. Married Women can not be Attorneys.-Under the constitution and laws of the United States a married woman is without legal capacity to take the office of attorney, and no court has power to admit her to such office. NOTT, J., delivered the opinion of the court. This is an application in effect, though not in purpose, to have the law declared to be that the wife of a judge of a United States court may appear at its bar, and being found duly qualified, be admitted to the practice of the law before her husband. This effect of the application has probably not entered the mind of the applicant, but it is, nevertheless, the duty of the court to survey the entire limits of the legal situation and foresee the effects which must necessarily follow the grant of her petition; for, if she be lawfully entitled to admission to this bar, no discrimination can be made between her and every other married woman, properly qualified, domiciled in the District of Columbia. If it be true that there is no law to prevent a woman from acquiring the office of an attorney, it is equally true that there is no law to forbid the wives of the judges and law officers of the government from acquiring the same privilege. Therefore, if we decide that this application should be granted, we must at the same time decide that two beings whom the common law regards, in every material interest, as nearly as possible, as one, can discharge, without detriment to the interests of public justice, the dissimilar duties of arbiter and advocate. The applicant comes before us as a married woman, domiciled in the District of Columbia, where the common law, except as it may have been altered by statute, prevails. It is needless to say that a system of law which prohibited the husband and wife from occupying the legal relations of witnesses for or against each other, and which scrupulously assured to every suitor an impartial tribunal, never contemplated as a possibility that the rights of third persons might be confided to judges liable to be swayed by the most powerful influence known to the law or to humanity. That there has been no express provision by statute, and that there was no exceptional rule at common law, to prevent any such dangerous and scandalous practice, certainly indicates that the law has never been considered to authorize the admission of women to the bar. It is not to be understood that there is any immediate likelihood that the wives of the judges or law officers of the government will descend to any such impropriety. Nevertheless, two things may be said of the matter: First, that the administration of justice should not be left to depend upon any man or woman's sense of propriety; and, second, that whenever the wife of a judge or attorney general is admitted to practice, she will speedily acquire a very lucrative practice, which may sufficiently piece out her husband's salary, but which will as quickly occasion suspicions of partiality and corruption on the part of that branch of the government whose power and usefulness peculiarly rest upon the respect and confidence of the community. Before this application can be granted there are three questions which must be considerd: First, is there any statutory law allowing women to practice in the courts of the United States; second, if there be none, was there any precedent of the kind at the time when the court was established; third, if there is neither positive enactment nor established precedent to sustain this application, would a woman be entitled to admission at common law? All of these questions, it is needless to say, must be answered in the negative. There is a statute relating to the separate prop. erty of the wife, but this is not a question of property. Admission to the bar constitutes an office. Its exercise is neither an ordinary avocation nor a natural right. It is an artificial employment created not to give idle persons occupation, nor needy persons sub. sistence, but its purpose is simply to aid in the administration of public justice. The question is not whether this and that person can make a living at the bar, but whether their admission to the bar will assist in carrying out the purposes of jurisprudence. Moreover, the statute which it was said, on argument, has "thoroughly exploded" the common-law notion that husband and wife are one, is copied from the New York married woman act (Session Laws 1849. p. 528), as to which it has been held by the highest court in the state that the act changes the common law only in the particulars specifically named; and hence, that while a married woman may convey or devise property under the act free from her husband's control, nevertheless, if she die intestate, her husband will take her personalty as heir at common law. Ransom v. Nichols, 22 N. Y. 110. The married woman act for the District of Columbia (16 Stat. L. 45) does nothing more than to allow a mar. ried woman to take and control "her sole and separate property;" to convey and devise it; to sue and be sued "in all matters having relation to it." The statute also expressly recognizes the fundamental principle of the common law that, husband and wife being one, can not traffic with each other, when it excepts from its enabling provision a "gift or conveyance from her husband.” The common law has always regarded the family as the unit of society; the civil law the individual. Hence, at the civil law marriage was little more than a partnership into which indivduals could enter at will, the terms of which they could vary by agreement, the profits of which were to be the property of each, and the bands of which they might dissolve at pleasure. At the common law the family has always been regarded as a sacred entirety, with regard to which the rights and freedom and convenience and wishes of every person connected with it must yield. Its bands were indissoluble, and the duties and obligations connected with it were to be scrupulously enforced. For an absolutely Christian and moral community, whose property consists chiefly of land, the common law in respect to marriage would still continue to be the perfection of human reason. But the unhappy recurrence of drunken or profligate or spendthrift husbands with patient and industrious wives, and the great accretions of personal over real property, in modern times, have rendered some changes in the common law desirable, which are, for the most part, concessions by the mass of society in favor of its unfortunate exceptions. The common law was not unmindful of the natural rights of women or of wives, but regarding the family as the unit of society, it was inevitable that it should cast the burdens and responsibilities of life upon its head. If the husband possessed land before marriage, the wife by marriage instantly acquired an inchoate estate in it for her future support. If he should acquire land after marriage, for the same reason it became in a measure subjected to her, and no conveyance to him could be devised which would elude her right to dower. If an injury-was done to her inheritance he was compelled to unite with her in her suit and assume the responsibility of its expenses, but if he died before judgment the action survived to her alone. If an estate was given to both or was acquired by purchase, they took neither as joint tenants nor as tenants in common. For the common law regarding them as but one person, held that they could not take by moieties and be both seized of an entirety; that neither could sell without the consent of the other, and that the survivors would take the whole. He was liable for her debts before marriage, though they were concealed from him, and for them his goods might be sold and his body thrown into prison. He was bound to provide for her in a manner suitable to her condition in life, and if he abandoned her, or they separated by consent, he lost not the liability, and when he sent her away he was said "to send his credit with her." Nay, if she abandoned him and returned, and he refused to receive her, his liability nevertheless returned with her, and he might be sued for her support. Her frauds and torts committed during coverture were his jointly with her, though he were ignorant or absent when they were committed, and if they were done by her in his presence they were his alone. If the remedy sought was by imprisonment, though the wrong was exclusively hers, he only was liable to be imprisoned. When we pass from the relations of husband and wife to the office of attorney we find several responsibilities inseparable from it which seem inconsistent with the holding of the office by a woman. In cases of misconduct by an attorney he may be attached by the court and imprisoned, but if the attorney were a married woman she might come in and say that the misconduct occurred in her husband's presence, and that at common law it was by his compulsion. She might misapply the funds of a client, or he guilty of gross neglect or fraud, and the husband be sued at common law for the wrong which she committed as attorney. In the case now before us it has been intimated that the admission of the party is sought with the husband's knowledge, and that she may be appointed by his consent. But a court can not make an exceptional rule which will apply to one party and not to another, nor can it change the existing law so as to hold a wcman to the full responsibility of an attorney, nor can it change the legal relations of husband and wife “by consent" any more than it can grant divorces "by consent." So far as the rule of this court is concerned it contemplates only the admission of men. Its language is that no counsel will be permitted to practice in the court unless he is a man of good moral character." It can not be denied that the masculine gender, which is generally used in statutes, frequently embraces the fem. inine; but if a masculine word receives any such latitude of construction it is when it is applied to those cases where law and custom recognize men and women as standing upon the same ground of right or responsibility, the general rule being that words are to be construed according to their usual meaning. Certainly it is not obligatory on courts to construe them otherwise, unless that is made obligatory by legislation. There is no such legislation affecting this court or its rules, and certainly when our rules were made the word "man" was used in its usual and literal meaning, and, so used, expressed all that the court then intended. If the statute require that the owner of a city lot shall remove the snow from his sidewalk, it will be held to extend to men, women and children; for the statute is directed indiscriminately to the owners of property, and pre-existing law and usage have regarded the owners of property as liable to certain charges upon it, without reference to their age or sex. But the word “man” in a statute exacting military service, would not be construed to include women, for the pre-existing law, that is to say, the established usages of society, have never regarded women as liable to render such service. In both England and this country the power of appointment was conferred upon courts by statute. 4 Henry IV. chap. 18; New York constitution, 1777, sec. 27; in re Cooper, 22 N. Y. 80. The appointment to the office by a court is a judicial act. Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9. Refusal to admit a person conceded to be properly qualified is a judgment subject to the reversal of an appellate court. In re Cooper. Disbarring an attorney is likewise a judicial act, in Miss. 127. Courts of the United States for convenience recognize admission to the bar of state courts as proof of qualifications, and accept the introduction by a member of their own bar as testimony of personal and professional good character; but these are merely evidence on which the court acts, and its action remains as betore a judicial decision. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333. It is to be understood that the decision of this court does not rest upon those grounds which would make its judgment final. We do not, in legal effect, pass upon the individual application before us, but refuse to act upon it for want of jurisdiction. Our decision is not necessarily final, and there is express authority for saying that if we err the supreme court can review our error and give relief to the applicant by mandamus. Roberts' Case, 8 Court Claims, 118. The position which this court assumes is that under the laws and constitution of the United States a court is without power to grant such an application, and that a woman is without legal capacity to take the office of attorney. MOTION DENIED. For the same reason the word in the rule can not be held to include women unless women have heretofore been regarded as capable of filling this office. If the word "man" in this rule can be enlarged, against all pre-existing usage, by the loose construction of a court, so as to include men and women, then the word man in a statute enforcing military service in like manner can be extended at the will of the judiciary. Where a statute provides that all able-bodied citizens between certain ages shall perform mil-like manner subject to be reversed. Ex parte Heyfron, 7 How. itary service, and then, like the conscription act, 3d March, 1863 (12 Stat. at Large, 731, sec. 2), excepts a "father in one case, a "son in another, and a "brother" in a third, and finally declares " that no persons except such as are herein excepted shall be exempt," it would be within the discretion of a court to say that the statute included women in the term "persons." The rule of construction unquestionably is that a statute can never be ex tended to a new subject-matter, nor used to alter what under prevailing usage exists, by giving to its words a meaning which, so far as regards that statute or that subject-matter, they were never before supposed to possess. If a judge could at his fancy so construe this rule of the court as to hold that women may be attorneys, I do not see upon what legal ground he would be restrained from holding that they must be soldiers, for the difference between the two is simply a distinction of taste or sentiment as to which the opinions of mankind change and vary. Some persons who regard women as eligible for admission to the bar would recoil from exacting of them military service. Others would think that both were equally beyond their sphere. I have been at the bar and in the military service, and my experience leads me to the conclusion that women are as well fitted for the one as for the other. Another person having had similar experiences may reach an opposite result. It is said that modern ideas have brought down many occupations within the reach of women which were supposed to belong exclusively to men; but in nothing nave modern ideas done so much of this leveling as in the art of war. In the hand-to-hand conflicts of antiquity women were manifestly unable to cope with the physical natures of men, and from necessity were exempt. But hand-to-hand conflicts are as obsolete as the wager of battle. The light breech-loading carbine demands activity rather than strength. Woman as a soldier would have little to do besides marching and shooting and being shot. It is said that a well-read, intelligent, honest woman will make a better attorney than an ignorant, vicious, unscrupulous man. This is true; but it is equally true that a healthy, active woman will make a better soldier than a decrepit man. Some considerations of public policy also intervene in favor of the latter course. There may be occasions when the conscription of women as soldiers, if permissible at law, will seem to verge on absolute necessity; but as to attorneys it can hardly be supposed that there will ever be a time when their scarcity will greatly endanger the public safety. These reflections I have indulged in, not from any serious appre hensions of their realization, but to illustrate how dangerously fallacious is the reasoning which invites a court to attempt the overthrow of existing law. It is not for the judiciary to intermeddle with the question as to what is or what is not the "proper sphere of woman." It is enough for judges to know that her legal position is, by an unwritten law, interwoven with the very fabric of society, and that when society frames constitutions of government it places them upon a foundation of its own immemorial usages, which society can reconstruct, but as to which it may be doubted whether even the legislative power has authority to overturn. It is said in the argument that the whole subject of the admission of attorneys is within the discretion of a court, but this is not strictly true. Admission to the bar constitutes an office. In the first days of attorneys of record the office existed only by appoint ment of the crown, and during our earlier history the power of appointment was exercised exclusively by the colonial governors. - NOTE. The above case will no doubt interest many of our readers. While we are inclined to concur in the result reached, we cannot but regret that the legal obstacles which exist in the present state of the common law in this country to the admittance of married women to the bar, had not been more fully stated. When we began reading the opinion we supposed that Mrs. Lockwood was the wife of some federal judge, but on enquiry we learn that she is not the wife of any judge, but that her husband is a doctor of medicine. Form the outset of the opinion to its close, the reader can not fail to be impressed with the conclusion that the learned justice who pronounced the judgment of the court entertains very strong views upon the question. Indeed! the opinion can scarcely be said to be couched in that calm and dispassionate language which should characterize judicial argument. Where the learned justice takes occasion to declare that "for an absolutely Christian community, whose property consists chiefly of land, the common law in respect to marriage would still continue to be the perfection of human reason," he utters an encomium upon the common law which eminent writers have uttered before him. But it is nevertheless true that there are lawyers quite as enlightened who, upon a comparison between the common and the civil law in their respective treatment of married women, believe the former to be a little better than an aggregation of barbarism. If we might resort to particular illustrations, as the learned justice has done, we could point to the fact that, upon the death of the husband, the wife is entitled, for her support, to a life estate in one-third of his realty; while upon the birth of a child capable of inheriting, the husband becomes vested with an interest in all of the wife's realty, which upon her death ripens into a freehold for life. How this can be pronounced the perfection of human reason, even as applicable to a purely Christian community, is more than we can see. On the contrary, it seems the very essence of barbaric injustice, un worthy of the jurisprudence of a nation which claims to be enlightened, but worthy only of the source from whence it derived its origin-worthy of the policy of the rude hordes which, from the frozen forests of Germany and of Scythia, descended like a curse upon the Roman world. The learned justice descends into particulars to explain what the common law was with reference to the status of married women, but he does not explain with equal clearness what her status is, nor does he present in a satisfactory manner the disabilities under which she at present labors, which would prevent her from assuming the responsibilities of an attorney. If these had been fully developed and properly presented, they probably would have been found insuperable. But instead of clearly discussing this, the only legal question involved in the case, a considerable portion of the opinion is devoted to a discussion of the question of policy involved in it. Upon this question of policy the opinion of the great mass of the legal profession will no doubt accord with that of the learned justice, but there are some enlightened lawyers who think otherwise. But, however this may be, so long as the court profess to decide it, not as a question of policy or propriety, but as one of jurisdiction, this part of the opinion appears to be quite irrelevant. More especially would this remark seem to be applicable to that part of it which institutes a comparison between women as lawyers and women as soldiers. Indeed, that The Arkansas Imbroglio-Opinion of the Attor was little better than a sneer. With reference to the doubt which the learned justice expresses whether even the legislative power has authority to overturn what society has established as the status of married women, we may be pardoned for suggesting that it is generally supposed among lawyers that the enacting of a measure by the legislature is the highest evidence that it is in accordance with public policy. State v. Clark, 54 Mo. We believe that it has never been supposed in this country that courts possess the power to declare a statute a nullity, unless it is found to conflict with the written constitution--the organic law. We may therefore indulge in the supposition that if congress should, in its wisdom or folly, see fit to pass a law making married women eligible to the office of attorney in the federal courts, even the Court of Claims might, on reflection, feel obliged to succumb. It is to be observed that the opinion concludes that a woman is without ney-General. The attorney-general has submitted to the president his opinion in the Arkansas case, wherein Elisha Baxter and Joseph Brooks, each claiming to be governor of the state, had made application to the president for aid to suppress the insurrection. After quoting from the constitution of Arkansas the section providing for the opening of and publishing of election returns for state officers, under which Baxter was declared governor, and the clause providing for contested cases, under which the lower house of the assembly rejected Brooks' petition for contest by the decisive vote of 33 to 9, the attorney passes to proceedings of Brooks in the courts, he in substance says: Subsequently to the vote in the lower house, the attorney-general of Ar legal capacity to take the office of attorney. It is perhaps to be regretted that kansas, upon petition of Brooks, applied to the supreme court of the state for the learned justice had not, in this concluding sentence, confined himself to the case in judgment-that of a married woman. Several courts, perhaps equally as respectable as the Court of Claims, have admitted single women to practice at their bar. This has been done by the federal court at St. Louis, and also by that at Chicago. In the later court, before his honor Judge BLODGETT, a lady attorney appeared a few days since and won her maiden case. From the report of the case in the Chicago Legal News, as well as our knowledge of the high standing of the court, we may presume that it was fairly won-not by overwhelming the learned judge with "the most powerful influence known to the law or humanity," but "by request and such fair [legal] question as soul to soul affordeth." S. D. T. Right of National Banks to Sue in the Federal FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF OMAHA, NEBRASKA, v. THE United States Cireuit Court, District of Nebraska. This was a bill in equity for an injunction to restrain the collection of taxes levied by the commissioners for the defendant county, on behalf of the state of Nebraska and of the county, upon the capital stock of the plaintiff. At the May term, 1872, a motion was made by Mr. Woolworth, counsel for the bank, to the court, Mr. Justice MILLER presiding, for an injunction, which motion was opposed by Mr. Cowen, counsel for the county, on the ground of want of jurisdiction. Mr. Justice MILLER held : a quo warranto to try the validity of Baxter's title to the office of governor, in which it was alleged that Baxter was a usurper, &c. That court denied the application upon the ground that courts of the state had no right to try and determine the question presented, because exclusive jurisdiction in such cases had been conferred on the general assembly by the constitution and laws of the state. Brooks then brought suit against Baxter in the Pulaski Circuit Court under the civil code of Arkansas. Brooks states in his petition that he received more than 95,000 votes, and that Baxter received less than 30,000 votes for governor, and after declaring that Baxter has usurped the office, prays that it may be given to him by judgment of the court, and that he may recover $2000, the emoluments of the office. This presented to the courts the simple question of a contest for the office of governor. Baxter demurred to afterwards, on the 15th of April, the court, in absence of defendant's counsel, the petition on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the case, and overruled demurrer, and without further pleadings or any evidence in the case, rendered judgment for Brooks in accordance with the prayer and petition. Brooks, within a few minutes thereafter, without process to enforce execution, of said judgment, and with the aid of armed men, forcibly ejected Baxter and took possession of the governor's office. On the next day after the judgment was rendered Baxter's counsel moved to set aside, alleging among other things as grounds therefor, that they were absent when the demurrer was submitted and final judgment rendered; that the judgment of the court upon overruling the demurrer should have been that the defendant answer over, instead of which final judgment was rendered without giving any time or opportunity to answer the complaint upon its merits; that the court assessed damages without any jury or evidence; and, finally, that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit. But the next day this motion was overruled by the court, when the president, in pursuance of a provision of the constitution of the United States, was called upon by the executive of the state to protect it against domestic violence. It appears to be his duty to give the required aid, especially when there is no doubt about the existence of violence. But where two persons claim to be governor, and make calls upon the president under the constitution, it becomes necessary for him to determine which of the persons is the constitutional governor. The constitution of Arkansas is 1. National banks may, by reason of their character as such, sue in the decisive of this question as between Baxter and Brooks. According to the federal courts. 2. A part of the taxes sought to be restrained being for the state of Nebraska, and the county treasurer being by the revenue law of the state required to pay the same into the state treasury when they are collected, and no provision being made by law for an action or other proceeding against the state for the recovery of them back if illegally exacted, the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law, and equity will intervene by injunction to restrain their collection. 3. When a county treasurer holds one warrant in which he is commanded to enforce payment of both state and county taxes, which for a common reason are illegal, equity, having jurisdiction to restrain the treasurer from enforcing the payment of the state taxes, may proceed to the determination of the validity of the county taxes as well, and restrain them also. 4. The First National Bank of Omaha filed its bill against the county of Douglas and its treasurer, to have it declared that taxes for 1870 and 1871, levied by the state of Nebraska and the county of Douglas upon the capital stock of the bank were illegal, and to restrain that officer “from making distress upon the property of the plaintiff as he threatened to do, and from all other proceedings to enforce the payment" of the taxes. tion for an injunction the defendant objected to the jurisdiction of the court as a federal court, and also as a court of equity. Held, that there was jurisdiction to entertain the bill and allow an injunction. On mo INJUNCTION Allowed. constitution and laws of the state, the votes for governor were counted, and Baxter declared elected, and he at once was duly inaugurated. presence of the general assembly than ought to be given to similar action by Assuming that no greater effect is to be given to counting the votes in the any board of canvassers, yet, when it comes to decide a question of contest, the general assembly is converted by the constitution into a judicial body; its judgment is as conclusive and final as is the judgment of the supreme court of the state on any matter within its jurisdiction. The parties to such contest plead and produce evidence according to practice provided in such cases, and the controversy is invested with the forms and effect of a judicial procedure. Mr. Brooks appears to claim that when the contest for governor is decided by the general assembly, the defeated party may treat the decision as a nullity and proceed de novo in the courts. This makes the constitutional provision as to contest of no effect, and proceedings under it an empty form. Looking at the constitution alone, it appears perfectly clear that the courts of the state have no right to try the contest about the office of governor, but that exclusive jurisdiction over that question is invested in the general assembly. There is a decision made by the supreme court upon the precise question presented in the case of Brooks v. Baxter. Berry was a candidate for state auditor on the same ticket with Brooks. Wheeler, his competitor, was declared elected by the general assembly. Berry then brought suit under ? 525 of the code, in the Pulaski Circuit Court to recover the office. Wheeler applied to the supreme court for an order to restrain proceedings, and that court issued a writ of prohibition forbidding said court to proceed, on the ground that it had no jurisdiction in the case as to the questions of law involved, |