Municipal Subscriptions to Railroads-Mandamus the power of his principal. P. & O. R. R. Co. v. Tazewell County, to Compel the Issuance of the Bonds. 22 Ills. 156.

1. Railway-aid Bonds - Mandamus to County Officers to Compel Issuance after Election -Although an election may have been lawfully held pursuant to a petition of some of the citizens of a county, upon the question of a county subscription in aid of a projected railway, and although such election may have resulted in favor of such subscription, yet this does not create a contract between the county and the

railway company such as will entitle them to a mandamus to compel the county commissioners to issue the bonds in exchange for the certificates of stock. The proposition not having been submitted to vote on petition of the company, the transaction was one purely between the people and their agents, the company being in no sense a party or privy thereto.

BELFORD, J.—From a careful examination of the act authorizing subscriptions to be made to aid in the construction of railroads, it is apparent that the body clothed with the power of contracting is the board of commissioners, and it is equally clear that the exercise of this power is made dependent on the approval of the people, expressed at an election called for that purpose.

In this case it is evident, from the form of the proposition submited to the voters, as from other things in the record, that no stock had been subscribed prior to the election, but that the purpose of the election was to ascertain whether the popular will would authorize and sanction such a subscription. The people can make no contract binding on the county. They can approve or disapprove a contract made by the board; beyond this they can not go. It is clear, also, that to maintain this action the complainants must have a valid, legal right against the county, springing out of a contract made in a way known to and approved by the

law.

If we were to concede the power of the people to make a contract by a vote to take stock, still their vote could not amount to a contract till the company, through its proper officers, also agreed to issue the stock. The record fails to disclose any such contract in behalf of the corporation.

The recitals in this writ are simply to the effect that the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad Company had constructed its railway to Colorado Springs, and contemplate extending it thence to the coal fields of Fremont county by the most advantageous route, and that the citizens of Pueblo county, desiring such extension via the town of Pueblo, made their petition, signed according to law, praying the board of county commissioners of Pueblo county to order an election for voting to subscribe $50,000 in this behalf, and to pay the same in bonds of the county.

That pursuant to this petition a special election was ordered, the notice reciting the proposition upon which said subscription was to be made. There is nothing in the record to show that the propositions voted on were submitted by the company, or that they The connection of the corpohad any knowledge of the same. ration with the transactions only became apparent when through their attorneys they appear before the board and demand the bonds of the county. Clearly, then, according to the recitals of the writ, there is nothing that would indicate the existence of an obligation on the part of the company.

Had the commissioners, on behalf of the county, brought suit to compel the issue and delivery of stock, the company could well have replied, under the facts set forth in this record, "We never contracted to deliver any. The election was a movement between the people and the commissioners; we made no propositions. The record fails to disclose any agreement, and hence there is nothing on which to predicate a claim against us." And taking the facts set forth, no sufficient rejoinder could have been made by the board. It is insisted, however, that when the pro

To constitute a contract there must not only be parties compe-posals were approved by the people it then became the duty of tent to agree, but also mutuality of consideration and obligation. Both must be bound or neither can be held. The election proceeds upon the petition of the citizens. The railroad company is not a party in this preliminary step. The election is not and can not be ordered at their request. They may submit their proposals to the board, and through it to the people; but the statute neither empowers the company to contract with the people, nor does it authorize the people, in their preliminary capacity, to contract with the corporation. This power is vested solely in their representatives, the commissioners, and to make it effectual they must pursue the strict letter of the law granting it.

The most that can be said to the action of the board in this case is, that at an election they submitted certain proposals-by whom made does not clearly appear-to the consideration of the voters, and that they approved them. This is not enough, for as we have seen, the people in their primary capacity are not empowered to contract. Nor can the commissioners make a contract that will bind the county until the people, through the ballot-box, tell them to do so. The action of both in their appropriate ways must be had before the negotiations can be consummated. "Until the county has subscribed," says the Supreme Court of Illinois, "there is no privity between the road and the county." It is the contract of subscription which compels the subscriber for stock to pay his money, and the company to issue to him shares of their stock. When the vote was taken and resulted in favor of subscription, it only amounted to a delegation of power to the commissioners to make the contract of subscription.

The company was no party in this vote, and has no more right to insist upon the execution of this power thus delegated, than it would have in case an individual were to authorize an agent to subscribe for stock in the road, and who should refuse to exercise

the board to subscribe. As stated above, it does not appear that these propositions were submitted by the company. If they were not, then the transaction was purely one between the people and their agents, the company being in no sense a party or privy thereto. Under a statute whose language is identical with that of our own, it was held that the vote of the people could create no obligation on the part of the county or railroad company. Mr. Justice Nelson, in answering the argument "that the duty of the board to issue stock after the election was imperative," said “that a subscription was necessary to create a contract binding upon the county, on one side to take the stock and pay in the bonds, and upon the other to transfer the stock and receive the bonds for the same. Until the subscription is made the contract is unexecuted and obligatory upon neither." Aspinwall et als. v. Davies County, 22 How. 364; Commissioners of Crawford County v. The L. N. A., etc., R R. Co., 39 Ind. 192; Union Pacific R. R, etc., v. Davies County, 6 Kansas, 256. In the absence of a contract, we see no obligation resting on the county which the complainants can enforce. It is very questionable whether the proceedings were valid in any sense.

The order for the election was made at

a special meeting, and there is nothing in the record to show that
the meeting was appointed at a regular session of the board.
We are of the opinion that the court committed no error in sus-
taining the demurrer and refusing the writ.

Judgment Affirmed.

Notes and Queries.

A correspondent asks whether the new rule (with regard to the taking of depositions) established in the federal court at St. Louis, and published in this journal, ante, p. 158, is a rule of United States circuit as well as of the district court. We are informed by Judge Treat that it applies to both the circuit and the district courts.

The Reed Murder Trial-Circumstantial Evidence body, but from the facts seen you infer that it did. What is this -Admirable Charge of Chief Justice Appleton, but circumstantial evidence?

of Maine.

Recently Elridge W. Reed was tried before Chief Justice APPLETON for the murder of John Ray. The evidence showed that on the afternoon of the 20th September, 1870, Ray, a quiet and peaceable man, in full health, returned home from hunting, with his gun; that about six o'clock in the afternoon, after eating his supper and being informed by his wife that his cow was missing, he left to go in search of his cow, taking, as his daughter says, the road toward Reed's. From that search he never returned

alive.

On Wednesday, the 28th September following, his body was found in a hole on the island, covered with rotten wood and brush. Upon removing the wood and brush, it was found that he had been cruelly and brutally beaten to death; a wound on the left temple so severe that the left eye protruded from its socket, twothirds of the ball out of the head; the neck dislocated; evidence of blows on the top of the head; a bunch as big as a hen's egg; one behind the ear an inch and a half long; blows on the back between the shoulders as big as a saucer; black and blue spots on the left side and on the hip-evidence of terrible and fearful violence inflicted by some one upon the body of the deceased.

The evidence to implicate the defendant was largely circumstantial. In the course of his admirable charge to the jury, the learned chief justice, who has given much attention to criminal evidence, made the following observations upon the necessity, nature, and evidential force of circumstantial testimony, which, though not new in principle, are still interesting from the clear, forcible, and even eloquent manner in which they were presented to the jury. He said:

"Evidence is ordinarily divided into two kinds, direct and circumstantial—direct when the witness testifies to the principal fact in issue-as when a murder is committed and the witness testifies that he saw the blow inflicted, which resulted in death, and the person by whom it was so inflicted. In such a case the truth of the witness testifying is the main subject of enquiry.

"The probative force of circumstantial evidence depends upon the closeness of connection between the fact inferred and the fact from which the inference is drawn. The more numerous the circumstances the facts tending to establish a given fact-the greater this probative force. One circumstance may be of slight weight ; another, tending to the same result, increases, by its consistency with the first, the probability of the inference to be drawn from their existence and co-existence. Another is added, and another, all pointing in the same direction, giving added and increased strength to the inference, as each strand gives strength to the cable of which it forms a component part. Men talk of a chain of facts. The comparison is inapt. The chain is weakened by the increasing number of its links, until it breaks by its own weight. Not so with circumstantial evidence. The rope or cable gains increased strength by each added strand. The failure of proof as to one circumstance is but one strand from the cable. The cable may still be firm and strong, holding the ship securely at anchor, though tossed upon the waves by the fierce and stormy winds. "The strength of the conclusion is not to be ascertained by the addition of the several probabilities created by the several circumstances. Their existence proved, and their concurrence increases in a much higher degree the truth of the conclusion, till that may become irresistible from the concurrence of numerous, distinct, co-existent and corroborating facts, all tending in the same direction to one and the same result.

"Nor is it necessary that each and every circumstance should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Some facts may be proved with more, some with less assurance of certainty. Such is the invariable result. Some facts are proved more satisfactorily than others. It is enough that you give to each fact its just and true weight. Then, after weighing and examining each and all the facts, exculpative and inculpative, if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the prisoner, it will be your bounden duty to say so, though some of the alleged facts may be proved with a less degree of certainty than others.

'It is in vain that we attempt to detect or punish crime unless we resort to circumstantial evidence. Crime shuns the light of day. It seeks darkness. It courts secrecy. It endeavors to escape detection. The assassin moves stealthily upon his unsus

the fatal blow. He attempts to obliterate all traces of crime. He seeks to cover up his tracks. Does the thief take a witness to see him steal-the incendiary to see him apply the torch? You must resort to circumstantial evidence or crime must remain unpunished. If you wait for an eye-witness, if you expect a felon to call one to witness his criminality, you at once grant impunity to crime.

In circumstantial testimony there is the fact proving and the fact proved inferentially from the fact given in testimony. The circumstance must be proved to the satisfaction of the jury, and it is for them to draw the inference from the fact proved. To il-picious or sleeping victim. He calls no witness to see him strike lustrate A snow storm; the new-fallen snow covers the earth; a witness testifies to human footprints; you infer some one has passed. He gives you the direction of the toe and the heel; you infer the direction which the person was moving. As his steps are watched, it is proved that there is a dot or hole in the snow; you infer he had a stick or cane in his hands. It is summer; the rain has fallen; the ground is muddy; a witness testifies to seeing the impression of the heel and the toes in the mud. If you believe the witness, do you doubt that the person whose feet made the impression was bare-footed? Yet this is circumstantial evidence.

'A man testifies to seeing a violent blow given by a club and the falling dead of the person struck. You infer the man was killed by the blow, from the fact that a witness so testified, for you did not see him; that is, you infer one fact from another; the killing from the sworn testimony-an inference properly drawn if the testimony be true, but it is still an inference. It is of the same kind as any other inference of one fact from another-the fact of testimony, the assumption of the truth of testimony, and the inference from the fact testified to its truth. In short, strictly speaking, all testimony is circumstantial or indirect, except what one sees or hears.

"You see a man discharge a loaded gun; you see the flash; you see a man fall dead; you find the bullet in the body; you saw not the ball in its passage through the air from the pistol to the body; you did not see it leave the pistol or enter the

"There may have been cases in which the innocent have been convicted. If this be so, it is a reason for caution; for giving to each circumstance its just and appropriate weight, not for disregarding such proof, or neglecting to give it proper consideration. But if men have been convicted erroneously on circumstantial evidence, so have they on direct testimony; but is that a reason for refusing to act on such testimony? Is it any more or better reason for refusing to act on circumstantial evidence? Assuredly not.

"The cases are few and far between in which erroneous verdicts were found, and they occurred under entirely different conditions from those of our own time. Formerly the prisoner was not permitted to call witnesses. He was not allowed to employ counsel. He could not be a witness in his own case. Now the government summons his witnesses, pays his counsel, and permits him to be a witness to explain, if he can, every adverse fact. But the cases of erroneous verdicts are of rare occurrence. The wonder is that they were so few. Did you gentlemen ever know or hear of one in this state? The stories told of such instances may or may not be true, but of their truth you have no proof. They are

resorted to for the purpose of imposing upon timid jurymen the the court shall adjudge the debtor to be a bankrupt and shall forthwith issue belief that there should be no safe conviction upon circumstantial evidence; that there is infinite danger to innocence if there is such conviction. They have nothing to do with the case under consideration. This you are to decide upon the evidence before you, upon nothing else.

“Circumstantial evidence is legal evidence. When that satisfies you beyond reasonable doubt, you are equally bound to act upon it as if it were the most direct. The possibility of error exists alike, whether the evidence be direct or circumstantial. But because you possibly may err, do you refuse to act? Because your wheat may possibly be blighted, do you refuse to sow ? Until it pleases Providence to give us means of knowledge beyond our present faculties we must act upon this kind of evidence, or grant almost universal impunity to crime.

a warrant, and that the proceedings for the taking possession, assignment and distribution of the property of the debtor shall be similar to those before provided for in the act in regard to voluntary petitions. It is contended that section 12 implies that if the debtor dies before the issuing of the warrant the proceedings can not be continued, and that the warrant is not issued in other words, that when it is physically issued it can not be considered in the meaning of the section or of the act until it is physically issued, or

as having been issued before it was physically issued. Section 38 provides that the filing of a petition for adjudication in bankruptcy, either by a debtor in his own behalf or by a creditor against a debtor, upon which an or der shall be issued adjudicating the debtor a bankrupt, shall be deemed and taken to be the commencement of proce dings in bankruptcy under the act. (In re Patterson, I Benedict, 508.) By section 14 the assignment to the assignee and his title thereunder relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy. In the present case, there having been an adjudication entered before the death of the bankrupt, the title of the assignee relates back to the time the petition was filed, and the title the bankrupt then had to his property is absolutely vested in the assignee, unless the death of the bankrupt has had the effect to prevent the vesting of such title in the assignee. I do not think that the bankrupt died before the issuing of the warrant in the sense of section 12. The warrant is required to be issued forthwith. It is, in judgment of law, issued simultaneously with the entry of the order of adjudication. When

When death occurs, it may be accidental or it may be by suicide. How do you know that John Ray's death was not the result of accident, or was not self-inflicted? No witness testifies to having been present when that sad affair occurred. Is not the answer obvious? The protruded eye, the blows on the back, on the head, on the sides, the secret and unknown burial place, the various circumstances detailed, do they not satisfy beyond a shadow of doubt that the death was not accidental, was not suicidal? Yet what is this but circumstantial? Can not you with almost abso-ever it is physically issued it relates back, for the purpose of section 12, to lute certainty, a certainty which no reasoning however acute, no eloquence however thrilling, can disturb, infer from the facts disclosed that the death of John Ray was by the hand of violence and of crime-for if no crime, why conceal or attempt to conceal the dead body? Could the dead man bury himself?

"If you can so infer, then you will remember that circumstantial evidence is not merely legal evidence, but that species of evidence upon which you can rest with an assured confidence of the truth of your conclusions.

the entry of the order of adjudication. The entry of that order causes the
entire proceedings and the title of the assignee to relate back to the filing
of the petition, and there is no indication in the act of any intention that
the death of the bankrupt, after the entry of that orde., shall dissolve all
the proceedings if the physical preparation and issuing of the warrant shall
happen to be delayed until after such death. Where section 12 speaks of
simultaneously with the entry of an order of adjudication, and the same in-
tent exists in regard to an involuntary case.
Section 12 must be read as if
the words "issuing of the warrant" were "entering the order of adjudi-
cation." There is no difference in the two forms of expression. — New
York Herald.

the issuing of the warrant it contemplates its issue in a voluntray case,

A Legal Opinion in Rhyme.

"All the acts of the prisoner-whatever explains or throws light upon those acts, all the acts of others relative to the crime charged, that came to his knowledge and which may influence him; his loves and hates, his threats, the truth of his statements, the falsehood of his explanations, his looks, his speech, his silence when It is said that one of our largest corporations, "in view of the approachcalled upon to speak; everything which tends in any degree to ing Centennial," has requested his solicitor hereafter to render his opinions establish the connection between the prisoner and the crime with on mortgage investments in verse. The legal gentleman being of known which he is charged; every circumstance preceding, accompany-poetic temperament has promptly complied. His first effort was the following or following the act, may become articles of circumstantial ing: evidence, and of no slight importance as proving or disproving guilt."

The Death of a Bankrupt no Bar to the Continuance of Bankruptcy Proceedings--Important Decision by Judge Blatchford.

On

Yesterday in the United States District Court Judge Blatchford rendered his decision in the case of E. C. Litchfield, an involuntary bankrupt. the 3d of November, 1873, the order of adjudication was made, and on the 27th of that month the bankrupt died. The warrant, based upon this adjudication, was not physically issued until the 27th of December, 1873. To a further continuance of the proceedings objection was made by a creditor. This creditor, through counsel, insisted that the court had no further jurisdiction over the cause by reason of the death of the bankrupt.

The twelfth section of the bankruptcy law has the following language, bearing on a case of this kind:

“If the debtor dies after the issuing of the warrant, the proceedings may be continued and concluded in like manner as if he had lived."

The decision of Judge Blatchford upholds the point that the court has jurisdiction over a bankruptcy proceeding, even after the death of the bankrupt. The Judge says:

"This provision is found among those which relate to voluntary bankruptcy. Section 11, which relates to voluntary bankruptcy, provides that the filing of a voluntary petition shall be an act of bankruptcy, and the petitioner shall be adjudicated bankrupt, and a warrant shall be forthwith issued. Section 42, which relates to involuntary bankruptcy, provides tha

I have examined with great care

(A sound opinion to prepare)

This mortgage, brief of title and the deeds therewith produced;
And I think beyond all question

Or contrary suggestion,

Good title to the mortgagor, in fee, is well deduced.

I've read the search certificates
With watchful reference to dates,

And find therein no prior lien or charge is interposed.
I'm ready, therefore, to advise

That no good reason doth arise

(With one exception) to prevent the matter being closed.

The single point I would reserve
Most grave attention does deserve,

As clearly coming to the notice of the mortgagee:
There does a valid claim exist,

Tho' not included in the list

Of cases in "the act of eighteenth April, '53."

Tho' "not of record" 'tis, nor large,
'Tis in the nature of a charge;

And to its liquidation there is SOME ONE "bound to see
In short, without addition more
To what I have remarked before-
The point that I refer to is the matter of my fee.

-Legal Intelligencer,

Supreme Court of Missouri-Decisions last Mon- is by a bill in equity for an account.

DeJarnett v. DeGiverville; reversed, Judges ADAMS and NAPTON dis- | leading article is on the Virginius case. The history of that vessel, and of senting.

last term of the Supreme Court of that State. If enterprises of this character could be instituted in every state, and then if there could be a general exchange of these publications, it would be a benefit to the profession. THE CASE OF THE VIRGINIUS, CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO THE

recently at Washington. Judge MILLIGAN resided in Greenville, East Tennessee, the home of ex-president Johnson, by whom he was appointed to the bench of the court of claims. At the time of his appointment to the court of claims he occupied a position on the supreme bench of Tennessee. Though not a great jurist, he was sound and conscientious. His

Law of Self-DefENCE. BY GEORGE TICK NOR CURTIS. New York: opinions delivered while on the supreme bench of Tennessee are, per

LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY-The Catalogue of the Library of the New York
Law Institute. By R. S. GUERNSEY. Reprinted from the New York Daily
Register of March 27, 1874.

Among the excellent suggestions contained in this little pamphlet we find the following: "It would seem that in a catalogue of all law books in the English language, chronologically arranged by editions and full titles under subjects, with an index by authors' names, after the manner of continental treatises on legal bibliography, where the latter science has been carried to perfection, should be eagerly sought for both in this country and in England. Such a work would now contain nearly twice the number of titles in Marvin's book, before mentioned, and would occupy about fifteen hundred pages. No publisher in Europe or America will undertake to publish so extensive a work and rely upon the sales for their reimbursement, although the compiler would ask nothing for his manuscript. Therefore, lawyers must still be content to resort to library catalogues only, for their knowledge of what books have been published on a special subject." | When the dream of the Albany Law Journal shall be realized, and we shall have a national bar association, it will be its duty to take upon itself the expense of publishing works of this character, the same as other learned societies are in the habit of publishing works which are beyond the limits of private enterprise.

Legal News and Notes.

haps, quoted with as much respect as those of any judge who has occupied a seat on that bench since the war. Horace Maynard, of Tennessee, and Mr. Secretary Richardson are mentioned as his successors.

tles as "

Whether we consider the remarkable

-SINCE the abandoned French steamer L'Amerique was picked up at sea, after having rolled for thirty-six hours in the troughs of the waves manless and lifeless," and towed into an English port, the newspapers have been reviving a popular taste for the study of maritime law by publishing long disquisitions on the law of salvage, under such suggestive tJetsam," Flotsam," and the like. Beyond question, the saving of the Amerique insures to her salvors the heaviest reward of any case which has occurred for many years. circumstances attending her abandonment within one hundred miles of port, or the fact that she was the second steamship of the same line abandoned within two weeks under the same circumstances, or the fact that be ing a French ship, after being abandoned by her crew, she persisted in not sinking for thirty-six hours, and was finally saved by an English vessel;— we may well conclude that an English court of admiralty will not be so far uninfluenced by national pride but that it will allow liberal salvage. It is not matter of surprise, then, that the admiralty court fixed her bail at £125,000.

-THE "vexed question" of the attorney-general's landaulet has at last apparently been settled by the adoption by the house of representatives, in committee of the whole, of an amendment to the congressional appropriation till providing that no civil officer of the government shall hereafter receive any compensation or perquisites, directly or indirectly, from the treasury or property of the United States, beyond the salary or compensation allowed

-HON. SAMUEL D. LOCKWOOD, who formerly occupied a position by law, or shall make any private use of such property, or of the services or

upon the supreme bench of Illinois, but who for many years has been in private life, died on the 23d instant at his residence in Batavia, Illinois, at an advanced age. Judge LOCKWOOD enjoyed considerable distinction as a jurist, but the conspicuous feature of his character was his integrity, which was of so high an order as to command the admiration of all who knew him.

-AN action has been commenced in the New York City Supreme Court by Daniel McFarland to recover $50,000 damages against the United States Publishing Company for an atrocious libel upon the plaintiff in a book known as the "History of the New York Tombs," published by the defendant corporation. McFarland, it will be remembered, is the man who figured some time since as the slayer of Richardson, one of the writers on the Tribune. Ex-Judge CURTIS is counsel for McFarland, and eminent legal talent is retained for the defendant.

--A NUMBER of the employees of a street railroad company in New York have been prosecuted for salting a railroad track for the purpose of clearing it of snow. The indictment was for nuisance detrimental to public health, and the society for the prevention of cruelty to animals had also a finger in the pie. It was the first suit of the kind that has ever been before the courts. The counsel for the prosecution claimed that salt and snow produce a freezing mixture which unnaturally chills the atmosphere, injures men's bronchial tubes, produce coughs, colds and diphtheria in human beings, and freezes and contracts the horses' feet. The trial resulted in a drawn battle.

-SENATOR STEVENSON has introduced a bill authorizing Indians in their tribal capacity and as individuals to sue and to be sued. This senator has given considerable attention to the subject of our relations with the Indians, and understands the sad consequences which constantly flow from the inability of Indians to claim and defend their rights before the

judicial tribunals of the country. A similar bill was introduced in the house some time since. It is hoped the proposed legislation may receive favorable consideration. That feature of the bill authorizing Indians to be sued should be carefully guarded.—Washington Chronicle.

labor of any person employed in the service of the United States, which service or labor is paid for by the United States; provided, this shall not be construed to deprive any officer of the United States of such fees as are or may be provided by law in addition to the salary of such officer, or of use of such property as may be expressly by law appropriated for the use of such officer.

-THE liberty of discussion which is the peculiar advantage of “committee of the whole" was conspicuously exemplified in the national house of representatives on Saturday. The house was in committee of the whole, considering the legislative appropriation bill.

Mr. Nesmith moved to strike out from the paragraph relating to the debts of the department of justice, the item of $140 for the care and subsistence of horses, and $600 for repairs to carriages and harness. He spoke of the attorney-general's $1,600 landaulet, and remarked that lawyers of the attor ney-general's calibre in his city rode on the outside of a fifty-dollar mule, [Laughter.] There was a Spanish proverb to the effect that if you put a beggar on horseback he will ride to the devil.

Mr. Negley objected to a comparison of an officer of the government to a beggar on horseback.

Mr. Nesmith: I simply referred to the mule. [Laughter.] The chairman: The gentleman from Oregon will continue, being care ful to keep in order.

Mr. Nesmith: I was only quoting the Spanish proverb, which says: "Put a beggar on horseback and he will ride to the devil." I have no objection to the termination of a journey in that particular direction; but I don't want the people to pay for the transportation. [Laughter.]

Mr. G. F. Hoar believed that a reasonable and decent conveyance should be provided for the attorney-general, and he asked the gentleman from Oregon (Nesmith) whether he would like to have the attorney-general ride down Pennsylvania avenue on the back of a fifty-dollar mule.

In reply to Mr. Hoar, Mr. Nesmith said he had seen the attorney-general ride in Oregon on a mule; that Philip the Second, of Spain, rode an Andalusian mule through the streets of Madrid when he went to marry Mary of England, and that sacred history gave an account of a better man than either of them riding on one of those useful animals that had no pride of

-HON. SAMUEL MILLIGAN, associate justice of the court of claims, died ancestry and no hope of posterity.