$250,000, thereby securing the control of the corporation, while it might not be willing to subscribe a like amount or any amount to one whose capital stock was $10,000,000, in whose control it would thus have little voice. Again it might be willing to subscribe to and risk its funds with a corporation whose managers were men of known good character and financial responsibility, and not be wil ling to do the same with one whose controlling men were wholly irresponsible. The fairness and good sense of the legislation is altogether on the side of the construction, which the natural meaning of the language so plainly demands. It seems, therefore, that some corporation must be named as the recipient of the subscription and bonds, or the proceedings will be without warrant of law and void. A majority of the votes cast at the election of 1867, were against subscribing stock and issuing bonds. This is an undisputed fact. The statute reads, " If a majority of the votes cast at such election shall be in favor of issuing such bonds, the board of commission defence. Mere good faith will never give a cause of action; it is the county no further than the legislature has provided it shall. And a statutory power so liable to abuse, should not, .by construction, be enlarged beyond the plain warrant of the language used by the legislature. What is the county board empowered to do? It may make a subscription to the capital stock of a railroad corporation. A subscription is a contract. A contract requires two parties. There can be no subscription of stock without a corporation to receive the subscription. The county was not authorized to pledge its funds to aid in building a railroad. It could not bind itself to give so much for a road. The railroad project might be aided, it is true, but only by virtue of the fact that the corporation had obtained a responsible subscriber for a large amount of its stock. But before the board could make a subscription to the capital stock of any railroad corporation, the question must first be submitted to a vote of the qualified electors. What question? Manifestly the question of making the subscription-entering into the contract with the railroad corporation.ers of the county shall issue the same." Laws 1866, page 73, § 1. The whole question, not a fragment of it—the question of authority to make the contract, not a contract. The whole authority delegated to the board by the first clause of the section, rests upon the expressed assent of the voters. It is an entire thing-the consummation of a contract—and to it as an entirety the people must assent. It may be said that the language used contemplates the submission of only the question of issuing bonds. "No such bonds shall be issued until the question shall be first submitted." "If a majority of the votes cast at such election shall be in favor of issuing such bonds, the board of commissioners," etc. But the issue of bonds is the last act of the board-the consummation of the contract. Bonds are to issue only in payment of stock already subscribed. If the language limits the question to that of issuing bonds, it limits it to that which implies a subscription already made-a contract already entered into-and therefore, an existing and named corporation, the recipient of the subscription and the party to the contract. In the arguments made in the case of the Missouri River Fort Scott and Gulf Railroad company v. Miami county, to which we referred, some stress is placed upon the use of the verbs "is or may be," in the first sentence of the section, which authorize the commissioners of any county, "to, into, through, from, or near, which any railroad is or may be located, to subscribe to the capital stock of any such railroad corporation," and it is claimed that "is" is used in a continuing sense, and refers, not to the time of the passage of the law, but to the time of making the subscription, and that, therefore, the addition of the words, "may be contemplates a location subsequent to the subscription. In support of that claim, the case of James v. City of Milwaukee, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, and reported in Chicago Legal News, of Feb. 22d, 1873, is cited. It is unnecessary to determine whether the citation supports the construction, or whether the construction is correct. For the corporation must exist before it can locate its road, and all that such construction would warrant is, that the subscription might be made, and, therefore, might be authorized, before the corporation had finally located its road, and not that it might be authorized before any corporation existed. The citation might be pertinent, and the construction demand examination, if the language had been "any railroad corporation which is, or may be organized." It may be asked, what difference does it make? The thing to be secured is the railroad, and if that be accomplished, it is enough. We reply, the legislature has not authorized counties to give their bonds, simply to secure railroads; it has authorized them to take stock in railroad corporations, and pay for it in bonds. It makes the same difference to a county that it does to an individual, as to the corporation in which stock is proposed to be taken. The county, like an individual, might be willing to take $150,000 of stock in a corporation, whose capital stock was only That an election is a prerequisite to the issue of bonds, is unquestioned. Equally clear is it, that at such election a majority of the votes must be in favor of the issue. Power to issue is not vested in the commissioners by virtue of their office, but given only by express authority of the voters. Issuing bonds without a vote, is no more ultra vires, than issuing them against the vote of a majority. Express authority by an affirmative vote, is a condition precedent to the existence of the power. These general propositions will not be disputed, and if the commissioners had at their meeting, on May 10th, 1867, canvassed the entire vote of the county, and declared the result in accordance therewith, (namely, a majority of 104 against the proposition), no one would be foolhardy enough to claim that the commissioners had any power to issue these bonds, given by that election. It is claimed, however, that the commissioners were the proper canvassing officers; that at the legal time and place they made the canvass and declared the result, and that the county is bound thereby. It must be conceded that this claim finds ample support in the language of some of the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States. That tribunal has uniformly held that the determination of the county board was the adjudication of a competent tribunal, with full jurisdiction, and cut off all enquiry as to the facts upon which the determination, at least after the bonds had passed into the hands of a bona fide holder, was based. In the case of the commissioners of Knox county v. Aspinwall, 21 Howard, 539, Mr. Justice NELson thus stated the proposition in his usual clear and forcible language: Full power is conferred upon the board, to subscribe for the stock and issue the bonds, when a majority of the voters of the county have determined in favor of the subscription, after due notice of the time and place of election. The case assumes that the requisite notices were not given of the election, and hence that the vote has not been in conformity with the law. This would seem to be decisive, against the authority on the part of the board to issue the bonds, were it not for a question that underlies it; and that is, who is to determine whether or not the election has been properly held,and a majority of the votes of the county cast, in favor of the subscription? Is it to be determined by the court in this collateral way, in every suit upon the bond or coupon attached, or by the board of commissioners as a duty imposed upon it, before making the subscription? The court is of the opinion that the question belonged to this board. The act makes it the duty of the sheriff, to give the notices of the election for the day mentioned, and then declares if a majority of the votes given, shall be in favor of the subscription; the county board shall subscribe the stock. The right of the board to act in an execution of the authority, is placed npon the fact that a majority of the votes had been cast in favor of the subscription; and to have acted without first ascertaining it, would have been a clear violation of duty; and the ascertainment of the fact, was necessarily left to the enquiry and judgment of the board itself, [CONCLUDED IN OUR NEXT.] ruptcy. IN RE MANUFACTURERS' NATIONAL BANK. Mead, 36 District Court of the United States, for the Northern District of I. Hon. HENRY W. Blodgett, District Judge. National Banks-Bankruptcy.-A national bank cannot be proceeded against under the bankrupt law: if insolvent, it can only be wound up in the mode pointed out by the national currency act and its amendments. 2. Statutory Interpretation-Repeals by Implication.-A statute, although so general in its terms, that its letter would comprehend all classes of persons and things to which it can relate, will nevertheless be construed by the courts as not applying to a particular class which has been specially provided for and regulated by another statute, relating solely to such class, if there is no language in the general statute repealing the former statute, or in any manner referring to it. Thus, the bankrupt act does not repeal those provisions of the currency act and its amendments, which relate to the winding up of insolvent national banks. 3. "Act of Insolvency."-What is an "act of insolvency," within the 52d section of the currency act. Opinion by BLODGETT, J. On the 15th day of November last, Messrs. R. J. Smith & Co., filed in this court their petition, setting forth that they are creditors of the Manufacturers' National Bank, of this city, for money deposited with said bank in due course of business, and alleging that the said bank had suspended payment on its commercial paper for over fourteen days, and had, when insolvent, made preferential payments; for which acts they prayed that the bank be adjudged bankrupt. Being aware that grave doubts had been expressed by many lawyers and business men, as to the application of the bankrupt as no other tribunal was provided for the purpose. This board 439; The People v. Mead, 24 N. Y., 114; The People v. was one, from its organization and general duties, fit and compe- N. Y., 224. tent to be the depository of the trust thus confided to it. The persons composing it were elected by the county, and it was already invested with the highest functions concerning its general police The National Banks Cannot be Thrown into Bankand fiscal interests. We do not say that the decision of the board would be conclusive in a direct proceeding to enquire into the facts previously to the execution of the power, and before the rights and interests of third parties had attached ; but, after the authority had been executed, the stock subscribed, the bonds issued and in the hands of innocent holders, it would be too late, even in a direct proceeding, to call it in question. Much less can it be called in question to the prejudice of a bona fide holder of the bonds in this collateral way." We have made this lengthy quotation, because it contains as clear and complete a statement of the views therein expressed, as can anywhere be found; and also, because it is from the leading case in that court. The views therein expressed have been uniformly adhered to by that tribunal: Bissell v. City of Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287; Moran v. Miami county, 2 Black, 722; Gelpcke, v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175; Mercer county v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83; Van Hostrup v. Madison city, I Wall. 291; Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772; Pendleton county, v. Amy, 13 Wall. 297; City of Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 283. It will be observed that this language does not affirm that the determination of the county commissioners gives authority to issue bonds, but only that that determination estops the county from denying the authority. All that is asserted and all that can be found in any of the opinions is, that that determination is evidence of authority otherwise given — evidence that is conclusive in an action by a bona fide holder. It is like other canvass-evidence - nothing but evidence of facts already done, and power already given. It is by universal consent, open to enquiry and attack, unless made conclusive by statute, until, at least, rights have been vested on the faith thereof. It is no more potent to confer authority, than a canvass of votes cast for an office, is to give a right to the office. It should not be so weighty, even as evidence; for in the one case, it is necessary that o ffices should be filled, and that evidence of who are entitled to fill them, should be easily accessible; while in the other, it is not necessary that county bonds should ever be issued to railroad corporations, and the people's right to control the extent of their obligations should not be frittered away, on a mere matter of evidence. The substantial question is, did a majority of the voters grant the authority? the formal question, what does the canvass show? Reverse the status, for a moment, and suppose the canvass showed a majority of 26 votes against, while an actual màjority of 104 votes was in favor of the proposition. Would not the authority to issue, pass to the commissioners, and could there be any question, but that bonds thus issued, even in the hands of the obligee himself, could be enforced. "If a majority of the votes cast at such election," is the language of the statute. Can the commissioners by a canvass destroy the power of the majority, and set at naught the will of the legislature? Can they in defiance of the statute, create an authority in themselves? It was well said by the supreme court of Ohio in State ex rel. Treadwell v. The Commisioners, etc., 11 Ohio State, 183: "The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States must rest on the assumption that it was competent for the commissioners of Knox county by some act of their own, to make their authority complete tion we are not at liberty to make in this case." In that case, the county commissioners of any county, through or in which a railroad might be located by any corporation, were by statute authorized to subscribe stock and issue bonds. Under this statute, bonds were issued and passed into the hands of a bona fide holder. In a mandamus proceeding thereon, the answer alleged that the railroad had never been located through or in the county, and this answer was held good, and in holding it good, the court used the language above quoted. Starin v. the Town of Genoa, 23, N. Y. an assump law to national banks, I directed notice of the application for a 1. The security of the circulating notes of those banks, by the pledge of government bonds in the hands of the treasurer of the United States, and in case of the failure of the bank to redeem its notes, then redemption of those notes by the government, for which it is to be reimbursed by the proceeds of the bonds deposited and a first lien on all the assets of the bank. 2. The responsibility of the stockholders of the bank to the extent of the par value of the stock held by them respectively, in addition to the amount invested in their shares. 3. The whole system to be under the surveillance of the comptroller of the currency, with full powers to examine into the affairs of each bank, and in cases of non-compliance with the provisions of the law, to appoint a receiver to administer and wind up their affairs. On the 2d day of March, 1867, congress passed an act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States; and by the thirty-seventh section of said act it is declared, “that the provisions of this act shall apply to all moneyed, business and commercial corporations and joint-stock companies," and by the third clause of the same section it is declared, that "all payments, conveyances and assignments, declared fraudulent and void by this act, when made by a debtor, shall in like manner, and to the like extent, and with like remedies, be fraudulent and void, when made by a corporation and company." The forty-eighth section declares that the word "person," when used in this act, shall be held to include and mean corporations; and by the ninth clause of the thirty-ninth section, it is made an act of bankruptcy for any bank to suspend payment of its commercial paper for fourteen days. records, and assets of the corporation, who shall proceed to convert the assets into money under the direction of a court of competent jurisdiction. And the money so realized shall be paid over to the treasury of the United States, subject to the order of the comptroller, who, after deducting, in full, whatever amount shall be due to the United States, shall distribute the balance exactly among the creditors of the bank. The claims of creditors to be proven before the comptroller, or adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction. "The application of its assets in the manner prescribed by this act, or with a view to the preference of one creditor to another, except in payment of its circulating notes, shall be utterly null and void. And by the 48th section, it is made unlawful for any such bank, after suffering a protest of its circulating notes, and after notice from the comptroller, to, in any manner, prosecute the business of banking, except to receive and safely keep its money and deliver its special deposits. And by the 53d section, any violation of the provisions of the currency act, done knowingly, by either a bank, or its officers, or agents, works a forfeiture of all its rights and franchises, to be adjudged by a federal court at the suit of the comptroller. The 8th section provides that said corporations, i. e. national banks, "may sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any court of law and equity, as fully as natural persons. act of March 3, 1873, it is further provided that "no attachment, injunction, or execution shall issue against such association or its property before final judgment." The bankrupt law is the latest expression of the legislative will, and its general terms and provisions must be held to repeal all previous statutes necessarily incompatible with it. The question then is, does the bankrupt law repeal and supersede the provisions in the currency act for winding up the affairs of insolvent national banks? or can its provisions be applied to those corporations, and leave intact the provisions of the currency act on the same subject? There is no doubt of the soundness of the general rule of interpretation cited by the counsel for the respondent, that a statute, although so general in its terms that its letter would comprehend all classes of persons and things to which it can reAnd by the 57th section it is declared, that "suits, actions and late, will nevertheless be construed by the courts as not applying proceedings against any association under this act, may be had to a particular class, which has been specially provided for and reg- in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States, ulated by another statute, relating solely to such class, if there is held within the district in which such association be established, no language in the general statute repealing the former statute, or in any state, county, or municipal court in the county or city, or in any manner referring to it. Hume v. Gossett, 43 Ill. 297; in which such association is located, having jurisdiction in simiThe People ex rel. Becker v. Miner, 46 Ill. 384; Hawkins v. Gath-lar cases." And by the amendment to this section made by the ercole, 6 De Gex M. & G. 1; Williams v. Pritchard, 2 Term R., 2. "A thing which is in the letter of a statute is not within the statute, unless it be within the intention of the makers." Bacon's Abridgment, title Statute. "When the intention of the legislature is not apparent to the purpose, the general words of another and later statute shall not repeal the particular provisions of a previous one." Dwarris on Statutes, 117, quoted from Coke. The rule is thus stated in Sedgwick on Statutory and Constitutional Law: "In regard to the mode in which laws may be repealed by subsequent legislation, it is laid down as a rule, that a general statute, without negative words, will not repeal the particular provisions of a former one, unless the two acts are irreconcilably inconsistent. * * * The reason and philosophy of the rule is, that when the mind of the legislator has been turned to the details of a subject, and he has acted upon it, a subsequent statute in general terms, or treating the subject in a general manner, and not expressly contradicting the original act, shall not be considered as intended to affect the more particular or positive previous provisions, unless it is absolutely necessary to give the latter act such a construction, in order that its words shall have any meaning at all." Sedg. Stat. and Const. Law, 123. The currency act provides for the appointment of a receiver to wind up the affairs of a national bank, in the following cases: 1. For not keeping good a surplus-12th section. 2. For not keeping stock at a minimum-15th section. 3. For not keeping good its reserve-31st section. I am not aware that any adjudication has yet been made, determining what is an "act of insolvency" within the intent and meaning of the 52d section; but it seems to me to be an act which shows the bank to be insolvent; such as non-payment of its circulating notes, bills of exchange, or certificates of deposit; failure to make good the impairment of capital, or to keep good its surplus or reserve; in fact, any act which shows that the bank is unable to meet its liabilities as they mature, or to perform those duties which the law imposes for the purpose of sustaining its credit. It will thus be seen that while the currency act does not specify in detail, and provide for all the specific acts of bankruptcy enumerated in the bankrupt law, it yet does furnish, through the functions of an important public officer-the comptroller of the currency-a very complete and detailed scheme or plan for administering the affairs of an insolvent national bank. It is true, there is no provision for an individual creditor's putting this machinery in motion. But the presumption is that congress deemed it wiser to leave this duty to an impartial public officer, rather than entrust it to the hasty, inconsiderate, and perhaps, selfish action of one or more creditors. It was probably thought that the necessity of maintaining the public confidence in the system, was such as would compel the comptroller to act in all cases when a 4. For not selecting a place for the redemption of its notes- bank had become derelict or discredited, and that this considera32d section. 5. For holding its own stock over six months-35th section. 6. For non-payment of its circulating notes-50th section. 7. For improperly certifying a check-section 1, act March 3, 1869. 8. For failure to pay up capital stock, and for allowing same to become and remain unpaid by losses-section 1, act March 3, 1873. tion, together with the clear obligations of duty, thrown upon the officer, would be sufficient to ensure his action in all cases when he acquired the right to do so. At all events, the law, as it was enacted, contained ample and specific provisions for creating and managing these corporations, and for administering their affairs, when they became unable or refused to perform their public functions. The system has been in operation nearly ten years; over 2,000 Upon the happening of either of these contingencies, the comp-banks have been organized under it. Of these, 21 have been troller may appoint a receiver to take possession of all the books, wound up through the agency of the comptroller and a receiver. The greater part of them since the enactment of the bankrupt law. All the legislation of congress has looked toward the perfecting and perpetuation of the system; and ought we now to say that congress, by the enactment of the general bankrupt law, intended to place these corporations under the provisions of that law, and to repeal the elaborate plan which it had specially furnished for winding up their affairs, when they became insolvent or incapable of transacting banking business? That it did not intend to repeal them, is conclusively evidenced by the fact that in two of the important amendatory acts, those of March 3, 1869, and March 3, 1873, especial reference is made to those winding up provisions of the original act, and they are treated as being in full force. So, too, in several cases which have been before the supreme court since the enactment of the bankrupt law, reference has been made to these winding up powers as still in force. It being clear, then, that congress did not intend to repeal the winding up clauses of the currency act, the question arises, Did it intend that the two remedies, that is, the one given by the currency act, and the one given by the bankrupt act, should exist as co-ordinate or concurring remedies, and the affairs of an insolvent national bank be administered by that tribunal which first acquired control? This construction might be admitted, if the two were entirely compatible with each other, or if each was equally as complete as the other. That is, if each could reach and administer upon all the assets of the debtor bank, so as to leave nothing to be done by the other. which shows, to my mind, that congress did not intend to repeal the winding-up provisions of the currency act, by the passage of the bankrupt law; and a comparison of the provisions of the two acts, show with equal clearness to my mind, that it did not intend to inject the provisions of the bankrupt act into the currency act, so that creditors could apply the remedies of the bankrupt act, and the comptroller the remedies of the currency act. Because such a construction would inevitably produce collision and conflicts of jurisdiction, and the remedies given by the bankrupt act would be so far unavailing in regard to important assets, as to make it evident that there was no intention to apply such a remedy. Suppose this court were to adjudge the respondent bankrupt today, and send its messenger and assignee to take possession of the assets. The officers of the court, could in no event, enforce the personal liability clause, or obtain possession of the government bonds deposited to secure the circulation, or any surplus of those bonds, after fully returning the circulation. Those assets are beyond the reach of this court or its officers, and can only be approached by the way of the comptroller and his receiver. Then why should this court take cognizance of a case it cannot administer. Why not, rather, say congress has acted upon the subject matter of insolvent national banks and made specific provisions for administering their affairs, and inasmuch as the general bankrupt law has not expressly repealed these specific provisions, nor necessarily contradicted them, the courts will presume it is the intention of congress to except this class of corporations from the operation of the later statute. Such conclusion seems to me consistent with authority; and is, in fact, the only conclusion that will not lead to inextricable complication and conflict of authority. But we find upon examination, that the important duty of paying the holders of circulating notes, and distributing the proceeds of the bonds deposited to secure them, or the surplus of those bonds, and of enforcing the liability of stock, is left with the compBut it is urged that the currency act makes these corporations troller, and can only be enforced by or through him. This latter liable to all suits and actions which might be brought against point was fully discussed and decided by the supreme court, in Ken- national banks, and that they can therefore be proceeded against nedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498; when it was expressly held that the in bankruptcy. A sufficient answer to this might be found in the comptroller alone could enforce the personal liability clause. The fact, that when the currency act was passed, there was no bankcourt says: "The receiver is the instrument of the comptroller. rupt law in force, no bankruptcy known to the law; and thereHe is appointed by the comptroller, and the power of appointment fore, the general language must be held subject to this limitation. carries with it the power of removal. It is for the comptroller to But I take it, there is no doubt that the legislative power which decide, when it is necessary to institute proceedings against stock-creates an artificial person or corporation, can also prescribe what holders to enforce their personal liability, and whether the whole remedies shall be had against it, and that such remedies would be or a part, and, if a part, how much shall be collected. The ques-held to be exclusive, and that the provisions of the general banktions are referred to his judgment and discretion, and his determination is conclusive. The stockholders cannot controvert it. It is not to be questioned in the litigation that may ensue. He may make it at such times as he shall deem proper, and upon such data as shall be satisfactory to him. This action on his part is indispensable, when the personal liability of the stockholders is sought to be enforced, and must precede the institution of a suit by a receiver. * * The claims of creditors may be proved before the comptroller, or established by suit against the association. Creditors must seek their remedy through the comptroller, in the manner prescribed by statute." * Much stress was laid by the attorneys for petitioners, upon the inadequacy of the security for creditors under the currency act, mainly because creditors could not, of their own motion, initiate winding-up proceedings; but how much more inadequate would the bankrupt law be to the same end, if it cannot reach or distribute assets, and perhaps must pay what it gets over to a government officer for distribution. I do not say that an assignee would be obliged to pay over to the treasurer, but that there is grave ground for a claim that he should do so, and that collision might grow out of such claim. The relief which could be afforded to the creditors of a national bank, then, being so incomplete, I cannot think it was the intention of congress, to clothe bankrupt courts with jurisdiction over this class of corporations. I have already cited the evidence rupt law would not be held to apply to corporations at all, but for the exemptions of the act. Should they then be held to apply to a class of corporations which have, as it seems, a bankrupt law of their own, original with their own constitution and part of their organic law, by the same authority which enacted the bankrupt law? I think not. Nor does it seem to me that there is any necessary hardship in denying the remedies of the bankrupt law to the creditors of this corporation. There is no evidence that either this petitioning creditor or any other creditor has applied to the comptroller to take possession and administer the assets. Additional force is also given to this consideration, from the fact that in the very latest amendment to the currency act, it is expressly provided that no attachment, injunction, or execution shall issue against a bank until judgment is obtained. It is well known that, in many of the states, proceedings by attachment may be taken by a creditor in the first instance, and, as a matter of course, and in nearly or quite all the states, attachments can issue upon affidavits showing the existence of certain facts, while injunctions are almost universally issued before judgment or decree in equity cases, when a case is made for one. And yet these corporations are, probably for reasons of public policy, simply exempted from liability to all this class of summary proceedings. Here we have a restriction upon the powers of the bankrupt court, almost, if not wholly, incompatible with the jurisdiction. For of what use would it be to proceed in bank ruptcy against a debtor, in a large number of cases, unless he could be enjoined, or his property seized by a process of attachment. Before adjudication or judgment could be obtained, the property of the debtor might be wasted or spirited away, so that the adjudication would be barren of results. viding that all actions founded on contracts, notes, bonds, judgments, etc., upon which liability accrued beyond the limits of the territory, should be commenced within two years next after the cause of action accrued. The plaintiff replied that the statute did not apply to his case, because it was passed after his cause of action accrued. The court held, that, as Waterson was a resident of Kansas, when the territorial act went into operation, not commenced within two years after, it could not be sustained. This judgment is sustained here, the court holding that the act was prospective in its operation, and affected existing causes of action only from the time of I do not say that the prohibition to enjoin or attach property; the limitation began to run from that period, and that, as the action was necessarily implies want of jurisdiction, but only that it goes far to show that it was never the intention of congress to clothe a bankrupt court with jurisdiction as against these corporations. I am therefore of the opinion that the rule to show cause should be denied, and the petition dismissed for want of jurisdiction. PETITION Dismissed. Supreme Court of the United States. [We give below the proceedings had in the Supreme Court of the United States, on December 24th, in several important cases, which we take from the New York Herald. The court adjourned until January 5th. We expect to be able to give a summary of its proceedings from the 5th to the 10th of January, in our next issue.] its passage. Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion. No. 576. Sawyer v. Hoag-Appeal from the circuit court for the northern district of Illinois. In this case it is held that a debtor of an insolvent cannot purchase claims against his creditor, having full knowledge of the insolvency, and have them set off at their full value against his indebtedness to the insolvent, and the decree below enforcing the same view is affirmed. Sawyer subscribed to the capital stock of the Lumberman's Insurance company, upon an understanding that 85 per cent. would be The insurance loaned back to him upon a secured note for the amount. company becoming insolvent after the great fire in Chicago, Sawyer bought No. 477. Knowles v. Logansport Gaslight Company-Error to the cir-up adjusted claims against the company and sought to have them set off cuit court for Minnesota.-This is an action by the company to recover on against his indebtedness on the note. The decision treats him as an ordia judgment obtained in Indiana. The defence was want of jurisdiction of nary debtor of the company, and holds that the set off cannot be allowed. the person of Knowles in the Indiana case, and the return of the sheriff Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion. This decision also disposes of certifying service of summons, but not showing where it was served, havcases 579, Jaegar v. Voeke, and 580, Meyer v. Voeke, and the decrees in those cases are affirmed. ing been admitted as evidence of service against defendant's objections, he brings the ruling here, and raises the following questions: Was the certificate of service properly received as evidence of jurisdiction, and, if so, can it be contradicted on the trial of the action? The further question is raised: If service is made in an action for $3,000, does that give jurisdic-fourths of it within the time fixed. Subsequently, a quartermaster agreed tion to render judgment for more than that sum? Submitted under the twentieth rule. H. R. Bigelow, for plaintiff in error; F. R. E. Cornell, for defendant. No. 165. Solomons v. the United States-Appeal from the court of claims.-Solomons was under a contract with the government to furnish a certain quantity of corn within a certain time, and delivered about three to accept a further quantity under the contract if delivered within another limited time. The amount was delivered and a voucher given. A part of it was used and a part damaged while lying in the fort. The department, subsequently, refused to pay for the portion not used, on the ground that the contract had expired and could not be extended by verbal agreement. The voucher was accordingly reduced, and payment tendered and declined. The court below sustained the department, and its judgment is here reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to enter a judgment for the amount of the voucher, the court finding that the time was extended verbally, and that such agreement was valid. Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion. No. 169. Buckley v. United States-Appeal from the court of claims.This is another suit for damages for an alleged violation of a contract made with the government for transportation of military stores. The court below found that the government having simply failed to produce the amount of stores for transportation which were contracted for, were not guilty of a violation of the entire scope of the contract, and therefore refused the claimant damages for the profits of the contract lost in consequence of such failure, but allowed him the amount of the expense he had incurred in preparing for the transportation. It was, however, held that he had not sufficiently proven the amount of such expense, and the bill was, therefore, dismissed. From this decision the claimant appeals, insisting that he should have damages for his loss of profits on the contract. The ment submits that the decision below was correct. Durant and Honter, for sequently chartered. The judgment on the facts found was for the holder the claimant; C. H. Hill, for the government. govern No. 542. McCarty v. Mann et al.-Appeal from the circuit court for Minnesota. This was an action to quiet title to certain vacant and unoccupied lands in St. Paul, brought by the appellant. The appellees claim, under a conveyance from the patentee, made prior to his patent; and as the appellant disputes the validity of the entry of the patentee, the question arises whether an act of congress reinstating an entry made by the patentee, which had been cancelled by the commissioner of the general land office, so that the title in said lands may inure to the benefit of his grantees, so far as he may have conveyed the same, is such a recognition and ratification of the original entry as will sustain the title of his grantees, made in pursuance of such entry, and which is in the appellees. The appellant maintains that the patentee had no title until after his entry under the special act, and that if this be so, he (appellant) has the better title, derived from the grantees, who took from him immediately thereafter, and that the act did not renew an old title in the patentee, but created a new one. Submitted under the twentieth rule. W. P. Clough, for appellant; H. I. Horn, for appellees. No. 134. Sohn v. Waterson et al.-Error to the circuit court for the district of Kansas.-This was an action on a judgment recovered in Ohio against the defendants, in 1854. The defence was the statute of limitations of the territory of Kansas (the defendant Waterson being, when the suit was brought, and the act was passed, a resident there), passed in 1859, pro No. 480. Town of Ohio v. Marcy-Error to circuit court for the northern district of Illinois.-This was an action on municipal bonds issued by the town, and the defence was that they were not issued by the road for which the subscription was made, but to a consolidated road sub of the bonds, and the case was brought here for review; but the court say that the question of law raised is not presented in the record, and the judg. ment is accordingly affirmed. Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion. Legacy; Interest.—Where a bequest of a certain sum of money is made, and time of payment is fixed, the same does not bear interest until the time of payment, except where the law infers an intention to pay interest from the relation of the testator to the legatee. Page's Appeal, 71 Penn. State, (21 P. F. Smith) 402. This inference does not arise from the relation of godmother and god-daughter. Ibid. But where a trustee or executor is put in charge of a special fund for a legatee to manage for his benefit, his right to the prod uct of the fund may be inferred from the fact of its being so set apart for him. Ibid. |