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importance of these considerations, no philosopher seems to have been fully aware, previous to Mr. Hume. "As to "past experience," (he observes) "it can be allowed to "give direct and certain information of those precise ob"jects only, and that precise period of time, which fell. "under its cognizance; but why this experience should "be extended to future times, and to other objects,—this "is the main question on which I would insist."* What is the proper answer to this question is of no moment to our present argument. It is sufficient, if it be granted, that experience alone does not afford an adequate explanation of the fact.

In concluding this essay, it may not be altogether useless to remark the opposite errors which the professed followers of Bacon have committed, in studying the phenomena of matter, and those of mind. In the former, where Bacon's maxim seems to hold without any limitation, they have frequently shewn a disposition to stop short in its application; and to consider certain physical laws (such as the relation between the force of gravitation, and the distance of the gravitating bodies), as necessary truths, or truths which admitted of a proof, a priori; while, on the other hand, in the science of mind, where the same principle, when carried beyond certain limits, involves a manifest absurdity, they have attempted to extend it, without one single exception, to all the primary elements of our knowledge, and even to the generation of those reasoning faculties which form the characteristical attri butes of our species.

See Hume's essay entitled Sceptical Doubts, &c.

ESSAY FOURTH.

ON THE METAPHYSICAL THEORIES OF HARTLEY,

PRIESTLEY, AND DARWIN.

WHEN I hinted, in the preceding essay, that the doc trines prevalent in this country, with respect to the origin of our knowledge, were, in general, more precise and just than those adopted by the disciples of Condillac, I was aware that some remarkable exceptions might be alleged to the universality of my observations. Of those, indeed, who, in either part of the united kingdom, have confined their researches to the Philosophy of the Human Mind, properly so called, I do not recollect any individual of much literary eminence, who has carried Locke's principle to such an extravagant length as Diderot and Helvetius; but, from that class of our authors, who have, of late years, been attempting to found a new school, by jumbling together scholastic metaphysics and hypothetical physiology, various instances might be produced of theorists, whose avowed opinions on this elementary question, not only rival, but far surpass that of the French Materialists, in point of absurdity.

Among the authors just alluded to, the most noted are Hartley, Priestley and Darwin; all of whom, notwithstanding the differences among them on particular points, agree nearly in their conclusions concerning the sources of our ideas. The first of these, after telling us, that "all our in"ternal feelings, excepting our sensations, may be called

"ideas;-that the ideas which resemble sensations may "be called ideas of sensation, and all the rest intellectual "ideas;"-adds, "that the ideas of sensation are the ele"ments of which all the rest are compounded."* In another passage he expresses his hopes, that, "by pursuing "and perfecting the doctrine of association, he may, some "time or other, be enabled to analyse all that vast variety "of complex ideas, which pass under the name of ideas "of reflection and intellectual ideas, into their simple com"pounding parts; that is, into the simple ideas of sensation "of which they consist." And in a subsequent part of his work, he points out, still more explicitly, the difference between his own doctrine and that of Locke, in the following words:" It may not be amiss here to take notice "how far the theory of these papers has led me to differ, "in respect of logic, from Mr. Locke's excellent Essay "on the Human Understanding, to which the world is so "much indebted for removing prejudices and incum"brances, and advancing real and useful knowledge."

"First, then, it appears to me, that all the most com"plex ideas arise from sensation; and that reflection is not "a distinct source, as Mr. Locke makes it."‡

The obvious meaning of these different passages is, that we have no direct knowledge of the operations of our own minds; nor indeed any knowledge whatsoever, which is not ultimately resolvable into sensible images.

As to Dr. Hartley's grand arcanum, the principle of association, by which he conceives that ideas of sensation may be transmuted into ideas of reflection, I have nothing to add to what I have already remarked, on the unexam

Hartley on Man, 4th edition, p. 2. of the Introduction.
Ibid. pp. 75, 76.

Page 360.

pled latitude with which the words association and idea are, both of them, employed, through the whole of his theory. His ultimate aim, in this part of it, is precisely the same with that of the schoolmen, when they attempt. ed to explain, by the hypothesis of certain internal senses, how the sensible species received from external objects, are so refined and spiritualized, as to become, first, objects of memory and imagination; and, at last, objects of pure intellection. Such reveries are certainly not entitled to a serious examination in the present age.*

*I do not recollect that any one has hitherto taken notice of the wonderful coincidence, in this instance, between Hartley's Theory, and that of Condillac, formerly mentioned, concerning the transfor mation of sensations into ideas. Condillac's earliest work (which was published in 1746, three years before Hartley's Observations on Man) is entitled, Essai sur l'origine des Connoissances Humaines. Ouvrage où l'on reduit à un seul principe tout ce qui concerne l'entendement humain. This seul principe is precisely the association of ideas. “J'ai, ce me semble," (the author tells us in his introduction) ❝trouvé la solution de tous ces problèmes dans la liaison des idées, "soit avec les signes, soit entr'elles."-In establishing this theory, he avails himself of a licence in the use of the words idea and asso ciation, (although, in my opinion, with far greater ingenuity) strictly analogous to what we meet with in the works of Hartley.

Another coincidence, not less extraordinary, may be remarked between Hartley's Theory of the Mechanism of the Mind, and the speculations on the same subject, of the justly celebrated Charles

Bonnet of Geneva.

In mentioning these historical facts, I have not the most distant intention of insinuating any suspicion of plagiarism; a suspicion which I never can entertain with respect to any writer of origi nal genius, and of fair character, but upon the most direct and conclusive evidence. The two very respectable foreigners, whose names have been already mentioned in this note, have furnished another example of coincidence, fully as curious as either of the preceding: I allude to the hypothesis of the animated statue, which they both adopted about the same time, in tracing the origin and progress of our knowledge; and which neither seems to have bor

It must not, however, be concluded from these extracts, that Hartley was a decided materialist. On the contrary, after observing, that "his theory must be allowed to over"turn all the arguments which are usually brought for "the immateriality of the soul from the subtilty of the "internal senses, and of the rational faculty," he acknowledges candidly his own conviction, that "matter and "motion, however subtly divided, or reasoned upon, yield "nothing but matter and motion still;" and therefore requests, that he may not be, in any way, interpreted so "as to oppose the immateriality of the soul."* I mention this in justice to Hartley, as most of his later followers have pretended, that, by rejecting the supposition of a principle distinct from body, they have simplified and perfected his theory.

With respect to Hartley's great apostle, Dr. Priestley, I am somewhat at a loss, whether to class him with materialists, or with immaterialists; as I find him an advocate, at one period of his life, for what he was then pleased to call the immateriality of matter, and, at another, for the materiality of mind. Of the former of these doctrines, to which no words can do justice but those of the author, I shall quote his own statement from his "History of Dis"coveries relating to Vision, Light, and Colours," first published in 1772.

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"This scheme of the IMMATERIALITY OF MATTER, AS IT MAY BE CALLED, or rather the mutual penetra"tion of matter, first occurred to my friend Mr. Mitchell, on reading "Baxter on the Immateriality of the Soul."

rowed, in the slightest degree, from any previous acquaintance with the speculations of the other.

Hartley's Observations, pp. 511, and 512.

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