these several viewpoints, we have attention to later thinkers but not to the ancients, signifying that the multitudes of men have no school or profession in common; we have the overcoming of difficulties but no sincerity, showing that there is inability to distinguish the worthy from the ignoble; we have a doctrine of uniformity which overlooks the many crucial inequalities of life, proving that government administration nowadays is not permitted to distribute goods. or give relief to the needy; and we have attention given to the small and few but not to the great and many, showing that the multitude of people are not readily reformed. In regard to these things the Shu King (Book of Records) says: "People who have not yet become good should be docile and follow obediently the principles laid down by the ancients, while those who have not yet become evil should follow the simple and virtuous ways of living practiced by the ancient rulers." This is what the principle involved may be called. This is the vantage ground from which to view the beauty and goodness of the universe. TRANSLATOR'S NOTES. 1 The philosopher Hsün Tzu,' or Hsim Ch'ing (Minister Hsün) as he is often called, lived approximately between the years 280-212 E. C. thus coming in contact with the reactionar aftermath of Mencius's influence as represented in the doctrines of "those two antithetical heretics," the epicurean Yang Chu and the altruist Mo Ti, whose opinions he commonly opposed. Hsün Tzu was a native of the Chao State but left there at 50 years of age, going to the Ch'i State seeking the association of philosophers and scholars. He there became chief libationer but through some covetous rival's intrigue he was impeached and withdrew to the Ch'u State where he was appointed magistrate of Lan Ling by Prince Ch'un Shen and in the comparative peace of his new post he became a teacher of philosophy and classical learning, and had as pupils the mystic Han Fei Tzu2 and the jurist Li Ssu3 who subsequently became his great opponent, almost his nemesis. His numerous troubles and the career of periodical dismissals, intrigues and disgraces had made him a misanthrope, however, and perhaps accounts for his most famous essay arguing that "Human Nature is Evil at Birth." But the essay from which the present translation is a major selection serves as part of the preliminary argument, and according to Huang Chen 李斯 1 荀子 2 韓非子 3 Fu (one of the editorial collaborators on the Pai Tzu Chin Tan "All Philosophers' Noble Precepts," reprint of June, 1904, Shanghai) it is a critical examination of education and the proper conduct of life which contains some of his best thoughts and arguments relative to the beauty and benevolence of the universe. Hence what is herein recorded should be regarded as of chief importance. in the regulation of human affairs." In both the translation and these notes I have incorporated some of the principal commentary remarks of Chia Shan Hsieh whose critical edition (1786) of Hsün Tzu's philosophical writings is now included in a twenty volume set. entitled "Twenty-Five Philosophers" (Shanghai, 1893). 2 The two words ch'ang shih, ordinarily meaning "to try by tasting," are used by the Taoists and office-holding literati in the sense of testing one's skill as in performing tricks or at an examination. But with Hsün Tzu, Han Fei Tzu and their more philosophical followers, the phrase is dignified with a usage which resembles that of our "inductive logic," "empirical science," or "critical philosophy.” and always implies that there is or has been much sampling, trial and experiment bolstering the bare hypotheses of man's inquisitive speculation. Therefore I believe I am translating simply and yet. adequately by using our term "peirastic inquiry" in the sense of Baconian or philosophical induction. 3 Shen Tzu (c. 390-337 B. C.) was minister under Prince Chao of the Han State and became famous as an authority on criminal law, interstate jurisprudence and ancient codes of government administration. He also wrote learned interpretations of the mystic. speculations of the Yellow Emperor and Lao Tzu, but it seems that the great flaw in his works on these two ancient sages was that of too much legal doubt, whence he devoted more attention to what later writers had to say than to the simple words and ways of the mystics. On this account, after harking back to the intelligent principles and clearcut precepts of Lao Tzu" and his imperial predecessor, Shen Tzu was strangely sidetracked and claimed neither to esteem them as virtuous men nor would he countenance the appointment to office of any man whose abilities were tinged with the least sympathy for Taoism. Thus, in commenting on Shen Tzu's scholarly attainments, Chuang Tzu,10 the great contemporary champion of 百子金丹 6=+47 5 8 10 莊子 Lao Tzu's doctrines, said: "If such a doltish person as I do not neglect Tao, why should such a great scholar (as Shen Tzu) not strive to emulate the thoughts and motives of the ancients?" This refers directly to what Hsün Tzu a century later called "observing the subsequent but overlooking the previous." According to a work entitled "I Wen Chih" (Collected Records of Arts and Crafts) published in the Han period about 100 B. C., Shen Tzu's work first. appeared in 42 sections, but later editions reduced this number to 34. And Pan Ku,12 the famous historian (native of An Ling, c. 2092 A. D.), says that "the influence of the ancients extended unaltered to the time of the Han State (403-273 B. C., and hence nearly contemporary with Hsün Tzu's time), but since then and especially in our own Han Dynasty many scholars have arisen. to challenge and weigh their claims." Thus it seems that Hsün Tzu was clearly anticipating what was subsequently proven. I do not understand what sort of view of Lao Tzu's teachings could have led Hsün Tzu to say that he did not "adequately look into the meaning of faith (sincerity)." If I read his "Tao Teh King" rightly and am not mistaken about the very scholarly and delightful interpretations of Henri Borel, Dr. Paul Carus, and C. H. A. Bjerregaard, sincerity and various other articles of faith were the very cornerstones of Lao Tzu's philosophy. I have counted the word hsin1s (sincerity, faith, believe) no less than 15 times, and its several approximate synonyms about 25 times throughout his famous book. "It is a common necessity both to realizing the way of Heaven and following the footsteps of the sages." 5 Mo Ti Tzu,1 a younger contemporary of Mencius, was an impractical utilitarian who believed in universal love and utter selfabnegation. His views were in almost diametrical opposition to those of Yang Chu, and Hsün Tzu considers them to be simply the two horns of the same dilemma-that either selfish hedonism or selfsacrificing altruism will get us anywhere that is still not a worldly vale of folly and delusion. There may be a general uniformity of principles and moral imperatives but there are certainly few of the world's ephemeral details which do not hinge on injustice, falsehood, and the odds and ends of finite interest. And Hsün Tzu criticizes Mo Ti for attending only to the ideal uniformity while overlooking the more immediate problem of inequality and heterogeneity both in nature and in human life. 6 Sung Tzu was another. younger contemporary of Mencius who regarded man's feelings as that which served to moderate his ambitions, whence if one's feelings are few and his power of sympathy is small (although he may quite possibly regard them as many and magnanimous), his private desires and public ambitions will become great and overbearing. The historian Pan Ku says that Hsün Tzu discussed this doctrine with Sung Tzu and pointed out that its principle had long ago been explained by the Yellow Emperor and Lao Tzu. 7 Chia Shan Hsieh's note on this point seems to try to reverse the situation, and yet in a way his comment carries the speculation further and can be considered permissible. He says: "However, if a certain sort of desire (that for personal virtue or world-betterment, for instance) is enlarged and importance is given to its realization then it will be possible for us to use exhortations and kindly advice to influence and encourage such people to become good. But if everyone's desires are vulgar and their ambition small, who then will be able to reform them?" In this remark I believe Chia shifts the meaning of the word to1 from "many" to "great and magnanimous," and of the word shoa" from "few" to "small and mean," for they are common words and have a very liquid usage which allows commentators too much latitude sometimes. This quotation is from that chapter in the Shu King which embraces the ancient Viscount Chi Tzu's Hung Fan18_"Great Plan" which was the model system of just government which Chi Tzu1 bequeathed to Wu Wang upon the latter's conquest of the Shang dynasty. One of its provisions explains that if our virtue is partia! and our love for the good is onesided then we will not be likely to follow the principles laid down by the ancients. As a supplementary note I would like to remind readers of this magazine that if they wish a further and more general account of Early Chinese Philosophy just such a survey may be had in The Monist for July 1907, April and October 1908. It is capably and entertainingly written under the collaboration of D. T. Suzuki and Dr. Paul Carus. 15 宋子 16 3 17 少 SOME MARGINAL NOTES ON LAUGHTER. BY SAMUEL D. SCHMALHAUSEN. Amico: I do not quite understand Professor Scott's contention that Henri Bergson's theory of the comic is tainted by "ethical pessimism." Professor Scott is molested by the thought that Morality may become a target of clever sharp shooters with a penchant for comic effect. To be laughed at for one's sincerity is, I submit, not an altogether pleasant experience. Why should there be a contradiction-a hostility-between customary morality and a sense of humor? Amicus: That's a very nice point you raise. Let us begin with some general truths about personal conduct. Everyone knows that to laugh at a neighbor is easier and more congenial than laughing at one's self. Does everyone surmise why? I suppose the simplest explanation of the problem may be summed up in one sentence: Man takes himself more seriously than he does his neighbor. In other words, he feels more keenly for himself than he does for his neighbor. Laughing at himself would pain these personal and serious feelings. Laughing at his neighbor wounds no such feelings. The inference seems to be that laughter has its roots in callousness. A drunkard's reels and gyrations do move to laughter-but not if the drunkard happens to be your father. Dirty jests about sex do make men leer and giggle-but not if the jests are about their sisters or mothers. We all enjoy laughing at somebody's else expense. Laughter is a species of callousness. Laughter, rooted in callousness, is a weapon of advantage in the struggle for prestige. Those who laugh gain a tremendous sense of power; the |