because their lightness rendered them more manageable; that an increased thickness of sides rendered a ship only more heavy, without bringing any counterbalancing advantage, as it could not be increased so as to stop an eighteen pound shot, while the sides of their frigates would resist grape and cannister as well as ours; and, finally, that it was also ascertained that a greater number of men than their regulations allowed was not only useless, but pernicious, because it only crowded them together, and exposed them to greater slaughter. Captain Carden proceeded to state, that this reasoning was founded on his own experience, he having obtained his promotion in consequence of being first lieutenant of a British thirtyeight, which captured a French frigate, mounting forty-four twenty-four pounders. He concluded by saying, that from this experience he felt satisfied he could take the United States. with the Macedonian, though at the same time he disclaimed any intention to question the skill or bravery of the American officers. These opinions were held by all the British naval officers in all their debates on the subject, either in the ports of England, the United States, or the Mediterranean sea.

Now really, in all humility, we conceive ourselves entitled, being a young and inexperienced nation, to some little credit for having taught the thrice valiant and experienced officers of our enemy, that they absolutely did not know what they were talking about, and that their "experience" had most wofully deceived them. It is certainly an evidence of the superior genius of our country, that even against the authority of such great men, and more than all, against the practice of Great Britain, from whom we are from time to time reproached with borrowing all we know, we should have persisted in building ships with such thick sides, and dared to fight her with twenty-four pounders. We further think, in the simplicity of our hearts, perhaps it may be from our ignorance of such matters, that the officer, who at this time of day, like Decatur, discovers "a novel manner of fighting his ship," by the which he renders his enemy "an unmanageable wreck,"

and kills and wounds more than one-third of his crew, with so little loss or damage to himself, deserves some little credit for his genius. A liberal and a noble enemy would have acknowledged this at once, instead of consulting Dilworth's Assistant, or Cocker's Arithmetic, and racking his brain for palliatives, the absurdity of which he is himself forced to acknowledge; for, notwithstanding every alledged disparity of force, he, in many instances, is obliged at last to resort to the confession, that this alone will not account for the disparity of loss. The solution of this enigma lies, we repeat again, not in the "length and scantling" of our ships, the weight of their metal, or the number of their men, but in the superiority of their officers and men, who are morally and physically better than those of the British navy;--who can point guns, and stand the pointing of an enemy better;-and who will neither risk drowning or hanging to desert from their ships whenever they have an opportunity.

The last thing we shall notice in the foregoing part of the Synopsis, is the author's spiteful denunciation against poor New London, where the Macedonian, together with the United States and Hornet, was blockaded by a British fleet. Not content with having burnt that good town once before, he is for burning it again, for affording a shelter to one of his B. M's. captured frigates. Now this is really carrying the joke a little too far. One would have supposed that burning a town once would content a magnanimous enemy; but some people are never satisfied. One might also have supposed, that a "British naval officer," who had, like our author, been on the coast of America during the whole war, would have known, that by burning New London he would have been never the nearer to burning the Macedonian, which lay several miles up the little river Thames; consequently, even our fiery officer's fire could hardly have reached her such a long way off, unless he could have set the river on fire, which perhaps, however, would be no very hard matter for such a smart, sensible officer as he appears to be.

BRITISH NAVAL PEACE ESTABLISHMENT.

We present our readers with an abstract of the proceedings of the British house of commons on voting the supplies for their present naval establishment. It will appear from this document, that the United States are at length respected by the govement of Great Britain.

HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEBRUARY 14, 1816.

Sir G. Warrender rose to move for the supplies for the navy of the present year. It was the intention, he said, of the naval administration of the country to put the navy in a state of perfect efficiency. By efficiency, he meant it would be kept in such a state, that it would be able to contend with the united navies of the world. He should now compare the naval establishment which it was intended to keep up, with that which had been determined on at the close of the last war, though to refer in this way to what had been done in former times, might not be the most convenient course, as he was prepared to contend that the question now to be considered ought to be viewed with a reference to the circumstances of the present day; to the state of our foreign commerce, and the number and importance of our colonies, rather than with a reference to what had been thought sufficient when the situation of the country was very different from what it was now known to be. In the East Indies no addition had been made to the naval force which it had been thought wise to keep up at the time of the last peace. From the Cape, which was perfectly a new station, and which, from its connection with St. Helena, now of more importance than ever, from its being the place wherein he who had so long disturbed the repose of Europe, was confined, must demand particular attention; and for the Mauritius a very considerable squadron had been appointed. This, however, was limited to the very lowest scale which the distinguished admiral on that station had thought would be sufficient. Eleven ships of the line had been thought necessary for this service. In the Mediterranean it had been thought advisable to substitute 74 gun ships for those of 50 guns, which had heretofore been employed. A small squadron had been station off South America, in compliance with the applications made since the last peace, in order to protect our growing trade in that quarter. This, it would be observed, was quite a new station. The force stationed at Jamaica and the Leeward Islands had been somewhat diminished; but, in consequence of the situation in which they stood with respect to South America, the reduction here was but small. One frigate had been added to the force stationed off North America; and on the coast of Africa a squadron would be maintained equal to that kept up during the last peace. The squadron on the home station would be the same as that maintained in 1792. It was proper to remark, that had there been no new stations to occupy, an

încrease of men for the peace establishment would be necessary from other circumstances. This partly arose from larger frigates being now more generally in use than were common formerly. These, from the arrangements made by other powers, had become necessary to us, and those now in commission required 260 men, instead of the former compliment of 200. He also thought it very important that a corps of royal marines should now be maintained, which were not thought to be necessary formerly. He concluded by moving a vote of 33,000 men to be employed in the navy for the present year, including 3000 marines.

Mr. Ponsonby said that it would require much stronger reasons than he had yet heard, for voting that number as a permanent peace establishment, which on an average had amounted to only 18,000 men. It would be necessary, therefore, to establish the necessity of a greater number. That necessity must be shown to exist, not from the state of our trade or commerce, but from the maritime force of other powers, who might attempt to interfere with our naval strength or safety. The American war closed after two naval campaigns, in one of which the fleet of the enemy rode triumphant in the British channel; and in the other, our ships were compelled to seek security in our harbors against the combined fleets of France and Spain.

If then, at the close of that war, the house thought 18,000 men sufficient for our safety, what could now induce them to vote 33,000? Spain and France were now in alliance with us, and though he did not place much security on their friendship, yet where was their power to injure us? The fleet of Spain was annihilated, and that of France was so reduced as not to deserve any serious consideration on our part. No nation in Europe had any formidable navy; and the combined fleets of the world could not collect twenty-five sail of the line to meet us. It was true, France had twenty ships at the termination of the war; but no one would contend that they were at all equal to a contest with us. But suppose that France should show a disposition to put her navy in a formidable state; could she proceed faster than ourselves? Or could it be a secret to those at the head of naval affairs, that France and Spain were making preparations? It must require a considerable time to augment their maritime strength, and we could not fail to perceive their motions. They could not have the means of increasing their power at sea in any way in which we should not be equal to their exertions. It was quite unneces sary, therefore, to maintain a greater number of men than after the American war.

Mr. Law, considering that from the disposition and conflicting interests of various powers, from the feelings known to exist in America, the hopes of a durable peace were not so certain as had been represented, that our navy ought not to be diminished even to the extent it had been already. If the gentleman passed his eye over the map of Europe, and considered the feelings of

the different governments, he would be satisfied there was a necessity for our keeping up a great naval establishment.

Sir G. Warrender wished to explain a point which he thought had been misunderstood; he wished to state that the increase in the number of seamen did not arise from the number of ships employed, but from the manner in which they were manned. The size of the French frigates had been increased, and it was necessary that the complement of ours should bear some approximation. The view that the gentleman had taken of the navies of Europe was not quite fair. The last time the Toulon fleet put out to meet lord Exmouth, it consisted of only seventeen sail of the line and two frigates: the hardest actions fought by the French were in the year 1813, during which period they sent to sea thirteen frigates, of which eleven were taken, but after hard fighting: but now the French ships of the line amounted to sixty sail, and those of Europe united to nearly two hundred. Such being the case, he would ask the house, he would ask the country, if they would wish to see the establishment of this country reduced to twelve guard ships? No! it would be said, let us rather submit to all the burthens of taxation than diminish that navy to which we owe all our glory-all our security! It had been urged that reduction might be made in some of the foreign stations; but the situation of South America was different from what it had been: our merchants desired protection, and it was proper they should have it. As to any reduction in the West Indies, could we forget or overlook the new power growing up in that quarter-the power of North America!

Mr. Ponsonby said a few words respecting the observations made upon America, and although he did not know, he believed no disposition of hostility existed in the government of that country towards us; and he regretted that such observations, made in the house of commons undesignedly, might yet have a tendency to inflame the minds of the people of America. He much dreaded the existence of any hostile spirit in America towards this country, or in this country towards America, and he wished that country should not be adverted to in the manner it had been adverted to this night.

Lord Castlereagh would only trouble the house with a very few words, as it would be much more satisfactory to reserve the minuter view of the subject to the proper time, when it would come before the house. The best general principle in the formation of a peace establishment must be to combine security with economy. It was on this principle, that owing to the unsettled state of the world at present, it had become nccessary, on many remote stations, to keep up a very considerable naval force, for the purpose of inspiring that confidence which was so indispensible for the prosperity of commerce. The knowledge that there

For French read American.