a provision which, at a single blow, should level system and supporters, judges and their courts, altogether. In both houses of congress the effort was manfully resisted. The majority was conjured not to interfere with this remnant of federal policy, because it was engrafted upon the constitution. They were entreated to postpone a decision until the public opinion could be clearly ascertained, and the efficacy of the system could be tested by experience; they were offered any, and every compromise:-if the army were disliked, to abolish it; if a further reduction of the little navy were required, to reduce it: to surrender internal revenues, and, indeed, to make any sacrifice short of the constitution.

On this memorable occasion all parties united in paying homage to the abilities of Mr. Bayard. It will not be invidious to remark, that in the constellation of talents that glittered in that transaction none were more conspicuous than his. He was alike distinguished for the depth of his knowledge, the solidity of his reasoning, and the perspicuity of his illustration. On his own side of the house his range was pronounced to be "commensurate with the extent of his own mighty mind, and with the magnitude of the subject," which was declared to be as awful as any on this side of the grave. On the part of the majority he was termed the Goliath of the adverse party, and sarcastically, but with truth, denominated the high priest of the constitution. In the discussion of the bill, introduced for the repeal of the law establishing the judiciary system, Mr. Giles had taken occasion to attack with vehemence the whole course of measures adopted by the federalists, and to assail them individually and collectively. In reply, Mr. Bayard felt himself called on to travel out of the immediate course of argument which the question afforded, and to enter upon a collateral one, into which he was driven in defence of his own, and the conduct of his friends. He traced the division of party to the difference of views, as to the powers which do, and ought to belong to the general and state governments. He deprecated the effect of state pride in

extinguishing national sentiment. "The ruins of this government," said he, "aggrandize the states. There are states which are too proud to be controlled; whose sense of greatness. and resource renders them indifferent to our protection, and induces a belief that if no general government existed, their influence would be more extensive; and their importance more conspicuous." He met the complaints against the federal party for their various prominent measures and principles. Assumption of state debts-internal taxes-the Indian war-the navy-war with Algiers-preparations for expected hostilities with France-the memory of Washington-all of which had been openly or indirectly assailed, passed in review under his masterly hand, and were depicted in the most glowing colours. He asserted and maintained the soundness of the doctrine, that the constitution was founded in an existing common law, and that the evils imputed to it never had, or could have, any existence. He vindicated the judges from the imputation of having sought for victims of rigorous statutes, and retorted upon the new executive a similar charge. "If," he observes, "the eyes of the gentleman are delighted with victims-if objects of misery are grateful to his feelings, let me turn his view from the walks of the judges to the track of the present executive. It is in this path we see the real victims of stern, uncharitable, unrelenting power. It is here, sir, we see the soldier who fought the battles of the revolution;-who spilt his blood, and wasted his strength to establish the independence of his country, deprived of the reward of his services, and left to pine in penury and wretchedness. It is along this path that you may see helpless children crying for bread, and gray hairs sinking in sorrow to the grave. It is here that no innocence, no merit, no truth, no services can save the unhappy sectaries who do not believe in the creed of those in power. I have been forced upon this subject, and, before I leave it, allow me to remark, that without inquiring into the right of the president to make vacancies in office during the recess in the senate, but admit

ting the power to exist, yet that it never was given by the constitution to enable the chief magistrate to punish the insults, to revenge the wrongs, or to indulge the antipathies of the man. If the discretion exists, I have no hesitation in saying, that it is abused when exercised from any other motive than the public good. And when I see the will of a president precipitating from office men of probity, knowledge, and talents, against whom the community has no complaint, I consider it a wanton and dangerous abuse of power; and where I see men who have been the victims of this abuse of power, I view them as the proper objects of national sympathy and commiseration."

Having thus pursued his antagonists through their erratic flight, among topics faintly and remotely connected with the legitimate subject of discussion-Mr. Bayard assumed the argument with respect to the repeal of the judiciary law. Deeply versed in his subject, from profound reflection, and active experience; and sensibly interested, from a solemn conviction of its magnitude, he penetrated the deepest recesses of his theme. The inexpediency of the bill was maintained, because it would restore the evil of appeals from the individuals who pronounce a decision, to the court of which the same individuals are component parts; which had been obviated by making the supreme court merely the great national tribunal of last resort, before which, questions of unlimited magnitude and concern both of a civil and politica! nature should receive their final determination-the national crucible of justice, in which the judgments of inferior courts might be reduced to their elements, and cleansed from every impurity. The inconvenience and delay attending the constant journeys of the judges on their circuits, and the want of uniformity in the decisions of those who followed each other in rapid succession in the same districts were exposed, The charge that the new system was introduced not so much with a view to improvement in the old, as to obtain places

for the friends of the administration, was pronounced a calumny so humble and so notoriously false, as neither to require nor deserve an answer. The advantage of the increased number of judges to sit in the circuit courts was displayed. It was demonstrated that no additional courts had been created by the new law-the number of district courts remained the same, the supreme court as such, was unchanged; a circuit court still continued to be held in each district, though under an improved modification as to form. But the unnatural alliance of the different courts had been severed, while the jurisdiction of each remained untouched. The expense of the establishment was proved to be insignificant; and the arguments that had been urged that it was formed by a party at a time when they were sensible that their power was expiring and passing into other hands, were answered by the assertion of the fulness and legitimacy of that power-that the remnant was plenary and efficient, and it was their duty to employ it according to their judgments and consciences for the good of the country. They thought the bill a salutary and wise measure, and there was no obligation on them to leave it to their successors. They had indeed, no confidence in the persons who were to follow them, and were therefore the more anxious to accomplish a work which might contribute to the safety of the nation by giving strength and support to the constitution through the storm to which it was likely to be exposed.

The constitutionality of the proposed repeal was argued with no less ability, than its expediency. It was declared to resolve itself into the question, whether the legislature has a right by law to remove a judge. The object of the advocates. of repeal, was to evince a distinction between the removal of a judge and the extinction of the office-and therefore that the purpose which was prohibited from being done directly, might still be indirectly effected: a difference being supposed to exist between taking the office from the judge, and removing the judge from the office. Two prominent features of the

constitution were perpetually exhibited in reply to such suggestions:-that the judges hold their offices during good behaviour; and that their compensation shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. By the term good behaviour, it was said was intended a tenure for life, qualified and accompanied by the good conduct of the judge, the cessation of which must be ascertained by impeachment. But, said the administration party, a necessary implication is contained in the power given to congress from time to time to establish tribunals inferior to the supreme court-a power it is presumed that could not carry with it by any implication, the right to destroy them. Inferences too of a most extraordinary character were drawn from the use of the word "hold," in allusion to judicial continuance in office. The president nominates the judge, and commissions him when approved by the senate. It was hence inferred that as the president nominates and commissions the judge, the judge holds the office of the president; and that when the constitution provides that the tenure of the office shall be during good behaviour, the provision applies to the president, and restrains the power which would otherwise result in consequence of the offices being holden of him, to remove the judges at will. It was no difficult task to expose the errors of 'an argument, which imputed to the president of the United States regal attributes. and prerogatives, derived not from the pure fountain of the constitution; but from the rude doctrines of the feudal law, by which the executive is made the fountain of honour, of justice and of office; an argument which would make the courts-the president's courts, and the judges the president's judges; and would infuse into the institutions of the republic the vital spirit of feudal principles. The construction of laws, or the application of them to the touchstone of the constitution, must be vested in some efficient authority. With whom should it reside? Not with the legislature or executive, because they have already passed upon the merits and pro

• Cons. U. S. Art. 3. Sec. 1.