might have had its effect upon us some five or six years ago, when the reputation of English official statements for veracity stood somewhat higher than at present. At all events, it is a method exceedingly well calculated to deceive, since we involuntarily pay a greater regard to these arithmetical statements, without reflecting that a falsehood may as easily be conveyed in figures, as in unqualified assertions. We have only to admit the premises of the author of the Synopsis, which are merely founded on assertion, so far as they relate to our vessels, and all the rest follows of course. It is only necessary, by this mode of establishing facts, to assert that one ship carries thirty-eight twenty-fours, and another forty-nine thirty-twos; and this being assumed, the calculation of the weight of ball fired in every broadside respectively will be undeniable. But this is no way of demonstrating facts, for though it is permitted a reasoner to prove the truth of a hypothetical axiom by the assumption of his premises, another and a more solid basis is necessary in establishing facts.

A writer whose professed object was to give "a fair and impartial summary of naval occurrences between England and America during the late war, and to detect and refute some at least of the numerous falsehoods hitherto so undeviating a feature in the maritime records of the latter power," ought certainly to have had the courtesy to inform us how he came by the basis of these accounts current, which would really do honour to honest Thomas Dilworth himself. For instance, it would have been just as well to tell us how it came to be "fully ascertained that the American forty-fours are equal to our first class of seventy-fours"-that they have "two entire decks," (meaning gun-decks) and carry their lower deck battery equally high and commanding with the new razees." Such astounding assertions ought to have been well substantiated before they were made the foundation of a summary, whose professed object was the refutation of falsehood. In order, however, to give some colour to these assumptions, the admiralty of England has cunningly laid the frigate President close alongside an

old low seventy-four at Plymouth. The President is lightened of every thing, and the seventy-four laden so deeply that she would not go to sea in her present trim. The consequence is that the President appears much higher out of water than the seventy-four, and every honest John Bull that comes down to Plymouth is fully convinced that our frigates are in reality seventy-fours in disguise. It is no small triumph to have driven the British government to such miserable shifts to keep up the credit of its navy even among its own ignorant, vain glorious people, and assuredly the mere resort to these petty arts, is a better proof of the superiority we assume, than any which has yet been offered in opposition. England, that used to depend upon her ships, her sailors, and her guns, is now reduced to depend for her naval reputation upon measurements, calculations, excuses, and mistatements. She is obliged to count men and guns, to measure keels and scantling, and to weigh balls with the most minute precision. It was not wont to be so with John Bull, and we cannot help thinking that if we have gained nothing else in the late war this is no small matter.

The first case the writer mentions, after the preliminary notice of the Chesapeake, is that of the schooner Whiting, a case of not the least importance, but introduced by this unlucky officer, as it were by a sort of fatality, to show us in the very outset what dependence we can place in his statements. He says the Whiting was taken by us, "lying at anchor, ignorant of the war." Now the Whiting was actually taken by the French letter of marque brig Le Diligence, captain Grassin, who a short time afterwards, off the capes of Delaware, fell in with and took his Britannic majesty's brig Laura, lieutenant Hunter, of very superior force, and carried her into the port of Philadelphia. This mistake is not otherwise of consequence, except as indicating the want of accurate information of the "British officer on the American station;" as such the reader is desired to bear it in mind.

The next action referred to by the officer, is that of the Alert, whose force is stated at sixteen guns, and eighty-four

men. Nobody in this country, and least of all captain Porter, ever thought of taking any credit for the capture of this ship, nor has it ever on any occasion been brought forward as an argument to sustain our reputation, or put down that of our enemy. As however it happens to be one of the cases in which there was indeed a vast disparity of force, the officer is quite right to make the most of that circumstance. All we shall take the trouble to do will be to detect some few mistakes with respect to this "action," as he chooses to call it.

The Essex was disguised-this is another art of these "cunning Americans," for which John Bull, who never uses any arts, not he, abuses them sadly.-The Alert ran down and fired into her most manfully, supposing her to be an English Indiaman, captured by the Americans. Immediately on discovering her mistake she struck, before the Essex had fired one complete broadside. Captain Laugharne informed captain Porter of his having mistaken his ship, but at the same time told him that he had been instructed by admiral Duckworth to engage any American frigate he fell in with, as he was confident of success. In this desperate affair the Alert had two men wounded, and a few shot in her hull, and only one of her shot touched the Essex. The first lieutenant of the Alert was broke for cowardice, notwithstanding this gallant defence, and captain Laugharne was not again employed during the war. The Alert mounted twenty guns; and one hundred and twenty men of her crew were sent in her to Halifax, captain Porter having converted her into a cartel for that purpose.

Preparatory to the exhibition of his account current of the action between the Constitution and Guerriere, the officer premises first," that the several situations of boatswain, gunner, captains of the guns, &c. on board every American ship were principally filled by British seamen❞—and " that at the period of the declaration of war our half-manned ships, having no enemy to dread, were carelessly cruising about in evcry sea." Poor big John Bull! he never was so hard put to it

before to find excuses. who are represented in songs and poetry as the most loyal and faithful subjects in the world, must be to join the enemies of their country, and thus teach them to beat their excellent sovereign-and what a set of careless persons must be these officers, who were thus carelessly, with their half-manned vessels, cruising about on every sea, although under the express apprehension of a war with the United States, the government had augmented its force on this station.

What a set of rascals John's seamen,

The writer of the Synopsis has here unwarily disclosed the true cause of the naval disasters which he attempts to trace solely and exclusively to our superior ships and heavier guns. It seems their seamen are disaffected, for they desert to the enemy, and teach them to beat their countrymen; and that their officers neglect their duty by "carelessly cruising about in every sea," without any apprehension of encountering an enemy. This is all we have ever contended for;-a superiority in men, who were attached to the service, and in officers, more brave, more hardy, and, above all, more vigilant than our rivals. For our part, we know of no legitimate claims to superiority but these, and having thus virtually acknowledged them, we cannot help thinking the British officer has taken a vast deal of trouble to account for it by his profound arithmetical calculations of weights and measures.

The defence thus set up by the British officer is, however, not only extremely injudicious, but palpably untenable and absurd. If the "boatswains, gunners, captains of guns," &c. on board of all our ships of war, were in reality all Englishmen, how comes it that they fulfilled their duties so much more effectually than those of the British ships? The answer is obvious: they must have been taught by our officers;they must have learned what they did not know before, and been scholars, instead of teachers, on board of the American ships. There is no other possible way of accounting for the truly marvellous difference between the "gunners, boatswains, and captains of guns," who deserted, and those who remained

true to his majesty's service. The admission also, that the British commanders were "carelessly cruising about," is one of the severest censures that was ever cast upon the character of British officers. Every body knows, that it is the express duty of every commander of a ship of war, when on a cruise, to keep his men in daily exercise, and his vessel always prepared for action, for the obvious reason, that the first notice he will probably receive of a declaration of war, will be an encounter with the enemy. Besides, England was then at war with France, and this furnishes additional reason why the British naval officers ought to have discarded this pleasant kind of "carelessness." We cannot but think these officers are but scurvily treated by their brother "officer on the American station;" for he here not only admits, but actually states, in extenuation of their defeats, a fact which is in itself sufficient to dishonour them forever.

However, under these disadvantages, the frigate Guerriere, "returning into port with sprung masts," as the writer says, and with her name painted in large letters on her topsails, as the writer does not say, met with the frigate Constitution, to which very vessel captain Dacres had a few days before sent a challenge. "A long action ensued," says the writer of the Synopsis, to wit, forty-five minutes. And now begins the cyphering business, which we will pass by in this instance, with only a few remarks, because the very humiliating acknowledgment of this expert arithmetician will save us a deal of trouble. This is the first time battles have been weighed and measured by the pound and by the foot, and really we are willing to give this laborious calculator all the benefits of his ingenuity in figures.

We all know that the Guerriere was in better order perhaps than any British ship on the American station. She was, in the cant of the English Naval Chronicle, a crack ship. She was returning to Halifax after that swaggering cruise, in which her name had been exhibited in proud defiance of the American frigates, and captain Dacres had endorsed the