The German Mutual Insurance Company v. Grim. learned judge who tried the case in the circuit court regarded the deed executed by Ritter to Mrs. Grim, pending the suit, as relating back to the date of the conveyance to Louis Grim, and as investing Mrs. Grim with the legal title, as of that date. But it must be remembered that the appellant had, in the mean time, become the purchaser of the premises for a valuable consideration, under the conveyance to Louis Grim, without notice of Mrs. Grim's claim; and hence the subsequent voluntary conveyance to her by Ritter could not prejudice the rights of the appellant thus acquired. The doctrine of relation cannot be invoked to work a fraud, or prejudice the intervening rights of an innocent purchaser for value. Fite v. Doe, 1 Blackf. 127; Jackson v. Bard, 4 Johns. 230. The deed from Ritter to Mrs. Grim of the 4th of May, 1864, must. therefore, stand upon its own merits, and, having been executed pending this suit, can have no effect on the prior equities of the appellant. Where the equities of the parties are equal, that having priority in time will prevail. But here Mrs. Grim, as we have seen, had no claim under the conveyance to Louis Grim which a court of equity would enforce, even as against Ritter. But if it were otherwise, still as her claim is only that of a voluntary grantee, while the appellant claims as a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice of the claim of Mrs. Grim, the equities are not equal; that of the appellant is superior, and must prevail. In any view of the case, it seems clear that the facts alleged in the third paragraph of the answer and cross complaint do not constitute a valid defense to the complaint, in favor of either Ritter or Mrs. Grim, and that the court erred, therefore, in overruling the demurrer. It appears by the evidence in the case, that the appellant was in possession of the premises in controversy at the date of the conveyance by Ritter to Mrs. Grim of the 4th of May, 1864, under a claim of title adverse to both Ritter and Mrs. Grim. And it is well settled, that a deed executed under such circumstances is void for maintenance. Fite v. Doe, 1 Blackf. 127; Leslie v. Slusher, 15 Ind. 166; Martin v. Pace, 6 Blackf. 99; Galbreath v. Doe, 8 id. 366. From the facts presented by the pleadings and evidence in the case, we are not prepared to say that the deed from Ritter to Louis Grim is void for uncertainty in the description of the premises conveyed, or intended to be conveyed, thereby, or that the property The German Mutual Insurance Company v. Grim. intended to be conveyed may not be located under it. The part of the description in the deed material to this question reads thus: "and being the middle twenty-two feet four inches of lot number 27, on Upper Spring street, being twenty-two feet four inches in front and rear, and extending back the same width sixty feet; being part of the lot held by said Ritter under deed from John Yager and wife, recorded in Book W, paye 363." The latter part of the description, which we have italicised, seems to have been overlooked by the appellant's counsel, and the deed from Yager to Ritter referred to was not given in evidence. Nor do the pleadings state either the length or width of the lot, but it is alleged in the complaint that Ritter owned the south part thereof, extending from the south line northward seventy feet, fronting on Upper Fourth street on the east, and extending back sixty feet, and that Ritter intended by the deed to convey the middle portion thereof, being twenty-two feet and four inches in front and rear. These facts are admitted by the third paragraph of Ritter's answer. The form and dimensions of the lot would be ascertained by refer ence to the recorded plat; but the evidence shows that its width is sixty feet, fronting on Upper Spring street, and its length one hundred and twenty feet, fronting on the east on Upper Fourth street Ritter testifies that he formerly owned a part of said lot 27, fronting on Upper Fourth street, and divided it into three parts of about twenty-two and one-third feet front each, one of which he sold, and conveyed another to his son-in-law Bowman, and intended the third one for his daughter Mrs. Grim. The general rule in regard to the construction of the description of the premises in a deed is one of the utmost liberality. The intent of the parties, if it can by any possibility be gathered from the language employed, will be effectuated. Peck v. Mallams, 10 N. Y. 509; Key v. Ostrander, 29 Ind. 1. It is also a rule of construction, that where one deed refers to another for description of the granted premises, reference may be had to the description in the latter to aid that of the former. 3 Washb. Real Prop. b. 2, p. 638; Key v. Ostrander, supra. Now, applying these rules to the present case, it seems but reasonable to construe the description in the deed from Ritter to Louis Grim as meaning twenty-two feet and four inches in front and rear, and extending back the same width sixty feet, of that part of lot 27, on Upper Spring street, held by said Ritter under deed from Robbins v. Cheek. John Yager and wife, recorded in book W, page 363. And if, by reference to the recorded plat and the deed of Yager to Ritter referred to, the middle third of the premises described in the latter deed should correspond with the premises intended to be conveyed, as the evidence indicates, there would seem to be no difficulty in locating the premises. At any rate, should such difficulty be found to exist. it would result from the practical application of the middle third of the premises conveyed by Yager to Ritter to the premises intended to be conveyed by the deed to Louis Grim, and would not be apparent from the description itself; and the deed, therefore, could not be held void for uncertainty in the description. The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded, with directions to the circuit court to sustain the demurrer to the third paragraph of the answer and cross-complaint of Ritter, and to the second paragraph of the answer and cross-complaint of Catharine Grim, and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. FRAZER, C. J., dissented. ROBBINS, appellant, v. CHEEK. (32 Ind. 328.) Promissory note— Action for interest after payment of principal. Where a promissory note contains a provision for interest, an action may be maintained for the interest after the principal has been paid. J. S. Scobey, E. R. Monfort, C. Ewing and J. K. Ewing, for appellant. W. Cumback, S. A. Bonner, J. Gavin and J. D. Miller, for appellee. RAY, J. The appellee sued Robbins before a justice of the peace, by filing as a cause of action a note which reads as follows: One day after date I promise to pay to the order of John Cheek the sum of eleven hundred dollars, without regard to valuation or appraisement laws of Indiana, for value received, with ten per cent interest, this 31st day of May 1865. JACOB F. ROBBINS. "Credit by cash eleven hundred dollars, October 15, 1865." Indorsed. Robbins v. Cheek. The suit was instituted February 9, 1869, and on the day of trial the appellant appeared and answered in four paragraphs: first, the general denial; second, payment; third, that before the commencement of this suit he paid to the plaintiff the sum of eleven hundred dollars, the principal sum due him, in full of his principal, which was received as such, and that there is nothing unpaid upon said note but interest, and the plaintiff cannot maintain his said action. for interest only; fourth, that the note in suit does not belong to said plaintiff, but is the property of Sandcreek township, in said county, which township is a body corporate and politic, and as such may suc and be sued; that Daniel Meredith is the trustee of such township; that the term of office of said plaintiff, who was trustee of said township when said note was given, has long since expired; that said note was given for funds and moneys of said township borrowed by the defendant of said Cheek as such trustee; that said Check has not accounted to such township for the sum due on said note; and that he should have delivered said note to his successor at the expiration of his term; wherefore, said plaintiff is not the real party in interest, and this action should abate; and the defendant on oath says that this fourth paragraph of his answer iz true, etc. On appeal to the common pleas court, a demurrer was overruled to the complaint and sustained to the third and fourth paragraphs of the answer; and to the sustaining of this demurrer and the exclusion of evidence offered on the trial to support the averments contained in the answer exceptions were taken, and error is assigned thereon in this court, a judgment having been rendered for the amount of interest due by the terms of the note. In support of the errors assigned, the decision in the case of Comparet v. Ewing, S Blackf. 328, is cited, where it was declared, that "if a creditor receive the principal sum due him, he cannot afterward sue for the interest." This was so held in an action upon a note "with interest from date." The cases cited to sustain this ruling are, Diron v. Parkes, 1 Esp. 110, and Tillotson v. Preston, 3 Johns. 229. In regard to the last case, it may be remarked, that there was no agreement to pay interest, and that the court of errors of the state of New York had, more than ten years before the case was cited as sustaining the ruling in Comparet v. Ewing, aeld, expressly, that the rule did not apply to a case where there was an express Robbins v. Cheek. agreement in the note or obligation to pay interest. The chancellor used this language: "The counsel for the plaintiff in error are wrong in supposing that the rule of law, that an action cannot be sustained for the interest of a demand after the principal has been paid, is applicable to this case. The cases of Tillotson v. Preston, 3 Johns. 229; Johnson v. Brannan, 6 id. 268; and People v. County of New York, 5 Cow. 331, were all cases in which there was no contract for the payment of interest, and it could only be recovered as damages for the non-payment of the principal debt when it became due. In such cases, if the party to whom the money is payable accepts the amount agreed to be paid, in full satisfaction of the principal debt, without requiring the debtor to pay interest from the time the debt became payable, he cannot afterward maintain an action for the mere incidental damages which he has sustained by reason of the debt not being paid upon the very day when it became due. But where there is an express agreement to pay the interest, as well as the principal, of the plaintiff's demand, I apprehend that the performance of one part of the agreement would be no bar to an action for the non-performance of another part thereof. It is a case of very frequent occurrence, that the interest is made payable before the principal becomes due; and no one ever doubted that, in such a case, an action could be maintained for ine non-payment of the interest merely." Fake v. Eddy, 15 Wend. 76. The case of Tillotson v. Preston, considered with the case of Fake v. Eddy, decided in 1835, was, therefore, in direct conflict with the decision of Comparet v. Ewing. The other case cited from 1 Esp. 110, held simply, "that the plaintiff could not, in the present form of action, recover the interest, having received the principal;" and this, on the ground that interest in such action could only be given by a jury in the form of damages, and not by virtue of an express contract. This construction was placed on this case in The White Water Valley Canal Co. v. Hawkins, 4 Ind. 474. But the distinction between the right to recover interest by reason of a stipulation in the contract, and the recovery which the jury gave by way of damages only, was plainly stated in Watkins v. Morgan, 6 C. & P. 661, decided in 1834, and might not unreasonably have suggested a doubt in regard to the propriety of citing the case of Dixon v. Parkes to sustain the ruling in Comparet v. Ewing. The statute in force when the note was given upon which the action in the latter case was brought, expressly authorized the |