Alexander Hamilton of New York next moved that "the rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to be proportioned to the number of free inhabitants;" and Richard Dobbs Spaight of North Carolina seconded him. But, to escape irritating debates, the resolution was postponed, and Madison, supported by Gouverneur Morris, moved, in more general terms, "that the equality of suffrage established by the articles of confederation ought not to prevail in the national legislature; and that an equitable ratio of representation ought to be substituted." *

Faithful to his instructions, George Read of Delaware asked that the consideration of the clause might be postponed; as on any change of the rule of suffrage it might become the duty of the deputies from his state to withdraw from the convention. "Equality of suffrage," said Madison, "may be reasonable in a federal union of sovereign states; it can find no place in a national government." But, from the spirit of conciliation, the request for delay was granted.†

The next day Georgia gained the right to vote by the arrival of William Pierce, a Virginian by birth, in the war an aid to Greene, and now a member of congress. The Virginia resolve, that the national legislature should be composed of two branches, passed without debate, and, but for Pennsylvania, unanimously; Hamilton and Robert Yates of New York voting together." Three weeks later, Pennsylvania, which had hesitated only out of forbearance toward its own constitution, gave in its adhesion. The decision, which was in harmony with the undisputed and unchanging conviction of the whole people of the United States, was adopted, partly to check haste in legislation by reciprocal watchfulness, and partly to prevent the fatal conflict which might one day take place between a single legislative body and a single executive.

On the method of electing the two branches, the upholders of the sovereignty of each state contended that the national government ought to seek its agents through the governments of the respective states; others preferred that the members of the first branch should be chosen directly by the people.

* Gilpin, 750, 751; Elliot, 134.

+ Gilpin, 751, 752; Elliot, 134, 135.

Gilpin, 753; Elliot, 135.

"The people," said Sherman, "should have as little to do as may be about the government; they want information and are constantly liable to be misled; the election ought to be by the state legislatures." "The people do not want virtue; but they are the dupes of pretended patriots," added Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts. To this arraignment of the people by men of New England, Mason of Virginia replied: "The larger branch is to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the government. We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the people. I have often wondered at the indifference of the superior classes of society to this dictate of humanity and policy." "Without the confidence of the people," said James Wilson of Pennsylvania, "no government, least of all a republican government, can long subsist; nor ought the weight of the state legislatures to be increased by making them the electors of the national legislature." Madison, though for the senate, the executive, and the judiciary he approved of refining popular appointments by successive "filtrations," held the popular election of one branch of the national legislature indispensable to every plan of free government. This opinion prevailed.*

It was agreed, unanimously and without debate, that the national legislature should possess the legislative powers of the confederacy; but, to the extension of them to all cases to which the state legislatures were individually incompetent, Charles Pinckney, John Rutledge, and Butler, all the three of South Carolina, objected that the vagueness of the language might imperil the powers of the states. But Randolph disclaimed the intention of giving indefinite powers to the national legislature, and declared himself unalterably opposed to such an inroad on the state jurisdictions. Madison was strongly biased in favor of enumerating and defining the powers to be granted, although he could not suppress doubts of its practicability. "But," said he, "a form of government that will provide for the liberty and happiness of the community being the end of our deliberations, all the necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be submitted to." The clause was Gilpin, 753, 754, 755, 756; Elliot, 135, 136, 137.

Gilpin, 760; Elliot, 139.

adopted by nine states, including New York and New Jersey. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, voting against Sherman, divided that state.

The clauses in the Virginia plan, giving to the national legislature the powers necessary to preserve harmony among the states, to negative all state laws contravening, in the opinion of the national legislature, the articles of union, or, as Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania added, “contravening treaties subsisting under the authority of the union," were agreed to without debate or dissent.

Madison struggled to confer on the national legislature the right to negative at its discretion any state law whatever, being of the opinion that a negative of which the rightfulness was unquestioned would strip a local law of every pretence to the character of legality, and thus suppress resistance at its inception. On another day, explaining his motives, he said: "A negative on state laws is the mildest expedient that can be devised for enforcing a national decree. Should no such precaution be engrafted, the only remedy would be coercion. The negative would render the use of force unnecessary. In a word, this prerogative of the general government is the great pervading principle that must control the centrifugal tendency of the states, which, without it, will continually fly out of their proper orbits, and destroy the order and harmony of the political system." But the convention refused to adopt his counsel.

Lastly: the Virginia plan authorized the exertion of the force of the whole against a delinquent state. Madison, accepting the argument of Mason, expressed a doubt of the practicability, the justice, and the equity of applying force to a collective people. "To use force against a state," he said, “is more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would be considered by the party attacked a dissolution of all previous contracts. I therefore hope that a national system, with full power to deal directly with individuals, will be framed, and the resource be thus rendered unnecessary." The clause was postponed.†

In this wise and in one day the powers of the legislature *June 8, Gilpin, 822, 823; Elliot, 171. Gilpin, 761; Elliot, 140.

which was to be the centre of the government were introduced, and, except the last, were with common consent established in their outlines. On points essential to union, Yates and Hamilton, New Jersey and Pennsylvania voted together. On the first day of June the convention took into consideration the national executive. The same spirit of conciliation prevailed, but with a chaos of ideas and a shyness in the members to declare their minds.

Should the national executive be one or many?-a question which, from a difference among themselves, the plan of the Virginia delegates had left undecided. Should it be chosen directly by the people? or by electors? or by the state legislatures? or by the executives of the states? or by one branch of the national legislature? or by both branches? And, if by both, by joint or concurrent ballot? or by lot? How long should be its term of service? And how far should its reeligibility be limited? Should it have the sole power of peace and war? Should it have an absolute or a qualified veto on acts of legislation, or none at all? Should its powers be exercised with or without a council? Should it be liable to removal by the legislatures of the states, or by the national legislature? or by the joint action of both? or by impeachment alone?

Here the convention marched and countermarched for want of guides. Progress began to be made on the ascertainment that the members inclined to withhold from the executive the power over war and peace. This being understood, Wilson and Charles Pinckney proposed that the national executive should consist of a single person. A long silence prevailed, broken at last by the chairman asking if he should put the question. Franklin entreated the members first to deliver their sentiments on a point of so great importance. Rutledge joined in the request, and for himself supported Pinckney and Wilson.* On the other hand, Sherman, controlled by the precedents of the confederacy which appointed and displaced executive officers just as it seemed to them fit, replied: "The legislature are the best judges of the business to be done by the executive, and should be at liberty from time to time to appoint one or more, as experience may dictate." +

* Gilpin, 762; Elliot, 140.

Gilpin, 763; Elliot, 140.

"I do not mean to throw censure on that excellent fabric, the British government," said Randolph; "if we were in a situation to copy it, I do not know that I should be opposed to it. But the fixed genius of the people of America requires a different form of government. The requisites for the executive department-vigor, dispatch, and responsibility-can be found in three men as well as in one. Unity in the executive is the fœtus of monarchy."* "Unity in the executive," retorted Wilson, "will rather be the best safeguard against tyranFrom the extent of this country, nothing but a great confederated republic will do for it." To calm the excitement, Madison led the convention, before choosing between unity or plurality in the executive, to fix the extent of its authority; and the convention agreed to clothe it "with power to carry into effect the national laws and to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for." +

ny.

On the mode of appointing the executive, Wilson said: "Chimerical as it may appear in theory, I am for an election by the people. Experience in New York and Massachusetts shows that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large is both a convenient and a successful mode. The objects of choice in such cases must be persons whose merits have general notoriety." "I,” replied Sherman, "am for its appointment by the national legislature, and for making it absolutely dependent on that body whose will it is to execute. An independence of the executive on the supreme legislature is the very essence of tyranny." Sherman and Wilson were for a period of office of three years and "against the doctrine of rotation, as throwing out of office the men best qualified to execute its duties." Mason asked for seven years at least, but without re-eligibility. "What," inquired Gunning Bedford of Delaware, "will be the situation of the country should the first magistrate elected for seven years be discovered immediately on trial to be incompetent?" He argued for a triennial election, with an ineligibility after three successive elections. The convention, by a vote of five and a half states against four and a half, decided for the period of seven years; and by at least Gilpin, 765; Elliot, 141.

*Gilpin, 763, 764; Elliot, 141.

Gilpin, 767; Elliot, 143.