half a page, but we have not half a page to devote to it, and if we had, we could apply it to better purpose. Having thus, we think, vindicated Mr. Roscoe from the charges of M. Thurot, we are led by him to examine charges, perhaps, of a more serious nature, and advanced by a writer of much greater celebrity, the Abate Andres, author of a voluminous work, "On the Origin, Progress, and present State of every Branch of Literature,” which, as Mr. Roscoe very impartially admits, "is a lasting monument of the erudition, taste, and judgment of the author." The learned Abate, who bestows very high praises on Mr. Roscoe's Life of Lorenzo, says, notwithstanding, that the good faith of the work is affected by misrepresenting an important fact in the narrative which he has given of the conduct of Sixtus IV. in the conspiracy of the Pazzi. In the narrative alluded to, Mr. Roscoe accuses the Pope of being an accomplice in the murder of Giuliano de Medici, the brother of Lorenzo; and in the work before us, he endeavours to justify the charge, and to shew, that this "weighty imputation on his (the Pope's) character, rests upon evidence too explicit to be misunderstood, and too strong to be refuted.' It would be unfair in us to quote the arguments and documents by which Mr. Roscoe establishes these assertions, unless we gave, at the same time, the opposite arguments and documents which go to exculpate the Pope from so infamous an attempt. In all historical controversies, relative to the establishment of facts, or the discovery of motives, nothing can be weaker than to draw conclusions from one side of the question, without examining minutely all the objections which are made to it on the other; for if, after examining both sides of the question, the impartial inquirer is fre quently obliged to acknowledge, that he is utterly at a loss how to decide, how much more incapable would he have been of forming a correct judgment, if he had not submitted to the drudgery of comparing and investigating the value and authenticity of every document which serves to elucidate the tion in debate. We shall, therefore, quesmerely observe, in Mr. Roscoe's defence, that whether he has proved the Pope's guilt or not, he is, at least, supported in making him an accomplice in concurring testimonies and authorities, the conspiracy of the Pazzi, by so many that if he has been imposed upon by them, or if they have been imposed upon by each other, or if one impostor has imposed upon them all, he cannot Andres with misrepresenting a fact, still be fairly charged by the Abate which rested on such numerous and imposing authorities. We shall not offer our own opinion on the subject, for the we ourselves attach little importance to reasons we have already mentioned. As the opinions of others when they are of that nature which require proof, while these proofs are not brought forward, we feel we should expose our own opinions to similar contempt, if we arbitrarily decided the present question only of the arguments, documents, and without giving a minute history, not authorities, on which our decision was founded, but also of those by which it might be contravened. In speculative, philosophic, or metaphysical subjects, dest caution" of "distrustful sense,' we should not much regard the " mobecause we know, that in subjects of this nature, the grounds of certainty are placed equally within the reach of all mankind, and, therefore, we would venture to speak "rattling nonsense," rather than be totally silent; but in substantiating historical facts, the grounds of certainty are frequently contained in necessarily be placed, in the first ina few rolls of manuscript, which must stance, within the reach of only a few individuals, and, consequently, only them, can pronounce with certainty. these few, and the few who consult But of all the writers who stand opposed to Mr. Roscoe, M. Simonde de formidable. No writer, however, can Sismondi, is, unquestionably, the most side, for though some truths are of such be formidable, who has not truth on his yet they happily possess one advantage, a nature that they cannot be proved, proved. An assertion may be true, and that is, that they cannot be disthough the thing asserted may be of such a nature that it admits of no proof. But though it is easy to shew the thing asserted not proved, it is impossible to shew that it is false, except where a sophist argues with a fool. In point appears to us to have frequently the of argument, we must confess Sismondi advantage over Mr. Roscoe; but it is where the argument has no reference to the character of Lorenzo de Medici. When we said that Mr. Roscoe succeeded in vindicating this illustrious personage from the imputations of his opponent, we did not maintain, at the same time, that all the arguments which he has used on the occasion were sub stantially true; and, therefore, we do not take upon us to prove, that he has been always successful in his mode of treating the subject. We only think him successful, where he and his opponent kept to the point in debate; but where he investigates some of Sismondi's opinions which had no reference, except in his own imagination, to the character of Lorenzo, we apprehend he has ventured assertions which are perfectly indefensible. He supposes, that Sismondi's strictures on the character of Lorenzo, resulted from his having been guided by a system to which he made all his opinions conform; and he thinks, at the same time, that a writer, guided by a "particular hypothesis, is not likely, on all occasions, to exhibit that impartiality which can only be derived from a total absence of all prejudices." With this opinion we cannot agree, because we do not think that "a particular hy pothesis" necessarily involves the concomitance of "prejudices." We are no admirers of hypothesis or theories, in general; but yet we believe, that a theory may be right; nor can we admit, that even when it is wrong, the error arises from the prejudices of the theorist. The man who never knew what the words, hypothesis, theory, or prejudice import, may still be in error; for human reason requires not the bias of prejudices to render it fallible. The hypothesis by which he imagines Sismondi influenced, is," that some particular form of government is pre-eminent, and entitled to an absolute and unqualified preference over the rest." And it is to this prejudice, he says, we are to attribute" his hostility to the Medici, and, in particular, to the character of Lorenzo." It is scarcely necessary to inform the reader, that the form of government advocated by Sismondi, is the republican, and that Mr. Roscoe leans to the mixed form. If we were asked our opinion on the subject, perhaps we would say, that "Whatever is best administered is best;" but as Mr. Roscoe and Sismondi are at variance, with re gard to the influence which government exercises over the character of the people, and, as the subject is important, we shall place their opinions before our readers. Sismondi maintains, that "One of the most important deductions that we can draw from the study of history, is, that the government is the principal cause of the character of a people; that the virtues and the vices of nations, their vigour or their imbecility, their acquirements or their ignorance, are scarcely ever the effect of climate, the attributes of a particular race, but are the result of their own laws; that every thing was given by nature to all, but that the government either secures to, or deprives those who submit to it, of the inheritance of the human race. To this Mr. Roscoe replies, "that if the government influences the people, the people also influence the govern ment, which is in fact only the result or spirit of the national character, insomuch that it has been acutely and truly said, that the government of any country can never be much worse than the people deserve. In whatever manner governments were first established, they must have been originally formed according to the temper, ability, and views of those by whom they were constituted; and not only have been, but still are, rather a result than a cause. And although the government and the people must always have a constant re-action on each other, yet it must be admitted as an incontrovertible maxim, that it ultimately rests with a people to modify their government according to their own character, and their own will" "What would be the con dition of the people, if their happiness or their misery, their debasement or their improvement, did not essentially and ultimately depend upon themselves." appear These arguments might have ed very specious to Mr. Roscoe: perhaps they were the result of his conviction; but to us they are one of the many proofs, how easy it is to find arguments to support any theory or hypothesis, however absurd. This is the reason that we distrust theories in general, not that we think them necessarily erroneous. Sismondi charges Mr. Roscoe with imposing upon himself and his readers, in describing the character of Lorenzo, but to us it appears, that if ever he imposed upon himself, the traces of error are no where so evident as in the view which he has taken of the influence of government on the character of a people. Were we not acquainted with the loyalty of his principles, we should be inclined to charge him with advocating rebellion and treason; but as we know that nothing was farther from his intention, we can only say, that his arguments go for nothing." What would be the condition of the people," he says, "if their happiness, their improvement, &c. did not essentially depend upon themselves." If their happiness and improvement, then, depend upon themselves, the just inference is, that whenever government opposes this improvement, the people have a right to suppress the government for opposing that right which Mr. Roscoe admits belongs essentially to the people. Now if the people of England exercised this right, whenever government refuses to accommodate itself to their wishes, how frequently would the standard of rebellion be hoisted in the country;-how often would our government be remodelled and changed. Besides, Mr. Roscoe forgets that he is ipso facto maintaining those republican principles which he censures in Sismondi; for if the people have a right to prosecute their own happiness and improvement, government can have no right to oppose them. There cannot be a right on both sides, for two rights, like two truths, can never contradict each other. If, then, according to Mr. Roscoe, the right be on the side of the people, and not on the side of government, it follows, that we have no government but the people itself, for that government which has no right to act against the will of the people, is a mere nullity; and that ple who possess the right of " modifying their government according to their own will," (they are Mr. Roscoe's own expressions) and whom government consequently can have no right of opposing, is virtually, substantially, and in very fact, the government itself. If Mr. Roscoe did not intend to deprive government of power whenever they oppose the people; if he did not intend to acknowledge the right of the people to prosecute their own happiness in spite of government, to what purpose qoes he tell us, that their happiness and peo improvement essentially depend upon themselves, for that cannot depend up on a person which another person is at liberty to disturb. Mr. Roscoe certainly cannot speak from experience, or his knowledge of general history, when he says, that "the government of any country can never be much worse than the people deserve." A nation deprived of its liberties, and reduced, after ages of oppression, to barbarism, ignorance, and superstition, cannot perceive the bondage to which they are reduced, and consequently cannot remedy it. But do such a people deserve a bad government because they are ignorant. Ignorance surely is no crime, because nothing can be criminal which is unavoidable, and ignorance is the unavoidable effect of slavery and oppression. If a nation could become enlightened by a wish, they would deserve a bad government for remaining in ignorance; but the most vigorous genius cannot pass the twilight confines of barbarism and ignorance, can never approach the daylight of science, where all is night and darkness around him, and the avenues to knowledge are closed up on every side. It is idle then to maintain, that the people who are thus the slaves of tyranny and oppression cannot be much worse than the tyrants who reduced them to slavery, and still continue them in their chains. It is a mere sophism to say that government is a result and not a cause; because all the causes which we perceive in the moral, political, and natural world, are results and causes at the same moment. We know of no cause which is not the result of some higher cause. Even gravitation, which is the most general cause to which we can refer the laws of motion, is itself only the effect of some other cause of which we are ignorant. It is not philosophy then, to say, that government has no influence over the people, because it is not a cause but a result; for though it is the result or effect of some other cause, it is still the cause of innumerable effects, and may consequently be the source of many evils, or of many blessings to the human race Mr. Roscoe, however, screens it from all responsibility by making it an effect and not a cause, for wherever there is no causation, there can be no responsibility. There are two other consequences which naturally result from Mr. Roscoe's view of government, neither of which, if we are not mistaken in our opinion of Mr. Roscoe's principles, he would be willing to admit. The first is, that the human race are not all descended from Adam, and that it is composed of different tribes, proceeding from different origins. The second is, that neither of these tribes can become better or worse than the original laws of their nature have made them; that man is not the creature of circumstances; and that the accidents of time and place can exercise no influence over him. In the first place, if government exercise no influence over the people, it is impossible to point out any circumstance or condition in which man can be placed that shall be able to improve or deteriorate his nature; for as the various conditions of various countries are entirely the result of the manner in which they are governed, and as government exercises no influence over the people, it follows that the circumstances in which they are placed can exercise none, for if they did, we should trace it to that government which placed them in those circumstances. If, then, all the endless variety of conditions and situations in which different portions of mankind are placed, leave him exactly as they found him, and make him neither better nor worse, it follows that all the diversity of manner, character, &c. that we perceive in different nations must have always existed, because they could not have been brought about at any time by the influence of government, or the nature of the circumstances in which they were placed. If then this diversity of character always existed, mankind must have proceeded from different origins. As the government cannot be much worse than the people, or as, according to Mr. Roscoe, it is the people that cause the government to be bad, both possessing the same nature and character, the consequence is, that wherever there is a bad government, the people of that country must have been always bad, for if they had been good at any time, they would have always remained so, as they would always possess governments similar to themselves, which would necessarily be good governments. This however is contradicted by the history of all ages and countries. The Persians were a race of heroes in the time of Cyrus, and a race of cowards in the time of Darius. The Greeks have not been for ages what they were in the time of Aristides and Themistocles; and the hand of time has assimilated the genius and character of every nation to the varying organization of its government. We must therefore say we are decidedly of opinion, that the view which Sismondi has taken of the influence of government over the people, is founded in truth and nature, and that Mr. Roscoe's theory would lead us into more inconsistences than all the politicians in Europe could reconcile with each other. We cannot therefore agree with him, when he says that Sismondi's political theory has warped his judgment, and prejudiced him against the fair fame of Lorenzo de Medici. We will easily grant, or, at least, it is our opinion, that Sismondi has not done justice to his character; but can we refer this want of justice to no other cause than political prejudices? Who can tell but that the character which he has given of Lorenzo originated from the corrupt sources through which he derived his information. Granting, however, that he was not misguided by the authority of others, might he not have been prejudiced by many other causes besides that of his political theory? Do we not find in the very country which we inhabit, men professing the same political creed who are eternally at variance? Do we not find the editors of opposition papers quarrel with each other, and quarrel too with a spirit of acrimony which they never betray in their contentions with the ministerial papers? Human nature is acted upon by a thousand influences which are not connected in the remotest degree with political theories. Sismondi and Lorenzo were of different religions, and experience convinces us that religious dissensions are conducted with a spirit of acrimony which political combatants would be ashamed to acknowledge. But it is not necessary to seek for the cause of Sismondi's antipathy to Lorenzo in religion more than in politics. Bossuet and Fenelon professed the same creed, but they could not admire each other, and therefore we do not see why Mr. Roscoe should think it necessary to combat and disprove the political creed of Sismondi, in order to defend the character of Lorenzo, not only because his defence must stand upon different grounds, but because Sismondi might have given a more unfavourable character of him than he has done, had he professed the same political opinions with Mr. Roscoe himself. Let us then examine the charges which he has brought against Lorenzo abstracted from his motives, and see whether they are borne out by the general testimony of ancient writers, for their authority must ultimately decide every opinion which we can offer on the subject, as their testimony is the only source of information to which either Sismondi or we can refer in examining the character of the illustrious Italian. Sismondi makes two charges, the one against Lorenzo, the other against Mr. Roscoe himself. Lorenzo he charges with having "corrupted his fellow-citizens by ostentatious and expensive spectacles," with having "incurred the resentment of his countrymen by his tyrannical measures." He maintains, that "the conspiracy of the Pazzi was a struggle for liberty," and that "so far from being the great character represented, he is not to be placed in the rank of great men, or even to be considered as a superior person in poetry, in philosophy, or in art." Mr. Roscoe he charges with having "exalted the services of the family, and extenuated or glossed over their crimes." The latter charge is obviously included in the former; for if Lorenzo was that tyrant which Sismondi represents him to be, Mr. Roscoe must evidently plead guilty to both these charges. If he be not, it is needless to enter upon Mr. Roscoe's defence. To acquit Lorenzo of the imputations brought against him, is to justify Mr. Roscoe for the exalted character which he confers upon him. It is obvious, as we have already observed, that the question regarding Lorenzo's character, must be decided by the authority of ancient writers and popular tradition, and not by the individual conjectures or abstract reasoning of any modern writer, who has no oppor tunity of knowing any thing about the matter but what he derives from this source alone. Now, if the question is to be determined by authority, we have no hesitation to say, that it is not only decided, but demonstrated in Mr. Roscoe's favour. Not only history, but tradition informs us, that he was the Mecenas of his age, the patron of literature and of genius in distress. The very name of Magnificent, by which he is handed down to us, sufficiently testifies his liberality and greatness of soul. That his death was a theme of universal regret, might easily be inferred in the absence of historic testimonies, though these testimonies are innumerable, from the verses of Politiano, the most elegant and refined writer of his age. We can not forbear giving the following extract from Mr. Roscoe's happy translation of these verses :— Through heaven the gleamy lightning flies, To give the reader the completest satisfaction which he can possibly require of Lorenzo's character, we have only to refer him to the Appendix to Mr. Roscoe's "Illustrations," where he has collected so many indisputable authori ties, not only in support of his noble and munificent character, but in vindication of his own life of him, that even scepticism must be silent, though it refuses to believe. Indeed, we doubt whether it be possible to be sceptical after reading this Appendix, and the "Illustrations" which precede it; and we rejoice to find, that Mr. Roscoe has not only vindicated the character of Lorenzo from Sismondi's imputations, but that the documents which he has collected on the occasion, will serve to refute whatever bigotry or prejudice may hereafter advance against the character of Lorenzo the Magnificent. We shall conclude our observations on this subject, by giving our readers the character of Lorenzo, from the pen of Sismondi himself. Had we no other means of disproving all that he has advanced to his prejudice, we think the following eulogium would be a sufficient confutation of it: "Perhaps the first person to whom we may attribute the revival of Italian poetry, was, at the same time, one of the greatest men of his age, and of those which have since occurred. Such was the brilliant 1 |