by the continual ftate of war it had maintained against most of the European powers, and alfo by the maffacres and executions that had met with no interruption fince the 10th of August 1792, that their numbers muft foon experience a very material diminution; the immenfe expence attending the fupport of fourteen armies could not long be maintained.

He would not, he faid, detract from the meafures of the ruling powers in France; for they were conducted with a certain degree of ability, however they were tinctured with crimes of the most novel, flagrant, and atrocious nature. They had given a fictitious currency to their paper money, that would for a fhort time be acceptable to the people. They had even fet famine at defiance, by feeding their hordes with a hope of famine, that caused them to carry into effect the most mercilefs exploits. Thofe hordes, like the favage hordes in former days, were fupported by the profpect of fuccefsful plunder and rapine; but it was impoffible that an army could long be fupported, which fignalized itfelf by exceffive infubordination, anarchy and confufion. He was free to acknowledge that the fuccefs of the war did not fo much depend upon the vigour and exertion of the allies, as upon the certainty that the enemy muft ultimately defeat itfelf. He afked, if there was any Noble Lord who could fay, that this nation could enjoy tranquillity, or look on with temper, while the French were fuffered to enjoy and practise those diabolical exceffes, which fanctioned the plunder of private property, and encouraged a fyftem of general warfare in all monarchical governments? It was inconfiftent to fuppofe that a free people could form any compact with fuch a nation; nor could he suppose that any Minifter would advise His Majefty to difarm his forces, or fufpend his operations. The national character and the national honour muft prevent us from fuch a compromife; and what, he asked, must be the confequence, if the French were fuffered to retain the Auftrian Netherlands? So long as France perfevered in her fyftem of aggrandizement, and Atruggled to obtain boundless territory, fo long muft England feel the neceffity of carrying on the war with fpirit, energy and vigour. His Lordfhip next obferved, that the monftrous proceedings and exertions of the Old Government of France, and its ambitious projects during the American war, precipitated it into that deplo rable fituation that caufed the Revolution. Since that period fhe had been impoverished, a depravation of manners then enfued, and the calamities followed which muft for ever stain the history of that unhappy and distracted country. Who then would argue that the prefent was a favourable time to abandon the war, when, in addition to other calamities, the expence of one month's campaign, according to the report of the Convention, exceeded the receipts of her revenues for one year? His Lordfhip next contrafted the fitua

tion of the finances of France with the flourishing situation of the revenues of this country. What with Dantzick and others, new markets had opened to our manufacturers; and our revenues last year exceeded, on an average, those of our peace establishment. For thefe reafons, his Lordthip concluded by feconding the Addrefs.

The Earl of Guildford faid he had no doubt but that his Majesty would always find fupport from that Houfe, when any fupport was. neceffary either for the honour of the Crown or the fafety of the people; and in fuch cafes none would be more ready than himself to ftand forward, and lend every affiftance that was neceflary. But the Noble Lord who moved, and the Noble Lord who feconded, the Addrefs, and himself, differed fo much upon the prefent occafion, that he was afraid he fhould be under the neceffity of propofing an alteration in the Motion now before the House. We were now in a ftate of difficulty and embarraffment. Whether that arofe from mifconduct or misfortune he fhould not now enquire into. The question now was, how we fhould get out of our prefent embarralliment; and from all he faw, by the information we had upon the fubject, our beft method was that of putting the contest in a train of negociation. He might be told that unanimity was very defirable: in such a contest as we were now engaged in, he would do as much as he thought any one ought to do, for the purpofe of preferving unanimity in the Great Council of the Nation; but that should only be the cafe when public affairs were conducted in the best manner. What was our fituation? We were engaged in a defperate and expenfive war, and without any definite object to be gained by it. Parliament thus met, and of courfe expected to be fatisfied upon material points. What had this day produced? They heard of nothing but that of perfevering in a fyftem that could gain us nothing, and might end in our total ruin. We were told at one time that the fafety of our allics the Dutch required our interference. Holland was now fafe, and yet we continued hoftilities as at the commencement. long we were to continue it was impoffible to tell, unless we came to fome specific point upon the fubject. If we were not to sheath the fword until Monarchy was reftored in France, God only knew when the difpute was to be put an end to; and it was impoffible to be too eager to check that career of pride and folly. Every man would, in his opinion, do all he could for that purpose, unless he thought that this country fhould be entirely facrificed to the aggrandizement of Auftria or of Pruffia, and that Monf. Calonne fhould fill the place of Roberfpierre. He therefore thought it a duty on him, to intreat the Houfe to be aware of the danger we were in, and to take care not to advife his Majefty to any thing

How

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that would risk the happiness of this country; but that, on the contrary, we fhould avoid the diftrefs that might await us.

To entertain their Lordships with general declamation upon the advantages of peace, and the calamities of war, was unneceffary, and therefore he should avoid it; but there were circumstances at the prefent moment of fo much confequence, that it was impoffible to pafs them without notice. First of all was to be confidered the undefined, and, he might add, the undefinable, object of the war. If we regarded the appearances that were made, at one time we fhould find that the war was undertaken for the fafety of Holland. At that time nothing was faid on our part about any form of government in France; on the contrary, the whole of it was given up.

When Lord Hood negociated with the Toulonefe, and when they were induced to receive him into their port, it was under the exprefs ftipulation of fupporting the Conftitution of 1789; but of the Conftitution of 1789, which has been properly filed a "Magnificent Fabric of human Wisdom and Virtue," and againft which our allies on the continent have declared war, we this day hear not a word. If my Lord Hood was not authorised to propofe the terms which he offered, his public declaration to the people of France is a fcandalous reflection upon the government of this country. Does the Addrefs propofe that we fhould profecute the war for the protection of our allies? Has Holland once entered into the minds of His Majefty's Minifters, or the Noble Lords who with so much eloquence fupported the Addrefs? It is but too obvious, from the language which they have ufed, that the objects which they have in view are widely different from thofe by which they lured the public into this unfortunate war. Let us, however, for a moment, fuppofe that the end which they wish to obtain is the protection of Holland, and of Great Britain, against the incurfions of the French Republicans, give me leave to afk your Lordships, whether this end could not have been as effectually obtained, and much more effectually obtained, by negociation than by warfare? Was it not propofed to them, before we were plunged into the horrors and devaftation of war, to try the experiment of negociation? When that had failed, it would have been time enough to commence hoftilities; and there are few, I believe, who are not now convinced, that the fafety of Holland would have been better fecured by the conciliating voice of our ambaffador at Paris, than by the thunder of cannon. It may be faid, that the moment I allude to was not the most favourable; that the French were at that time fo elated with their aftonishing and before unheard-of fucceffes, that they would have liftened to no terms which the dignity of Great Britain, and her good faith to her allies, could have permitted her to offer. The hiftory of that period, and the language and efforts of her minifters, ambaffadors, and generals, afford a complete refutation of fuch an affertion. But det us No. 1. ****

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even here again concede to those who are of this opinion. We know of another period, the circumitances of which can give no fupport to fuch an argument: were they not fufficiently humbled in the course of last fummer, by a retreat as fpeedy and difaftrous as their march was rapid and victorious; when their army had been half deftroyed, and the remains of it had been almoft totally diforganifed; when they had been driven from Brabant, and had been unfuccefsful from Western Flanders to the Rhine; when feveral of their provinces had been invaded, and their most important fortreffes had been fubdued; is there a Noble Lord in this Houfe who does not in his confcience believe that they would have been eager to liften to fuch terms of peace as became the dignity and juftice of this country to offer? If infolence is too often the attendant of profperity, adverfity is generally accompanied by moderation and humility. Much has been faid of the fignal advantages we have gained over them, and the certain profpect we have of a fpeedy peace, by vigorously exerting the ftrength, and applying the refources of this country in the profecution of the war. Our advantages, I much fear, will be greatly counterbalanced by the expences we have incurred, and the loffes fuftained by our traders and manufacturers. If we alfo compare the conquefts made by the allies with the prefent pofition of the French armies, it is much to be feared, that the former have not much to boast of. May it not reasonably be enquired, whether we have not already obtained the end which we propofed? and after the obtaining of which, His Majefty's Minifters repeatedly and folemnly declared they would purfue every meafure that should tend to procure a fpeedy, fafe, and honourable peace? Our allies, the Dutch, are in perfect fecurity. The French have been driven from their territories, and confined within limits, beyond which we ought not to attempt to pafs. The Noble Lords admit, that they have made the moft ftupendous efforts, and fuch as have aftonished all Europe; but this rifing in a mafs, fay they, cannot be repeated. It is a violent convulfion, which muft exhauft the nation, or at least fo far weaken it as to bring it to a low pitch of humiliation. The fame caufes, my Lords, will produce the fame effects. The preflure of an invading enemy only bends the bow to give the arrow a greater force. Their extentive territories we are all acquainted with; their vaft numbers, and great internal refources, are unqueftioned; and whatever may be their diffenfions and mafiacres, we find them capable of bringing into the field, troops that have fuccefsfully oppofed the beft difciplined armies in Europe. What reafon have you to believe that thofe troops, which they will oppofe to us in the next campaign, will be icfs difciplined, or worfe appointed, than those we have already had to contend with? Hiftory teaches us that experience makes the foldier, and practice often leads to victory. The cruelties practifed at Lyons, which have been painted in fuch glowing colours by the

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Noble Lords, and to no one are they more abhorrent than to me; the deftruction of that firft manufacturing city in the world, as they have called it; the maffacre and banishment of its numerous inhabitants to the interior provinces, all forming, as they fay, a dreadful prelude to the fate of the not lefs celebrated city of Toulon; the wars and murders of La Vendée, the finest province in France; are urged to fhew that the French are fo reduced, that they cannot long refift the formidable powers of the allies. Here let me again ask, whether he defolation of La Vendée, and the destruction of thofe once famed and flourishing cities, will encourage other provinces to revolt against the exifting government, and induce Bourdeaux, Marseilles, and Dunkirk, to expofe themselves to the fame exterminating vengeance?

There is another argument adduced to encourage us in the profecution of the war, arfing from the destruction of the ships and naval ftores at Toulon. The Noble Lord who moved the Addrefs fays, that this alone will compenfate us for all our lofies and expences incurred during the war; and whatever may be their future form of government, they will not for many years, perhaps an age to come, be able to disturb the tranquillity of this country. To eftimate our gain by the loffes of the French is not the most accurate method of calculation. I cannot fee how the reducing of France to poverty will enrich Great Britain; and I fhall have occafion to fhew prefently, that it will have a contrary effect. Was it for the purpofe of making a partition of France amongst the allies, that we fo benevolently interfered? Was it then for the purpose of destroying her wonted confequence, that we fo humanely interpofed our fleets and armies in behalf of Louis XVII.? Is it to reduce her for the future to the lowest degree in the fcale of nations, whatever may be her form of government, that we are to profecute this difaftrous war? Our allies may, perhaps, owe us fome obligations, if this be the cafe; but no Frenchmen of any defcription, Royalifts or Republicans, can thank us, after having difcovered this cloven foot. The arguments fuggefted in favour of the continuance of the war may in general be reduced to two heads, the policy of it, and the neceffity of it. The policy of it, if there be any, muft be founded upon fome prefent gain, or future advantage, that we are to reap from it, Circumstanced as the two countries are, our intereft would be promoted by its profperity, rather than ruin. A neighbouring nation, defolated and impoverished, can hold out no advantage to this country, whose profperity depends upon the flourishing ftate of her trade and commerce. If you dry up the refources of France, you destroy your own markets. If you defolate her, fhe will have no commodities to exchange with you, or money to purchase what you have to fell. But be the policy what it may, if it be not founded in justice and