upon the iffue of it every thing that was dear and valuable to this country depended. Mr. Fox faid, that, notwithflanding the latenefs of the hour, the importance of the queftion, and the confufed mode in which it had been treated by the advocates for the profecution of the war, rendered it neceffary for him to attempt, if it were by any means poffible, to diffipate the mift in which it had been involved. He would endeavour once more to obtain an explicit declaration of what was the real object of the war, that the people of this country might be no longer the dupes of artifice and delufion, and made to believe, that they were expending their money and their blood for one purpose, while, in fact, they were called upon to do fo for another. On this point the laft few minutes of the fpeech of a Noble Lord, (Mornington,) long and eloquent as the whole fpeech was, had afforded more valuable information than all the reft. The Noble Lord had said, in very explicit terms, that, as long as the present or any other Jacobin Government fubfifted in France, no propofitions for peace could be made or received by us. He wished this had been flated last year; and that neither the House nor the Country had been drawn in to countenance a war, the object of which was not fairly explained to them, till, as they were now told, they had gone fo far that they could not recede. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the debates of laft Seffion, although he deprecated the continuance of a Jacobin Government, yet faid, that he would not confider that as a bar to a negociation, provided the objects then held out, viz. the fafety of Holland, and the exclufive navigation of the Scheldt, could be fecured; and he illuftrated his doctrine by his practice; for he actually did open a negociation with perfons deriving their powers from the then Jacobin Government of France. What then became of the argument, that there could be no fafety for neighbouring ftates, no fecurity for the obfervance of any treaty, while fuch a Government was permitted to fubiift? That negociation, he should perhaps be told, was never meant to fucceed, and well did the mode of conducting it justify the fuppofition; but why was it not to fucceed? That the people of England might be deluded into a war on a falfe pretence of defending an ally, while the real object was the fubverfion of the ruling power in France. Again he would ask the queftion, although he should fhudder to hear the melancholy information; but if it was fo, let it be unequivocally told, that we were engaged in a war which could have no termination, till we had exterminated French Jacobinifm; in other words, till we had conquered France. In the prefumption of certain theories of our own, we were to ftake the wealth, the commerce, and the Constitution of Great Britain, Britain, on the probability of compelling the French to renounce opinions for which we had already feen that they were ready to facrifice their lives. This at leaft was the cafe, if the majority of the Houfe had come over to the fyftem of extermination which was last year allowed only by a few. He admitted the fpeech of the Noble Lord, and that of his Right Honourable Friend, (Mr. Wyndham,) the lefs, because much of them was only imitation or tranflation of fpeeches and reports in the French Convention. The Noble Lord asked if we could trust to the religion of Roberfpierre, the finance of Cambon, the moderation of Danton? The anfwer of the French Convention to his Majelly's Declaration appeared in terms not decent to be mentioned in that Houfe, to the wifdom of our Monarch, the good faith of another, and the chastity of a third. His Right Honourable Friend treated Vatel with as little respect as M. Genet, the French Minifter to the United States of America. "I would throw Vatel and Grotius into the fea," faid M. Genet, when their principles interfered with his notions of the rights of nations. Juft fo would his Right Honourable Friend treat them when they controverted his ideas. Ey fome ftrange fatality we were now conftantly reprobating the language and practices of the French, and as conflantly copying what we reprobated. More inclined, as he was, to follow experienced rules of judging and of fpeaking, he held the opinions of eminent and learned men, difpaffionately given on fubjects which they had findied, as of great importance in regulating their conduct. Vatel, than whom he knew of no man more eminently learned in the science on which he had written, laid it down as a principle, that every independent nation has an undoubted right to regulate its own internal government; and on this authority he had reprobated the conduct of Auftria and Pruffia in attacking the French, for no reafon but because they were attempting to regulate their government; a conduct which he feared had been more fatal to the political morality of Europe, than any thing the French had yet done. It was true, as his Honourable Friend (Mr. Sheridan) had flated, that the French were not alone chargeable with the carnage which had wafted Europe. The Duke of Brunfwick's manifefto he confidered as the fignal for carnage, and a general war. For carnage, by whomfoever committed, he was no apologist; it was equally repugnant to his feelings and his judgment; and therefore he had kept himself clear of all concern in measures which tended to lead to it. But thofe who negociated the treaty of Pilnitz, impartial pofterity would pronounce guilty; and this country, if it had acceded to that treaty, would not be acquitted. To the treaty of Pilnitz he traced the origin of the war. "Could it be pretended that France had been in all cafes the aggreffor? Had he been fo with refpect to Pruflia? The proof was obvious. We had a treaty of alliance with Pruffia, by which we were bound to furnish certain fuccours if Pruflia fhould be attacked. Were we called upon for thofe fuccours? No fuch thing. Sufficient evidence that Pruffia did not confider the war with France as a war of defence, but a war of aggreffion, voluntarily undertaken. Whether we or the French were originally the aggrefTors, made no great difference now. This much we know, that they offered to negociate, and that all their propofals were treated with difdain and haughtinefs, which could not fail to render peace impofiible. Roberfpierre, that great authority, whom the advocates for the war never failed to quote when they found him on their fide, accufes Briffot of having involved France in the war with this country. On the ftrength of Roberfpierre's impartial judgment in the cafe were Minilters exculpated from the charge of having caufed the war. Such were the arguments on which their friends defended their conduct! At that time, contrary to the opinion of many of his friends, in the face of almoft the reprobation of that Houfe, he had recommended negociation in preference to war; and painful as it was to him to differ from men whom he had long loved and efteemed, on the moft mature reflection, he felt as much folid fatisfaction in the advice he had then given, and the conduct he had purfued, as it was poffible to derive from the consciousness that they were precifely fuch as they ought to have been. But the origin of the war was now a fecondary confideration. The main queftion was, how can it be concluded? His opinion ftill was, that we ought to treat with the prefent, or any other government, to which the prefent may give place in France; while others faid, and an awful confideration it was, that no treaty with any modification of Jacobin Government could be fecure. The queftion of fecurity he would now examine, confidering an attempt to negociate in the only two points of view under which, as appeared to him, it could poflibly fall. His own opinion, or rather his conjecture, was, that peace might be obtained. But however well or ill founded this might be, we were first to confider whether fuch a peace as might be fuppofed attainable, was fo defirable as to induce us to negociate; and next, whether failing in the negociation would be attended with fuch dangers as ought not to be hazarded. However we might abhor the conduct of Frenchmen towards Frenchmen, whatever indignation we might feel against crimes from which humanity fhrunk aghalt, hatred of vice was not a juft caufe of war between nations. If it were, Good God! 65 with which of thofe with whom we are now combined against France thould we be at peace? We, proud of our own freedom, had long been accustomed to treat defpotic governments with contempt, and to mark the vices of defpots with vigilant fenfibility. Of late, however, our refentment had been moft readily excited by the abufes of Liberty; and our hatred of vice was very different on different fides. In France an old defpotifm is overturned, and an attempt made to introduce a free government in its room. In that attempt great crimes are committed, and language is ranfacked, and declamation exhaufted, to raise our indignation, and excite us to war against the whole people. In Poland liberty is fubverted; that fair portion of the creation feized by the relentlefs fangs of defpotifmn; the wretched inhabitants reduced to the fame fituation with the ancient ilaves of their new mafters, her fair and fertile fields wrefted from her, to enrich the Destroyers of her Freedom; and, O fhameful mockery! compelled to fing Te Deum for the favours the has received at the hands of thofe infatiate Tyrants! but all we hear of this enormity is, perhaps a flight expreffion of flight difapprobation, or a well turned fentence to exprefs our forrow. But hatred of vice is no juft caufe of war, nor ever was among nations; and when he heard men declaim on the crimes of France, who knew how to reafon as ftatefmen, he could not but fufpect that they meant to deceive. Such a peace, it was next faid, would not be fecure. He admitted that it would not be fo fecure as for the permanent intereft of this country he could with; but it would be as fecure as any peace that had been made with France at any other time, and more fo than any that they, who would make no peace without the refloration of the monarchy, could ever expect to make. The present Rulers of France had declared themselves our natural enemies; they had contrived fchemes, and fent emiffaries to overturn our Conftitution. Had not all this been conftantly done by Louis XIV? Was he not the declared enemy of our Revolution? Did he not keep up a correfpondence with the Jacobite party among us; and endeavour by force and artifice to overturn our eftablishment in Church and State? Had our new-fangled politicians lived in thofe times, they would have faid, before the peace of Ryfwick, "What! treat with Louis XIV. who has made war upon you unjustly, who has fomented treafon and rebellion, attempted to destroy all that you hold facred, and, inftead of a limited monarchy, and the Proteftant religion, would impofe upon you the fetters of defpotifm and Popery?" Such muft then have been their language; but King William and his minifters would have thought those who held it fitter for Bedlam than a Cabinet. But the Jacobins have No. 2 **** I threatened threatened to over-run Holland, and extend their conquefts to the Rhine. Did not Louis XIV. invade Holland? Were his projects of conqueft fo moderate as to be confined within the Rhine? The whole argument then comes to this, that you must be fatisfied with the beft fecurity you can get, taking care that the power with whom you make a peace, thall have no temptation to break it, either from your mifconduct or want of vigiLance. The beft fecurity for Holland is the Emperor's poffeffion of the Netherlands, and repairing the fortifications of the barrier towns, which the Emperor was bound by treaty to maintain. Whether the Emperor thould be obliged to do this at his own expence, or whether Holland and Great Britain fhould affift him, was matter of difcullion; certain it was, however, that it would coft us much less than another campaign. If we looked at the declaration to the people of France, the first idea prefented by it, although afterwards fomewhat modified, but again confirmed by the Declaration at Toulon, was, that the reftoration of monarchy must be the preliminary to peace. Now fuppofe that inftead of the Jacobin Republic, fome table form of government, but not a monarchy, thould be established, with which we might think it fafe or necellary to treat, what would become of our promifes to Louis XVII. and the people of Toulon? Then as to our fecurity, according to the Declaration, as foon as the French have a King, we will ceafe to make war upon them, and they may fet about modifications of their monarchy. But how are thefe to be made? Not certainly with a guard of German troops furrounding the hall where thofe meet who are to make them. France will then be left in precifely the fame fituation as in 1789, from which flowed all the mifchiefs that are now faid to render it impollible for us to treat with them. Such is the notable fecurity which the Minifter propofes to obtain by way of indefinite duration. The fame Minister promifed at Toulon, or those whom he employed promifed for him, to restore the Conflitution of 1789, and it was in fact reflored there. Louis XVII. was not ftyled King of France, and Navarre, &c. but King of the French, and all the authorities appointed by the Conftitution of 1789, were re-established. How did this agree with the conduct of our allies? While we were in polletion of Toulon, General Wurmfer entered Alface, where he ifted a proclamation, difmiffing all perfons appointed to offices under the Constitution of 1789, and restoring till further orders, the ancient fyttem, which we are apt to call defpotic. He would fuppofe a thing tco abfurd to be fuppofed, but merely for the fake of argument, viz. that France were brought to fubinit to whatever we choose to propofe. Muft the have a King? She confents-Muft that |