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account whatever of their fafety had yet arrived, to quiet the anxiety of the merchants on their account. He knew that it would be argued, that there was no poffibility of preventing accidents of that kind; but he would leave it to the confideration of the Houfe, if one fingle crazy veflel was a fufficient convoy for the Quebec fleet, bound as it was for fuch different ports of Europe. In these two cafes the trade of the country had been injured, or put in imminent danger, for want of fufficient protection. But admitting that the whole fquadron returned home safe, and even without attack or injury, to their feveral ports of destination, he could not exculpate thofe people who had the direction of the convoy: their mifmanagement would be notorious by the following examples. The fquadron was compofed of veffels returning to England, Spain and Portugal. The only protection was the Severn. Could the Severn conduct the fhips of Spain and Portugal into their feveral ports of deftination, and leave the Britifh fhips to their own defence? or, if it accompanied the Britifh fhips, how could it be refponfible for the fafety and fecurity of thofe of Spain and Portugal ? The question was too contemptible for deliberation. He fhould now advert to the management at home, which, of course, as be- . ing near the feat of operation, would be fuppofed to attract, if it did not attract, vigilance, and obtain remedy whenever complaint was made, or neceffity feemed to require it. That this was not the cafe, he fhould immediately convince the Houfe, and thus perhaps prevent, at leaft he hoped fo, any fimilar accident in future. On the 15th of May, 1793, (he had been particular in the specific regifter of the dates), on the 15th of May, 1793, an outwardbound fquadron was ready to fail for the Weft Indies; but as some more fhips were to fail on the 1ft of June under convoy, it was deemed expedient that this fquadron fhould wait and join company. From the ift of June to the 23d of Auguft elapfed before the fquadron failed. What was the reafon of this delay? The fquadron had been complete, and fitted for the voyage on the 15th of May, and yet three months, three full months had expired before it left the Channel. Even from the 1ft of June, when the remaining fhips and convoy were either ready, or expected to be ready, near three months paffed in ufelefs delay; a time which was never paralleled in 1778. Let Gentlemen recollect what an immenfe lofs this must be to the merchants, whofe veffels, even if their goods, wares, and commodities, were not rendered of lefs value by the retardment, nor returned upon their hands, were thus deprived of arriving at their deftined places, there to land their cargoes, reload, and return at the ufual period. Every perfon was acquainted with the peculiar current of the winds in that quarter, and must be well aware, that unless a veffel was able to return at the usual season, one voyage, with the commercial intercourfe, and profits thereto belonging,

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belonging, was entirely loft. This fubject was of the utmoft importance. In a commercial country like this, where the Members of that House were fo well acquainted with the particular laws, interests, advantages, and detriments, in a courfe of mercantile affairs, it would be highly reprehenfible to fuffer fuch carelefinefs or fuch unjustifiable neglect to pafs unreproved. If the Minifters had obtained information that the enemy had at the time a powerful force at fea, why was our navy then riding fecurely in the Channel? or why were not fuch measures adopted as would guarantee our trade, and remove every apprehenfion?

In confequence of the delay of fome fhips in the Mediterranean, in the Italian trade, for want of convoy, there was a litigation now between the English and Italian merchants, about receiving the goods. As the English merchant had discharged his duty in fhipping the goods according to ftipulation, he would be extremely unfortunate to be obliged to pay the cofts of fuit, and the expences of the voyage to and from Italy, and finally have the goods returned upon his hands; nor would the Italian merchant be lefs pitiable if he fhould be a lofer by the decifion. Be that decifion what it may, both parties were involved in litigation, and must incur great trouble and great expence another evil which might have been avoided, if proper care had been taken refpecting the He ftated these facts to the Houfe, in order that they might reflect a little upon the fubject, and confider how light a matter it was made of on the opening of the Seffion; and that they might pause a little, and examine facts before they give implicit credit to every general and round affertion. For it had been ge nerally and roundly stated, that none of the ships had been taken. There had been no delay for want of convoy; whereas, there had been delay, and that not the delay of a fingle fhip, but of a whole fleet. What excuse Minifters could make for fuch endeavours to miflead the public, he could not tell; they could not plead ignorance of thefe things furely, when they were boafting of the protection which our convoys had given to our commerce in all parts of the globe.

convoy.

There was another thing not very flattering to the pride of Englifhmen; fix French frigates had been masters of the Channel for a confiderable time, and had taken, as he had been informed, fix teen fail of very valuable prizes. He contended, that it was owing to the negligence of Government, that a few French frigates could have fo long been on our coaft, and done fo much injury, without our fending out any force to oppofe them. Adminiftration must either want intelligence of the defigns of the enemy, or exertion to use the fuperior force which they manifeftly poffefs, to counteract them. He expreffed fome apprehenfion of the fate of the victualling fleet from Ireland, and faid there was a rumour of

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its being taken and carried into a port of the enemy. Befides this, a fleet defined for the Weft Indies had been detained for a confiderable time, on account of a rumour that there was a French fleet out, too powerful for us to attack at that time, in that quarter; that was, at the time we were told every thing was protected, we were afraid of the enemy, and were deficient in intelligence of their strength, and that too when, from all fair expectation, we fhould have fhewn our fuperiority. He thought it right to ftate thefe things to the Houfe, as grounds of the reafon he had for his jealoufy and diftruft of the information which the Houfe received of the Minifter on the opening of the Seffion, The fervice of the navy we were told, on the whole conduct of it, had never been better performed than it had fince the commencement of the war. He believed the Houfe would hefitate a little before they gave full confidence to that round declaration. But fuppofe the whole of it to be unquestionably true; fuppofe the fervice had been as well performed in this war as it ever was-Would that be fufficient? Would the House be satisfied with that? Was it matter for praise, and a thing to be wondered at, that Great Britain in the plenitude of its power, and with fo much courage (for courage in a public conteft was a part of power) should be equal in her navy to what fhe had manifefted on many occafions? Was it a wonderful thing that, after having bought, or obtained, or any thing else, apart of the French fleet, and deprived them of the ufe of great part of their navy, we should afterwards be able to protect ourselves at fea? During the laft war we had to protect our trade against two of the greatelt Maritime Powers (he believed he was juftified in calling Holland and Spain fo) that exifted in Europe. Thofe powers were now our allies; and therefore, instead of having to guard against their attacks, we ought to have recourse to them for affiftance. At that time we militated with three enemies, powerful in their naval armaments; whereas now we only waged hoftilities with one. He had made fome enquiry, as he had already told the Committee, and he fhould make ftill more into this bufinefs; and he had fome doubt whether it would not turn out, that, in point of fact, there was not more taken of our fhips in the year 1778, when we contended with all thofe powers, than have been taken from us fince the commencement of the prefent war. He thought it neceffary, on the prefent occafion, to make thefe obfervations; not that he thought them arguments immediately to the' queftion before the Committee, but that they might poffibly lay the foundation for a future investigation of the fubject. He had ftated facts, many of which he knew to be true, all of which he believed to be true; but he would not be understood to pledge himself for the truth of the whole of what he had ftated, because, as must be obvious to the Committee, fome of his information might be

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defective or erroneous. When he reflected on the oftentation of the Gentlemen who conducted the public affairs, and the bold affertions that they had made in praife of their own arrangements, above all precedent, he was reduced to the neceffity of profecuting them in the manner he had done, for two reasons-that of bridling their vanity, and preventing a repetition of the like abfurdities and evil. The public ought to be rightly informed upon this fubject, and not to be put in a state of difmay and confufion hereafter, at finding they had been unhappily deceived by the speech of the Right Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Dundas) a fpeech which, in fome parts of it, he must say, he did not think consistent with the belief of any well informed man in the kingdom.

Mr. Pitt admitted that no time was better adapted to the dif cuffion of any arguments or opinions relative to the Marine, than when the grant of the Supplies for that purpose was in contemplation. Upon fome particular points, he could not speak with the precision he could wifh, as not falling immediately under what had much occupied his attention: these he fhould leave to the fuperior information of his Right Honourable Friend, (Mr. Dundas,) whofe abfence was occafioned by fudden indifpofition. When it was recollected by the Houfe, that the operations of our navy, in confequence of our extent of territory, and our extent of commerce, which was in fo flourishing a condition at the commencement of the war, and which, fince its commencement, he was happy to fay, was not in the leaft degree affected, injured or impaired, but, on the contrary, confiderably promoted, were fo profperous and extenfive, it would immediately be confidered as impoffible for him to call inftantaneously to his recollection all the operations that had been used, or to carry particular points exclufively in his memory. Whatever objections the Right Honourable Gentleman had to make against the reigning fyftem, when they were stated in a fair and reasonable way, he fhould regard them with the most candid attention; and whenever any alteration or improvement was suggested, that could induce him to believe contained more general advantage and convenience, he should be confeffedly willing to accept them. It had been urged, in a direct and pofitive manner, that our convoys were infufficient for the protection of our trade, and fome inftances of loffes which our merchants had fuftained were quoted in fupport of this declaration. Perhaps fome loffes had been sustained he was incompetent either to remember or deny them. He would, however, venture to fay, that the trade and commerce of this country, fo profperous and extensive as it was at prefent, was effectually protected beyond the most fanguine expectations of the most warm friends to their country.

Did the Honourable Gentleman reflect on the advantages that the enemy had at the beginning of the war? Did he recollect that

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the French had no commerce to protect? Did he recollect that confequently they did call in all their fhips from the ocean, and unite them in a bulk with thofe in their feveral harbours? Did he remember that the enemy had a decided advantage in the fufpenfe that was occafioned through the difficulty of obtaining an accurate account of their deftination and force? To this might be added, the neceffity of having a powerful force, to ftand ready and prepared, at a moment's notice, to perform the most important and momentous fervice.

Gentlemen would be pleased to recollect, that in a traffic fo wide and extenfive as that of England, where fo many veffels are employed, and fo many circumftances to be confidered, it was abfolutely impoffible that we should avoid some accidents that have happened in every state, and under every administration; and that the wifeft and moft active precautions could not effectually prevent them. Perhaps the Right Honourable Gentleman who had just made his obfervations upon thefe accidents, was more able to acquire an exact account of the loffes which the merchants had fuftained than he could determine; but he was convinced that none of them were imputable to the neglect or careleffness of Minifters, and this he trusted he should speedily prove to the fatisfaction of almost every Member prefent. He reminded the House that the Right Honourable Gentleman had exprefsly stated his enquiries to be contradictory of an affertion, which his Right Ho nourable Friend, Mr. Dundas, had formerly made refpecting the protection afforded to our trade, as unexampled in any preceding war. He believed that Minifters, without any imputation of vanity, might perfift in this affertion, fince it was grounded upon truth. Never was our naval fuperiority greater than in the prefent period, and never had it been productive of more defirable effect. This country had great reason to triumph in the success of its maritime power, efpecially when we recollected the decifive blow we had given to the maritime power at Toulon, and that we had been able to block up the whole of the Mediterranean until that was effected. With respect to convoys, if some loffes had happened, they were certainly not occafioned by any defect in the equipment of convoys, or the vigilance of Adminiftration, but by fuch circumftances as would defy the niceft difquifition to forefee. Some veffels had been feparated from their convoys in a gale of wind; others had refufed to wait for convoy, and therefore rifqued at their own peril the dangers they were expofed to; while others lagged behind, and thus became a prey to the enemy. To rebut the charges more minutely: Was it expected, or even was it poffible, that, although Great Britain had the largest, beft planned, and most effective armament in the world, the fhould cover the feas, and fhelter every trader from injury? In the Baltic, it was

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