it is a branch of the royal prerogative, that he may (whenever he pleases) prorogue the parliament for a time, or put a final period to it's existence. If nothing had a right to prorogue or diffolve a parliament but itself, it might happen to become perpetual. And this would be extremely dangerous, if at any time it fhould attempt to encroach upon the executive power: as was fatally experienced by the unfortunate king Charles the first; who, having unadvisedly paffed an act to continue the parliament then in being till fuch time as it fhould please to diffolve itself, at last fell a sacrifice to that inordinate power, which he himself had confented to give them. It is therefore extremely neceffary that the crown fhould be empowered to regulate the duration of thefe affemblics, under the limitations which the English conftitution has prefcribed: fo that, on the one hand, they may frequently and regularly come together, for the dispatch of bufinefs, and redrefs of grievances; and may not, on the other, even with the confent of the crown, be continued to an inconvenient or unconftitutional length.

2. A PARLIAMENT may be diffolved by the demife of the crown. This diffolution formerly happened immediately upon the death of the reigning fovereign: for he being confidered in law as the head of the parliament, (caput principium, et finis,) that failing, the whole body was held to be extinct. But, the calling a new parliament immediately on the inauguration of the fucceffor being found inconvenient, and dangers being apprehended from having no parliament in being in cafe of a difputed fucceffion, it was enacted by the ftatutes 7 & 8 W. III. c. 15. and 6 Ann. c. 7. that the parliament in being fhall continue for fix months after the death of any king or queen, unless fooner prorogued or diffolved by the fucceffor: that, if the parliament be, at the time of the king's death, feparated by adjournment or prorogation, it fhall notwithstanding affemble immediately and that, if no parliament is then in being, the members of the laft parliament fhall affemble, and be again a parliament.

[189] 3. LASTLY, a parliament may be diffolved or expire by length of time. For if either the legislative body were per

petual;

petual; or might laft for the life of the prince who convened them, as formerly; and were fo to be fupplied, by occafionally filling the vacancies with new reprefentatives; in thefe cafes, if it were once corrupted, the evil would be past all remedy: but when different bodies fuccced each other, if the people fee caufe to difapprove of the prefent, they may rectify it's faults in the next. A legislative affembly alfo, which is fure to be feparated again, (whereby it's members will themselves become private men, and fubject to the full extent of the laws which they have enacted for others,) will think themselves bound, in intereft as well as duty, to make only fuch laws as are good. The utmost extent of time that the fame parliament was allowed to fit, by the ftatute 6 W. & M. c. 2. was three years; after the expiration of which, reckoning from the return of the firit fummons, the parliament was to have no longer continuance. But by the ftatute 1 Geo. I. ft. 2. c. 38. (in order, profeffedly, to prevent the great and continued expences of frequent elections, and the violent heats and animofities confequent thereupon, and for the peace and fecurity of the government then just recovering from the late rebellion) this term was prolonged to feven years: and, what alone is an instance of the vaft authority of parliament, the very fame houfe, that was chofen for three years, enacted it's own continuance for feven (65). So that, as our conftitution now ftands, the parliament muft expire, or die a natural death, at the end of every feventh year; if not fooner diffolved by the royal prerogative.

(65) This has been thought by many an unconftitutional exertion of their authority; and the reafon given is, that those who had a power delegated to them for three years only, could have no right to extend that term to feven years. But this has always appeared to me to be a fallacious mode of confidering the fubject. Before the triennial act, 6 W & M. the duration of parliament was only limited by the pleasure or death of the king; and it never can be supposed that the next, or any fucceeding parliament, had not the power of repealing the triennial act; and if that had been done, then, as before, they might have fat feventeen or seventy years. It is certainly true, that the fimple repeal of a former ftatute would have extended their continuance much beyond what was done by the feptennial act.

СНАРТER THE THIRD.

OF THE KING, AND HIS TITLE.

THE

HE fupreme executive power of these kingdoms is vefted by our laws in a fingle perfon, the king or queen: for it matters not to which sex the crown defcends; but the perfon entitled to it, whether male or female, is immediately invested with all the enɓigns, rights, and prerogatives of fovereign power; as is declared by ftatute 1 Mar. ft. 3. c. I.

IN difcourfing of the royal rights and authority, I shall confider the king under fix diftinct views: 1. With regard to his title. 2. His royal family. 3. His councils. 4. His duties. 5. His prerogative. 6. His revenue. And first, with regard to his title.

THE executive power of the English nation being vested in a fingle perfon, by the general confent of the people, the evidence of which general confent is long and immemorial ufage, it became neceffary to the freedom and peace of the ftate, that a rule fhould be laid down, uniform, univerfal, and permanent; in order to mark out with precision, who is that fingle perfon, to whom are committed (in fubfervience to the law of the land) the care and protection of the community; and to whom, in return, the duty and allegiance of every individual are due. It is of the higheft importance to the public tranquillity, and to the confciences

of

of private men, that this rule should be clear and indisputable and our conftitution has not left us in the dark upon this material occafion. It will therefore be the endeavour of this chapter to trace out the conftitutional doctrine of the royal fucceffion, with that freedom and regard to truth, yet mixed with that reverence and refpect, which the principles of liberty and the dignity of the subject require.

THE grand fundamental maxim upon which the jus coronae, or right of fucceffion to the throne of these kingdoms, depends, I take to be this: " that the crown is, by common "law and conftitutional cuftom, hereditary; and this in a "manner peculiar to itself: but that the right of inheritance "may from time to time be changed or limited by act of "parliament; under which limitations the crown ftill con"tinues hereditary." And this propofition it will be the bufinefs of this chapter to prove, in all it's branches; first, that the crown is hereditary; fecondly, that it is hereditary in a manner peculiar to itself; thirdly, that this inheritance is fubject to limitation by parliament; laftly, that when it is fo limited, it is hereditary in the new proprietor.

1. FIRST, it is in general hereditary, or defcendible to the next heir, on the death or demife of the last proprietor. All regal governments must be either hereditary or elective: and, as I believe there is no instance wherein the crown of England has ever been afferted to be elective, except by the regicides at the infamous and unparalleled trial of king Charles I, it muft of confequence be hereditary. Yet while I affert an hereditary, I by no means intend a jure divino, title to the throne. Such a title may be allowed to have fubfifted under the theocratic eftablishments of the children of Ifrael in Palestine: but it never yet fubfifted in any other country; fave only fo far as kingdoms, like other human fabricks, are fubject to the general and ordinary difpenfations of providence. Nor indeed have a jure divino and an hereditary right any neceffary connexion with each other; as fome have very weakly imagined. The titles of David and Jehu were VOL. I. equally

S

equally jure divino, as thofe of either Solomon or Ahab; and yet David flew the fons of his predeceffor, and Jehu his predeceffor himself. And when our kings have the same warrant as they had, whether it be to fit upon the throne of their fathers, or to destroy the house of the preceding fovereign, they will then, and not before, poffefs the crown of England by a right like theirs, immediately derived from heaven. The hereditary right which the laws of England acknowlege, owes it's origin to the founders of our conftitution, and to them only. It has no relation to, nor depends upon, the civil laws of the Jews, the Greeks, the Romans, or any other nation upon earth: the municipal laws of one fociety having no connexion with, or influence upon, the fundamental polity of another. The founders of our English monarchy might perhaps, if they had thought proper, have made it an elective monarchy: but they rather chofe, and upon good reason, to establish originally a fucceffion by inheritance. This has been acquiefced in by general confent; and ripened by degrees into common law; the very fame title that every private man has to his own eftate. Lands are not naturally defcendible any more than thrones: but the law has thought proper, for the benefit and peace of the public, to establish hereditary fucceffion in the one as well as the other.

It must be owned, an elective monarchy seems to be the most obvious, and best suited of any to the rational principles of government, and the freedom of human nature and accordingly we find from hiftory that, in the infancy and first rudiments of almost every state, the leader, chief magiftrate, or prince, hath ufually been elective. And, if the individuals who compose that state could always continue true to first principles, uninfluenced by paffion or prejudice, unaffailed by corruption, and unawed by violence, elective fucceffion were as much to be defired in a kingdom, as in other inferior communities. The beft, the wifeft, and the bravest man would then be fure of receiving that crown, which his endowments have merited; and the sense of an unbiaffed majority would be dutifully acquiefced in by the few who were