THE ifle of Ely is not a county palatine, though sometimes erroneously called fo, but only a royal franchise: the bishop having, by grant of king Henry the first, jura regalia within the ifle of Ely; whereby he exercises a jurisdiction over all causes, as well criminal as civil.

[120] THERE are also counties corporate: which are certain cities and towns, fome with more, fome with lefs territory annexed to them; to which out of special grace and favour the kings of England have granted the privilege to be counties of themfelves, and not to be comprized in any other county; but to be governed by their own fheriffs and other magiftrates, fo that no officers of the county at large have any power to intermeddle therein. Such are London, York, Bristol, Norwich, Coventry, and many others (23). And thus much of the countries fubject to the laws of England.

tural, and not in the political perfon of
king Henry VII, as formerly in that of
Henry IV; and was defcendible to his
natural heirs, independent of the fuccef-
fion to the crown. And, if this notion
were well founded, it might have be-
come a very curious question at the time
of the revolution in 1688, in whom the
right of the duchy remained after king
James's abdication, and previous to the
attainder of the pretended prince of
Wales. But it is obfervable, that in the
fame at the duchy of Cornwall is alfo
vested in king Henry VII and his heirs;
which could never be intended in any
event to be feparated from the inherit
ance of the crown. And indeed it
feems to have been understood very early
after the ftatute of Henry VII, that the

duchy of Lancaster was by no means thereby made a separate inheritance from the rest of the royal patrimony; fince it defcended with the crown, to the halfblood in the inftances of queen Mary and queen Elizabeth: which it could not have done, as the estate of a mere duke of Lancaster, in the common course of legal defcent. The better opinion therefore feems to be that of those judges, who held (Plowd. 221.) that notwithstanding the ftatute of Hen. VII. (which was only an act of refumption) the duchy ftill remained as established by the act of Edward IV; feparate from the other poffeffions of the crown in order and government, but united in point of inheritance.

4 Inft. 220.

(23) 3 Geo. I. c. 5. for the regulation of the office of sheriffs, enumerates twelve cities, and five towns, which are counties of themselves, and which have confequently their own fheriffs. The cities are, London, Chefter, Bristol, Coventry, Canterbury, Exeter, Gloucefter, Litchfield, Lincoln, Norwich, Worcester, York. The towns are Kingston-upon-Hull, Nottingham, Newcaftle-upon-Tyne, Pool, Southampton.

T

INDIVIDUALS.

HE objects of the laws of England are so very numerous and extenfive, that, in order to confider them with any tolerable ease and perfpicuity, it

will be neceffary to distribute them methodically, under proper and diftinct heads; avoiding as much as poffible divifions too large and comprehensive on the one hand, and too trifling and minute on the other; both of which are equally productive of confufion.

Now, as municipal law is a rule of civil conduct, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong; or as Cicero, and after him our Bracton', have expreffed it, fanctio jufta, jubens honefta et prohibens contraria; it follows, that the primary and principal objects of the law are RIGHTS and WRONGS. In the profecution therefore of these commentaries, I shall follow this very simple and obvious divifion; and hall in the first place confider the rights that are commanded, and fecondly the wrongs that are forbidden, by the laws of England.

RIGHTS are however liable to another subdivision: being either, first, those which concern and are annexed to the perfons of men, and are then called jura perfonarum or the rights of perfons; or they are, fecondly, fuch as a man may acquire over external objects, or things unconnected with his person, which are stiled jura rerum or the rights of things. Wrongs alfo are divifible into, first, private wrongs, which being an infringement merely of particular rights, concern individuals only, and are called civil injuries; and fecondly, public wrongs, which, being a breach of general and public rights, affect the whole community, and are called crimes and misdemefnors.

THE objects of the laws of England falling into this fourfold divifion, the prefent commentaries will therefore confift of the four following parts: 1. The rights of perfons; with the means whereby fuch rights may be either acquired or loft. 2. The rights of things; with the means alfo of acquiring and lofing them. 3. Private wrongs, or civil injuries; with the means of redre!ling them by law. 4. Public wrongs, or crimes and mifdemefnors; with the means of prevention and punishment (1).

(1) The diftinction between private wrongs and public wrongs is more intelligible, and more accurately limited by the nature of the Tubjects, than the diftinction between the rights of things, and the rights of perfons for all rights whatever muft be the rights of

certain

WE are now, first, to confider the rights of perfons; with the means of acquiring and lofing them.

Now the rights of perfons that are commanded to be ob- [123 1 served by the municipal law are of two forts: first, such as are due from every citizen, which are ufually called civil duties; and, fecondly, fuch as belong to him, which is the more popular acceptation of rights or jura. Both may indeed be comprized in this latter divifion; for, as all focial duties are of a relative nature, at the same time that they are due from one man, or set of men, they must also be due to an other. But I apprehend it will be more clear and easy, to confider many of them as duties required from, rather than as rights belonging to, particular perfons. Thus, for inftance, allegiance is ufually, and therefore moft easily, confidered as the duty of the people, and protection as the duty of the magiftrate; and yet they are reciprocally, the rights as

certain perfons to certain things. Every right is annexed to a certain character or relation, which each individual bears in fociety. The rights of kings, lords, judges, hufbands, fathers, heirs, purchafers, and occupants are all dependent upon the respective characters of the claimants. These rights might again be divided into rights to poffefs certain things, and the rights to do certain actions. This latter clafs of rights conftitute powers and authority. But the diftinction of rights of perfons and rights of things in the first two volumes of the Commentaries, feems to have no other difference than the antithefis of the expreffion, and that too refting upon a folecism; for the expreffion, rights of things, or a right of a horse, is contrary to the idiom of the English language: we fay, invariably, a right to a thing. The diftinction intended by the learned Judge, in the first two volumes, appears, in a great degree, to be that of the rights of persons in public stations, and the rights of perfons in private relations. Bnt as the order of legal fubjects is, in a great measure, arbitrary, and does not admit of that mathematical arrangement, where one propofition generates another, it perhaps would be difficult to discover any method more fatisfactory, than that which the learned Judge has purfued, and which was first suggested by lord C. J. Hale. See Hale's Analysis of the Law.

L3

well

well as duties of each other. Allegiance is the right of the magistrate, and protection the right of the people.

PERSONS alfo are divided by the law into either natural perfons, or artificial. Natural perfons are fuch as the God of nature formed us; artificial are fuch as are created and devised by human laws for the purposes of fociety and government, which are called corporations or bodies politic.

THE rights of perfons confidered in their natural capacities are also of two forts, abfolute, and relative. Abfolute, which are fuch as appertain and belong to particular men, merely as individuals or fingle perfons: relative, which are incident to them as members of society, and standing in various relations to each other. The first, that is, abfolute rights, will be the fubject of the prefent chapter.

By the abfolute rights of individuals we mean those which are fo in their primary and strictest sense; fuch as would belong to their persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled to enjoy, whether out of fociety or in it. But with regard to the abfolute duties, which man is bound [124] to perform confidered as a mere individual, it is not to be

expected that any human municipal law fhould at all explain or enforce them. For the end and intent of such laws being only to regulate the behaviour of mankind, as they are members of fociety, and ftand in various relations to each other, they have confequently no concern with any other but focial or relative duties. Let a man therefore be ever so abandoned in his principles, or vicious in his practice, provided he keeps his wickedness to himself, and does not offend against the rules of public decency, he is out of the reach of human laws. But if he makes his vices public, though they be fuch as feem principally to affect himself, (as drunkennefs, or the like,) they then become, by the bad example they fet, of pernicious effects to fociety; and therefore it is then the bufinefs of human laws to correct them. Here the circumftance of publication is what alters the nature of the cafe.