United States v. Brig Neurea.

The court below sustained the demurrer and dismissed the libel, from which decree the United States appealed.

It was argued for the United States by Mr. Cushing, (Attorney General.)

Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.

The Swedish brig Neurea was seized by the collector of customs at San Francisco, as forfeited to the United States under the passenger act of 1847. The record in this case exhibits the libel for information, filed on behalf of the United States, a demurrer thereto by the claimant, and a decree of the court below dismissing the libel. The appeal, therefore, brings under review the question of the sufficiency of the libel. The claimant sets forth the following grounds of demurrer: 1. That the said libel states no sufficient cause of condemnation of said ship.

2. Because the said libel states no offence against the laws of the United States.

8. Because the said libel does not aver that the excess of passengers carried or imported on said ship were so carried or imported on the lower deck of said brig, or the orlop deck thereof.

4. Because the facts stated in said libel do not constitute a violation of the passenger act of the United States of 1847, or any other law of the United States.

The first, second, and fourth, are but different forms of the same general assertion, "that the libel states no offence."

The third, which is more specific, objects to the libel for want of an averment that the passengers were carried on the lower deck.

An information for forfeiture of a vessel need not be more technical in its language, or specific in its description of the offence, than an indictment. As a general rule, an indictment for a statute offence is sufficient, if it describe the offence in the very words of the statute. The exceptions to this rule are, where the offences created by statute are analogous to certain common-law felonies or misdemeanors, where the precedents require certain technical language, or where special averments are necessary in the description of the particular offence, in order that the defendant may afterwards protect himself under the plea of autrefois acquit or convict. (See on this subject United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheaton, 474.)

The offence created by the statute on which this libel is founded has no analogy to any particular common-law crime. If, therefore, the libel sets forth the offence in the words of

United States v. Brig Neurea.

the statute which creates it, with sufficient certainty as to the time and place of its commission, it is all that is necessary to put the claimant on his defence.

The object of the act in question is the protection of the health and lives of passengers from becoming a prey to the avarice of ship owners. In order to test the sufficiency of the libel, it will be necessary to set forth at length the two sections under which it was framed:

The first section provides, that no master "shall take on board such vessel, at any foreign port or place, a greater number of passengers than in the following proportion to the space occupied by them and appropriated to their use, and unoccupied by stores or other goods not being the personal baggage of such passengers, that is to say, on the lower deck or platform, one passenger for every fourteen clear superficial feet of deck, if such vessel is not to pass within the tropics during such voyage; but if such vessel is to pass within the tropics during such voyage, then one passenger for every twenty such clear superficial feet of deck; and on the orlop deck, (if any,) one passenger for every thirty such superficial feet in all cases, with intent to bring such passengers into the United States of America, and shall leave such port, or place, with the same, and bring the same, or any number thereof, within the jurisdicdiction of the United States aforesaid, or if any such master of vessel shall take on board of his vessel, at any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States aforesaid, any greater number of passengers than the proportions aforesaid admit, with the intent to carry the same to any foreign port or place, every such master shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof before any circuit or district court of the United States aforesaid, shall, for each passenger taken on board beyond the above proportions, be fined in the sum of fifty dollars, and may also be imprisoned for any term not exceeding one year: Provided, that this act shall not be construed to permit any ship or vessel to carry more than two passengers to every five tons of such ship or vessel."

"SEC. 2. That if the passengers so taken on board such vessel, and brought into, or transported from, the United States aforesaid, shall exceed the number limited by the last section, to the number of twenty in the whole, such vessel shall be forfeited to the United States aforesaid, and be prosecuted and distributed as forfeitures are under the act to regulate duties on imports and tonnage."

Now, the libel conforms strictly to the requirements of this

act.

It avers, that the master "took on board the Neurea at

Seymour et al. v. McCormick.

Hong Kong, in China, on the 1st of June, 1854, two hundred and sixty-three passengers. That this was a greater number than in proportion to the space occupied by them, viz: "on the lower deck or platform" one passenger for every fourteen clear superficial feet, with intent to bring said passengers to the United States. That he afterwards, viz: on the 26th day of August, did bring them on said vessel to the port of San Francisco. That the passengers so taken on board and brought into the United States did exceed the number which could be lawfully taken, to the number of twenty in the whole, &c.

The act does not require an averment that the passengers "were carried or imported on the lower deck or the orlop deck."

The libel sets forth every averment of time, place, numbers, intention, and act, in the very words of the statute. It was not necessary to specify the precise measurement of the deck, or to show by a mathematical calculation its incapacity; nor to state the sex, age, color, or nation, of the passengers; nor how many more than twenty their number exceeded the required area on deck. All these particulars were matters of evidence, which required no special averment of them to constitute a complete and technical description of the offence.

The decree of the District Court is therefore reversed, and record remitted for further proceedings.

WILLIAM H. SEYMOUR AND LAYTON S. MORGAN, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. CYRUS H. MCCORMICK.

The act of Congress passed on the 3d of March, 1837, (5 Stat. at L., 194,) provides that a patentee may enter a disclaimer, if he has included in his patent what he was not the inventor of; but if he recovers judgment against an infringer of his patent, he shall not be entitled to costs, unless he has entered a disclaimer for the part not invented.

It also provides that if a patentee unreasonably neglects or delays to enter a disclaimer, he shall not be entitled to the benefit of the section at all.

In 1845, McCormick obtained a patent for improvements in a reaping machine, in which, after filing his specification, he claimed, amongst other things, as follows, viz:

"2d. I claim the reversed angle of the teeth of the blade, in manner described. "3d. I claim the arrangement and construction of the fingers, (or teeth for supporting the grain,) so as to form the angular spaces in front of the blade, as and for the purpose described."

These two clauses are not to be read in connection with each other, but separately. The first claim, viz: for "the reversed angle of the teeth of the blade," not being new, and not being disclaimed, he was not entitled to costs, although he recovered a judgment for a violation of other parts of his patent.

Under the circumstances of the case, the patentee was not guilty of unreasonable neglect or delay in making the disclaimer, which is a question of law for the court to decide.

Seymour et al. v. McCormick.

The facts that a similar machine was in successful operation in the years 1829) nd 1853, do not furnish a sufficient ground for the jury to presume that it had been in continuous operation during the intermediate time.

The fifteenth section of the patent act of 1836, which allows the defendant to give in evidence that the improvement had been described in some public work anterior to the supposed discovery of the patentee, does not make the work evidence of any other fact, except that of the description of the said improvement.

THIS case came up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of New York.

It was a suit brought by McCormick against Seymour and Morgan, for a violation of his patent right for reaping machines, which suit was previously before this court, and is reported in 16 Howard, 480.

It will be seen by reference to that case that McCormick obtained three patents, viz: in 1834, 1845, and 1847. The suit, as originally brought, included violations of the patent of 1845, as well as that of 1847; but the plaintiff, to avoid delay, proceeded then only in his claim for a violation of the patent of 1847, which consisted chiefly in giving to the raker of the grain a convenient seat upon the machine. When the case went back under the mandate of this court, the claim was for the violation of the patent of 1845, that of 1847 being mentioned only in the declaration, and not brought before the court upon the trial, the main question being the violation of the patent of 1845.

McCormick's claim in the patent of 1845 was as follows, viz: I claim, 1st, the curved (or angled downward, for the pur'pose described) bearer, for supporting the blade in the manner described:

2d. I claim the reversed angle of the teeth of the blade, in manner described.

3d. I claim the arrangement and construction of the fingers, (or teeth for supporting the grain,) so as to form the angular spaces in front of the blade, as and for the purpose described. 4th. I claim the combination of the bow, L, and dividing iron, M, for separating the wheat in the way described.

5th. I claim setting the lower end of the reel-post, R, behind the blade, curving it at R 2, and leaning it forward at top, thereby favoring the cutting, and enabling me to brace it at top by the front brace (S) as described, which I claim in combination with the post.

The fourth and fifth claims were those which were alleged to have been infringed.

The defendants pleaded the general issue, and gave notice of various prior inventions and publications in public works, which they designed to give in evidence in their defence. The last trial was had in October, 1854, when the plaintiff obtained

Seymour et al. v. McCormick.

a verdict for $7,750, and judgment was entered in June, 1855, for $10,348.30.

There were twenty exceptions taken in the progress of the trial, twelve of which were as to rulings upon points of evidence, which it is not material to notice. The remaining eight were to portions of the charge of the court to the jury.

The defendants, in addition to other matters of defence, alleged that the second claim was not new, and that as there had been unreasonable delay in the disclaimer of it, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover at all; and, at all events, was not entitled to recover costs.

Only such portions of the charge of the court to the jury will be here inserted, as were the subjects of the opinion of this court.

One part of the charge was as follows, viz:

"The claim in question is founded upon two parts of the patent. As the construction of that claim is a question of law, we shall construe it for your guidance. In the fore part of the patent, we have a description of the blade, and of the bladecase, and of the cutter, and of the mode of fastening the blade and the blade-case and the cutter, and of the machinery by which the arrangement is made for the cutter to work. We have also the description of the spear-shaped fingers, and of the mode by which the cutter acts in connection with those fingers. Then, among the claims are these: 2. I claim the reversed angle of the teeth of the blade in manner described. 8. I claim the arrangement of the construction of the fingers, (or teeth for supporting the grain,) so as to form the angular spaces in front of the blade, as and for the purpose described.' Now, it is insisted, on the part of the learned counsel for the defendants, that this second claim is one simply for the reversed angles of the sickle-teeth of the blade. These teeth are common sickle-teeth, with their angles alternately reversed in spaces of an inch and a quarter, more or less. The defendants insist that the second claim is merely for the reversed teeth on the edge of the cutter, and that the reversing of the teeth of the common sickle as a cutter in a reaping machine was not new with the plaintiff; and that if it was new with him, he had discovered it and used it long before his patent of 1845. The defendants claim that Moore had discovered it as early as 1837 or 1838; and it would also seem that the plaintiff had devised and used it at a very early day after his patent of 1834-that is, the mere reversing of the teeth. But, on looking into the plaintiff's patent more critically, we are inclined to think that when the plaintiff says, in his second claim, 'I claim the reversed angle of the teeth of the blade, in manner described,' he