gaged beams of the British battle cruisers. Destroyers were active in attempts to screen the big ships from underwater attack.

Ten minutes after the engagement become general an explosion occurred in the Indefatigable, and she sank almost immediately. At 4:15 twelve British destroyers moved forward to attack the German battle cruisers; German light cruisers and destroyers made a similar advance at the same time. A fierce engagement ensued between these light craft at close quarters. The Germans did not press their torpedo attack, but six of the British destroyers continued the advance under a heavy shell fire, and fired torpedoes at the German lines. At 4:30 a mighty explosion occurred in the Queen Mary, and she went down so quickly that the following ships in the formation are reported as having steamed right over her. At 4:42 the German battle fleet was sighted to the southeast, and the British ships turned right about (180 degrees) in succession. The German battle cruisers also altered course 16 points, and the action continued on a northwesterly course, beginning what we will call the second phase.

According to German Admiralty reports, during the first phase, lasting about an hour, from 3:49 to the time the British changed course 16 points at 4:45, the British battle cruiser Indefatigable, (tonnage 18,750, main battery eight 12inch, carrying 899 men,) was sunk at 4:05, and the Queen Mary, (tonnage 27,000, main battery eight 13.5-inch guns, carrying 1,000 men,) was destroyed at about 4:35. It is also reported that the British lost four destroyers and the Germans two. Before taking up the second phase of the battle, a few points bearing on the first phase will be briefly discussed.

Cause of British Losses

Several theories have been advanced as to the probable causes of the loss of the two British battle cruisers. It is also reported that both ships suffered heavy explosions which appeared to come up through turret tops. This has led to the opinion that enemy shells exploded in the respective turrets, and, igniting chains of

powder to the magazines, caused the blowing up of the magazines. This is not at all unlikely, and directs attention to the need of safety precautions in the supply of ammunition to turret guns. Still another theory is that these two ships were sunk either by mines or torpedoes; while a few credit the surmise that the explosions were of internal origin, either in turret or magazine, and having nothing to do with enemy fire.

There has been some comment in the press to the effect that Admiral Jellicoe may have violated the principle of concentration of forces by sending in advance a squadron of four battleships to support Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers. The consensus of professional opinion, however, does not appear to support any such criticism. This advance force was composed entirely of fast ships, (the battleships had the unusually high speed of 25 knots,) operating on interior lines between the supporting British fleet and the enemy main fleet, with little or no chance of being cut off by a superior enemy force.

There is also more or less criticism to the effect that Admiral Beatty rashly exposed his command; that the Germans counted on his impetuosity; and that he did just what Admiral Hipper expected him to do and wanted him to do. On the other hand, it may be argued that at the start of the action the situation was not unfavorable to the British because Admiral Hipper was almost cut off by a superior force and in danger of being compelled to turn toward the British Grand Fleet. The plan of co-ordination between the main body under Admiral Jellicoe and the British advance force is not altogether clear, but it is evident that Admiral Beatty tried to get to the southward of Admiral Hipper, and upon the approach of the High Seas Fleet was compelled to make a right about turn, a manoeuvre likely to prove diastrous if attempted under gun fire. Reports are somewhat obscure as to just what happened at this time, but it seems that the British ships accomplished the turn without suffering much damage, and that the German battle cruisers turned around at about the same time. Perhaps the

All That Was Left of a Train of French Freight Cars Caught in an Artillery Duel Between the British and Germans During the Fighting Along the Ancre River.

(Photo Underwood & Underwood.)

battleships under Admiral Evan-Thomas were used to provide a covering fire while Admiral Beatty countermarched. Some incline to the opinion that Admiral 'Hipper failed to take advantage of his speed to draw ahead to a semi T-ing or capping position where he might have hammered Admiral Beatty's ships on the knuckle of their pivoting point without subjecting his own ships to anything worse than a long range fire from the 15inch guns of the enemy battleships. It may be that the German battle cruisers did not have enough speed to do this, or it may be that Admiral Hipper was intent only on drawing the enemy into the fire of the approaching German battle fleet. At any rate, whatever the actual circumstances, neither side lost any ships at this time and the battle continued on northerly courses, beginning the second phase.

The Second Phase

Action Between British Advance Force of Battle Cruisers, Supported by Four Battleships, and German Battle Cruisers Supported by German High Seas Battle Fleet.

The Fifth Battle Squadron is reported to have closed the German battle cruisers on an opposite course, engaging them with all guns, when Admiral Beatty signaled Admiral Evan-Thomas the position of the German battle fleet and ordered him to alter course 16 points. At 4:57 the Fifth Battle Squadron fell into line behind the battle cruisers and came under the fire of the leading ships of the German battle fleet, which, in the meanwhile, had joined the line of battle in rear of Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers. The action continued at about 14,000 yards range on northwesterly courses curving north and then northeasterly. At 5:56 Admiral Beatty sighted the leading ships of the British Baltic battle fleet bearing north, distant five miles, and altered course to east, increasing speed to the

utmost, thereby reducing the range to 12,000 yards, and opening a gap between his battle cruisers and Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas's supporting battleships. The German van also turned eastward.

This completed the second phase of the battle, during which four British battle cruisers and four battleships were engaged for about one hour and a half with the van of the German fleet led by five battle cruisers followed by battleships of the Koenig class. Light cruisers and destroyers were also intermittently engaged during this phase and a few isolated but determined torpedo attacks were pushed home. These apparently met with little success, the attackers suffering severe punishment.

In this second phase, while at first glance it appears that four British battle cruisers supported by four battleships were engaging the entire German High Seas Fleet, such was not strictly speaking the case. The superior speed of the British squadrons enabled them to keep in the van, out of range of the enemy centre and rear. At this time the advantage of light was with the Germans, because the British ships had a sky brightened by the setting sun for background, while the German ships were more obscured in the mist by reason of their dark background. But the British Vice Admiral reports administering severe punishment to enemy ships during this phase. It is not clear whether the Germans turned to the eastward to avoid being capped or T-ed by the faster enemy ships, or whether they originated the easterly change of course because of the approaching British battle fleet, but this manoeuvre put the British fleet in a tactically favorable position for gun fire as well as ultimately placing them between the German fleet and its bases.

[The third and fourth phases of the battle of Jutland, with conclusions, will appear in April.]

ESS than 50,000 tons is the difference

L

between the British and German naval losses in the present war, probably not more than 27,000 tons, according to the 1917 issue of Jane's Fighting Ships," a publication approved by the British Government. According to this publication, the British have lost nine battleships of a total tonnage of 127,500, three battle cruisers, 65,000; twelve armored cruisers, 143,600; seven light cruisers, 28,285, and torpedo boats and destroyers, 16,270, a total of 381,105 tons. This does not include submarines or mine sweepers, which probably would add from 10,000 to 20,000 to the total.

The German battleship losses are put at five ships, with the added statement that a sixth, a vessel of the Helgoland type, probably was lost also in the battle of Jutland. The total German losses are given as five battleships of a total of 104,300 tons, three battle cruisers, 72,400; six armored crusers, 65,750; twenty light cruisers, 76,950; one unprotected cruiser, 1,600; four gunboats, 2,136; twelve destroyers, 6,000, and one 2,200-ton mine layer. The total German losses, exclusive of submarines and " a great many destroyers," figure up 331,336 tons, or 49,769 tons less than the British losses. If a second vessel of the Helgoland type was lost, as intimated, it would reduce the difference between the British and German losses to 26,969 tons.

Here are tables which give the losses of the British and German Navies, exclusive of auxiliary ships, as listed:

BRITISH LOSSES

No. 11

.....Mar., 1916

No. 12

BATTLESHIPS

No. 96

130.. Collision

.Nov., 1915

AE-1

AE-2

...Mar., 1915

D-2

K. Edw'd VII..16,350..Mined ....Jan., 1916

D-5

Majestic

Ocean

......14,900..Torpedoed ..May, 1915 .12,950..Mined

E-3

.Mar., 1915

E-7