A letter from General Sullivan, who had been consulted as to the form to be established, shows the state of public opinion. "I can by no means consent to lodge too much power in the hands of one person, or suffering an interest in government to exist separate from that of the people, or any man to hold office for the execution of which he is not, in some way or other, answerable to that people to whom he owes his political existence."

The course of New Hampshire showed the extent of this feeling. Its constitution did not provide a governor. A House of Representatives, elected annually by the towns, chose a council of twelve persons, who chose a presiding officer. This officer, called the "President of the Council," performed the undefined duties of a governor, and was, at the same time, appointed judge of the superior court. This imperfect scheme existed until near the end of the revolution.

In March, the Provincial Congress of South Carolina organized themselves as a general assembly of the colony, framing a constitution. This assembly was authorized to elect by ballot from its own body a legislative council, and these jointly were to choose a president and a privy council by ballot. This temporary constitution gave place soon after to another, by which a rotation in office was secured, and more popular elements introduced.

In New Jersey, a legislature of two branches was also elected annually, and they chose an annual governor. In Virginia, one branch of the legislature and the governor were annually chosen, the latter by the legislature who was only re-eligible for three successive years, and was controlled by a council chosen by joint ballot of the legislature, whose term of office was of several years. His powers were few, his patronage small. Maryland also chose her governor annually by her legislature of

two branches, who was likewise controlled by a council elected annually by the same body. He also was re-eligible for only three consecutive years: his powers very limited and guarded. The constitutions of Delaware and North Carolina were in these respects similar. All these frames of government were made in the course of the year seventy-six. Connecticut and Rhode Island remained, under their charter systems a little modified, of a very popular cast, and in part models of those recently instituted.

The constitution of New York, at this moment completed, established a legislature of two branches, the senate, like that of Virginia and of Maryland, being of longer duration than the other branch, and changed successively by rotation; chosen, as was the governor, by freeholders.

His term of office was three years, and his powers were larger than those conferred by the other States. Here his patronage, power and responsibility were sought to be checked by councils, one exercising conjointly with him, the power of revising and rejecting the acts of legislation, the other that of appointments.

This plan of government was believed to be chiefly the production of Jay, to whom Rutledge of South Carolina wrote: "Vest the executive powers of government in an individual, that they may have vigor, and let them be as ample as is consistent with the great outlines of freedom."

The larger executive powers conferred by it was the result of obvious causes. The seaboard of the State was at this moment in possession of the enemy, its interior frontier was menaced by them, many of its inhabitants were disaffected. Its safety demanded a prompt exertion of all its resources, to which it had been habituated during its colonial existence. "Our constitution," Jay writes,

"is universally approved, even in New England, where few New York productions have credit.”

Hamilton's views of it are given in his letters to Gouverneur Morris.

"I thank you for the favor of the pamphlet containing your form of government, which, without flattery, I consider as far more judicious and digested than any thing of the kind that has yet appeared among us; though I am not so unreserved in my approbation as to think it free from defects. While I view it in the main as a wise and excellent system, I freely confess it appears to me to have some faults which I could wish did not exist. Were it not too late to discuss particulars for any useful end, or could my judgment have any weight in a matter which is the work of so many far more able and discerning than I can pretend to be, I should willingly descend to an exhibition of those parts I dislike, and my reasons for disapproving. But, in the present situation of things, it would be both useless and presumptuous."

Morris answered, "I am very happy to find that our form of government meets with your approbation. That there are faults in it is not to be wondered at, for it is the work of men, and of men, perhaps, not the best qualified for such undertakings. I think it deficient for want of vigor in the executive; unstable, from the very nature of popular elective governments; and dilatory, from the complexity of the legislature.

"For the first, I apologize by hinting the spirit which now reigns in America, suspiciously cautious. For the second, because unavoidable. For the third, because a simple legislature soon possesses itself of too much power for the safety of its subjects. God grant it may work well, for we must live under it."

Hamilton answered: "I partly agree and partly disa

gree with you respecting the deficiencies of our constitution. That there is a want of vigor in the executive, I believe will be found true. To determine the qualifications proper for the chief executive magistrate requires the deliberate wisdom of a select assembly, and cannot safely be lodged with the people at large. That instability is inherent in the nature of popular governments, I think very disputable; unstable democracy is an epithet frequently in the mouths of politicians; but I believe that from a strict examination of the matter-from the records of history, it will be found that the fluctuations of governments in which the popular principle has borne a considerable sway, have proceeded from its being compounded with other principles; and from its being made to operate in an improper channel. Compound governments, though they may be harmonious in the beginning, will introduce distinct interests, and these interests will clash, throw the State into convulsions, and produce a change or dissolution. When the deliberative or judicial powers are vested wholly or partly in the collective body of the people, you must expect error, confusion and instability. But a REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, where the right of election is well secured and regulated, and the exercise of the legislative, executive, and judiciary authorities is vested in select persons, chosen really and not nominally by the people will, in my opinion, be most likely to be happy, regular and durable. That the complexity of your legislature will occasion delay and dilatoriness is evident, and I fear may be attended with a much greater evil; as expedition is not very material in making laws, especially when the government is well digested and matured by time. The evil, I mean, is, that in time your Senate, from the very name, and from the mere circumstance of its being a separate member of the legislature,

will be liable to degenerate into a body purely aristocratical.

And I think the abuse of power from a simple legislature would not be very great in a government where the equality and fulness of popular representation is so wisely provided for as in yours. On the whole, though I think these are the defects intimated, I think your government far the best that we have yet seen, and capable of giving long and substantial happiness to the people. Objections should be suggested with great caution and reserve."

The qualified opinion here expressed of the durability of representative democracies is not without color of authority.*

The distrust of a Senatc, as verging towards aristocracy, was the transient emotion of a youthful mind, to which the vista of human happiness in modern institutions was opening in all its beauty and grandeur. It soon gave place to wiser views.

The efforts of the disaffected Americans were now a source of serious alarm. In New York the enemy had formed bodies of troops composed of them and of British and Irish refugees under the command of men driven. from their colonial stations; and with embittered feelings, eager to wage unrelenting hostilities upon those they had recently governed. Of these was Tryon, with the rank of major-general, conspicuous in the recent incendiary inroads upon Connecticut. Hamilton, sensible of the great importance of marking the true line of policy to be adopted as to so delicate and difficult a matter, now wrote to the convention of New York, deprecating the substitu tion of tyranny for discriminating energy. "The disposition of the convention, with respect to the disaffected

*Montesquieu's Esprit des Loix. "Republique Federative," i. 391.