the priesthood, and even that of dictator: the fenate, after long oppofition, yielding merely for prefent quiet to the continual urging clamours of the commons, and of the tribunes their advocates. A law was likewife enacted, that the plebiscita, or a vote of the house of commons, fhould be of univerfal obligation; nay, in time the method of enacting laws was wholly inverted; for whereas the fenate ufed of old to confirm the plebifcita, the people did at laft, as they pleased, confirm or difannul the fenatufconfulta *.

Appius Claudius brought in a custom of admitting to the fenate the fons of freed men, or of fuch who had once been flaves; by which, and fucceeding alterations of the like nature, that great council degenerated into a moft corrupt and factious body of men, divided against itfelf; and its authority became despised.

The century and half following, to the end of the third Punic war, by the destruction of Carthage, was a very bufy period at Rome; the intervals between every war being fo fhort, that the tribunes and people had hardly leifure or breath to engage in domeftic diffenfions: however, the little time they could spare, was generally employed the fame way. So Terentius Leo, a tribune, is recorded to have bafely prostituted the privileges of a Roman citizen, in perfect fpite to the nobles. So the great African Scipio, and his brother, after all their mighty services, were impeached by an ungrateful commons.

However, the warlike genius of the people, and continual employment they had for it, ferved to divert this humour from running into a head, till the age of the Gracchi.

Thefe perfons entering the scene in the time of a full peace, fell violently upon advancing the power of the people by reducing into practice all thofe incroachments, which they had been fo many years gaining. There were at that time certain conquered lands to be divided, befide a great private eftate left by a king these the tribunes, by procurement of the elder Gracchus, declared by their legislative authority, were not to be disposed of by the nobles, but by the commons only. The young

• Dionyf. lib. 2.

er

er brother purfued the fame defign; and, befides, obtained a law, that all Italians fhould vote at elections, as well as the citizens of Rome: in fhort, the whole endeavours of them both perpetually turned upon retrenching the nobles authority in all things, but especially in the matter of judicature. And though they both loft their lives in those purfuits, yet they traced out fuch ways as were afterwards followed by Marius, Sylla, Pompey, and Cæfar, to the ruin of the Roman freedom and greatnefs.

For in the time of Marius, Saturninus a tribune procured a law, that the fenate fhould be bound by oath to agree to whatever the people would enact: and Marius himself, while he was in that office of tribune, is recorded to have, with great industry, ufed all endeavours for depreffing the nobles, and railing the people, particularly for cramping the former in their power of judicaturé, which was their most ancient inherent right.

Sylla by the fame measures became abfolute tyrant of Rome: he added three hundred commons to the fenate, which perplexed the power of the whole order, and rendered it ineffectual, then flinging off the mafk, he abolished the office of tribune, as being only a fcaffold to tyranny, whereof he had no further use.

As to Pompey and Cæfar, Plutarch tells us, that their union for pulling down the nobles (by their credit with the people) was the cause of the civil war, which ended in the tyranny of the latter; both of them in their confulfhips having uted all endeavours and occafions for finking the authority of the patricians, and giving way to all incroachments of the people, wherein they expected beft to find their own account.

From this deduction of popular incroachments in Rome, the reader will easily judge, how much the balance was fallen upon that fide. Indeed by this time the very formdation was removed, and it was a moral impoffibility, that the republic could fubfift any longer: for the comnons having ufurped the offices of ftate, and trampled on the fenate, there was no government left but a dominatio plebis. Let us therefore examine how they proceeded in this conjuncture.

I think it is an univerfal truth, that the people are much

much more dexterous at pulling down and fetting up, than at preferving what is fixed; and they are not fonder of feizing more than their own, than they are of delivering it up again to the worst bidder, with their own into the bargain. For although in their corrupt notions of divine worship, they are apt to multiply their gods; yet their earthly devotion is feldom paid to above one idol at a time, of their own creation, whofe oar they pull with lefs murmuring and much more skill, than when they hare the leading, or even hold the heim.

The feveral provinces of the Roman empire were now governed by the great men of their ftate; those upon the frontiers with powerful armies either for conqueft or defence. Thefe governors, upon any defigns of revenge or ambition, were fare to meet with a divided power at home, and therefore bent all their thoughts and applica- · tions to close in with the people, who were now by many degrees the ftronger party. Two of the greatest fpirits that Rome ever produced, happened to live at the fame time, and to be engaged in the fame purfuit; and this at a conjuncture the most dangerous for fuch a conteft: these were Pompey and Cæfar, two ftars of fuch a magnitude, that their conjunction was as likely to be fatal, as their oppofition.

The tribunes and people, having now fubdued all competitors, began the laft gaine of a prevalent populace, which is that of chufing themselves a mafier; while the nobles forefaw, and used all endeavours left them to prevent it. The people at first made Pompey their admiral with full power over all the Mediterranean, foon after captain-general of all the Roman forces, and governor of Afia. Pompey, on the other fide, reftored the office of tribune, which Sylla had put down; and in his con fulfhip procured a law for examining into the miscarriages of men in office or command for twenty years past. Many other examples of Pompey's popularity are left us on record, who was a perfect favourite of the people, and defigned to be more; but his pretenfions grew ftale for want of a timely opportunity of introducing them upon the stage, For Cafar, with his legions in Gaul, was a perpetual check upon his designs; and in the arts of pleafing the people did foon after get many lengths beyond

him. For he tells us himself, that the fenate by a bold? effort having made fome fevere decrees against his proceedings, and against the tribunes, these all left the city,. and went over to his party, and confequently along with them the affections and interests of the people; which is further manifeft from the accounts he gives us of the citizens in feveral towns inutinying against their commanders, and delivering both to his devotion. Befides, Cæ-. far's public and avowed pretenfions for beginning the civil war were to restore the tribunes and the people op-. preffed (as he pretended) by the nobles.

This forced Pompey, against his inclinations, upon the neceflity of changing fides, for fear of being forfaken by both; and of clofing in with the fenate and chief magi-Atrates, by whom he was chofen general against Cæfar..

Thus at length the fenate (at least the primitive part of them, the nobles) under Pompey, and the commons under Cæfar, came to a final decifion of the long quarrels between thein. For, I think, the ambition of private men did by no means begin or occafion this war; though civil diffenfions never fail of introducing and spiriting the ambition of private men; who thus become indeed the great inftruments for deciding of fuch quarrels, and at last are fure to feize on the prize. But no man, that fees a flock of vultures hovering over two armies ready to en.. gage, can juftly charge the blood drawn in the battle to them, though the carcafes fall to their fhare. For while the balance of power is equally held, the ambition of private men, whether orators or great commanders, gives neither danger nor fear, nor can poffibly inflave their country; but that once broken, the divided parties are forced to unite each to its head, under whofe conduct or fortune one fide is at first victorious, and at last both are flaves. And to put it paft difpute, that this entire sub-... verfion of the Roman liberty and conftitution was altogether owing to those measures, which had broke the balance between the patricians and plebeians, whereof the ambition of particular men was but an effect and con... fequence, we need only confider, that when the uncorrupted part of the fenate had, by the death of Cæfar, madeone great effort to restore their former state and liberty, the fuccefs did not answer their hopes, but that whole affembly

affembly was fo funk in its authority, that thofe patriots were forced to fly, and give way to the madnefs of the people, who by their own difpofitions, ftirred up with the harangues of their orators, were now wholly bent upon fingle and defpotic flavery. Elfe, how could fuch a profligate as Antony, or a boy of eighteen, like Octavius, ever dare to dream of giving the law to fuch an empire and people wherein the latter fucceeded, and entailed the vileft tyranny, that heaven in its anger ever inflicted on a corrupt and poifoned people. And this, with fo little appearance at Cafir's death, that when Cicero wrote to Brutus, how he had prevailed by his credit with Octavius to promife him [Brutus] pardon and fecurity for his perfon, that great Roman received the notice with the utmost indignity, and returned Cicero an anfiver, yet upon record, full of the highest refentment and contempt for fach an offer, and from fuch a hand.

Here ended all fhew or fhadow of liberty in Rome. Here was the repofitory of all the wife contentions and ftruggles for power between the nobles and commons, lapped up fafely in the bofom of a Nero and a Caligula, a Tiberius and a Domitian.

Let us now fee from this deduction of particular împeachments, and general diffenfions in Greece and Rome, what conclufions may naturally be formed for inftruction of any other ftate, that may haply upon many points la bour under the like circumstances.

TPON the fubject of impeachments we may obferve,

UPON

U that the cuftom of accufing the nobles to the people,

either by themselves, or their orators, (now ftyled an impeachment in the name of the commons), hath been very ancient both in Greece and Rome, as well as Carthage; and therefore may feem to be the inherent right of a free people, nay, perhaps it is really fo: but then it is to be confidered, first, that this custom was peculiar to republics, or fuch ftates where the administration lay princiRally in the hands of the commons, and ever raged more or less according to their incroachments upon abfolute power