while they were employed in the wars. Thefe men, at feveral times, ufurped the abfolute authority, and were as cruel tyrants, as any in their age. Soon after the unfortunate expedition into Sicily, the Athenians chofe four hundred men for administration of affairs, who became a body of tyrants, and were called, in the language of thofe ages, an oligarchy, or tyranny of the few; under which hateful denomination they were foon after depofed in great rage by the people. When Athens + was fubdued by Lyfander, he appointed thirty men for the adminiftration of that city, who immediately fell into the rankeft tyranny: but this was not all; for conceiving their power not founded on a bafis large enough, they admitted three thoufand into a share of the government; and thus fortified, became the cruelleft tyranny upon record. They murdered in cold blood great numbers of the beft men, without any provocation, from the mere luft of cruelty, like Nero or Caligula. This was fuch a number of tyrants together, as amounted to near a third part of the whole city; for Xenophon tells us, that the city contained about ten thousand houses ; and allowing one man to every houfe, who could have any fhare in the government, (the reft confifting of women, children, and fervants), and making other obvious abatements, these tyrants, if they had been careful to adhere together, might have been a majority even of the people collective. In the time of the fecond Punic war, the balance of power in Carthage was got on the fide of the people, and this to a degree, that fome authors reckon the government to have been then among them a dominatio plebis, or tyranny of the Commons; which it seems they were at all times apt to fall into, and was at laft among the causes that ruined their state: and the frequent murders of their generals, which Diodorus ** tells us was grown to an established cuftom among them, may be another instance, that tyranny is not confined to numbers. I shall mention but one example more among a great number, that might be produced. It is related by the author last cited *. The orators of the people at Argos (whether you will ftyle them, in modern phrafe, great Speakers of the house; or only, in general, representatives of the people collective) stirred up the commons against the nobles, of whom 1600 were murdered at once; and, at laft, the orators themselves, because they left off their accufations, or, to speak intelligibly, because they withdrew their impeachments; having, it seems, raised a spirit they were not able to lay. And this laft circunftance, as cafes have lately stood, may perhaps be worth noting. From what hath been already advanced, several conclufions may be drawn : If, That a mixed government partaking of the known forms received in the schools is by no means of Gothic invention, but hath place in nature and reafon, feems very well to agree with the fentiments of most legiflators, and to have been followed in most states, whether they have appeared under the name of monarchies, ariftocracies, or democracies: for not to mention the feveral republics of this compofition in Gaul and Germany, defcribed by Cæfar and Tacitus, Polybius tells us, the best government is that which consists of three forins, regno, optimatium, et populi imperio † ; which may be fairly tranflated, the King, Lords, and Commons. Such was that of Sparta, in its primitive inftitution by Lycurgus; who, obferving the corruptions and depravations to which every of thefe was fubject, compounded his scheme out of all, fo that it was made up of reges, feniores, et populus. Such alfo was the ftate of Rome under its confuls: and the author tells us, that the Romans fell upon this model purely by chance, (which I take to have been nature and common reafon), but the Spartans by thought and defign. And fuch at Carthage was the fumma reipublicæ ‡, or power in the last refort; for they had their Kings called fuffetes, and a Se * Lib. 15. † Fragm. lib. 6. nate nate which had the power of nobles, and the people had a fhare established too. 2dly, It will follow, that thofe reafoners who employ fo much of their zeal, their wit, and their leisure for the upholding the balance of power in Christendom, at the fame time that by their practices they are endeavouring to destroy it at home, are not fuch mighty patriots, or fo much in the true intereft of their country, as they would affect to be thought; but feem to be emnployed like a man, who pulls down with his right hand what he has been building with his left. 3dly, This makes appear the error of those who think it an uncontrollable maxim, that power is always fafer lodged in many hands than in one: for if thefe many hands be made up only from one of the three divifions before mentioned, it is plain from those examples already produced, and eafy to be parallelled in other ages and countries, that they are as capable of enslaving the nation, and of acting all manner of tyranny and oppref fion, as it is poffible for a single perfon to be, though we should fuppofe their number not only to be of four or five hundred, but above three thousand. Again, It is manifeft from what has been faid, that, in order to preferve the balance in a mixed state, the limits of power depofited with each party ought to be afcer. tained, and generally known. The defect of this is the caufe that introduces those strugglings in a state about prerogative and liberty, about incroachments of the few upon the rights of the many, and of the many upon the privileges of the few, which ever did, and ever will conclude in a tyranny; firft either of the few, or the many, but at last infallibly of a single perfon: for, which ever of the three divifions in a state is upon the fcramble for more power than its own, (as one or other of them generally is), unless due care be taken by the other two, upon every new question that arifes, they will be fure to decide in favour of themselves, talk much of inherent right; they will nourish up a dormant power, and referve privileges in petto, to exert upon occafions, to ferve expedients, and to urge upon neceffities; they will make large demands, and fcanty conceffions, ever coming off confiderable gainers: thus at length the ba lance lance is broke, and tyranny let in; from which door of the three, it matters not. To pretend to a declarative right upon any occafion whatfoever, is little lefs than to make ufe of the whole power; that is, to declare an opinion to be law, which has always been contested, or perhaps never ftarted at all before fuch an incident brought it on the ftage. Not to confent to the enacting of fuch a law, which has no view befides the general good, unless another law fhall at the fame time pafs, with no other view but that of advancing the power of one party alone; what is this but to claim a pofitive voice, as well as a negative? To pretend that great changes and alienations of property have created new and great dependencies, and confequently new additions of power, as fome reafoners have done, is a molt dangerous tenet. If dominion muft follow property, let it follow in the fame place; for change in property through the bulk of a nation makes flow marches, and its due power always attends it. To conclude, that whatever attempt is begun by an affembly, ought to be purfued to the end, without regard to the greatest incidents that may happen to alter the cafe; to count it mean, and below the dignity of a houfe, to quit a profecution; to refolve upon a conclu fion before it is poffible to be apprifed of the premiffes: to act thus, I fay, is to affect not only abfolute power, but infallibility too. Yet fuch unaccountable proceedings as these have popular affemblies engaged in, for want of fixing the due limits of power and privilege. Great changes may indeed be made in a government, yet the form continue, and the balance be held: but large intervals of time must pass between every fuch innovation, enough to melt down and make it of a piece with the conftitution. Such, we are told, were the proceedings of Solon, when he modelled anew the Athenian commonwealth; and what convulfions in our own, as *This seems to allude to a practice of the houfe of Commons called Tacking: when they fulpected that a favourite bill would be rejected, they tacked it to a money-bill; and as it was not poffible to proceed without the fupply, and as it became neceflary to reject or receive both the bills thus tacked together, this expedient perfectly aufwered its purpoft. Hawkef VOL. II. B well well as other states, have been bred by a neglect of this rule, is fiefh and notorious enough; it is too foon in all confcience to repeat this error again. Having fhewn, that there is a natural balance of power in all free ftates, and how it hath been divided, Tometimes by the people themfelves, as in Rome, at others by the inftitutions of the legiflators, as in the feveral ftates of Greece and Sicily; the next thing is to examine, what methods have been taken to break or overthrow this balance, which every one of the three parties hath continually endeavoured, as opportunities have ferved; as might appear from the ftories of most ages and countries: for abfolute power in a particular ftate, is of the fame nature with univerfal monarchy in feveral states adjoining to each other. So endlefs and exorbitant are the defires of men, whether confidered in their perfons or their states, that they will grafp at all, and can form no fcheme of perfect happiness with lefs. Ever fince men have been united into governments, the hopes and endeavours after univerfal monarchy have been bandied among them, from the reign of Ninus to this of the Moft Chriftian King; in which purfaits commonwealths have had their fhare as well as monarchs: fo the Athenians, the Spartans, the Thebans, and the Achaians, did feveral times aim at the univerfal monarchy of Greece: fo the commonwealths of Carthage and Rome affected the univerfal monarchy of the then known world. In like manner hath abfolute power been purfued by the feveral parties of each particular ftate; wherein fingle perfons have met with moft fuccefs, though the endeavours of the few and the many have been frequent enough: yet, being neither fo uniform in their defigns, nor fo direct in their views, they neither could manage nor maintain the power they had got; but were ever deceived by the popularity and ambition of fome fingle perfon. So that it will be always a wrong ftep in policy, for the nobles or commons to carry their endeavours after power fo far, as to overthrow the balance; and it would be enough to damp their warmth in such pursuits, if they could once reflect, that in fuch a courfe they will be fure to run upon the very rock that they meant to avoid; which, I fuppose, they |