our review or correction; but many others, which, however unfinished, are not now in our power to fupprefs. Whatfoever was in our own poffeffion at the publishing hercof, or of which no copy was gone abroad, we have actually destroyed, to prevent all poffibility of the like treatment. Thefe volumes likewife will contain all the papers wherein we have cafually had any share; particularly those written in conjunction with our friends, Dr Arbuthnot and Mr Gay; and, laftly, all of this fort compofed fingly by either of thofe hands. The reader is therefore defired to do the fame juftice to thefe our friends, as to us; and to be affured, that all the things called our mifcellanies (except the works of Alexander Pope, published by B. Lintot, in quarto and folio, in 1717; thofe of Mir Gay by J. Tonfon, in quarto, in 1720; and as many of thefe mifcellanies as have been formerly printed by Benj. Tooke) are abfolutely fpurious, and without our confent impofed upon the public. Twickenham, JONATH. SWIFT. A 3 A A Difcourfe of the CONTESTS and DISSEN SIONS between the NOBLES and the COMMONS in ATHENS and ROME; with the confequences they had upon both those ftates *. Si tibi vera videtur, Dede manus; et, fi falfa eft, accingere contra. Lucret. I' Written in the year 1 701. CHA P. I. Tis agreed, that in all government there is an abfolute unlimited power, which naturally and originally feems to be placed in the whole body, whereever the executive part of it lies. This holds in the body natural; for where-ever we place the begin ning This difcourfe is a kind of remonstrance in behalf of King William and his friends, against the proceedings of the house of Commons; and was published during the recefs of parliament in the fummer of 1701, with a view to engage them in milder meafure when they should meet again. As this time Lewis XIV. was making large ftrides towards univetfal monarchy; plots were carrying on at St Germain's; the Dutrh had acknowledged the Duke of Anjou as King of Spain, and cKing William was made extremely uneafy by the violence with which many of his minifters and chief favourites were purfued by the Commons; the King, to appease their resentment, had made feveral changes in his miniftry, and removed fome of his most faithful fervants from places of the highest trust and dignity this expedient, however, had proved ineffectual, and the Commons perfifted in their oppofition; they began by impeaching William Bentinck, Earl of Portland, Groom of the Stole ; and proceeded to the impeachment of John Somers, Baron Somers of Evesham, Firft Lord Keeper, afterwards Lord Chancellor ; Edward Ruffel, Earl of Orford, Lord Treasurer of the Navy, and one of the Lords Commiffioners of the Admiralty; and Charles, ning of motion, whether from the head, or the heart, or the animal fpirits in general, the body moves and acts by a confent of all its parts. This unlimited power, placed fundamentally in the body of a people, is what the best legiflators of all ages have endeavoured, in their several fchemes or inftitutions of government, to depofit in such hands as would preferve the people from rapine and oppreffion within, as well as violence from without. Most of them feem to agree in this, that it was a trust too great to be committed to any one man or affembly, and therefore they left the right still in the whole body; but the adminiftration or executive part in the hands of the one, the few, or the many, into which three powers all independent bodies of men seem naturally to divide; for by all I have read of those innumerable and petty commonwealths in Italy, Greece, and Sicily, as well as the great ones of Carthage and Rome, it feems to me, that a free people met together, whether by compact, or family-government, as foon as they fall into any acts of civil fociety, do of themselves divide into three powers. The firft is that of fome one eminent spirit, who, having fignalized his valour and fortune in defence of his country, or by the practice of popular arts at home, comes to have great influence on the people, to grow their leader in warlike expeditions, and to prefide, after a fort, in their civil affemblies; and this is grounded upon the principles of nature and common reason, which in all difficulties or dangers, where prudence or courage is required, do rather incite us to fly for counfel or affiftance to a fingle perfon, than a multitude. The second natural divifion of power is of fuch men, who have acquired large posles Charles Montague, Earl of Halifax, one of the Commissioners of the Treasury, and afterwards Chancellor of the Exchequer. Its general purport is to damp the warmth of the Commons, by fhewing, that the measures they pursued had a direct tendency to bring on the tyranny which they profeffed to oppofe; and the particular cafes of the impeached Lords are parallelled in Athenian characters. Hawkef This whole treatife is full of hiftorical knowledge, and excellent reflections. It is not mixed with any improper fallies of wit, or any light airs of humour; and, in point of ftyle and learning, is equal, if not fuperior, to any of Swift's political works. Or rery. fions, and confequently dependencies, or defcend from anceftors who have left them great inheritances, together with an hereditary authority. Thefe eafily uniting in thoughts and opinions, and acting in concert, begin to enter upon measures for fecuring their properties, which are beft upheld by preparing against invafions from abroad, and maintaining peace at home; this commences a great council or fenate of nobles for the weighty affairs of the nation. The laft divifion is of the mafs or body of the people, whofe part of power is great and indifputable, whenever they can unite either collectively, or by deputation, to exert it. Now, the three forms of government, fo generally known in the fchools, differ only by the civil administration being placed in the hands of one, or fometimes two, (as in Sparta), who were called Kings; or in a fenate, who were called the Nobles; or in the people collective or representative, who may be called the Commons. Each of these had frequently the executive power in Greece, and fometimes in Rome; but the power in the laft refort was always meant by legiflators to be held in balance among all three. And it will be an eternal rule in politics among every free people, that there is a balance of power to be carefully held by every state within itself, as well as among feveral states with each other. The true meaning of a balance of power, either without or within a state, is beft conceived by confidering what the nature of a balance is. It fuppofes three things: Firft, the part which is held, together with the hand that holds it; and then the two fcales, with whatever is weighed therein. Now, confider feveral states in a neighbourhood; in order to preferve peace between these states, it is neceffary they should be formed into a balance, whereof one or more are to be directors, who are to divide the reft into equal fcales, and upon occafion remove from one into the other, or elfe fall with their own weight into the lightest; fo in a ftate within itself, the balance must be held by a third hand, who is to deal the remaining power with the utmost exactness into the feveral fcales. Now, it is not neceffary, that the power fhould be equally divided between thefe three; for the balance may be held by the weakeft, who, by his addrefs and and conduct, removing from either fcale, and adding of his own, may keep the fcales duly poized. Such was that of the two Kings of Sparta, the confular power in Rome, that of the Kings of Media before the reign of Cyrus, as reprefented by Xenophon; and that of the feve ral limited states in the Gothic inftitution. When the balance is broken, whether by the negli gence, folly, or weakness of the hand that held it, or by mighty weights fallen into either fcale, the power will never continue long in equal divifion between the two remaining parties, but, till the balance is fixed anew, will run entirely into one. This gives the trueft account of what is understood in the most ancient and approved Greek authors by the word tyranny, which is not meant for the feizing of the uncontrolled or abfo lute tpower into the hands of a fingle perfon, (as many fuperficial men have grofsly mistaken), but for the breaking of the balance by whatever hand, and leaving the power wholly in one fcale; for tyranny and ufurpation in a state are by no means confined to any number, as might eafily appear from examples enough; and be caufe the point is material, I fhall cite a few to prove The Romans having fent to Athens, and the Greek cities of Italy, for the copies of the best laws, chofe ten legiflators to put them into form, and, during the exercife of their office, fufpended the confular power, lea ving the administration of affairs in their hands. These very men, though chofen for fuch a work, as the digefting a body of laws for the government of a free ftate, did immediately ufurp arbitrary power; ran into all the forms of it, had their guards and fpies after the practice of the tyrants of thofe ages, affected kingly ftate, deftroyed the nobles, and oppreffed the people; one of them proceeding fo far, as to endeavour to force a lady of great virtue: the very crime which gave occafion to the expulfion of the regal power but fixty years before, as this attempt did to that of the Decem viri. The Ephori in Sparta were at fift only certain perfons deputed by the kings to judge in civil matters, * Dionyf. Hal. lib. 10. while |