Why People Obey the Law
Princeton University Press, 7 de mai de 2006 - 299 páginas
People obey the law if they believe it's legitimate, not because they fear punishment--this is the startling conclusion of Tom Tyler's classic study. Tyler suggests that lawmakers and law enforcers would do much better to make legal systems worthy of respect than to try to instill fear of punishment. He finds that people obey law primarily because they believe in respecting legitimate authority.
In his fascinating new afterword, Tyler brings his book up to date by reporting on new research into the relative importance of legal legitimacy and deterrence, and reflects on changes in his own thinking since his book was first published.
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LibraryThing ReviewComentário do usuário - thcson - www.librarything.com
I'm not sure if this book is a rewritten doctoral thesis, but it sure seems like one. As such, its title is very misleading. A more suitable title would have been "Phone questionnaire about legal ... Ler resenha completa
LibraryThing ReviewComentário do usuário - dono421846 - LibraryThing
Not a new edition, but does include a new afterword in which Tyler reviews the theoretical advances and new literature on the question of why people obey the law: "people's motivation to cooperate ... Ler resenha completa
Procedural Justice Legitimacy and Compliance
Design of the Chicago Study
Legitimacy and Compliance
Legitimacy as a Theoretical Issue
Measuring Legitimacy and Compliance
Does Legitimacy Contribute Independently to Compliance?
Citizens Concerns When Dealing with Legal Authorities
What Do People Want from Legal Authorities?
The Antecedents of Compliant Behavior
The Psychology of Legitimacy
Questionnaire Used in First Wave of Chicago Study
Coefficient Alphas for Scales Used in the Analysis
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