Utility Maximization, Choice and Preference

Capa
Springer Science & Business Media, 9 de ago. de 2007 - 283 páginas

The utility maximization paradigm forms the basis of many economic, psychological, cognitive and behavioral models. However, numerous examples have revealed the deficiencies of the concept. This book helps to overcome those deficiencies by taking into account insensitivity of measurement threshold and context of choice. The second edition has been updated to include the most recent developments and a new chapter on classic and new results for infinite sets.

 

Conteúdo

Introduction
1
Classic Models
17
Utility Maximization Within a Constant Threshold
53
Utility Maximization Within a Threshold
112
Utility Maximization Within a Contextdependent
145
xii
160
Numerical Representation of Binary Relations
197
Conclusion
245
List of Notations and Symbols
255
Index
281
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Página 4 - The nontransitiveness of indifference must be recognized and explained on [sic] any theory of choice, and the only explanation that seems to work is based on the imperfect powers of discrimination of the human mind whereby inequalities become recognizable only when of sufficient magnitude.
Página 264 - The non-existence of a utility function and the structure of non-representable preference relations.
Página 5 - Sometimes we are able to make the distinction between two sensations while we cannot distinguish them from a third sensation. For example, we can easily make the distinction between a weight of 12 grams and a weight of 10 grams, but we are not able to distinguish each of them from a weight of 11 grams. This fact can symbolically be written: A = B,B = C,A< C.
Página 2 - What the rational preference theorist is assuming is something much stronger, however. He is assuming that both preference and its complement are transitive. That is. he is assuming both the validity of the previous axiom and that (~xPy & ~ yPz) ->~xPz. (In words: "If x is not preferred to y and y is not preferred to z, then x is not preferred to z.) Together these two axioms justify the claim that "indifference is an equivalence relation" ("xly" — the chooser is indifferent as between x and y...

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