Social Choice and Individual Values: Third Edition
Yale University Press, 26 de jun. de 2012 - 192 páginas
Originally published in 1951, "Social Choice and Individual Values" introduced "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem" and founded the field of social choice theory in economics and political science. This new edition, including a new foreword by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin, reintroduces Arrow's seminal book to a new generation of students and researchers."Far beyond a classic, this small book unleashed the ongoing explosion of interest in social choice and voting theory. A half-century later, the book remains full of profound insight: its central message, 'Arrow's Theorem, ' has changed the way we think."--Donald G. Saari, author of "Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected "
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admissible set alternative social andy Arrow’s assumed behavior Bergson candidates Chapter choice function Collective Rationality commodity compensation principle Conditions 1—5 Condorcet criterion Consequence Cowles Commission Cowles Foundation decisive set defined Definition discussed environment ethical follows formal Hence implies Independence of Irrelevant indifference curves indifference maps individual ordering relations individual orderings R1 individual values individual’s individualistic assumptions individuals prefer interpersonal comparisons Irrelevant Alternatives Kaldor principle least Lemma Let R1 majority decision marginal utility mathematical method of majority number of individuals ordering of social pair of alternatives Pareto principle particular Possibility Theorem preference relation preference scales preferred or indifferent probability distributions problem Professor proof quasi-ordering ranks satisfies Axioms satisfies Conditions Scitovsky Section set of individual Single-Peaked Preferences social alternatives social choice social preference social welfare function society subset Suppose three alternatives utility function utility indicators V’is decisive value judgment weak ordering welfare economics welfare judgments