Resolving Controversy in the European Union: Legislative Decision-Making before and after Enlargement
Cambridge University Press, 15 de set de 2011
How does the EU resolve controversy when making laws that affect citizens? How has the EU been affected by the recent enlargements that brought its membership to a diverse group of twenty-seven countries? This book answers these questions with analyses of the EU's legislative system that include the roles played by the European Commission, European Parliament and member states' national governments in the Council of Ministers. Robert Thomson examines more than 300 controversial issues in the EU from the past decade and describes many cases of controversial decision-making as well as rigorous comparative analyses. The analyses test competing expectations regarding key aspects of the political system, including the policy demands made by different institutions and member states, the distributions of power among the institutions and member states, and the contents of decision outcomes. These analyses are also highly relevant to the EU's democratic deficit and various reform proposals.
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2 Research design measuring controversy spatially
Part I Inputs
Part II Processes
Part III Outputs
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2004 enlargement Achen actors affiliated alignments analyses applies average Barroso Commission budgetary position Chapter co-decision procedure Commission and EP Commission’s policy positions Commission’s positions concerning consultation procedure Council and EP decision makers decision outcomes decision-making process delegate discretionary power delegation to member disagreement outcome distance distribution of power dyads effect EP’s collective policy EP’s policy positions EP’s positions EU’s European Parliament European Union examined experts favoured Figure formal governing party hypothesis implementers included interests Left–Right dimension legislative proposals levels of subsidies median MEP median voter theorem minimax national level NBS-no RP ofissues old member party groups policy areas policy demands policy preferences posi power scores procedural model Prodi Commission qualified majority voting range Rapporteur’s nationality rapporteurs reference point regarding relative relevant responsible commissioner rules salience state’s position Stokman strength of regulation sugar sector reform supranational Table Thomson tions unanimity variation voting