Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America
Cambridge University Press, 13 de ago de 2001 - 220 páginas
Sometimes politicians run for office promising one set of policies, and if they win, switch to very different ones. Latin American presidents in recent years have frequently run promising to avoid pro-market reforms and harsh economic adjustment, then win and transform immediately into enthusiastic market reformers. Does it matter when politicians ignore the promises they made and the preferences of their constituents? If politicians want to be reelected or see their party reelected at the end of their term, why would they impose unpopular policies? Susan Stokes develops a model of policy switches and tests it with statistical and qualitative data from Latin American elections over the last two decades. She concludes that politicians may change policies because unpopular policies are best for constituents and best serve their own political ambitions. Nevertheless, even though good representatives sometimes switch policies, abrupt change tends to erode the quality of democracy.
O que estão dizendo - Escrever uma resenha
Não encontramos nenhuma resenha nos lugares comuns.
ELECTIONS MANDATES AND REPRESENTATION
ELECTIONS AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA
EXPLAINING POLICY SWITCHES
ARE PARTIES WHATS WRONG WITH DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA?
NEOLIBERALISM WITHOUT MANDATES CITIZENS RESPOND
MANDATES AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY
Outras edições - Visualizar todos
Alberto Fujimori announced Argentina austerity beliefs Bunge y Born campaign messages campaign pronouncements Carlos Andres Perez Carlos Menem change course change of course Chapter cians citizens coalition consistent corruption democracy democratic Duran Ballen economic outcomes economic policy economic program Ecuador effect Efficiency Efficiency efficiency policies election electoral expect favor Fujimori growth hence ideological income incumbent inflation interests Jan July Jan July Jan July Latin American leaders legislators majority manifestos Manin Mario Vargas Llosa markets median voter Menem ment neoliberal nomic officeholders once in office paign people's Peronist Peru Peruvians policy intentions policy preferences policy switches political parties politicians poll popular positions predict president presidential probit model promises public opinion pursue reasons reelection reforms renege rent-seeking representation model response Sandinistas security-oriented candidate security-oriented policies shift social switch policies switchers term limits tion unemployment unpopular policies Vargas Llosa Variable Venezuela violation of mandates vote
The Economic History of Latin America Since Independence
Visualização parcial - 2003
Todos os resultados da Pesquisa de livros »
Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in ...
Visualização parcial - 2003