Man-made DisastersElsevier Science & Technology Books, 1997 - 250 páginas Originally published in 1978, and with the working sub-title 'The Failure of Foresight', this was the first book to suggest the possibility of systematically looking at the causes of a wide range of disasters. It still provides a theoretical basis for studying the administrative and organizational origins of disasters, bringing together relevant work based on a study of inquiries into accidents and disasters in Britain over an eleven year period. This second edition has been fully updated, with the inclusion of a final chapter covering more recent events, a task that Barry Turner had undertaken shortly before his sudden death and which has been ably completed by Nick Pidgeon, Associate Editor of the journal Risk Decision and Policy. It is certain that the book will prove to be not only a seminal reminder of the original thinking behind the concepts examined here but also a fitting memorial to Barry Turner's life and work. One of the original works on Disaster Analysis Widely acclaimed in its first edition Endorsed by leading experts in the US and Europe |
Conteúdo
The origins of disaster | 157 |
List of 84 accident and disaster reports published | 196 |
Author index | 237 |
Direitos autorais | |
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Termos e frases comuns
Aberfan accidents and disasters action administrative analysis arise assessment associated assumptions Barry Turner behaviour bounded rationality British Rail channel Chapter Colliery communication complex concerned consequences context danger decision decision-making decision-premises developed discussion disruption emergency energy engineering environment errors examination example existing explosion factors fire firedamp goals groups hazard Hixon ill-structured incident incubation period individual industrial institutional interaction involved Isle of Gigha issues kind knowledge large-scale accidents learning limited London Man-made Disasters manner Miss Algeo National Coal Board nature negentropic nuclear occur operate organizational organizational learning organizations origins of disaster outcomes particular patterns perception possible potential precautions precipitating event preconditions present problems produce public inquiry regard relating relevant reports response result risk Ronan Point safety culture situation smallpox social study of disasters Summerland surprise theory tion tips Turner uncertainty understanding warning