Originally published in 1978, and with the working sub-title 'The Failure of Foresight', this was the first book to suggest the possibility of systematically looking at the causes of a wide range of disasters. It still provides a theoretical basis for studying the origins of man-made disasters, bringing together relevant work based on a study of inquiries into accidents and disasters in Britain over an eleven-year period.
O que estão dizendo - Escrever uma resenha
Não encontramos nenhuma resenha nos lugares comuns.
The origins of disaster
culture politics and organizational
List of 84 accident and disaster reports published
2 outras seções não mostradas
Aberfan accidents and disasters action administrative analysis arise assessment associated assumptions Barry Turner behaviour bounded rationality British Rail channel Chapter Colliery communication complex concerned consequences context danger decision-making decision-premises developed discussion disruption emergency energy engineering environment errors examination example existing explosion factors fire firedamp goals groups hazard Hixon ill-structured incident incubation period individual industrial institutional interaction involved Isle of Gigha issues kind knowledge large-scale accidents limited London Man-made Disasters manner Miss Algeo National Coal Board nature negentropic normal accidents nuclear occur operate organizational organizational learning organizations origins of disaster outcomes particular patterns perception possible potential precautions precipitating event preconditions present problems produce public inquiry regard relating relevant reports response result risk Ronan Point safety culture situation smallpox social study of disasters Summerland surprise theory tion tips Turner uncertainty understanding warning