Hannah Arendt e a banalidade do mal

Capa
Editora UFMG, 1998 - 152 páginas
Explains that Arendt's concept of the "banality of evil, " as described in her book "Eichmann in Jerusalem, " is supported by her description of totalitarianism as a system in which the exercise of violence does not aim at dominating man but at making him superfluous. The banal acceptance of this order of values by an individual would be based, in Arendt's understanding, on a lack of independent judgment in recognizing the existence of evil. Concludes that Arendt shares with Kant the idea that evil is not intrinsic to man, but a contingency. The difference between them lies in the fact that Kant considered evil to be opposition to moral laws, while Arendt affirms that evil takes place where moral judgment is absent.
 

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